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i.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
The fundamental project management requirements which must be satisfied to successfully
accomplish the Voyager Spacecraft Project are:
a. Achievement of the necessary long-life reliability with a high degree
of confidence.
b. Strict schedule control to meet a fixed launch window.
c. Effective management of the Project and spacecraft system to achieve
the above within the established cost.
1.1 PHASE IA STUDY
In carrying out the Phase IA study, General Electric's activities were geared to two primary
objectives:
a. To arrive at a conservative, flexible spacecraft design which could accomodate
a variety of spacecraft and lander science payloads, mission profiles, and
trajectories, adapt to subsequent missions, and accept technology improvements.
b. To formulate an overall implementation plan which would provide the highest
possible confidence in achieving the project management requirements stated
above.
To satisfy these requirements, General Electric has planned a Project team having experience
and competence in depth in all technical disciplines to give total support to JPL; a conservative,
manageable, implementation approach; and a balanced application of management controls to
all activities.
2.0 PROJECT ORGANIZATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Further study of Voyager requirements during Phase IA led to censolidatien of the functions
reporting to the GE Voyager Spacecraft Project Manager, and provides a more manageable
span of control. This structure, shown in Figure 2-1 for Phase IB and II, provides a more
homogenous grouping of activities and responsibilities, and has been designed to interface
as closely as possible with the JPL organization.
2.2 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
Principal concepts which will govern the overall management and operation of the project
organization are:
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ao JPL will be integrated into the project functions to the maximum extent desired-
membership on review and controlboards, invitatio_ to attend meetings, office
space in the Project area, open access to all office areas and the Project Control
room.
bo The entire project must be responsive and readily adaptable to direction. Greater
knowledge, increased capability, and better understanding contribute to a more
successful program.
C. Management plans and controls are considered tools which: (1) provide guidelines
and boundaries within which mature individuals can exercise maximum use of
their experience and ingenuity in performing assigned responsibilities, and (2)
provide the means for a common understanding between JPL and GE from upper
management through all levels of both operations.
2.3 STRUCTURE AND LOCATION
The Voyager Project organization is vertical with all personnel performing full time on the
Project reporting administratively and functionally to the Project Manager. All Project
personnel are, and will be, located in the same office area adjacent to the assembly and test
area to provide minimum communication lines between personnel while promoting maximum
total responsiveness to Voyager requirements and Project Manager direction.
2.4 ORGANIZATION DESCRIPTION
The following paragraphs briefly describe the function of the Project Manager and each group
reporting to him, together with the key responsibilities and relationships which are considered
of most importance.
2.4.1 PROJECT MANAGER
The Project Manager is responsible for the successful fulfillment of allVoyager Spacecraft
Project obiectives and e_tr__e__,al _-_,_o_o_+o and _ " ....
. .......... _ ........ , ,,,_no other responsibilities, ne w_,
be assigned, by the General Electric Company, the authority, personnel and facilities
required to fulfill the following responsibilities:
a. Meeting General Electric's commitments to JPL on the Voyager Spacecraft
Program.
b. Identification and establishment of the required resources including personnel
and facilities needed to meet the Project requirements.
c. Preparation and implementation of the required program to fulfill technical,
schedule and cost commitments.
d, Communication of Project progress against plan, key problem areas, and
assistance required to JPL management and the General Electric Executive
Office.
3 of 14
V_ooVP
2.4.2 PROJECT CONTROL
In a project of the magnitude of the Voyager Spacecraft System, with its multitude of complex
interfaces, program measurement and control becomes an extremely important consideration.
For this reason, a Project Control Section has been established reporting directly to the
Voyager Project Manager.
To provide overall task management, Project Engineers will be assigned responsibility
for major work package tasks with the authority to carry out project direction, task planning,
activity integration, and schedule and cost management. In this regard, their responsibility
for assigned tasks is similar to that of the Project Manager for the overall project. The
operation of the project control section is geared to support the Project Engineer with
progress information, current stakm of work, cost VSo plan, focusing of developing trouble
spots, subcontract progress, and hardware status and assignment° The primary point of
contact for the JPL cognizant engineers will be the project engineers. However, the
project engineers are also responsible for assuring that the JPL cognizant engineers have
ready access to the design and systems engineers as well as other specialists for detailed
discussions.
Major elements of the Spacecraft System will be subcontracted; therefore, effective
management and control of subcontractors is essential to the success of the program. All
subcontracts will be managed by Project Control. A subcontract manager will be assigned
responsibility for each major subcontract and will have a team representing concerned
sections (Procurement for contract administration, Engineering, Quality Assurance,
Reliability, Legal, etc.) for a particular subcontract. His responsibility includes inte-
gration of all related management functions - vendor selection, work statements and
specifications, negotiation, progress review, technical direction, design review, and
hardware acceptance.
The Project Control Operation is responsible for assuring the implementation of the
interface requirements established by the systems engineering section in conjunction with
JPL. The Interface Integration Engineer in project control will serve as the GE Chairman
of the Science Interface Control Working Group in support of JPLo In addition, the Interface
Integration Group will provide personnel to serve on the Interface Control Working Groups
chaired by JPL, e.g., launch vehicle, capsule and the DSN.
The Integrated Test Board, chaired by the Test Control Engineer of Project Control, will
assure that the Integrated Plan is prepared, reviewed and approved by JPL; and, they will
monitor, review, and approve the ITP and all changes to it. The Integrated Test Board
is made up of representatives of all concerned Project functions - Engineering, Reliability,
Quality Assurance, Project Control, System Test and Field Operations, Safety and JPL
if desired.
Effective configuration and data management is considered an essential requirement in the
Voyager Spacecraft Project. The Project Control Section has responsibility for this activity
which includes; establishment and operation of the data bank for configuration identification
(the hardware-software numbering system, the computer programs, the remote update
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centers, and the communication link with all elements - JPL, subcontractors, etc. ),
chairmanship of the Change Control Board which reviews and approves all hardware and
software changes after formal review procedure is invoked, and provision of the single
source of parts lists used for procurement and assembly of hardware.
A Pasadena Engineering Office, reporting to the Project Control Manager, will be established
at/or near JPL to assist and support JPL in all Project communications. General Electric
will locate key members of its engineering and management team at this office, during Phase
IB, in order to facilitate supporting JPL in the preparation of the Project specifications
and implementation plans.
2.4.3 SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Systems Engineering will be responsible for definition and establishment of the spacecraft
and OSE systems design in compliance with JPL technical direction. A well integrated
systems design is achieved through the establishment of a competent centralized systems
group with the authority to define and integrate the requirements for the system design.
This includes supporting JPL in performing mission analysis, defining the spacecraft and
OSE system concept, and performing operational systems analysis for space flight operations.
Support is also provided to JPL in defining the interfaces: science, lander, launch vehicle
and DSN, integrating the science interface, and supporting the JPL integration effort in the
other interface areas.
A key responsibility of systems engineering is to apportion reliability to the subsystem and
component level, working in conjunction with design engineering, in order to assure optimum
allocation of risks across the total spacecraft system.
To assure a Spacecraft OSE system design concept which is consistent with the space vehicle
system as well as with the capsule, DSN, and other external interfaces, Spacecraft System
Engineering has responsibility to define the OSE system specifications.
To assure that both system views and hardware views are taken by highly _aalified homo_
geneous groups, and that conflicts between system requirements and equipment performance
are directly visible to the Project Manager, Systems Engineering, and Design Engineering
have been organizationally separated.
2.4.4 SPACECRAFT DESIGN ENGINEERING
The Spacecraft Design Engineering section has the responsibility for the design of the
spacecraft hardware for each subsystem in compliance with the requirements-established by
Systems Engineering. The design engineer is responsible for this activity from project
inception to launch. Design responsibility for all OSE hardware which interfaces (electrical,
mechanical, thermal, RF) with spacecraft equipment is organizationally centralized within
an OSE Design group in the Design Engineering Section. OSE design engineers for individual
OSE subsystem elements will be physically located with their spacecraft subsystem design
counterpart for maximum integration. To assure subsystem and system compatibility, OSE
tasks placed on other internal Project Sections, such as Quality Assurance Engineering for
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STE, or on outside subcontractors, will be accompanied by design specifications prepared
by OSE Design which prescribe specific design approaches, standards, functional and
physical interface characteristics, etn.
2.4.5 MANUFACTURING
The Manufacturing Section has direct responsibility for providing all Voyager Spacecraft
and OSE hardware. The Procurement Operation prepares and implements the Make-or-
Buy plan which is approved by the Voyager Project Manager. The overall management
and direction of subcontractors rests with the Project Control Section and tl_ Manufacturing
Procurement Operation supports these activities by administering all contractual matters.
Other Manufacturing functions provide all necessary resources for the in-house hardware
fabrication, starting with raw material receiving through storage in bonded stock of completed
subassemblies. They also assign to the system test teams, which are under the direction
of System Test and Field Operations, the necessary technicians to assemble each spacecraft.
Manufacturing will be represented on the Design Review Board, the Reliability Board, the
Change Control Board, and the Material Review Board.
The establishment of Manufacturing facilities requirements, and the implementation of these
facilities, is the responsibility of the Manufacturing Section. This section will also
implement the facilities requirements established by other sections such as Systems
Engineering, Systems Test and Field Operations, and Quality Assurance.
2.4.6 QUALITY ASSURANCE
To assure the conformance to design specifications for all flight hardware, spares and OSE,
a Quality Assurance Section will report directly to the Voyager Project Manager° This
function has been established as an independent group because it will not only provide the
measurements required to establish conformance to specifications, but will also establish
the quality requirements that must be met if reliable long-life hardware is to result° Quality
Assurance has the authority to reject hardware if requirements are not being met. They
are responsible for the conduct of type approval and acceptance testing up to the subassembly
level. Key tasks to be performed by this section include:
a. Integration of quality considerations during the design and development
phase.
b. Implementation of the vendor control plan.
c. Configuration control and traceability to the parts level.
d. Conduct of in-line quality measurements and evaluations during the
procurement and manufacturing cycle.
e. Failure analysis, reporting, corrective action, and follow-up, including
chairmanship of the Failure Analysis Review Board.
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2.4.7 SYSTEM TEST AND FIELD OPERATIONS
Providing technical competence and continuity of experience for the conduct of all system
level testing, from the initial in-house development tests to launch, were key requirements
in determing the organization structure. To meet these requirements, an independent
System Test and Field Operations section reporting to the Project Manager was established.
Its responsibility includes planning, direction, and evaluation of all system tests, e.g.,
engineering system model tests, environmental model tests, proof test model tests, system
interface tests, and flight spacecraft acceptance tests and launch preparation,
An assembly and test team, headed by a senior test director reporting to the System Test and
Field Operations Manager, will be assigned to each spacecraft. These basic teams will be
augmented by systems, design, project, quality assurance and manufacturing engineers to
utilize important knowledge and experience available and to provide the capability to expand
and retract efficiently with test requirements.
The team is thoroughly familiar with the Voyager Spacecraft when it formally starts its activity
at the beginning of the assembly phase. It provides technical direction and conducts subsystem
tests as the assembly progresses in order to provide the important continuity between the
assembly experience and the actual system test. Three complete teams and test leaders are
required to process three flight spacecraft essentially in parallel. A pool of Voyager experi-
enced personnel can be drawn on to supplement these teams if extended coverage is required.
Each team remains together when formed and proceeds with the assigned spacecraft from start
of system assembly through launch operations. The assembly and test team concept will
also be applied to the Engineering Test Model and PTM Spacecraft.
2.4.8 RELIABILITY
Because it is the most critical key problem in the entire Voyager Spacecraft program, the
reliability function has been set up reporting directly to theVoyager Project Manager. The
section will be responsible for preparation, overall implementation, and direction of the
Voyager Reliability Program. Key elements of its _._ _._1,,a_.
a. Reliability analyses, studies and investigations during all phases of the program,
from initial hardware specifications through flight operations. This includes the
establishment of reliability objectives, figure-of-merit analysis , parts/materials/
processes and standards definition.
b° Chairmanship of the Design Review Board which will be responsible for
organizing, conducting and reporting on technical design reviews.
c. The audit of all activities of file program to assure that all procedures, practices
and activities are compatible with long-life reliability.
d. Granting qualification status to TA and PTM hardware.
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ee Operation of the Risk Appraisal of Programs System (RAPS) if further
experience in its use on other programs supports its effectiveness
(Section V - CII-VB120VP016).
2.4.9 BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
The primary responsibility of Business Management will be the administration of all
matters pertaining to the contract. In this regard, one of the most important aspects in
a program of the magnitude of Voyager, is the maintenance of technical flexibility and,
at the same time, complete compliance with contractual provisions. Business Management
will interface closely with JPL Procurement and with the GE Voyager Project Control Section
to assure that contractual paper work keeps pace with the work activity. The establishment
of well defined work statement and effective and workable incentive provisions will be
another key responsibility of this section.
2.5 MANNING PLAN
The in place Phase IA team will be augmented during expansion in Phase IB by transfer of
experienced personnel from other areas of the Missile and Space Division to the Voyager
Spacecraft Project. Planned phase-out of work on existing Missile and Space Division
programs will provide the necessary personnel to accomplish all Phase IB tasks. The
Division's total employment of 17,000, of which 4,000 are engineers, will provide a pool
of experienced personnel for the expansion required during Phase H of the Project. Design
experience and implementation planning capability can be maintained during this growth
by use of these personnel who have been working on programs with similar requirements
to Voyager_
2.6 RELATIONSHIP OF IMPLEMI_NTATION PLANS TO ORGANIZATION
Figure 2-1 shows the relationship of the Voyager implementation plans to the organization.
This chart indicates the organizational elements responsible for management (seeing that
the plan is prepared and implemented} and approval of each plan.
3.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN APPROACH AND STRUCTURE
3.1 PURPOSE
The depth of consideration given to the requirements presented in each of the plans -
particularly, the Type Approval and PTM, Assembly and Checkout, Launch Operation,
and Space Flight Operations Plans - serves three important needs for the next phase
of activity.
a_ Identify specific design features which must be incorporated in the spacecraft
and OSF, system desiga during Phase IB to accommodate the special require-
ments _ assembly, test, handling_ communication, data handling, safety-
of each acti_.
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b. Identify all preparation work which must be accomplished and properly
phased to assure adequate planning for that area to be fully ready when
required.
Ce Establish a preliminary approach to serve as discussion material with JPL
early in Phase IB. When modified and agreed upon, this will become the base-
line for the definitive plan to be prepared and approved before the end of IB.
3.2 PLAN STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
The Schedule and Implementation Plan is divided into two primary plan groups - the
Project Plans Group and the Project Control Group (see Figure 3-1, Section V outline).
The total of twenty-eight plans and plan elements are identified in three classes within
these groups to better illustrate their purpose and application (see Figure 3-2). These
are: Work Flow, Work Integration, and Work Control. The Project Plans Group contains
two classes of plans:
a. Work Flow Plans - Design and Development, Type Approval and PTM,
Assembly and Checkout, Launch Operations, and Space Flight Operation
Plans - described the main stream of Project work.
b. Work Integration Plans - All other plans in the Group, such as Reliability
Assurance, Quality Assurance, Integrated Test Plan, etc., overlay the
Work Flow by defining the functional requirements which constrain the total
effort and the monitoring necessary to assure adherence to these requirements
throughout.
c. Work Control Plans - The Project Control Group makes up the third class of
plans - Work Control. These plans serve the following purposes:
1. Describe the process for project direction and integration.
2. Define the means for resource control.
3. Describe the progress measurement and reporting mechanism.
4. Describe the method of assuring full and complete understanding
and agreement of end item identification.
The total plan structure presented reflects a combination of those plans identified in
Phase IA RFP specimen statments of work, and those additional which General Electric
considered important to highlight as significant functional or control requirements for
Voyager.
Implementation plans of typical major subcontractors, representing Telecommunications
and Propulsion subsystems, who contributes to the study effort, have been included in
appendices.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Voyager Spacecraft and OSE schedules were developed to meet the 1971 launch period
and the 1969 objectives in the following sequence:
a. Determine the key project events and each of their event networks, including
timing (both optimum and latest possible} of critical interface decisions
required for spacecraft and OSE system development
Do Perform schedule studies and trade-offs to establish optimum time intervals
for the various activities, including reasonable time for updating, rework
and retest in the various assembly and test cycles
Co Time phase the key events and tasks into an optimum base line schedule for
the 1971 launch, which provides for assurance of meeting the launch data and
incorporates a safety factor for planned slack time at the launch pad
dQ Superimpose schedule requirements for the various 1969 flight test approaches
on the 1971 schedule to evaluate the effect on the 1971 schedule of each, and,
based on these studies and other 1969 test flight objectives studies, determine
the optimum 1969 schedule approach
e. Identify potential problem areas, both internal and external to the project which
may critically influence the base line schedule
f. Determine alternatives to the assumptions used in the base line schedule in order
to accommodate problem areas without compromising overall project objectives
g. Analyze potential alternative mission objectives to be used in the event of
emergency schedule developments.
2.0 BASE LINE SCHEDULES
The summary base line schedules for the Spacecraft and OSE are presented in Figures 2-1
and 2-2.
3.0 SCHEDULE ANALYSIS
The updated spacecraft system schedule shown in Figure 2-1 conforms to JPL work state-
ments, mission specification and guidelines. The schedule has been developed to provide
balanced, integrated and readily measurable work cycles of design and development, T/A
and PTM testing, hardware fabrication, flight acceptance and life testing, and adequate
time at ETR for interface verification and launch preparation. All schedule analyses have
been directed to the critical importance of providing reliable spacecraft to a fixed launch
period in 1971.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Voyager Spacecraft and OSE schedules were developed to meet the 1971 launch period
and the 1969 objectives in the following sequence:
ao Determine the key project events and each of their event networks, including
timing (both optimum and latest possible) of critical interface decisions
required for spacecraft and OSE system development
Do Perform schedule studies and trade--offs to establish optimum time intervals
for the various activities, including reasonable time for updating, rework
and retest in the various assembly and test cycles
Co Time phase the key events and tasks into an optimum base line schedule for
the 1971 launch, which provides for assurance of meeting the launch data and
incorporates a safety factor for planned slack time at the launch pad
do Superimpose schedule requirements for the various 1969 flight test approaches
on the 1971 schedule to evaluate the effect on the 1971 schedule of each, and,
based on these studies and other 1969 test flight objectives studies, determine
the optimum 1969 schedule approach
e. Identify potential problem areas, both internal and external to the project which
may critically influence the base line schedule
fo Determine alternatives to the assumptions used in the base line schedule in order
to accommodate problem areas without compromising overall project objectives
g. Analyze potential alternative mission objectives to be used in the event of
emergency schedule developments.
2.0 BASE LINE SCHEDULES
The summary base line schedules for the Spacecraft and OSE are presented in Figures 2-1
and 2-2.
3.0 SCHEDULE ANALYSIS
The updated spacecraft system schedule shown in Figure 2-1 conforms to JPL work state-
ments, mission specification and guidelines. The schedule has been developed to provide
balanced, integrated and readily measurable work cycles of design and development, T/A
and PTM testing, hardware fabrication, flight acceptance and life testing, and adequate
time at ETR for interface verification and launch preparation. All schedule analyses have
been directed to the critical importance of providing reliable spacecraft to a fixed launch
period in 1971.
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Table 3-1 describes thirty spacecraft schedule elements identified in Figure 2-1, together
with the assumptions made and the rationale for each element. The charts also describe
potential problem areas, the effect they may have on the schedule, and the corrective action
that can be taken should these, or similar problems, occur. Table 3-2 analyzes twelve OSE
schedule elements identified on Figure 2-2 in a similar manner.
Included in the above charts are the following significant items:
a. Provision for two development S/C - one for the 1969 configuration and one for the
1971 configuration - primarily because of the overlap in the system development
test requirements, the need for an engineering system to support the 1969 assembly
and checkout and launch activity, and to reproduce and evaluate 1969 flight anomalies.
bo A launch period for the recommended 1969 Test Flight (Earth orbit-deep space)
that provides maximum compatibility with the 1971 development schedule, and
engineering flight test data at the optimum point in the program. The launch
period is planned for September 1, 1969 through the end of December, 1969. The
closing date allows sufficient time to factor the 1969 flight experience into the 1971
flight spacecraft, and to update the 1969 STC and LCE for subsequent 1971 activities.
Co For both 1969 and 1971 flight spacecraft, the back-up spacecraft will be fabricated,
assembled and flight-acceptance tested first to accumulate experience that will be
factored into the comparable cycles of the designated flight spacecraft, and to
provide a source of spares for the flight spacecraft.
do The 1969 back-up spacecraft will be "walked thru" the launch cycle prior to the
actual flight spacecraft processing. For 1971, the PTM will be used for the first
"walk-thru" of the launch cycle. In addition, each 1971 Flight Spacecraft will be
subjected to a dry run through the launch cycle before processing for launch.
The following "overlay" elements were incorporated throughout the updated schedule, and
were considered to be of prime importance in attaining confidence that the 1969/1971 schedule
goals will be met.
a. Provision for reasonable times throughout the entire schedule for updating, rework
and retest to solve unanticipated problems as they may arise.
bo Development of a work breakdown structure and schedule that can be readily and
easily measured via frequent, timely and significant milestone points defined for
each work package. This technique will permit early detection of any schedule
deviation and promote prompt corrective action. Details on the preliminary work
breakdown structure can be found in the Cost and Schedule Plan, CII-VB120VP003.
4.0 RELATIONSHIPS AND INTERACTIONS OF SPACECRAFT HARDWARE AND OSF.
Voyager OSE deployment and utilization requirements are presented in Figure 4-1. To
provide OSE properly phased to the availability of spacecraft hardware with a minimum of
OSE hardware, the following requirements and constraints were adhered to:
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ITEM
LONG LEAD DEVELOP.
DEV. MODELS
DEV. HDW
PTM
71 FLIGHT
71 ETR
GE PRIME
RECOMMENDATION
69 FLIGHT
ENGINEERING RELEASES
PROJECT REVIEWS
SYSTEM DEFINITION
SPECIFICATION PREPARATION
CIRCUIT & LOGIC DESIGN
BREADBOARD ACTIVITY
PACKAGING DESIGN
UPDATE & PREPARE IMPLEM. PLANS
MAJOR GE MGT/TECH TEAM AT JPL
GE MGT/TECH SUPPORT AT JPL
RETRO PROPULSION
THERMAL MODEL ACTIVITY
STRUCTURAL MODEL ACTIVITY
R. F. MODEL ACTIVITY
PROCURE & FAB. DEVELOP. HARDWARE
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT TEST
SUBSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT TEST
ENG'RG MODEL ASSY. & TEST
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. T./A. HDWRE - GE
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. T./A. HDWRE - JPL
TYPE APPROVAL TESTING
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. PTM - GE
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. PTM - JPL
PTM GE ASSY. TEST
PTM JPL ASSY. CHECKOUT
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. FLIGHT S/C #3 (BACK_JP)
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. FLIGHT S/C #I
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. FLIGHT S/C # 2
UPDATE 69 FLT SPARES FOR 71
Ac_v • .-_'_T FLIG_4T S/C #3 fBACKUP)
ASSY. &TEST FLIGHT S/C #I
ASSY. & TEST FLIGHT S/C # 2
PLANNED SLACK
ETR ACTIVITY S/C #I
ETR ACTIVITY S/C #2
ETR ACTIVITY S/C #3 (BACKUP)
PROCURE FAB. &F./A. 69 FLT S/C#1
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. 69 FLT S/C #2
PROCURE FAB. & F./A. 69 FLIGHT SPARES
ASSY. &TEST 69 FLT. S/C#2
ASSY. & TEST 69 FLT. S/C #I
ETR. ACTIVITY 69 FLT S/C #I
ETR. ACTIVITY 69I_LT S/C #2
1966
t
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1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
DEL.
Illllllll Illlllll
IST FLT HDW. DEL.
O KEY SCF_EDULE ELEMENT
SEE TABLE 3-1
m 71 ONLY
-,,gums 69 ONLY
Ilillnlllll 69 _ 71 COMM
LIFE TESTING
@
ETR LIFE TESTING
Figure 2-1. Voyager Master Schedule
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PROGRAM
ACTIVITIES
OSE
DESIGN
DEVELOPMENT
OSE HARD'WIIE
PROTOTYPE
OSE HARD'WR E
ITEM
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN UPDATE
FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION UPDATE
ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT PLAN
DESIGN OR PROCUREMENT SPECS.
SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE TEST SPEC.
TEST PROCEDURES
MAKE OR BUY DECISION
SUBCONTRACT PROCUREMENT CYCLE
ASSOCIATE CONTRACTOR ITEMS CYCLE
GFE PROCUREMENT CYCLE
STC SUBSYSTEM DESIGN
STC SYSTEM DESIGN
STC SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
AHSE PACKAGING DESIGN
LCE DESIGN
MDE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL DESIGN
SIMULATORS, RF & THERMAL-DESIGN
BREADBOARD ACTIVITY-SELECTED ELEMENTS
PROCURE & FAB. ENGRNG MODEL HRDWRE
COMPONENT DEVELOPMENT TEST
SUBSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT TEST
STC ENG'RG MODEL ASSY & TEST
LCE ENG'RG MODEL ASSY & TEST
SIMULATORS. RF & THERMAL-FAR. ASSY & TESTS
ENGRNG MODEL OSE VALIDATION TESTS
MDE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT & PROOF
OSE AVAIL FOR ENG'RNG MODEL S/C ASSY & TEST
PROCURE & FAB CERT-MODEL-HRDWRE
STC, LCE & AHSE CERT-MODEL ASSY & TEST
MDE PROTOTYPE MODEL TEST PROGRAM
CERT-MODEL CERTIFICATION TESTS
-- T/A CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR F/A & T/A HARDWARE TESTING, GE
USE CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR F/A & T/A HARDWARE TESTING, oPL
71 CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR PTM-S/C TESTING, GE
PTM CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR PTM-S/C TESTING, JPL
USE
CEBT-OSE FOR AShY & TEST FLIGHT S/C #3 (BACKUPI
71
FLIGHT CERT -OSE FOR ASSY & TEST FLIGHT S/C #I
USE 'CEBT-OSE FOB ASSY &TEST FLIGHT S/C #2
DSIF & SFOF OSE SITE INTEGRATION
71 ETR CERT-OSE FOR ETR &SFOF ACTIVITY S/C #l
USE CERT-OSE FOR ETR & SFOF ACTIVITY S/C _2
CERT-OSE FOR ETR & SFOF ACTIVITY S/C #3 (BACKUP)
69
FLIGHT
& ETR
USE
CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR '69 FLT S]C * 1-ASSY F/A TEST
CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR qS9 FLT S/C #2-ASSY E  A TEST
CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR '69 ETR FLT S/C _1
CERT-OSE AVAIL FOR '69 ETR FLT S/C _2
1966
1 2 3
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1967 1969 1970 1971
71 m
69 ,ommmmmum
O KEY SCHEDULE
ELEMENT SEE
TABLE 3.2
CERT-OSE
IS "CERTIFIED OSE"
S/C LIFE TESTIEG
ETR
WALK THRU
Figure 2-2. Voyager '69 and '71 OSE
Master Schedule
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a. Each S/C will require its own STC which will accompany the S/C to all
destinations.
b. Each STC will be configured for testing isolated S/C subsystems.
c. One LCE will be required at each launch pad, plus one for the explosive
safe area.
d. One LCE will be required in house for OSE/spacecraft compatibility testing
on the PTM and each Flight S/C.
e. Project phasing of the AHSE subsystems will be scheduled to assure that these
items will be completed to satisfy in house requirements in support of space-
craft development, assembly, test, checkout and shipment. AHSE will be used
throughout the entire factory sequence.
fo Each Deep Space Instrumentation facility will provide a general purpose
digital computer for processing of telemetry and command data.
g. MDE hardware will be minimal - consisting of only modulation and de-
modulation equipment.
5.0 MASTER MILESTONE SCHEDULE
For management planning, integrating and controlling of costs and schedule on the Voyager
project during phases IB, and H, GE-MSD will employ a pert system as described in
CH-VB120VP003. A basic element of this control system is a Project Summary network,
(Figure 5-1). Project relationships and interactions aria hardware utilization carl best be seen
from a study of this figure. For monitoring and control purposes, Figure 5-1 will also be
displayed in accordance with the committment scheduling technique in CII-VB120VP003.
A TTI_T_g"_ q'll'XTl'_ CI4_IT]'.T_lr_TTT "1_O
Detailed schedules in support of Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 5-1 are presented as follows:
Phase IB Schedule Figure 6-1
Guidance and Control Figure 6-2
Controller & Sequencer Figure 6-3
Power Figure 6-4
Structural Figure 6-5
Pyrotechnics Figure 6-6
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Thermal
Telecommunications
Propulsion (Liquid)
Propulsion (Solid)
OSE
Development Spacecraft
Assembly and C/O 1971 S/C
Assembly and C/O 1969 S/C
PTM Assembly and Test
71 Launch Operations Schedule
69 Launch Operations Schedule
Figure 6-7
Figure 6-8
Figure 6-9
Figure 6-10
Figure 6-11
Figure 6-12
Figure 6-13
Figure 6-14
Figure 6-15
Figure 6-16
Figure 6-17
Supporting schedules Figure 6-12 through 6-17 above have been related to the Summary net-
work Figure 5-1 using the appropriate master milestone numbers contained in Figure 5-1.
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ITEM
S A S CE L SUPPORTS HDW. & DEPL. ACT.
NOZZLES, VALVES & TUBING
MECH, ALIGNMENTS & PNEU. CHECKS
_T. HARNESS & THERMAL SENSORS
HARNESS TEST & GND. VERIFICATION
S SS S A TION
HARNESS TESTS
INST. ELEC. ASSEMBLIES & SENSORS
SUBSYSTEM TESTS
INTER-S/S TESTS & GND. VERIF.
ASSEMBLE & ALIGN SUPPORT SHELL, SEP., ADAP. & EC.
_LANDER SUPPORT STRUCTURE
A SENSOR ASSEMBLIES
PRELIMINARY SYSTEMS TEST
ELECTRICAL MATE
SYSTEMS TEST
S/C ASSEMBLY & ALIGNMENTS
MATE CAPSULE & SPACECRAFt
ALL SYSTEMS TEST
EMI TEST
WEIGHT & CG MEASUREMENTS
SYSTEMS CONFIDENCE TEST
VIBRATION
SYSTEMS CONFIDENCE TEST
THERMAL VACUUM TEST
S/C-LCE INTERFACE TESTS
MAGNETIC MAPPING
A S S EMSTEST
fORM 9479V R£V. (I0--6_)
VBIIOVP001
Figure 6-13. Assembly and Checkout Schedule
1971 Flight S/C
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ASSEMBLY & C/O - "196
!
ITEM
S/C SUPPORT STRUCTURE
,INSTALL SOLAR CELL SUPPORTS HARDWARE & DEPLOYMENT ACTUATORS
INSTALL A/C TANKS. NOZZLES, VALVES, & TUBING
MECHANICAL ALIGNMENTS & PNEUMATIC CHECKS
INSTALL HARNESS & THERMAL SENSORS
HARNESS TEST & GROUND VERIFICATIO?{
S/C EQUIPMENT COMPARTMENT
TORUS HARNESS INSTA LLATION
,.
HARNESS TESTS
INSTALL ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES & SENSORS
SUBSYSTEM TESTS
INTER-SUBSYSTEM TESTS & GROUND VERIFICATION
SPAC ECRAFT
ASSEMBLE & ALIGN SUPPORT SHELL ASSY. SEPARATION ADAPTER, & EQUIPMENT COMPAI_FME
INSTALL ALL SENSOR ASSEMBLIES (SCIENCE, G &C, THERMAL)
PRELIMINARY SYSTEMS TESTS
ELECTRICAL MATE RETROPROPULSION
RETROPROPULSION INTERFACE TESTS
INSTALL RETROPROPULSION, ANTENNAS, & SOLAR PANELS
i
! SYSTE MS TESTS
I ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TEST EMI
WEIGHT, CG & FINAL ALIGNMENTS
SYSTEM CONFIDENCE TEST
VIBRATION- ENVIRONMENTAL TEST
SYSTEM CONFIDENCE TEST
THERMAL/VACUUM ENVIRONMENTA L TEST
SPACECRAFT-LCE INTERFACE TESTS
MAGNETIC MA PPING
FINAL SYSTEM TEST
FLIGH'
"/////////z F L IG H'
BOX-PACK-& SHIP TO ETR
_O MASTE
NUMB_
VB110VP001
i
9" FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
ELAPSED TIME - WEEKS
MILE STONE
SEE FIGURE 5-1 VOL A
Figure 6-14. Assembly and Checkout Schedule
1969 Flight S/C
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TASKS
PROCURE, FABRICATE, FA TEST PTM HARDWARE
SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT/STC COMPATIBILITY
TELEMETRY CHANNELS CALIBRATION A ¸
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE TEST AI
WEIGHT AND C.G. A
PNEUMATIC TESTING A
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TEST A i
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST A
SPACECRAFT/CAPSULE MATE B
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE TEST B
WEIGHT AND C°G. B
ALIGNMENT CHECKS B
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY TEST B
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST B
FREE MODE TEST B
PARAMETER VARIATIONS TEST B
MISSION SEQUENCING TEST B
FAILURE MODES TEST B
LCE-SPACECRAFT COMPATIBILITy"
VIBRATION TESTS
B
A, B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST B
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST B
ALIGNMENT CHECKS B
PNEUMATIC TEST B
SIMULATED MIDCOURSE & RETRO PROPULSION TEST A_B
ACOUSTIC NOISE TEST B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST B
PNEUMATIC TEST B
ALIGNMENT CHECKS B
SPACE SIMULATION TEST A
i
LIVE PYRO SEPARATION SHOCK TEST B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TE_T
LV-SPACECRAFT COMPATIBILITY TEST
B
B
MDE-SPACECRAFT COMPATIBILITY TEST B
DISASSEMBLE, BOX, PACK & SHIP TO ETR FOR VALIDATION----_'
ELAPSE
214 I J,ol, l,41, i,B12o122Iz41  12,
||
|
I
]
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TIME - WEEKS
a i u i i i i i u I a |
LEGEND:
A = SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATION
B = SPACECRAFT/CAPSULE
CONFIGURATION
O | | ! i u n ! u i IMASTER MILESTONE NUMBER
(SEE FIGURE 5-1)
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Figure 6-15. PTM Assembly and Test Schedule
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• I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
*6.
7.
8.
9.
i0.
ii.
12.
13.
"14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
"19.
*20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25,
26.
"27.
28°
29.
30.
31o
32.
33.
34,
35,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40°
"41.
I
*42. i
43. ]
I
44. ]
Operations and TESTS
Receiving, Inspection & Installation
STC Checkout
S/C INCOMING CONFIDENCE TEST
CAPSULE INCOMING CONFIDENCE TEST
Solar Arrays and Antenna Trial Fit
ELECTRICALLY MATED SYSTEM TEST
Transport to ESF
OSE CHECKOUT AT ESF
Press. Test, Prop. Load & Gas Press Dry Run
S/C Hazardous Preparations Dry Run
S/C - ESF COMPATIBILITY TEST
Capsule Sterilization Dry Run
Overall S/C Assembly
POST-ASS'Y CONF. TEST & FAI_ING INSTALL
Transport to LC
Mating with LV at Pad
LCE CHECKOUT
S/C - LC COMPATIBILITY TESTS
LC FINAL CONFIDENCE TESTS
COMBINED SYSTEM TEST
Demate and Transport to ESF
Remove Payload Fairing
Transport to SCF
MAGNETIC MAPPING
SCIENCE INSTRUMENTS CALIB. & ASS'Y.
Remove and Pack Solar Arrays
FINAL SYSTEMS FLIGHT ACCEPT. TEST
Load on Transporter
Transport to ESE
Disassemble Overall S/C
S/C Hazardous Preparations
S/C EXPLOSIVES CONFIDENCE TEST
Capsule Hazard. Prep. & Sterilization
POST-STERILIZATION CONFIDENCE TEST
Overall S/C Assembly
POST-ASs'Y CONF. TEST & FAIRING INSTALL
Transport to LC
Mate with LV at Pad
S/C-LC COMPAT. TEST- ELECT/MECH.
LC FINAL CONFIDENCE TESTS
J-FACT
Propellant Load & Cold Gas Top-Off
Conf. Test and Final Launch Preparations
COUNTDOWN & LAUNCH
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m FLIGHT S/C NO. 1
FLIGHT SIc NO. 2
"///////////_ FLIGHT S/C NO. 3 (BACKUP)
Q MASTER MILESTONE NUMBER
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Figure 6-16. 1971 Launch Operations and Test
Schedule
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iI.
2.
3.
4.
OPERATIONS AND TESTS
RECEIVING, INSPECTION & INSTALLATION
STC CHECKOUT
S/C INCOMING CONFIDENCE TEST
ELECTRICALLY MATED SYSTEM TEST
5. OSE CHECKOUT AT ESF
6. TRANSPORT TO ESF
7. PRESS. TEST, PROP. LOAD & GAS PRESS. DRY RUN
8. S/C HAZARDOUS PREPARATIONS DRY RUN
9. S/C - ESF COMPATIBILYrY TEST
10. OVERALL S/C ASSEMBLY
11. POST-ASS'Y CONF. TEST & FAIRING INSTALL
12. TRANSPORT TO LC
13. MATING WITH LV AT PAD
14. LCE CHECKOUT
15. S/C - LC COMPATIBILITY TESTS
16. LC FINAL CONFIDENCE TESTS
17, COMBINED SYSTEM TEST
18. DEMATE AND TRANSPORT TO SCF
19. REMOVE PAYLOAD FAIRING
20. SCIENCE INSTRUMENTS CALm. & ASSY.
21. FINAL SYSTEMS FLIGHT ACCEPT. TEST
22. LOAD ON TRANSPORTER
23. TRANSPORT TO ESF
24. DISASSEMBLE OVERALL S/C
25, S/C HAZARDOUS PREPARATIONS
26. S/C EXPLOSIVES CONFIDENCE TEST
27. OVERALL S/C ASSEMBLY, ALIGNMENT & CG
28. POST-ASSY CONF. TEST & FAIRING INSTALL
29. PROPELLANT LOAD & COLD GAS TOP-OFF
30. TRANSPORT TO LC
31. MATE WITH LV AT PAD
32. S/C-LC COMPAT. TEST - ELECT/MECH.
33. LC FINAL CONFIDENCE TESTS
34. J-FACT
35. CONE, TEST AND FINAL LAUNCH PREPARATIONS
36. COUNTDOWN & LAUNCH
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ELAPSED TIME - WEEKS
Figure 6-17. 1961 Launch Operations and Test
Schedule
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i. 0 INTRODUCTION
The Integrated Test Plan (ITP) is the mechanism by which (1) the project test require-
ments, test philosophy and ground rules for achieving an integrated test program are
disseminated; and (2) the specific tests planned are drawn together for critical exami-
nation to achieve completeness, balance and the optimum utilization of project
resources.
This plan has been prepared in response to the Voyager Phase IB work statement
which requires the submission of an ITP and the Phase II work statement (preliminary)
which requires that the contractor "establish and maintain a Test Board to generate
and maintain an Integrated Test Plan, to monitor conformance with that plan, and to
certify the successful completion of individual tests and the validity of test data. "
During Phase IB, the ITP will be updated and completed in order to assist in the
definition of the program resources required to implement the tests.
i. 1 SCOPE OF THE INTEGRATED TEST PLAN
The ITP encompasses all facets of the Voyager test program for the spacecraft and
its OSE including:
a. All test phases of development, type approval and flight acceptance.
b. Generic test areas such as magnetics, EMI, interface, life, and the require-
ments for their consideration.
e. All levels of test from those on materials through components, assemblies
to the over-all flight spacecraft.
d. Facilities and test equipment requirements.
i. 2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of the Voyager project is to obtain scientific data relative to Mars. Achieving
this goal requires that spacecraft capable of performing the mission must be available
at the launch site in time for launch during that specific opportunity, and that the
spacecraft can operate properly and can be operated during the mission.
a. The total test program will contribute to the realization of this goal by:
l. Supporting the design effort by providing required test data and by con-
firming the conclusions of analyses.
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Providing verification of the design capability.
Demonstrating compatibility of subsystems, S/C and OSE; and all
associate-contractor and government-furnished hardware, equipment,
procedures, and operations. This latter group includes such items as
the capsule, L/V, MOS.
Validating procedures.
Verifying performance capability and conformance to design intent in
each flight spacecraft.
Contributing to the achievement of required life and reliability through
iterative redesign and test, as well as to the measurement of reliability
by required reporting of both operating times and failures.
Fulfilling contractual requirements for type approval, flight acceptance,
material, parts, processes, inspection; and quality control.
Providing operability and performance standards for subsequent use in
analysis and system operation.
Developing acceptable OSE which is fail-safe, self-checking, and ade-
quate for load-bearing.
specific objectives of the Integrated Test Plan are:
To assure a complete test program which conforms to requirements.
To produce a balanced program with an optimum allocation of program
resources including test hardware, facilities, personnel, and time.
To eliminate duplication.
To inform personnel of the general test program requirements, philos-
ophies, goals, ground rules and schedules.
To provide a management control tool.
To provide a means for communicating plans, schedules, status, re-
sponsibilities, interfaces, sources of data, facility and test equipment
usage.
7. To establish implementation and adjudication policies.
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8. To facilitate JPL review by providing in a single place a summary of:
(a) Requirements and test policies
(b) Tests to be conducted
(c) Test hardware to be used
(d) Test facilities to be used
(e} Test controls
{f} Sequence and schedules
2.0 PROJECT TEST REQUIREMENTS
This section contains the project requirements, policies and ground rules for the test
program.
Testing fulfills a very vital role in the total program by isolating and defining defici-
encies which must be corrected so that the hardware can satisfy the program intent.
Testing is directed specifically at four categories of deficiencies:
a. Those associated with the hardwarets ability to perform the intended function.
b. Those associated with manufacture and assembly, often designated as
workmanship.
c. Those associated with the degradation of hardware performance with timed
often referred to as life.
d. Unexpected interactions.
At some point in a program, it becomes necessary to abandon or relinquish the ability
to make changes. Launch usually represents the point beyond which no change can be
completed. At the point where control is relinquished, it is imperative that:
a. The spacecraft have the potential to accomplish the intended functions.
b. Tests (the right type and number} have already been conducted to provide the
desired confidence that this particular S/C will perform these functions.
4
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Assurance is a term that has been adapted to express the whole activity of establishing
potential and its demonstration. It is related to the degree that the following are
believed:
a. That the design is adequate and is capable of performing its intended functions.
b. That the materials have the required life capability (materials is used in the
general sense).
c. That the materials are being used in such a way that they can realize their
potential or at least exceed the requirement.
d. That the equipments were produced correctly.
e. That the frail or marginal items had been identified and removed.
f. That the hardware was not damaged during test, handling, etc.
g. That proper control was exercised over the hardware to limit changes which
might invalidate the knowing (assurance).
h. That the S/C is still operative when control is relinquished.
i. That the tests had been designed to uncover unanticipated interactions.
Testing requires the recognition of these formal phases:
a. Tests in the Development Phase are concerned with establishing the basic
design capability. This implies that both functional capability and life must
be considered.
b. Tests in the Type Approval (T/A) Phase are concerned with verifying the
design, and of validating the capability of the combined activities of procure-
ment, manufacturing, inspection, test, and control to acquire a product
which can fulfill the intent of both program and design.
c. Tests in the Acceptance Phase are concerned with demonstrating that each
piece of hardware has the required performance capability, and that all
workmanship and assembly faults have been eliminated.
Within the test activity, the three phases share in varying degrees a number of spe-
cific reasons for conducting the tests. Table 2-1 summarizes these considerations.
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2.1 REQUIREMENTS
Requirements are derived basically from the mission, from the particular hardware
designs furnished to fulfill the mission functions, and from Project Management
both in-house and at JPL.
Mission requirements are derived from the total environment which is anticipated and
the length of time specified for the mission. Hardware approaches impose test re-
quirements because of the margins included and the experience which exists to sup-
port a particular application. Detailed design features, such as the ability of the
hardware to function in a lg field, also impose certain restraints.
Requirements imposed by Project Management are primarily a function of the confi-
dence desired, or conversely, the degree of risk that Project Management is willing
to assume taking into account resources, the potential value of the data, and the con-
sequences of a partial success.
2.1.1
NOTE:
a.
JPL REQUIREMENTS
Modifications and additions to this listing taken from the Mission Specification
can be expected.
Breadboards
Breadboards shall be constructed for all major spacecraft subsystems and
OSE and subjected to tests during Phase lB.
b. Subsystems
1. JPL will conduct TA tests on certain subsystems.
. Compatibility tests between subsystems shall be completed prior to
assembly of the PTM; prototype subsystems assembled into an Engi-
neering Model shall be ......useufor this pu-,_pose. Electrical and mechanical
compatibility between subassemblies of flight configuration shall be
demonstrated in the PTM prior to assembly of the Flight Spacecraft
hardware.
c. Systems
JPL will conduct tests on a PTM.
d. Environmental Tests
1. Performance and environmental tests shall be conducted simultaneously
where appropriate.
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FA vibration tests shall be conducted at the 95th percentile of the pre-
dicted flight environment envelope.
TA vibration tests shall be conducted at 5db above the FA level.
FA temperature tests of subsystems shall be conducted at 20°C above
the maximum and 20°C below the minimum temperatures expected in
flight.
TA tests on subsystems shall be conducted at 40°C above the maximum
and 30°C below the minimum temperatures expected in flight.
FA and TA temperature tests of systems shall be conducted using solar
simulation at levels 10% and 20% above and below realistic solar radia-
tion, respectively.
7. For other environmental tests, FA levels shall exceed the expected en-
vironment, and TA levels shall exceed FA levels.
. The basis for choosing environmental test levels shall be such that a
probability of the flight hardware withstanding the actual flight environ-
ment can be stated.
9. The environmental test program shall require combinations of certain
environments where the interactions of environments is significant.
e. Type Approval Tests
f.
go
Type approval tests shall be required on all components, assemblies, sub-
assemblies and spacecraft test models. This is flight quality but not flight
hardware.
Flight Acceptance Tests
Flight acceptance tests shall be required to qualify all flight hardware prior
to launch. This shall include performance, environmental, and margin tests.
The PTM shall be used to demonstrate system design adequacy by perform-
ance of system TA tests. These tests shall include:
1. Mission sequencing tests.
2. Parameter variation tests.
3. Magnetic mappings - perm and current fields.
I
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h.
4. Spaee Simulation with simulations of the space and boost environments.
5. Acoustic and vibration tests greater than expected boost levels.
6. Simulated midcourse and retro interaction tests.
7. Free Mode tests with all test equipment disconnected and power fur-
nished by on-board supplies.
8. Failure mode tests.
Interface tests
The following interface tests are required:
1. Spacecraft subsystem/OSE compatibility will be established prior to
delivery to the system test area.
2. Inter subsystem, STC compatibility shall be established during the Engi-
neering Model Phase and completed during the early part of the PTM
phase.
3. The following shall be demonstrated during the PTM phase:
(a) Spacecraft, LCE compatibility.
(b) Spacecraft, Capsule compatibility.
(c) Spacecraft, DSN mission dependent equipment compatibility.
(d) Spacecraft Communication, DSIF compatibility.
(e) Overall Flight Spacecraft, Launch Vehicle, Adapter, Nose Fairing
compatibility.
(f) Launch Vehicle System, Spacecraft compatibility (at AFETR).
(g) Spacecraft, MOS compatibility.
4. Early compatibility of the launch complex and spacecraft shall be estab-
lished using a spacecraft simulator.
5. Spacecraft, AHSE compatibility shall be demonstrated with the dynamic
or structural test model prior to use with PTM.
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i. All flight hardware will be required to be tested to FA specifications at both
the system and subsystem levels. The flight spacecraft shall demonstrate
compatibility with the LV, MOS, Capsule, and DSNduring its testing phase.
2.1.2 REQUIREMENTSBY GENERICAREAS
The requirements discussed in this section are by generic areas suchas EMI or
magnetics and are to cover all phasesand all levels of tests for that particular gen-
eric area. The following are included:
a. Electrical Performance
b. EMI
c. Magnetics
d. Thermal
e. Structural
f. Explosive (One-shot} Devices
g. Life
h. Interfaces
i. OSE
j. Spacecraft Mass Properties
k. Separation
2.1.2.1 ELECTRICAL PERFORMANCE
2.1.2.1.1 INTRODUCTION
In general, each electrical item must perform some function within specified limits
when receiving inputs within specified limits. This type of electrical performance is
the subject of this discussion as opposed to performance of the power subsystem or
the suitability of EMI controls although they are all closely related.
2.1.2.1.2 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
The general test approach used will be to investigate the output capability of
components and functional sections as a function of input variations to establish
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the range of performance capability, (a general philosophy of testing to
failure is not being advocated). As testing progresses from the breadboards
and developmentcomponentsup through the higher levels of assembly and to
the type approval and flight hardware, emphasiswill be placedupon the
verification of performance capability within the total system environment.
For a component, the input variations that it experiences and the suitability
of its output must both be evaluated. These tests will be supplemented by
Mission Profile Tests to induce unexpected interactions as a result of the
complex nature of the system.
As the program progresses, changes will be incorporated. This, coupled
with the fact that each component and assembly is unique (even though they
will be interchangeable), requires that comprehensive electrical performance
tests be conducted on each spacecraft.
b. Breadboards
Components and functional sections will be breadboarded during Phase IB to
support the design effort. Electrical performance of the individual assem-
blies as well as the subsystem will be investigated. The test range of inputs
shall be in excess of the requirements in an effort to establish "how good
it is. "
c. Component and Assembly Tests
1. Development
Development components and assemblies will be tested for their output
variations as a function of input variations. This shall be done in ambient
as well as during the environments which are imposed at this level of
testing.
Type approval hardware will be used to verify the input-output relation-
ships as a function of the various environments imposed. Tests beyond
the specified range of inputs will be conducted.
3. Flight Hardware
Flight hardware will also be tested to verify its input-output relation-
ships over a range of inputs in excess of the specified range. The range
for FA testing will be less than for TA testing. Input-output tests will
be conducted a sufficient number of times to determine if trends toward
unsatisfactory performance and operation develop.
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d. Systems
1. Development
The Engineering Development Spacecraft will be the first opportunity to
investigate the electrical performance of the spacecraft system. This
will be accomplished in both ambient and environmental tests after veri-
fication of basic intersubsystem compatibility including the test support-
ing OSE. Parameter variation tests will investigate system performance
over a range of operating voltages. Mission Profile tests will be con
ducted in both ambient and in Thermal/Vacuum to identify unexpected
interactions.
2. PTM
The PTM tests will be utilized to confirm electrical performance of the
spacecraft with the capsule system, the launch vehicle and the OSE used
both in-house and in the Launch Complex area.
A free-mode test will be conducted to verify the performance of the sys-
tem with all connections to external equipment removed.
Parameter variation tests conducted on the PTM will exceed expected
input ranges and data shall be taken for the evaluation of trends which
are indicative of potential unacceptable performance and operation.
3. Flight Spacecraft
The flight spacecraft will be tested under ambient and environmental
conditions. Parameter variation tests will be conducted at more than
expected levels, but less than PTM levels. Trends will be evaluated.
Mission Profile tests will also be conducted. As tests proceed toward
the launch date, less and less hardline data will be available throughout
the system for performance evaluation. It is, therefore, imperative that
key performance parameters be identified so that system readiness can
be confirmed with the reduced amount of data available.
4. Flight Tests
The '69 flight test will provide an opportunity to evaluate electrical per-
formance under actual flight conditions.
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2.1.2.2 EMI TESTING
2.1.2.2.1 INTRODUCTION
A complex electromagnetic environment will exist inside and outside the spacecraft.
Various controls will be applied during the program to reduce these effects to the
point where they will not degrade the probability of mission success. The effective-
ness of such control will be verified by EMI tests which determine the hardware's
electromagnetic interference and susceptibility characteristics.
EMI is an electromagnetic disturbance (field) which can potentially cause a perform-
ance degradation of the equipment. Electromagnetic susceptibility is a hardware
characteristic which results in degradation of performance when subjected to these
disturbances. The hardware can also produce disturbances which will effect the oper-
ation of adjacent equipment. This, too, must be controlled.
EMI tests are performed to assure and demonstrate the probability of withstanding the
flight environment. The test environment levels incorporate margins for both the
existing or expected internal and external EMI sources.
2.1.2.2.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
ae Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) between the various elements of the
Voyager system is essential for success. EMC must be established be-
tween the following.
1. The individual components of the spacecraft.
2. The functional sections of the spacecraft.
3. The spacecraft and the capsule.
4. The overall flight spacecraft and its supporting OSE.
5. The overall flight spacecraft, the launch vehicle, and the launch complex.
6. The spacecraft and the range equipments.
Do Testing of components, component groups or subsystems shall be done in
accordance with MIL-STD-826 serving as the guide. Both susceptibility and
interference tests will be performed.
If a component will be tested as a part of a grouping or in a subsystem, it
does not have to be tested separately.
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c. System tests shall be performed to provide evidence of.
1. Electromagnetic compatibility betweensystem equipments.
2. Complianceto acceptance criteria.
MIL-STD-6051 shall be used as a guide in planning system EMI tests.
do Acceptance criteria shall be in nominal compliance with MIL-STD-826 for
components and assemblies. During system tests, the maximum noise
reaching a device shall be such that the probability of a malfunction shall
be less than 0.1% and this shall be demonstrated to 90% confidence.
Deviations to the acceptance criteria will be treated individually for a decision
relative to corrective action or acceptability.
2.1.2.2.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
EMI testing will be performed to the extent necessary to provide evidence
that:
1. The EMI characteristics of system components will not result in system
EMI incompatibilities;
2. The EMI characteristics of highly critical component groups will not
deteriorate intra-group performance, and will not result in system EMI
inc ompatibilitie s;
3. The EMI safety margins within each system are satisfactory and the
system complies with the acceptance criteria.
b. Components
The degree of testing required of each component in each phase of testing
shall depend upon the EMI history of the component. Components tested and
operated on other programs shall receive only partial tests possibly at the
subsystem level. New components shall be fully tested.
Tests shall be initiated as soon as component hardware is available. That is,
there shall be several stages of testing:
1. Development components. (Does not apply to components tested and uti-
lized on other programs, providing evidence to support its suitability is
available. )
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2. TA (Type Approval)
3. FA (Flight Acceptance)
c. ComponentGroups and Assemblies
Equipmentswhich are more effectively EMI tested as a group shall be tested
at the subsystem level. Subsystemtests shall be performed in the following
stages:
1. DevelopmentModel Subsystem.
2. Final SubsystemDesign.
3. TA (Type Approval).
In addition, an inter-subsystem EMI compatibility test shall be performed
with subsystems mountedin the Engineering DevelopmentModel and the
Proof Test Model (PTM).
OSE shall be tested as a subsystem. Each OSE Equipment shall be fully
tested in the manner described in MIL-STD-826.
Subsystem/OSE compatibility will be established during tests on the develop-
ment subsystem and verified on the PTM.
Science equipment groups provided to GE by NASA/JPL will not require EMI
testing at this level of assembly, but will be tested as part of the spacecraft
system.
d. System Tests
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of compliance with the acceptance criteria.
In the system EMI test, system "noise sources" are operated, while simul-
taneously, sensitive equipments are monitored for:
1. Amplitude of noise signal received from each source.
2. Type of malfunction or degraded system performance as a result of the
encountered EMI signals.
Systems EMI Tests shall be performed in the following sequence:
1. Development System.
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Ca)
(i)
(2)
Intersubsystem compatibility.
Spacecraft subsystems (including Science).
Subsystems and OSE.
(b) System EMC
2. Proof Test Model.
Ca) Intersubsystem compatibility verification (including Science).
(b) Spacecraft OSE/Capsule.
(c) Spacecraft/Capsule OSE.
(d) Spacecraft System/Capsule System.
(e) Overall Spacecraft/Launch vehicle and Complex.
(f) Overall Spacecraft/Range Support Equipments.
(g) Overall Spacecraft/AFETR.
3. Flight Spacecraft (each).
Ca ) Spacecraft System compatibility.
(b) Spacecraft/Capsule compatibility.
(c) Overall Spacecraft compatibility with:
(1) Launch Vehicle and Complex.
(2) Launch Support Equipments.
2.1.2.3 MAGNETIC TESTING
2.1.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The requirement for magnetic cleanliness stems from the magnetometer included as a
part of the science payload. This instrument will measure magnetic fields during the
interplanetary and Mars orbiting phases of the Voyager Mission.
There are two aspects to magnetic testing. One is related to determining the relative
cleanliness of the hardware (magnetic mapping of S/C subassemblies). The other is
concerned with determining the effect of the spacecraft's field on the magnetometer's
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output so that this can be separatedout of the flight measurements (magnetometer
zero offset due to the S/C). Permanent fields and induced fields must both be con-
sidered during these investigations.
2.1.2.3.2 OVERALL REQUIREMENTS
Magnetic field stability is the primary consideration in conducting a magnetometer
experiment. Magnetic cleanliness, or the absenceof magnetic material, results in
this stability. Stability of the magnetic field is particularly important since handling,
vibration and the launch environments can result in a significant changein the field
due to the influence of the earth's field. While these changesmay not be large in the
numerical sense, they may be very large whencompared to the sensitivity and range
of the magnetometerwhich is provided to detect a field of only a few gamma. In
addition, inducedfields are important becauseof the variety of operating modes and
becauseof the evenlarger number of potential failure modes which could degrade
the validity of the field measurements.
a. General Requirements
. Magnetic tests will be performed to the extent necessary to provide
evidence that:
(a) The characteristics of the components, assemblies and the system
are within the requirements.
(b) Spacecraft magnetic field stability is compatible with measure-
ment requirements.
(c) Both induced and perm spacecraft fields are known prior to launch.
. Magnetic tests will be performed on the appropriate '69 test hardware
as well as the 1971 spacecraft hardware in order to refine procedures
and to identify areas requiring further action to meet criteria.
3. Acceptance Criteria
Acceptance criteria is as follows:
(a) All spacecraft assemblies shall have total field magnitudes of less
than 1 gamma at 3 times their average dimension measured along
natural rectilinear axes. Induced fields shall cause a change of less
than one gamma at 2 feet.
(b) Field changes shall be less than a factor of 10 after exposure to:
(1) A 100 gauss field for components and assemblies;
17 of 88
VB110VP002
18 of 88
(2) A 25 gauss field for the complete spacecraft.
4. Overall Test Conditions
(a) Magnetic evaluation of basic materials and parts shall be done in an
ambient environment of less than 100gamma with mapping being
performed for 360" of rotation about 3 orthogonal axes referenced
only to the part itself.
(b) Assemblies shall be mapped in three orthogonal coordinate axes
parallel to the spacecraft coordinates.
(c) In testing components and assemblies for fields induced by loop
currents, while operating, the tests shall be conducted at the maxi-
mum expected operating voltage to verify compliance to the require-
ment of less than 1 gamma change at 2 feet.
b. Materials and Piece Parts
1. Experimental Surveys
Materials and piece parts which are identified for potential use on the
Voyager spacecraft must be investigated for their magnetic properties.
Both level and stability must be determined to provide data for their
consideration as additions to the magnetically acceptable list.
2. Acceptance Tests
Since cleanliness is dependent upon the use of magnetically clean parts,
all piece parts for flight hardware shall be tested. Where magnetic
materials are used, stability shall be verified.
c. Components and Assemblies
Tests shall be initiated to determine the magnetic characteristics of compo-
nents and assemblies as soon as the first flight-type hardware (i. e., com-
parable packaging) is available. Both perm and induced fields shall be investi-
gated on all hardware packaged in the anticipated flight hardware configuration.
Stability shall be evaluated on the hardware by exposure to a magnetizing
field of 100 gauss. On TA and development hardware, tests shall be conducted
before and after exposure to environments judged to effect stability.
Since the subassemblies in an electronic assembly may come from different
sources, these individual subassemblies shall be checked for conformance to
magnetic requirements. In those cases where these subassemblies are joined
together for FA testing, the total assembly shall be mapped after environmental
tests.
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If deperming of hardware is required, it shall be done at the electronic as-
sembly level.
d. Spacecraft Systems
i. General
Mapping of the perm field may be accomplished in the ambient field pro-
viding that (1) the field is relatively stable over the period of one mapping
run (the mapping procedure can be done rapidly enough to obscure vari-
ations in this field), and (2) the geomagnetic gradients in the mapping
area are on the order of 100 gamma per foot or less.
Mapping of the perm field can be accomplished by rotating the spacecraft
about 3 coordinate axes which intersect at the position of the flight mag-
netometer. If desired, fixture design and handling can allow the mapping
to be done by rotation of the spacecraft about any two of the three axes.
Spacecraft fields can be derived from this data. In mapping the space-
craft, the effect of moveable appendages (such as the antenna) must be
evaluated. For the perm mapping, the following will be accomplished:
(a) Mapping shall determine the effect of deploying and articulating the
antenna.
(b) For the scan platform, the mapping will be accomplished with the
platform in the stowed position and in the deployed position. In addi-
tion, motions of the platform in the deployed position will be evaluated.
For mapping of the current fields which are a result of operating, all
normal modes of operation will be evaluated as well as principal failure
modes. The effect of motions of both the antenna and scan platform will
also be evaluated.
During development and PTM testing, a thorough analysis will be made to
determine which of the tests shall be emphasized during the project and
which are less significant.
2. Development Spacecraft
Tests shall be conducted on the Engineering Development Spacecraft to
evaluate the effectiveness of magnetic controls. This shall include field
stability determinations as a result of exposure to a magnetizing field of
25 gauss followed by deperming.
19 of 88
VB110VP002
3. Proof Test Model (P. T. M. ) Spacecraft
Tests will be conductedon the PTM spacecraft to verify the conclusions
reachedwith the developmentspacecraft relative to the results and effec-
tiveness of the controls. Field stability will also be evaluated in the
manner described above. The PTM will also be utilized to verify the
validity of the test approachwherein the spacecraft and capsuleare
mappedonly about the longitudinal axis of the spacecraft-capsule
assembly.
4. Flight Spacecraft
Mapping of the flight spacecraft will be conducted both in-house and at
Cape Kennedy. Magnetic mapping at the Cape will be conducted as late
as practicable in the flow to allow for hardware changes. This mapping
will be done without fuel in the propulsion system tanks. Propulsion
fuel is not, however, expected to be a significant magnetic source.
2.1.2.4 THERMAL TESTS
2.1.2.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of thermal conditions within certain prescribed limits is essential
for the Voyager spacecraft from two separate but related points of view:
a. A proper thermal environment is required in some cases to achieve the re-
quired performance or operation. Examples of this are the gyro package,
batteries, and monopropellant.
Do Of broader significance is the degradation of performance and operation of
many parts as a result of thermal stresses. Voyager life requirements
also dictate the necessity for thermal control.
2.1.2.4.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
ao Testing of the thermal control aspects of the Voyager system will be ap-
proached from two points of view. In the first case, the thermal conditions
required for spacecraft mission accomplishment (whether for performance
or life) will be verified and demonstrated. In the second case, tests will be
aimed at evaluating whether the hardware can perform and survive in the
complex thermal environment which results.
b. Thermal compatibility between the various elements of the spacecraft system
is essential for success. This compatibility must be established for the
following:
1. Between piece parts within a subassembly.
O
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2. Betweenthe various assemblies which constitute the spacecraft.
3. Betweenthe spacecraft and the capsule.
4. For the various spatial positions relative to the sun:
(a) Oriented toward the sunat near earth and Mars distances.
(b) During Maneuvers.
(c) As a result of occultation by the earth or Mars.
C. During the TA and FA thermal tests of components and assemblies, the
temperature shall be referenced to the component or subassembly mounting
surface.
2. i. 2.4.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Thermal tests shall be performed to the extent necessary to provide evidence
that:
1. The actual thermal environment is within requirements (with a suitable
margin) where performance and operation demands such control.
2. The hardware is capable of withstanding the resulting environments with
a positive margin of performance capability.
3. The various pieces of the overall spacecraft system are thermally
compatible.
4. Expected thermal conditions ..... Lhe ............ :-^'^- _" .... _ '.......
b. Piece Parts and Materials
. Performance degradation as a result of thermal stresses can ultimately
be reduced to a change in a piece part or material. It is very necessary,
therefore, to know the capability of these parts and materials to with-
stand thermal stresses. Where this is not defined, tests must be con-
ducted to establish a basis for design and test verification. Accelerated
test techniques can be utilized if applicable. These tests should be ac-
complished as early as possible in the development program.
. Parts for flight hardware shall be "burned-in." Thermal stressing shall
be a part of this burn-in where thermal degradation is one of the principal
modes of failure.
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c. Breadboards
Thermal tests (high and low temperature) will be performed onbreadboards
of spacecraft subsystems. Performance characteristic variations as a re-
sult of theseenvironments will be evaluated.
d. Componentsand Assemblies
e.
1. Development
Development tests on components and assemblies shall include thermal
tests. Emphasis shall be placed upon the determination of the total
range of temperature which will allow satisfactory performance.
Specific attention shall be given to monitoring the thermal environments
on parts or materials within the component or assembly which are known
or are suspected to be marginal.
2. Type Approval
Type approval tests shall be conducted to verify the existence of a mar-
gin of performance capability during thermal tests conducted at 40°C
above the maximum and 30°C below the minimum temperature expected
in flight.
3. Flight Acceptance
Flight acceptance tests of components and assemblies shall include a
similar verification of performance margin at 20°C above the maximum
and 20°C below the minimum flight temperature.
Spacecraft Systems (and Models)
1. Models
Models shall be used to simulate the spacecraft (and capsule) to verify
calculations relative to performance of the thermal control devices and
methods employed on the complex system configuration. Tests in both
the '69 and '71 configuration will be conducted.
(a) Spacecraft Model
The spacecraft model will employ heaters to simulate anticipated
thermal loads within the bus assembly. The performance of the
thermal control devices above and below the expected thermal load
range shall be evaluated to establish margins. Principal failure
modes shall also be evaluated.
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(b) Scale Model
A scale model of theoverall spacecraft will be used to evaluate the
expectedthermal conditions which will result from the various mis-
sion phases. This model will be used to evaluate the suitability of
the overall thermal control approach.
In addition, the modelwill be used to verify the validity of the pro-
posedapproachwherein the capsule is not required for effective
evaluation of the spacecraft thermal control system.
Emphasis shall againbe placed upon the evaluation of margins.
2. Engineering DevelopmentSpacecraft
The Engineering DevelopmentSpacecraft shall be tested to evaluate the
following:
(a) The performance of the thermal control devices and methods.
(b) The temperatures which result in the spacecraft.
(c) The ranges of temperatures which exist on specific piece parts and
materials which are marginal.
3. Proof Test Model (PTM) Spacecraft
The PTM shall be tested to verify the conclusions reachedas a result of
the tests with the Engineering DevelopmentSpacecraft.
4. Flight Spacecraft
control devices and the existence of suitable thermal conditions at those
specific points in the spacecraftwhich require close thermal control for
performance or life purposes.
5. Flight Test
The '69 test flight will allow an evaluation of thermal performance in the
real environment.
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2.1.2.5 STRUCTURAL TESTS
2.1.2.5.1 INTRODUCTION
During the course of the Voyager mission, the overall spacecraft will be subjected to
a number of dynamic environments. This includes mechanically induced vibration,
acoustic noise, sustained acceleration, and shock which will occur during the launch
and injection phase. In addition, shock, vibration and sustained acceleration will
result at other times in the mission during pyrotechnic firings and midcourse or
retro engine firings.
During launch, the spacecraft's appendages will be stowed. After injection, the
antennas, etc., will be deployed, and they will be in a deployed position during sub-
sequent engine firings.
2.1.2.5.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a. The structural members of the spacecraft provide the support for the various
components and assemblies of spacecraft hardware. Tests will be conducted
to verify analyses, to confirm load paths and construction methods, and to
demonstrate that the structural subsystem has a positive margin relative to
the loads that it must support.
be Tests will be conducted to evaluate the dynamic stresses which result within
the various operating sections of the spacecraft. These tests will reflect the
effect of deployable items and the variations which might result from their
failure to deploy or their articulation after deployment. In those cases where
environmental limits are imposed because of their effect or tendency to de-
grade either performance or life, the environments will be evaluated relative
to these limits. For example, if a component is known to be susceptible to
damage due to shock, it must be verified that sufficient attenuation exists to
provide a suitable environment.
Co Tests will be conducted to verify that the overall spacecraft has dynamic
characteristics compatible with the launch vehicle and spacecraft guidance
and control requirements. This will require a quantitative determination of
these characteristics.
de Test will be conducted on components and assemblies to demonstrate per-
formance capability over a range of environments in excess of anticipated
levels.
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2. I. 2.5.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Tests shall be conductedto the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
1. The structural members of the spacecraft can cupport the loads imposed
upon it with a positive margin.
o The dynamic characteristics of the spacecraft are compatible with the
system requirements and verify analytical predictions.
3. The actual dynamic environment within the functional sections is within
requirements where performance or life place an environmental limit.
. The components and assemblies of the spacecraftare capable of with-
standing the environments with a positive margin of performance
capability.
b. Components and Assemblies
1. Development
Development components and assemblies will be subjected to vibration
tests to determine the suitability of the design.
These development items will not be subjected to acoustic excitation,
shock or sustained acceleration unless the items are known (or are sus-
pected} to be vulnerable to this type of environment within the range that
could be expected.
2. Type Approval (TA)
Type approval components and assemblies will be tested to verify the
existence of a margin of performance capability during the following
tests:
(a) Vibration
(b) Acoustic Noise
(c) Acceleration
(d) Shock
The Mission Specification requires that TA levels exceed FA levels and
that the levels selected shall be such that a probabilistic statement can
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be made relative to surviving flight environments. For example, FA
vibration shall be conductedat the envelopeof the 95th percentile of the
predicted flight environment and TA will be conductedat 5 db abovethis
level.
3. Flight Acceptance (FA)
During FA, the components and assemblies will be subjected to vibra-
tion only.
c. Systems and Models
1. Structural Test Model (STM)
A structural test model will be used to conduct sinusoidal vibration
modal tests of the spacecraft in both the launch and cruize configurations.
Longitudinal, lateral and torsional vibrations will be imposed.
A static test will be conducted with the STM to establish a positive mar-
gin and to evaluate deflections, load paths, etc. under the combined
influence of loads resulting from static acceleration and torsional
vibration.
Tests of the major pyrotechnic devices will be conducted with the STM
to determine the response of the spacecraft to these inputs.
The initial STM tests will be in the '69 configuration. It will be modi-
fied to the '71 configuration and the tests will be repeated where
applicable.
2. Engineering Development Spacecraft
The Engineering Development Spacecraft will be subjected to elements
of the sinusoidal vibration modal tests to verify the conclusions during
the STM tests relative to modes, excursions, deflections, etc.
It will also be subjected to random vibration tests with emphasis upon
the evaluation of responses within the various functional sections of the
spacecraft.
A live pyrotechnic firing test will be conducted to verify the conclusions
reached as a result of the similar test on the STM.
Similar tests will be conducted with the '69 Flight S/C #1 (the back-up
for S/C #2 which is the prime flight S/C).
I
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2.1.2.6.2
o
4.
2.1.2.6.3
OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a. Since these explosive devices will usually be employed on mission-critical
functions, they must have a demonstrated capability commensurate with
their application. This will include:
1. Compliance to the reliability requirement.
2. Compliance to the no-fire and all-fire requirements for range safety.
3. The capability to generate the required output under the varying environ-
ments. This implies a variability that is compatible with the minimum
output for operation and the maximum output allowable for containment.
b. Tests of the overall spacecraft system must be conducted to demonstrate
that spurious signals will not accidentally initiate an explosive device during
the total environment including:
1. Spacecraft intersubsystem and system tests (including OSE).
2. Spacecraft - Capsule tests.
Overall Spacecraft - Launch Vehicle - ESF - Launch Complex tests.
Overall Spacecraft - Range Support Equipment tests.
TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Tests shall be performed to the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
1. The reliability of the explosive device is compatible with its application.
2. The performance of the explosive device is compatible with its
application.
3. The external environment imposed upon the device is compatible with
its performance and operation.
4. The flight hardware is equivalent in its performance characteristics to
the type-approved design.
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3. Proof Test Model (PTM) Spacecraft
The PTM will be used to confirm previous conclusions and to demon-
strate a margin of performance capability above expected flight levels.
The following dynamic tests will be conducted:
(a) Sinusoidal vibration modal tests in the launch and post-launch con-
figurations with and without the capsule assembled.
(b) Random vibration tests with emphasis upon the confirmation of
data. These tests will be clone both with and without a capsule
assembled to the spacecraft.
(c) Live pyrotechnic firing test.
(d) Acoustic noise test of the spacecraft-capsule assembly.
4. Flight Spacecraft
Flight spacecraft will be subjected to random vibration only. (The
Flight Capsule for 1971 will be vibrated separately. )
2.1.2.6 EXPLOSIVE (ONE-SHOT) DEVICES
2.1.2.6.1 INTRODUCTION
Explosive devices will be used in a number of places within the Voyager Spacecraft
to operate valves, pin pullers, etc. In addition, the design for the spacecraft separa-
tion system incorporates a confined, linear detonating cord to accomplish separation.
A common characteristic of these explosive devices is the fact that they are "one-shot"
devices.
Two separate problems are involved in their use:
a. The suitability of the "one-shot" device itself must be demonstrated.
be The application of the device must be demonstrated, i.e., it must operate
the component under the loads and environments which are present when the
firing signal is generated.
This discussion is related to the demonstration of the suitability of the one-shot de-
vices and not its application.
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b. Components
Co
1. Development
After the basic performance capability of the explosive device has been
established, it will be tested with the component or assembly that it
operates. During the early development stage, representative sections
may be used. For example, the spacecraft separation system develop-
ment tests will be on representative sections rather than a full ring.
2. Type Approval
Type-approval tests of explosive devices will be conducted on a sample
basis. These devices will be subjected to appropriate environmental
and/or mechanical tests prior to firing tests. Firing tests of the type-
approval hardware will be divided as follows:
(a) A portion will be fired during the type-approval tests of the device
that they operate.
(b) Portions will be subjected to selected environments determined to
be mission critical (for example, high and low temperature vac-
uum soaks) and then fired at service conditions.
(c) A portion will be subjected to no-fire tests and then firing tests with
output measurements being made.
3. Flight Acceptance
Flight Acceptance tests (non-destructive) will be conducted on all ex-
plosive devices. Lot sampling will be used to select a sample for
firing tests.
Systems
1. Development
During the tests of the Engineering Development Spacecraft, the total
environment within which the explosive devices must operate will be
investigated. Emphasis will be placed upon the identification of spurious
signals and electromagnetic disturbances which could cause a premature
ignition of the devices.
End-to-end tests of the circuits with simulators will be accomplished to
evaluate the capability to operate the devices.
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2. Proof Test Model or '69 Flight Spacecraft#1
The tests will verify the developmenttests with simulators andwill in-
clude a test with live pyrotechnics to demonstrate the existence of ade-
quate margins. During the tests at ETR with the launch vehicle, simu-
lators will be used to verify the compatibility of the environment and the
pyrotechnic subsystem.
3. Flight Spacecraft
During the Assembly and Check-out of the flight systems, end-to-end
testing of the circuitry will be conducted with simulators to demonstrate
circuit operation. After installation of the explosive devices, continuity
measurements only will be made. Their installation will be made as
late as practicable in the field flow cycle.
2.1.2.7 LIFE TESTS
2.1.2.7.1 INTRODUCTION
Life, or the capability to sustain a suitable level of performance for the length of the
Voyager mission, is a vital consideration.
Life, when viewed as the capability to sustain performance, is related to every other
aspect of the program including reliability and redundancy, the performance margins
included in the design, the identification of failure mechanisms, the existence of de-
grading stresses and environments, and the elimination of workmanship faults.
2.1.2.7.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
Life testing on the Voyager spacecraft will be approached from two points of view.
Where historical data is available relative to the total environment within which per-
formance can be sustained, testing shall be aimed at verifying the existence of these
environments. In those cases where historical data is inadequate, tests will be con-
ducted to determine the capability of the hardware to sustain suitable performance in
the complex environment. Environment as used in this case is the total environment.
Acceptance testing at all levels is closely related to life testing because it is con-
cerned with the elimination of "weak" parts and materials and the identification and
repair of workmanship faults. Both of these goals are necessary for proper and
sustained performance. The test program must also verify that the tests which will
be conducted during acceptance of the flight hardware will not "use up" the life capa-
bility of the equipment.
O
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2.1.2.7.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Life tests shall be conducted to the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
1. Actual environments are within the requirements (with suitable margins)
where life considerations dictate the limitations on certain environments.
2. The hardware is capable of withstanding the resulting environments and
stress with a positive margin of life capability.
3. The procedures used for flight acceptance tests are compatible with the
life capability of the hardware.
The concept of the Static Mission Equivalent (SME) and the Dynamic Mission
Equivalent (DME) will be applied to evaluate the life capability of the hardware.
This will be applied at various levels of assembly with the process of identi-
fication being used at the higher levels of assembly to verify the validity of
DME used at the subordinate levels of assembly.
b. Parts and Materials
An approved parts list will be maintained for the use of designers. When a
part or material is identified which is not on the approved parts list, tests
will be required to demonstrate their limitations and suitability for the pro-
posed application. Accelerated test techniques may be used if applicable.
These tests should be identified and accomplished as early as possible in
the development program.
Piece parts for flight hardware shall be 'Burned-in" to reduce the possibility
that a faulty part will be assembled into the hardware°
c. Components and Assemblies
1. Development
Development components and assemblies shall be tested to determine the
magnitude of known or suspected degrading stresses. As a part of the
development testing, the component or assembly will be subjected to a
number of DME's. This number shall be determined as a function of the
relative complexity and criticality of the component.
For some development components and assemblies, particularly such
things as electro-mechanical devices which are frequently unique designs
or unique applications of a proven design, Static Mission Equivalents
shall be imposed to evaluate basic life capability. These tests may be
done in an environment. In general, it will not be efficient to do environ-
mental life testing at this level to look for failure modes, but if a partic-
ular environment is known to have a degrading effect, such tests may be
required to provide reasonable data.
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2. Type Approval
During the design verification tests on Type Approval components and
assemblies, environments will again be evaluated for comparison to
specified environmental limitations. In addition, the hardware will be
subjected to a number of DME's to verify the capability of the hardware
to withstand the complex environments which exist.
3. Flight Acceptance
During flight acceptance tests, a minimum "run-in" or "burn-in" time
will be imposed along with a requirement to conduct a number of DME's.
Since TA hardware will be subjected to flight acceptance prior to TA, the
basic capability of the hardware to withstand the FA and mission require-
ments will be established.
Having established basic capability with the TA hardware, tests on the
actual flight hardware can be used to obtain assurance that the specific
flight components and assemblies are suitable for the mission.
Systems
1. Development
The Engineering Development Spacecraft will afford the first opportunity
to verify system environments. Thus, those environments which have
known limits should be determined for comparison with the specified
limits. Other environments which might result from the system level of
testing such as transients, etc., should be carefully evaluated. During
the course of testing this system, mission profile tests will be conducted.
These tests should be designed to expose the system to its DME. During
these tests, the validity of the DME's designed for tests at lower levels
should be checked. Test specifications and procedures shall be revised
as required.
After the completion of performance tests, the '71 Spacecraft will
be utilized for operating life tests.
2. Proof Test Model (PTM) Spacecraft
The PTM spacecraft will be utilized to verify the conclusions which result
from tests on the Engineering Development Spacecraft. The DME's im-
posed on the PTM must exceed the number that will be imposed on the
flight spacecraft by a margin suitable to demonstrate the basic life capa-
bility of the system.
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3. Flight Spacecraft
During Assembly and Check-out of the flight spacecraft, DME's will be
conducted to provide assurance relative to the life capability of each
flight system.
2.1.2.8 INTERFACE
2.1.2.8.1 INTRODUCTION
The Spacecraft is but one element of the total Voyager system. These various elements
are joined together at various points in the mission for the accomplishment of the proj-
ect goal which is the acquisition of scientific data relative to Mars.
The principal interfaces involving the spacecraft can be categorized as either mechanical,
electrical or RF; however, there are some special interface requirements such as
cooling while encapsulated within the nose fairing and fuel loading at the Explosives
Safe Facility (ESF).
In addition to the interfaces involving the spacecraft itself, there are interfaces involving
spacecraft OSE and softwares and personnel. For purposes of this discussion, the
following interfaces will be treated:
ao
b.
Ce
Spacecraft with the capsule.
Overall spacecraft with:
1. Launch Vehicle
2. Launch Complex
3. E,_F
4. Spacecraft Check-out Facility
5. DSN
6. Range Support Equipments
OSE
1. MDE to DSIF
2. MDE to SFOF
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3. LCE to ESF
4. LCE to Launch Complex
Personnel and softwares integration are not discussed herein. The science hardware
is not discussed separately, but is considered to be a subsystem in the other sections
relating to test requirements.
2.1.2.8.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a_ Mechanical (including cooling air, etc. ), electrical, and RF compatibility
will be demonstrated with models, simulators and development or _TM hard-
ware prior to the mating of overall flight spacecraft.
be The compatibility of spacecraft interfaces will be confirmed with each flight
spacecraft as early as practicable so that changes can be incorporated if
required.
1. Spacecraft/capsule mating will be accomplished in-house prior to ship-
ment to AFETR.
1 Upon arrival at the Cape, each overall flight spacecraft will have a "dry-
run" through the ESF and the launch pad for preliminary tests with the
launch vehicle, the fairing, the launch complex, the LCE, range equip-
ments and DSN 71 to demonstrate compatibility.
Co The tests of OSE installed at the various sites shall include a demonstration
of the sating features incorporated into the OSE to protect the other equip-
ments.
2.1.2.8.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. _ener_l
Tests shall be conducted to the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
. The spacecraft and the capsule are compatible mechanically, electrically,
thermally in the assembled condition and that RF compatibility exists for
the relay function at encounter.
. The Overall Spacecraft and the Launch Vehicle are compatible mechan-
ically, electrically (including electro-magnetic compatibility}, and
thermally. RF compatibility with the launch vehicle nose fairing is also
a requirement as are adequate clearances within the fairing to allow for
motions, etc., during handling, mating and launch.
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3. The Overall Spacecraft is compatible with the launch complex. This
includes :
a) Clearances and handling for mating.
b) Work platforms.
c) Wiring
4. The Overall Spacecraft is compatible with the ESF facilities and equip-
ments for control, power, fueling, gas purging and pressurization, etc.
5. The Overall Spacecraft is compatible with the Spacecraft Checkout Facility
and the equipments provided to support Spacecraft launch preparations.
. The RF transmissions between the Overall Spacecraft and the stations
which constitute the DSN are receivable and usable over the range of
transmitted powers expected with a positive margin.
. The Overall Spacecraft is compatible with the various range equipments
which might influence the environment (particularly electromagnetic) that
the overall spacecraft will be exposed to at the SCF, the ESF, and the
launch area.
8. The MDE is compatible with the DSIF and the SFOF equipments.
9. The LCE is compatible with the equipments and other facilities in the
ESF and launch complex.
b. Spacecraft to Capsule Tests
1. Mechanical Tests
Mechanical compatibility between the Spacecraft and capsule will be
established by:
(a) The exchange of match-mate fixtures for the location of mounting
holes, etc.
(b) A capsule adaptor will be furnished to the capsule supplier for checks
of the interface during capsule acceptance testing.
(c) Dynamic tests of the interface during the Structural Test Model
modal and static load tests using a dynamically equivalent capsule.
(d) Tests with the Engineering Development Spacecraft.
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(e} Tests with the PTM.
(f) Tests with each flight spacecraft.
Electrical Tests
Electrical compatibility of the spacecraft and capsule will be established
Tests between the power and telecommunications subsystems during
subsystem development tests. The capsule hardware may be in a
breadboard form for these tests.
(b) Tests between a development capsule and the Engineering Develop-
ment Spacecraft. These tests shall include comprehensive EMI
cheeks.
(c) Tests between the PTM spacecraft and the Capsule. These tests
will demonstrate basic compatibility and the existence of positive
margins.
(d) Tests with each flight spacecraft and capsule.
Thermal Tests
Thermal compatibility between the spacecraft and the capsule is dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.2.4 of the ITP which relates to thermal tests.
RF Tests
RF compatibility tests between the spacecraft and the capsule will be
established by:
(a) Initial compatibility will be investigated during the telecom-
munication subsystem tests with the capsule subsystems (may
be breadboards).
(b) Compatibility of the packaged hardware will be investigated and
evaluated during the tests with the Engineering Development
Spacecraft.
(c) Compatibility will be verified with the PTM hardware.
(d) Flight hardware compatibility will be verified in-house prior to
shipment to the launch site. Checks will also be made at the
SCF and at the ESF after sterilization.
by:
(a)
36 of 88
VBll0VP002
@
5. Magnetic Tests
Magnetic testing of the spacecraft and capsule is discussed in Section
2.1.2.3 of the ITP.
6. Separation Tests
See Section 2.1.2.11 of the ITP for a discussion of separation tests.
c. Spacecraft to Launch Vehicle Test
1. Mechanical Tests
Mechanical compatibility between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle
will be established by:
(a) Exchanging match-mate fixtures for the location of mounting
holes.
(b) A Launch Vehicle adaptor with interface cables and connectors
will be furnished for tests with the spacecraft in-house. A com-
parable spacecraft adaptor will be furnished to the Launch Ve-
hicle contractor.
(c) Tests of the Engineering Development Spacecraft with nose
fairings (both configurations} furnished to GE for checks of the
handling procedures and the clearances within the fairings.
These tests shall be repeated on the '69 Flight S/C #1 (Back-up
S/C) and the PTM using the appropriate fairing.
(d) Assembly of the '69 Back-up Spacecraft or PTM to the Launch
Vehicle during the tests at KSC prior to arrival of the flight
spacecraft.
(e) Assembly of each flight spacecraft to the lauch vehicle during
the preliminary pad tests.
2. Electrical Tests
Electrical compatibility between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle
will be established by:
(a) The exchange of electrical simulators. The launch vehicle
simulator will be utilized during the Engineering Development
Spacecraft tests with the L/V adaptor and the L. C.E. It will
also be used during Assembly and Check-out of the PTM and
flight spacecraft. This will not be a test of electromagnetic
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compatiblity. The Spacecraft similator will be used by the
L/V contractor during development and acceptance tests of the
L/V.
(b) Compatibility including EM[ will be evaluated during the tests at
KSC with the test L/V and the '69 Back-up S/C and the PTM.
(c) Compatibility will be verified with each flight spacecraft during
the preliminary pad tests at KSC.
RF Tests
RF compatibility between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle will be
established by:
(a) Tests with the nose fairing and the Engineering Development
Spacecraft will evaluate the suitability of the antennas located
in the fairing.
(b) Tests will be conducted in-house with the '69 Back-up S/C and
the PTM using the appropriate nose fairing and at KSC during
the tests at the launch pad.
(c) Tests will be conducted with each flight spacecraft during the
preliminary pad tests using the actual flight fairing.
4. Thermal Tests
Thermal compatibility will be established by:
(a) Tests in-house involving the fairing and the '69 Back-up S/C
or the PTM.
(b) Tests of the L/V and Spacecraft at KSC involving the '69 Back-
up S/C or the PTM prior to the arrival of the flight spacecraft.
(c) Tests of the flight spacecraft during the preliminary pad tests.
d. Spacecraft to Launch Complex Tests
1. Mechanical Tests
The mechanical compatibility between the spacecraft and the launch com-
plex relates to clearances, mating procedures, the location of work plat-
forms, and the connection of umbilicals. This compatibility will be es-
tablished by: Q
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(a) Tests at the launch complex with the '69 Back-up S/C and
the PTM (with their associated AHSE) during the pad tests with
launch vehicle test vehicle prior to the arrival of the flight
spacecraft.
(b) Preliminary pad tests with flight spacecraft.
2. Electrical Tests
The electrical compatibility between the spacecraft and the launch com-
plex will be established by:
(a) Providing a spacecraft simulator for tests of the complex wiring
prior to tests with a spacecraft.
(b) Tests with the '69 Back-up S/C or the PTM.
(c) Tests with the flight spacecraft during the preliminary pad tests.
Spacecraft to ESF Tests
1. Mechanical Tests
The mechanical compatibility between the Explosives Safe Facility and
the spacecraft relates to clearances, handling procedures, and the con-
nection of power and control cabling, fueling, and pyro installation.
This compatibility will be established by:
(a) Tests of the '69 Back-up S/C or the PTM during the test of these
spacecraft at KSC prior to the arrival of the flight spacecraft.
run" through the ESF.
2. Electrical Tests
The electrical compatibility of the SCF with the spacecraft is through
the System Test Complex except as related to EMI. This compati-
bility will be established during the tests of the '69 Back-up S/C and
PTM at KSC which will require the use of an STC in the Spacecraft
Check-out Facility (SCF). A spacecraft simulator will be used during
these tests.
Electrical compatibility will be established by:
(a) Providing a spacecraft simulator for tests of the ESF wiring prior
to tests with a spacecraft.
(b) Tests with the Flight Acceptance Test Model on the PTM.
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(c) Tests with each flight spacecraft during the preliminary "dry-run"
through the ESF.
o Magnetic Tests
Prior to the arrival of the spacecraft, it must be verified that the gradi-
ents and stability of the SCF are suitable for magnetic mapping of the
spacecraft.
f. S]_acecraft to SCF Tests
1. Mechanical Tests
The mechanical compatibility between the spacecraft and the SCF relates
to clearances, handling procedures, etc. This compatibility will be
established by:
(a) Tests with the Flight Acceptance Test Model or the PTM prior to the
arrival of the flight spacecraft.
(b) Tests with the flight spacecraft.
g. Spacecraft to DSN Tests
The interface betweeen the spacecraft and the stations which constitute the
DSN is an RF interface. It will be verified by:
1. Tests at the Goldstone site with both a spacecraft RF simulator and
with a Development System (or the '69 Back-up S/C) and the PTM.
2. Tests at remote sites will be conducted with the RF simulator and
results will be compared to the Goldstone tests.
. During the tests at KSC with the '6Y Back-up S/C, the PTM and the
flight spacecraft, tests will be conducted with Cape 71 for DSN com-
patibility.
ho Spacecraft to Range Equipment Tests
Various range instrumentation systems will be operating at KSC in direct
support of the Voyager project as well as during the time period that the
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Voyager Spacecraft are at the launch site. The compatibility of these range
equipments is an EMI consideration which will be demonstrated during the
tests of the '69 Back-up S/C and the PTM prior to the arrival of the flight
spacecraft. While the most concentrated EMI environment might be expected
at the launch pad area, the ESF and SCF are considerations which must be
evaluated.
i. Mission Dependent Equipment - DSIF Tests
1. Mechanical Tests
Mechanical compatibility of the MDE will be established first at the
Goldstone site. Subsequently, the flight support MDE will be veri-
fied at each site. This assumes the use of standard packaging.
2. Electrical Tests
During installation, the electrical compatibility of the MDE with the
station will be verified. This will be done first at Goldstone and shall
include:
(a) Checks with station power
(b) Checks of the MDE sating features
3. Environmental Control
Environmental control will be verified at each site since variations
in location and the specific environmental control equipments are
anticipated at the various sites.
j. MDE - SFOF Tests
Mechanical, electrical and environmental compatibility of the MDE in the SFOF
will be established with the hardware which supports the flight operations.
This assumes the use of standard packaging. Electrical tests shall include:
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1. Checks with facility power
2. Checks of the MDE safing features
3. Operational checks using simulated spacecraft signals.
k. Launch Complex Equipment to ESF Tests
Launch complex equipment will be installed at the Instrmnent Lab., the pro-
pellant loading area, and the assembly area in the explosives safe area. These
interfaces will be established by:
1. Mechanical
(a) Tests will be conducted with the LCE prior to the arrival of the
'69 Back-up S/C or the PTM at KSC. These tests shall include
checks of the propellant and gas loading equipments, but not the
spacecraft handling equipment.
(b) Tests of the spacecraft handling equipment and the loading of
propellants and gasses will be done on the PTM but not the '69
Back-up S/C.
(c) Propellants will not be loaded during the "dry-run" of the flight
spacecraft through the ESF.
2. Electrical Tests
(a) Electrical tests will be conducted prior to the arrival of the '69
Back-up S/C or the PTM using a spacecraft simulator. Checks
will be made using facility power. Particular attention shall be
given to the effects of EMI on control lines.
(b) These tests shall be verified on the '69 Back-up S/C, the PTM
and the flight spacecraft (during their "dry-run" through the
ESF).
3. RF Tests
The RF compatibility of the antenna mounted in the ESF area will be
verified during the tests of the '69 Back-up S/C or the PTM.
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1. LCE to Launch Complex Tests
The compatibility of the LCE with the Launch Complex will be established
prior to the arrival of the t69 Back-up S/C or PTM utilizing simulators.
The electrical, mechanical and RF compatibility of the LCE will be validated
in tests of the '69 Back-up S/C and PTM at the pad prior to the arrival of the
flight spacecraft.
The compatibility will be checked again during the preliminary pad tests of
the flight spacecraft.
2.1.2.90SE
2.1.2.9.1 INTRODUCTION
The Operational Support Equipment is a key element in the total Voyager System. In
addition to its functions of control and handling, the OSE is used to help interpret the
performance and operability of the flight hardware. In this role, it can have a major
effect upon mission success. Consequently, emphasis will be placed upon design,
manufacture and test of the support equipment.
2. !. 2.9.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a, All OSE shall be tested and certified as being safe to use with any Overall
Flight Spacecraft before being connected to any Overall Flight Spacecraft.
Such tests shall include the following:
1. Proof loading of all AHSE including facility equipments.
2. The electrical compatibility of the Overall Flight Spacecraft with
the STC, LCE, and special test equipment.
3. The verification of fail-safe features in the STC, AHSE, LCE, and
environmental test equipment.
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b. Simulators shall be used to verify the safety of connecting the spacecraft to
the OSE under the following conditions:
1. Before a test set-up such as the STC is used with the spacecraft for
the first time.
2. After a test set-up such as the STC has been disassembled and moved
to another location.
3. After modifications have been made to either the spacecraft or the
OSE which might invalidate previous compatibility demonstrations.
C. Basic compatibility between the spacecraft and the principal elements of the
OSE will be demonstrated prior to shipment to a field test site or to the launch
site.
2. i. 2.9.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Tests will be conducted to the extent necessary to demonstrate that:
1. Electrical compatibility exists between the spacecraft and the elements
of the OSE subsystem.
2. The AHSE is satisfactory for handling and shipping with a positive
margin of safety.
, The fail-safe features in the OSE are suitable and will provide ade-
quate protection for the flight hardware.
4. The self-check features incorporated into the OSE function properly.
b. OSE Tests
Breadboards of the OSE for the major subsystems will be fabricated during
Phase IB and tested for design information. These breadboards will be tested
with the Spacecraft subsystems to establish basic performance suitability and
compatibility.
Prototype OSE will be tested prior to use with the Development subsystems.
The STC will be tested to establish the compatibility of the various pieces of
subsystem OSE and with a Spacecraft simulator prior to its use with the
Engineering Development Spacecraft.
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AHSE will be used with the engineering models (STM, TCM, etc. } to the ex-
tent possible to demonstrate basic compatibility before use with the Engineer-
ing DevelopmentSpacecraft.
OSEwill be used during the type approval and PTM tests to certify its suit-
ability for use with the flight hardware. This shall include the AHSE, the STC,
the LCE, and special test equipment.
2.1.2.10 SPACECRAFT MASSPROPERTIES
2. i. 2. I0.1 INTRODUCTION
The weight, center of gravity, moments of inertia and products of inertia of the space-
craft are required for:
a. Trajectory calculations.
b. Attitude control and guidance.
c. Alignment of the midcourse and retropropulsion engines.
d. Comparison with specification limits which are imposed to comply with the
limitations of the launch vehicle system.
These properties must be known for the overall spacecraft assembly with the appen-
dages stowed (launch configuration) and with the deployed appendages in their various
articulated positions (cruise configuration). In addition, these properties must be
known for the spacecraft after capsule separation which is the Mars orbiting config-
uration.
The following will be determined analytically:
1. The C.G. envelope as a result of the deployment and articulation of the an-
tenna and scan platform.
2. The moments and products of inertia of the spacecraft.
3. The change in longitudinal C.G. location after shipment to KSC.
2.1.2.10.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a. Tests will be made to determine the weight and center of gravity of all com-
ponents and assemblies for:
1. Comparison with specified limits.
2. Use in making calculations.
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NOTE
In those cases where field spares will be
provided at a level of assembly other than
the FA level, weight and C.G. measure-
ments must be made at the spares level.
b. Weight andC.G. measurements will be made on the spacecraft with and with-
out the capsule assembled.
c. Lateral and longitudinal C.G. locations will be determined In-house, but
only lateral off-sets will be determined at KSC before launch.
2.1.2.10.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Tests shall be conducted to the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
1. The component and assemblies comply with their weight allocations.
2. The weight and C.G. of components and assemblies are known suffi-
ciently well to allow calculations of the inertial characteristics of the
spacecraft and the C.G. envelope due to deployment and articulation.
3. The weight of the spacecraft with and without the capsule is known.
4. The envelope of C.G. locations is known and is compatible with the
alignment and thrust control capabilities included in the propulsion
subsystem.
b. Components and Assemblies
1. Development
Weight and C.G. measurements will be made on development com-
ponents and assemblies for comparison with their weight allocations.
2. Type Approval
TA hardware will be tested to confirm specification conformance.
3. Flight Acceptance
The weight and C.G. of flight hardware will be measured,
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c. Spacecraft Systems
1. Development Spacecraft
Tests will be conducted with the Engineering Development Spacecraft
to determine the weight and C.G. envelope for the various flight con-
figurations.
2. Proof Test Model (PTM} Spacecraft
The PTM will be tested to determine the weight and C.G. envelope for
the various flight configurations. Comparable tests will be conducted
with the '69 Back-up S/C.
3. Flight Spacecraft
The weight and C.G. of each flight spacecraft will be determined in-
house for the various appropriate configurations.
Following shipment to the field, the lateral off-set will be checked for
final alignment of the propulsion subsystem.
2.1.2.11 SEPARATION TESTS
2. i. 2. ii. 1 INTRODUCTION
During the Voyager mission, there are three separations involving the spacecraft.
The first is the separation of the overall spacecraft from the Centaur. This
separation joint is on the spacecraft side of the spacecraft - launch vehicle interface.
The second separation involves the capsule. This is a two-fold operation in which the
biological barrier is first parted and then the capsule itself is separated from the
spacecraft. This joint is oi_ my _lJ_U-_ _u_ of ,k_,_........._a_=_o..__+ ...... _ ..._+_o_..__. Th_..._
third separation involves the removal of the aft section of the biological barrier which
is jettisoned because of the planet scan arrangement on the spacecraft. This joint is
incorporated into the spacecraft-capsule interface and is the responsibility of the
spacecraft contractor.
Separation and the resulting forces and motions imparted to the spacecraft and cap-
sule will be the subject of separation testing.
The specific hardware to accomplish the actual separation, such as the linear det-
onating cord, is not the subject of this discussion.
2.1.2.11.2 OVERALL TEST REQUIREMENTS
a. Tests will be conducted to demonstrate that separation occurs and to evaluate
the forces (particularly shock) which are transmitted into the spacecraft.
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Tests will be conducted to demonstrate that the motions {linear and angular}
which result at separation of the overall spacecraft from the launch vehicle
are compatible with spacecraft requirements.
Tests will be conducted to demonstrate that the separations of the bio-barrier
and the capsule do not introduce disturbances which are incompatible with the
spacecraft's attitude control subsystem. These tests will be made with
appendages deployed.
Tests will be conducted to demonstrate separation of the aft section of the bio
barrier from the spacecraft.
2.1.2.11.3 TEST PHILOSOPHY
a. General
Tests will be conducted to the extent necessary to provide evidence that:
. Separation of the overall spacecraft and launch vehicle is compatible
with the requirements for linear and angular rates and the forces which
result are known.
2. Separation of the aft section of the bio barrier is satisfactory.
3. Separation of the bio barrier and capsule is satisfactory.
NOTE
It is assumed that a spacecraft model will be re-
quired by the capsule contractor for development
tests of the capsule {and bio barrier} separation
system. It is further assumed that separation dem-
onstration tests will be conducted by the space-
craft contractor acting in the role of Overall Space-
craft integrator.
b. Spacecraft Model and System Tests
1. Separation Model
Spacecraft-launch vehicle separation system development and demon-
stration will be accomplished with a separation model. This may be the
Structural Test Model or a different model {which can subsequently be
used by the Capsule Contractor}.
O
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2. Flight Spacecraft ('69)
The '69 flight test will provide additional separation information relative
to the spacecraft-launch vehicle separation system.
3. Proof Test Model (PTM) Spacecraft
The PTM tests will provide information relative to the separation of:
(a) The '71 overall spacecraft-launch vehicle separation system.
(b) The spacecraft-capsule separation system (including bio barrier
separation).
(c) The spacecraft-aft bio barrier section separation.
2.1.3 MISCELLANEOUS REQUIREMENTS
Engineering specifications are the mechanism by which test requirements are defined
and disseminated. The following specifications are anticipated:
a. Test Requirements Specification for Components and Assemblies.
b. Test Requirements Specification for the Spacecraft System.
c. Environmental Test Specification.
d. Individual Component and Assembly Specifications will contain the specific
requirements for that particular hardware.
Test requirements for both Type Approval and Flight Acceptance testing (components
and systems) will be contained in the specifications. Tables 2-2 and 2-3 contain
summaries of the anticipated environments to be imposed during Type Approval and
Flight Acceptance testing. Further definition of the design and environments is re-
quired to complete these tables. For example, the ethylene oxide requirement is
dependent upon the necessity to reduce the biological load after capsule sterilization
but prior to launch.
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Type Approval Environmental Test Program
Environments
EMI
Magnetic Mapping
Humidity
High Temperature
Low Temperature
Acoustic Noise
Vibration
Thermal-Vacuum
Shock
Acceleration
Pressure
Pressure Reduction
Electrical Transients
Ethylene Oxide
Explosive Atmos
Components
and Assemblies
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
?
X
X
?
?
Spacecraft
(PTM)
X
X
X
X
X
X
?
X
?
?
Remarks
Short duration test on
selected items only.
Table 2-3. Flight Acceptance Environmental Test Requirements
Components
Environment and Assemblies Spacecraft
EMI
Mag Mapping
Vibration
Thermal-Vacuum
Thermal
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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2.2 TEST PROGRAMPOLICIES
This section contains test program policies with regard to test categories such as
development, type approval and assembly and check-out, and the test policy being
applied for the following specific subsystems:
a. Power (move specifically, the solar array).
b. Propulsion.
c. Guidance & Control.
The "test rationale" for these particular subsystems is presented here anticipating a
particular interest in the general approach being advocated.
Structural & thermal testing are included in Section 2.1.2. The test approach relative
to both the Controller & Sequencer and the Telecommunications (including antennas,
etc.) is considered to be "conventional" and specific discussion relative to these tests
are not deemed to be necessary.
2.2.1 POLICIES BY TEST CATEGORY
The basic philosophy guiding the Voyager Test Program requires a demonstration
by realistic experimental methods of the validity of new designs and of the capability
of new hardware items to meet performance requirements. This is particularly
true of the long-life requirement. The philosophy further requires that this empirical
confirmation be provided as early as possible as well as at each level of hardware inte-
gration, i.e. materials, components, assemblies, subsystems, and spacecraft.
Some applications of test philosophy have already been expressed throughout Section 2.0.
In addition to these applications, any testing program must contain the following essen-
tial elements:
a. Those specific areas of the design that are critical to mission success, or
which represent potential problem areas because of new applications or small
margins, must be defined so that emphasis in testing can be placed in those
areas that require it.
b. Each test must have specific stated goals and criteria for success.
C. Data must be utilized to establish the degree to which these specific goals
had been fulfilled. Anyperformance variation, as indicated by data, must be
understood. It is only in this manner that unanticipated performance inter-
actions can be discovered and/or anticipated.
d. Spacecraft deficiencies that are detected must be corrected.
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2.2.1.1 DEVELOPMENT TEST POLICY
"Breadboard" and model tests will beconductedto supply data essential to (or to con-
firm) the various analytical methodsand techniques used to arrive at designs of the
flight hardware. Tests will also be conductedon engineering prototype components,
subsystems and the spacecraft system to establish basic performance and life capa-
bility, to check degradingenvironments, to select the best test and measurement
points, to verify the suitability of FA and TA procedures and Specifications, and to
demonstrate the suitability of the OSE.
2.2.1.2 TYPE APPROVAL AND PTM TEST POLICY
Flight-quality componentsand assemblies and a Proof Test Model Spacecraft will be
subjected to a series of functional and environmental tests at levels appreciably higher
than anticipated mission loads. Type approvedhardware, therefore, has the inherent
margin of design to allow for variability in the hardware and the uncertainty in pre-
dicted mission environments.
Two (2) of each componentand appropriate subassembly or assembly will be type
approved.
Oneobjective of type approval testing is to validate acceptanceprocedures. All levels
of TA hardware will be subjected to the FA test cycle prior to the TA test cycle except
where the cycle can be altered to:
a. Produce required data significantly earlier.
b. Reduceenvironmental test set-up time where FA and TA test may be imposed
consecutively during the same test set-up.
Subsystemelectrical and mechanical compatibility shall bedemonstrated on the PTM
before assembly of the flight spacecraft.
IndependentTA and PTM tests will be conductedby JPL to provide further assurance
of design adequacy. All suchhardware will be acceptancetested prior to shipment
to JPL.
2.2.1.3 LIFE TEST POLICY
Life testing shall bea part of all categories of testing, starting with development and
proceeding through assembly and checkout of the flight spacecraft. Emphasis shall be
placed uponthe identification of degrading environments and verification of the exist-
ence of acceptableenvironmental levels in the various hardware assemblies. The
concept of the Dynamic Mission Equivalent will be applied to all phases, supplemented
by static missions on critical hardware.
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a third S/C is readied as a backup. The secondS/C may be launchedas soonas
two days after the first one.
2.2.2 POLICY FOR SUBSYSTEM TESTS
2.2.2.1 POWER SUBSYSTEM
2.2.2.1.1 INTRODUC TION
The Voyager power subsystem is a conventional photovoltaic primary power source
with rechargeable batteries for energy storage. Power is regulated and converted
for use by the various operating sections of the spacecraft. Most of the elements of
the power system can be tested effectively by supplying power from an external source.
The following discussion applies to the array.
2.2.2.1.2 SOLAR ARRAY TEST APPROACH
Verification of solar array output capability will be based on performance measure-
ments of individual panels. The procedures to be used are outlined below:
a. Development Hardware Standards
Two of the development solar panels will be shipped and calibrated at the
Table Mountain, California, site. These panels will provide a means for
adjusting the intensity level of a tungsten light source to be used for in-
house panel testing.
b. TA and P TM Hardware
Performance of these panels will be based on the standard described above.
With the finalization of fabrication and test techniques on these panels, it is
anticipated that several such panels will undergo testing at Table Mountain
to serve as the standards for further panel evaluation. They will be retained
only as standards and will not undergo environmental testing.
c. Flight Hardware
Hardware in this category will be tested using the standards described above.
d. System Tests
This category of testing concerns array operability once panels have been
assembled into a total array on the spacecraft.
1. INDIVIDUAL PANEL TESTS - Figure 2-1 shows the approach to be em-
ployed. The spacecraft is shown in an upright position with the active
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2.2.1.4 OPERATIONAL INTERFACES TEST POLICY
Each interface between the spacecraft system with its associated OSE and other hard-
ware or equipment will be validated. Early tests will be conducted using prototype
hardware and simulators. Later tests (still in advance of launch operations), will be
conducted with TA hardware and the PTM. Final checks will be made as a part of
launch operations. In all tests involving the launch vehicle, facilities, or support
equipments at ETR and the DSN, GE will assist JPL.
2.2. I.5 PARTS, MATERIALS, AND PROCESSES CONTROL TESTS POLICY
Rigid laboratory tests and inspections will be conducted to assure that all "ingredients"
of flight hardware conform to NPC 200-2, NASA Quality Assurance Requirements
Specification.
2.2.1.6 IN-PROCESS AND COMPONENT F/A TEST POLICY
The limited flight opportunities and complexity of the overall system requires that
acceptance testing be comprehensive. Every item of hardware is inspected and tested
after each step in its assembly. This is done in accord with NPC 200-2. Each com-
pleted component or assembly (either singly or in connected groups) is then subjected
to performance and selected environmental tests at essentially mission levels. Specific
requirements will be contained in applicable specifications.
2.2.1.7 S/C FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TEST POLICY
Performance tests will be conducted after each step of the assembly. Tests of each
function are run at each level of integration. The total spacecraft, including the flight
capsule and the retro-propulsion, will be assembled for functional and environmental
tests prior to shipment to the launch site. Environmental tests will essentially be at
mission levels.
Abbreviated mission tests which exercise the spacecraft in the mission sequence will
be conducted. During the latter phases of the assembly and checkout process, the
mission test should be a simulation of the operational situation to the maximum degree
practicable.
2.2.1.8 LAUNCH OPERATIONS TEST POLICY
Testing in the field is for functional performance and compatibility only at subsystem
and higher levels. Safety is given first priority, especially at the ESF and launch
complex. Installation and checkout of LCE during pad activation precedes shipment
of the spacecraft. Post-transportation integrity is verified; compatibility with L/V
and DSN is established; explosive devices, propellants, gases, etc. are loaded; ster-
ility of capsule is maintained; mating, the countdown, and launch through injection are
accomplished. Two S/C are prepared and counted-down simultaneously, one is launched;
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side of the array panelspointing downwards. A portable tungsten light
source with a double-walled water filter is positioned at distance h from
one of the panels. The water filter serves to minimize heating of the
panel by absorbing a large portion of the infra-red energy from the tung-
sten source. A standard reference panel is inserted into a support frame
attached to the portable light source and output readings are recorded.
The source is now indexed upward distance x and readings on the test
panel are recorded and compared with the reference panel output. This
procedure provides a reasonable check on pre and post-environmental
test performance. Since output is based on relative comparison, the
degree of light source refinement can be greatly reduced. Output of the
test panel is measured at a direct-access test connector located on each
panel ahead of its associated isolation diode. In this way stray light
reaching other panels will not contribute to the test panel output.
. FREE-MODE TESTS - Such tests are to determine the overall operability
without specifically attempting to determine performance on a quantitative
basis. One approach is to use direct sunlight in an out-of-doors test.
This may be cumbersome because of the vehicle size. Another option
is to use artificial sources such as banks of tungsten lights. It is
estimated that 30 Kilowatts of power would be required with appropriate
means for heat removal.
2.2.2.2 PROPULSION SUBSYSTE M
2.2.2.2.1 INTRODUC TION
The spacecraft's propulsion subsystem provides the impulse for mid-course corrections
as well as the retro-thrust which places the spacecraft in orbit around the planet Mars.
Two basic systems are combined to perform these functions. A mono-propellant sys-
tem with four (4) throttleable hydrazine decomposers will be used for midcourse
corrections and to provide steering during retro engine operation. The retro system
is a bi-propellant system.
The hardware will be procured from propulsion vendors to take maximum advantage
of the technologies, facilities and experience which exists within the propulsion in-
dustry.
An integrated test approach will be implemented to incorporate the propulsion subsystem
into the total spacecraft system.
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2.2.2.2.2 TESTAPPROACH
a. DevelopmentTests
Developmentcomponentswill betested by the propulsion contractor to verify
basic performance capability. In general, these tests will include environ-
mental tests and duty cycle tests. Only verification tests will beconducted
on those componentswhich are already developedor require minimum changes
for Voyager application.
Thrust chamber development for the bi-propellant engine will be donein two
phases. The first phasewill be sea-level tests with a "battle-ship" configura-
tion to verify combustor characteristics. The secondphasewill be doneat
simulated altitude with prototype (flight-weight) thrust chambers.
Thrust chamber developmentof the monopropellant engine will include catalyst
bed optimization andperformance at simulated altitude to evaluate the jet
vane action and the throttle control.
The vibration tests on the Structural Test Model (STM) at GEwill confirm the
dynamic load inputs expectedon the propulsion assemblies as a part of the
spacecraft system.
Developmenttests of both the monopropellant and bi-propellant systems will
include environmental tests followed by hot-firings at simulated altitude. A
portion of the spacecraft structure will be furnished to the propulsion con-
tractor for the environmental tests to enhancesimulation. Duty cycles will
be evaluated in eachcase. Loading andhandling procedures will be devel-
opedduring this phase.
TheEngineering DevelopmentSpacecraft tested at GE will contain a prototype
propulsion subsystem. This spacecraft wiii be subjected to compreheasive
functional and environmental tests at the system level to confirm the basic
suitability of the total spacecraft system. It is anticipated that electrical
functional tests including EMI would beconducted. Propulsion firings are
not anticipated.
During dynamic tests such asvibration, the tanks will be loaded with simu-
lated propellants to verify the integrity of the overall system. Loading pro-
cedures will bechecked during these tests.
b. Type Approval (Qualification)
A minimum of two (2) of eachcomponentused in the propulsion subsystem
will be subjected to type approval tests. This will include (where applicable)
comprehensiveperformance andenvironmental tests.
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Type approval tests on the monopropellant or bi-propellant engine systems
will be conducted by the propulsion contractor(s). This will include environ-
mental and hot-firing performance tests for design verification. Loading
procedures will be validated during these tests.
c. PTM Tests
The propulsion assembly will be included in both PTM spacecraft {one tested
at GE, the other at JPL). Hot-firing tests are being considered as an alter-
native test approach to determine interactions of the spacecraft system with
the autopilot. This is discussed in Section 4.7.2 of the Type Approval and
PTM Test Plan, CII VR ll0VP004.
Functional performance and environmental tests will be conducted on this
PTM system as will magnetic tests.
During the tests conducted at AFETR, loading will be performed in the ESF
to verify procedures.
d. Acceptance Tests
Components will be given functional and environmental tests before assembly
into the system.
Prior to delivery to GE, hot firings will be conducted to demonstrate per-
formance.
Upon arrival at GE, only functional and leak checks will be made. As a
part of the spacecraft system, environmental tests will be made.
e. Flight Tests
The propulsion assembly will be included in the '69 test flight for performance
evaluation.
2.2.2.3 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
2.2.2.3.1 INTRODUC TION
The Guidance and Control Subsystem performs four interrelated functions during the
Voyager mission.
a. The altitude control (essentially the same system employed on Mariner) tor-
ques the Overall Spacecraft from its random orientation at separation into a
controlled position about all three axis using the sun and the star Canopus as
references. This is the normal operating mode.
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b. The autopilot derives signals from a 3-axis gyro system to provide for thrust
vector control during both the midcourse and retro engine firings.
C. Articulation is provided for the high gain antenna (2 axes) and the planet scan
package (3 axes). The antenna is programmed in both axes by the Controller
and Sequencer rather than having an "active" system. Two axes of the scan
package are similarly programmed by the C and S but control for the third
axis is derived from a planet IR sensor.
do Approach Guidance is furnished to provide planet-spacecraft relative position
for planet approach and rendezvous. The information is derived from a sensor
which concurrently senses the planet, the sun and the star Canopus. This data
is transmitted back to earth for calculation of corrections which are subse-
quently accomplished by commands to the propulsion system.
Spacecraft subsystems are typically optimized for operation in a space en-
vironment and tests conducted on earth cannot yield comparable results.
This does not, of course, reduce the necessity to obtain assurance that the
subsystem can and will perform satisfactorily.
2.2.2.3.2 TEST APPROACH
The test approach for each operational function is discussed separately.
a. Attitude Control
The attitude control system is a cold gas system of the type used on Mariner.
. Development tests will be conducted on a subsystem breadboard and upon
the individual components which constitute the altitude control. This in-
^1.._^_ ,h_ se,_n_,% _r_lv_. tanks, electronics, etc. During the compon-
ent tests, environmental tests will be conducted to verify performance in
critical environments. Dynamic performance tests of certain loops will
be conducted to verify analyses of the system.
. During development tests of the subsystem, a dynamic test of the attitude
control will be conducted on an air bearing. Attitude control components
will be mounted on a fixture which simulates the principal mass properties
of the spacecraft for this test.
. During systems tests, the attitude control tanks will be charged (partial
pressures) and tests will verify operation, and polariS. Mission test
sequences will be conducted using sensor stimulators and interactions
will be checked.
4. TA and PTM tests will verify the test results from development testing
and provide a full range of environmental exposures.
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5. Tests on the flight spacecraft will include operation with the system
charged (partial pressure) to verify polarity, etc.
6. The '69 test flight will be a full system verification test.
Autopilot
The autopilot derives information from a 3-axis gyro package and generates
signals which are utilized by the throttleable midcourse propulsion system for
thrust vector alignment control. The dynamic responses of the vehicle sys-
tem are important considerations for the autopilot.
Autopilot testing has three principal objectives:
1. The inputs and outputs of the various sections of the autopilot must be
tested to verify operation and performance capability.
2. The dynamic characteristics of the spacecraft system couple with the
autopilot and this compatibility must be established.
3. The operation and compatibility of the autopilot-propulsion system
must be verified.
During development testing, the inputs and outputs of components will be
checked in breadboard tests and in tests of the individual components under
ambient and environmental conditions.
As a part of the subsystem development tests, the autopilot will be given a
closed loop test with typical propulsion system valves. A computer(s)
will be utilized to provide simulated dynamic inputs into the autopilot and
receive the outputs from propulsion system valves to study performance
capability.
PTM tests will check the operation and performance of the full autopilot
system. Two general approaches are being considered. One involves a
hot-firing of the propulsion system with the spacecraft suspended on a
system with 6 degrees of freedom similar to the Mariner Simulated Mid-
course Interaction Test (SMIT). The other involves the use of avibration
shaker. See Sect. 4.7.2 of CII VBll0VP004, T/A and PTM Test Flan for
a discussion of these alternatives.
On flight spacecraft, the autopilot will be checked by introducing error
signals via the gyro torquing motor and monitoring the output of the auto-
pilot and the actions of the propulsion system valving.
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The '69 test flight will be a partial system verification test in that the arrays
will bedifferent and, hence, the dynamics of the spacecraft will be different.
c. Articulation
Conventional test approacheswill beused to test the articulation devices.
For thoseprogrammed motions, the C and S and articulation device will be
tested together. For the single axis on the PSPwhich uses an IR sensor to
track the planet, a stimulator will be used. The '69 test flight will provide
a full test of these devices.
d. Approach Guidance
Conventionaltest approacheswill be used to test this sensing device. The '69
test shot will not provide a full test of this sensor.
2.2.2.4 OTHER SUBSYSTEMS
As noted in the introduction to Section 2.2, Test Program Policies, Power, Propulsion
and Guidance and Control are the only subsystems treated in this section.
2.3 GROUND RULES
The following ground rules pertain to test methods, assurance of performance capa-
bility, relative stresses, and compatibility:
a. The Overall Flight Spacecraft will be assembled and tested in-house before
shipment to the launch site. This testing shall include the checkout and
validation of procedures to the degree practicable.
b, Assurance of performance capability is dependent upon the existence of
adequate margins in the design. _+_-_.._, win...... h_ imnlemented, to demon-
strate the existence of these margins.
1. Environmental Test Considerations
(a) In general, flight acceptance will be conducted at just over
anticipated flight loads.
(b) Type approval tests are conducted at significantly greater than
the FA levels.
(c) Development tests should be aimed specifically at verification of
the design levels, which are higher than either FA or TA.
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o Performance or parameter variation tests will be conducted on flight
hardware at greater than specification requirements (but controlled
within safe limits) to verify margins and to discern trends in perform-
ance which may indicate potential marginal performance.
c. The following shall be accomplished before the 1969 test flight:
do
e.
f.
g.
h.
i,
j.
k,
.
1. Significant system test experience shall be accumulated.
2. Components and assemblies must have successfully completed TA
testing.
Hardline monitors will be used to supplement the telemetry during system
testing. As time progresses toward the launch date, an increasing amount of
dependence must be placed upon the telemetry data for interpretation of system
performance. This must be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in de-
pendence upon the hardline data.
Emphasis will be placed upon testing at the lowest practicable level of assembly
to preclude problems at the system level where time is so much more critical.
Spares are to have "system test experience" prior to use. To implement this,
two spacecraft will be designated as flight spacecraft and spares for these
flight spacecraft shall be taken from the backup spacecraft.
Testing approaches cannot compromise safety of the hardware and test per-
sonnel and shall not degrade reliability.
To reduce the possibility that a particular Systems Test Complex can result
in the continued erroneous interpretation of spacecraft capability, test the
system at least once with a different test complex.
Tests shall be designed to verify operability as well as performance of the
hardware. This is particularly important where redundant elements are
included in the design.
Complex systems result in unexpected interactions between components, sub-
systems, and assemblies. Tests must be designed to allow for the occurrence
of such interactions and special care must be exercised to detect them. This
implies mission profile testing.
Environmental tests shall be conducted with the spacecraft in the appropriate
operating condition. Launch and post-launch duty cycles shall be duplicated
to the degree feasible.
During assembly and checkout of the flight spacecraft, failed hardware will
be replaced rather than repaired.
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3.0 TEST PROGRAM SUMMARY
The test program which has been conceived to meet program requirements is summarized in
this section. It is expressed by a series of tables which depict the following test-related
con siderations:
a. Identification of the test
b. Purpose of the test
c. Identification of the hardware under test
d. Identification of the major facilities required
e. Identification of special test equipment requirements
f. Scheduling for hardware, facilities and equipment
g. Identification of hardware quantities by facility usage
h. Review requirements
The introduction to the ITP noted that the achievement of a test program which was complete
yet balanced was a key objective of the plan. During Phase IB, the effort to achieve an
optimum program must be continued as the design, the requirements for test and the test
program are further refined.
Data will be required at finite points in the program to assist in design, to confirm analyses,
to verify design, and to provide assurance that the system is capable of fulfilling its intended
function. In looking at the tests to fulfill these data requirements, three criteria must be
considered m__d traded-off. They are:
a. Timeliness, i.e., is the data available in a useable form at the right time ?
b. Validity, i.e., is the data suitable for its intended use?
c. Cost, i.e., is the increased assurance gained commensurate with the cost of
conducting the test7
Frequently, less valid data can be extremely valuable because of its timeliness. Similarly,
timely data may be produced cheaply, but its validity may be such that it cannot be justified.
This type of rationale must be applied to achieve the optimum program.
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3.1 INTEGRATED TEST PROGRAM SUMMARY
Figure 3-1 is a summary of all the significant Voyager tests and schedules.
of this chart supplies information in the following sequence:
a.
b.
Each line item
Test Number - A sequential identification number to aid in communication,
Test Name - A traditional, significant test identifier.
c. Test Plan Number & Date (When available) - Appropriate to those tests requiring
a formal test plan for ITB or JPL review and action.
d. Test R epo_rt Number and Date - Identification of significant reports for reference
purposes.
e. Purpose of Test - The principal reasons or objectives of the test.
f. Hardware under Test - Hardware item to be subjected to the test.
g. Facilities & Equipment Required - Only major facilities and special equipment
are included.
h. Review - indicates requirements for ITB review.
i. Remarks - Appropriate comments concerning any unique features of the test.
]. Test Phase - The phase in which the test will be accomplished.
k. Test Schedule - The planned time for the test in an integrated test schedule.
This figure is the most significant and inclusive of the summary. With the exception of
Figure 3-4 which depicts Hardware Quantities vs Facilities, the integrated Test Program
Summary indicates or implies all other information. The other summaries are included for
both condensation and clarification of certain test-related information to show the broader
aspects, usage, facility availability, etc.
Additional test detail can be found in other plans as noted in Section 4.0 of the ITP.
A chart of the ITP Summary will be wall mounted in the Program Control Room and main-
tained in a current condition.
3.2 OVERALL TEST PROGRAM SCHEDULE
Figure 3-2 portrays the overall test program schedule. It is summarized to show the relation-
ship of development, type approval, acceptance and compatfbility testing for the various levels
of assembly. For more detailed information, Figure 3-1 or the specific test plans must be
consulted.
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3.3 MAJOR TEST HARDWAREUSAGESUMMARY
Figure 3-3 depicts theplannedusageof test hardware as a function of time. This sttmmaxy
includes the major spacecraft models, developmentsystems, Proof Test Models, etc.
As the test program is refined further, this figure will be expanded.
3.4 MAJOR TEST EQUIPMENTUSAGESUMMARY
Figure 3-4 depicts the planned usage of test equipment as a function of time. The summary
includes the major test equipment items such as System Test Complexes, Launch Complex
Equipment, etc., and indicates use area as well as loading.
3.5 ITEMIZED OSE REQUIREMENTS
Figure 3-5 depicts the various test areas in which individual OSE items will be utilized.
As the program is refined and the schedule is developed in more detail, quantities of each
item will be added to this figure to indicate the number of development and prime units
that will be utilized during the program.
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4.0 TEST PLANS SUMMARY
Portions of the total test program have been included in a number of different plans
not all of which are identified as test plans. The Integrated Test Plan serves as a
tie for these separate plans to produce a balanced test program.
The interface and life test categories were deemed to be of sufficient importance to
justify separate plans even though hardware from many test phases will be used in
these tests.
This summary identifies where different parts of the test program are defined in detail.
4.1 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN
The Engineering Development Test Plan is a part of the Design and Development Plan
and includes the major ground development tests performed from the initiation of pre-
liminary design up to but not including the Type Approval hardware. It includes tests
of breadboards, engineering model hardware, and test models of both the spacecraft
and its related OSE for the '69 and '71 opportunities.
Tests relating specifically to interface testing, life testing or parts and material test-
ing are included in other test plans.
4.2 TYPE APPROVAL AND PROOF TEST MODEL TEST PLAN
The TA and PTM Test Plan includes the plans for the type approval testing of both
components and assemblies and the Proof Test Model Spacecraft. OSE will not be sub-
jected to formal type approval, but will be certified as suitable for use with flight hard-
ware as a result of testing with the development and TA hardware.
Tests relating specifically to life capability determination or verification with TA com-
ponents and assemblies and the PTM are included in the Life Test Plan.
4.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN
The Quality Assurance Plan includes the in-process inspection and test plans, the pro-
cess control test plans, and the plans for Flight Acceptance (FA) of spacecraft compo-
nents and assemblies.
4.4 RELIABILITY PLAN
The Reliability Plan includes the test plans for materials and piece parts. Tests of a
developmental nature to place parts or materials on "approved" lists and the in-coming
acceptance tests on piece parts and materials are contained in this plan.
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4.5 ASSEMBLY AND CHECK-OUT PLAN
The Assembly and Check-out Plan relates to the testing Qf flight spacecraft hardware.
It encompasses the assembly and test of the hardware after its removal as components
and assemblies from '%onded stock" through final acceptance, buy-off and transporta-
tion to AFETR.
4.6 LAUNCH OPERATIONS PLAN
The Launch Operations Plan includes all tests conducted on and with the Spacecraft
after its arrival at KSC. Launch operations terminate at injection of the Spacecraft
into orbit.
4.7 INTERFACE TEST PLAN
The Interface Test Plan includes all tests of the spacecraft and its OSE with the fol-
lowing elements of the Voyager project:
a. Flight Capsule.
b. Launch Vehicle System.
c. The facilities, equipments and procedures at KSC for supporting the Launch
Operations.
d.. The facilities, equipments and procedures of the DSN for supporting the
Flight Operations.
4.8 LIFE TEST PLAN
The Life Test Plan includes all tests on allhardware conducted specificallyfor deter-
mining or demonstrating the lifecapability of the spacecraft hardware.
4.9 OSE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
The OSE Implementation Plan includes the tests to be conducted on OSE alone during
development and certification.
5.0 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
The test program for Voyager will result in the expenditure of a significant portion of
the Voyager resources of time, manpower and facilities. Due to the unalterable nature
of the schedule with launch opportunities occurring but once every (approximately) two
years, it is imperative that the resources required to conduct the test program be de-
fined early in the program to assure their availability during Phase II. As stated pre-
viously, one of the objectives of the ITP is to assist in this early definition.
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As the project progresses, it will be necessary to monitor all aspects of the test pro-
gram to determine if it is fulfilling its role. Thus, the test schedule will be monitored
to verify that it supplies the required data at the proper time to support project effort.
Similarly, manpower and facilities and expenditure rates will be monitored and con-
trolled to assure that the total test program can be accomplished.
Complete program and resources definition are required if perturbations or changes
resulting from design or other problems are to be recognized quickly and effectively
controlled.
The test program will be implemented within the guidelines established by project
management and approved by JPL. The Integrated Test Board is the principal manage-
ment mechanism by which the over-all test program will be controlled and implemented.
5.1 INTEGRATED TEST BOARD
5.1.1 MAKE-UP OF THE ITB
The Integrated Test Board will consist of authoritative representatives from JPL,
Engineering, Quality Assurance, Reliability, Manufacturing, Safety, Systems Test and
the Project Office. As required, the board will be supplemented by specialists from
design engineering, the technology groups, configuration control, etc.
5.1.2 FUNCTION OF THE ITB
The function of the ITB results from the following:
ao Voyager contract acceptance is an obligation to control, design, develop,
fabricate, test, and launch mission-achieving hardware on specific dates and
within cost.
b. Project objectives are established by project management to meet these ob-
ligations.
c. An Integrated Test Plan is developed (with many other plans} to fulfill these
program objectives.
d. The acceptability of these plans is verified.
e. An authority is established to monitor the test program and maintain its
optimization of test effort, time and cost.
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This authority is theIntegrated Test Board. It functions to assure significance of test
uuj_uLlv_ _uiucritei_ia a_luLn_validity of test resuits which demonstrate performance
capability. This assurance is implemented by two powers delegatedby Project Man-
agementto the ITB:
a. Review
1. Of test plans, objectives and acceptancecriteria.
2. Of test specifications.
3. Of resources application.
b. Approval
1. Of test specifications andplans.
2. Of TA and FA test demonstrations and results.
3. Of readiness for shipment.
4. Of readiness for launch.
In addition to these primary functions, the ITB has certain responsibilities related to
its authority. These responsibilities include:
a. Maintenanceof current test status and plans
b. Complete dissemination of status, plans, decisions, and approvals
information.
c. Full integration of test related activity with JPL andproject management.
5.2 DOCUMENTATION
Appropriate documentationmust be prepared for both in-house and external distribu-
tion. It is anticipated that this documentationwill be as follows:
a. The ITP will be published and issued both internally and externally.
b. Summary charts of the test program will be maintained on a current basis in
the Project Control Room.
c. Photographic copies of these charts will be included in the internal status
reports andin the Monthly Progress Reports for JPL.
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d. The ITP will be re-issued periodically to reflect total program status.
e. Internal Memos will be issued which record the activities of the ITP with re-
gard to type-approval buy-off.
5.3 TEST PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES
5.3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT
A '_eam concept" which involves the systems and design engineers through-out the de-
sign, development, test and launch and flight operations will be implemented on
Voyager in light of:
a. The relative sophistication of the mission and hardware.
b. The small number of spacecraft produced and launched.
c. The long duration of the program.
The long life and high reliability requirements of the Voyager mission demand
rigid controls, established methods, disciplines, and skills. The proposed approach
incorporates both the engineer with his specialized knowledge of the design and the
functional organizations with their controls, methods and disciplines.
5.3.2 RESPONSIBILITIES
The following identifies the principal activities of the organizations in implementing
the test program,
a. Engineering provides:
1. Test requirement specifications.
2. Test hardware definitions, drawings, and specifications.
3. Procedures (broad).
4. Plans for all Engineering Development Tests.
5. Conduct and evaluation of Development tests (with assistance from others
such as facility operators when required).
6. Support for tests and operations with the TA, PTM and Flight hardware.
7. OSE definition, drawings and specifications.
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b. Quality Assurance provides:
1. Requirements and plans for in-process tests andinspections.
2. Process control requirements.
3. Plans for componentand assembly TA and FA tests.
4. Facility and equipmentoperation.
5. Test equipment(other than OSE).
c. Manufacturing provides:
1. Test hardware (other than somedevelopment items).
2. Manufacture and assembly of componentsand assemblies.
3. Supportduring assembly andtest operations.
d. System Test and Field Operations provide:
1. Plans for PTM assembly and proof tests.
2. Plans for flight S/C assembly and checkout.
3. Plans for launchoperations.
4. Plans for operational interfaces tests.
5. Plans for spaceflight operations support.
6. Definitions and implementation plans for facilities and equipment other
than OSErequired for the abovetests.
Other project elements such as Project Control and Reliability contribute to the over-
all test program andits management,but contribute more indirectly to the implemen-
tation of the overall test program.
6.0 REFERENCES
Voyager Design Study
63SD801
15 October 1963
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i. 0 INTRODUCTION
The Design and Development Phase Activity Flow Diagram (Figure 1-1. ) is divided into four
task categories or engineering functions as follows:
a. System Engineering
c. Subsystem and Component Design
d. S_ Technical Activities
1.1 SYSTEM ENGINEERING
This activity begins with analysis of requirements and constraints, proceeds to performance
of system trade off studies, development of subsystems requirements, definition of interface
functions and preparation of systems functional specifications. During Phase II, analysis of
performance data, design revision and establishment of system test requirements and team
operation are major tasks. System design and test requirements are released.
1.2 SPACECRAFT VEHICLE DESIGN AND INTEGRATION
This activity includes the design and development of the spacecraft, integration of the
mechanical design requirements for all hardware interfaces, the design and test of thermal
and structural components, the design of the spacecraft electrical harness, and hardware
interfaces with the L/V, capsule and science packages. Mockups and models to be designed
and developed and the designs and test requirements to be released are included.
1.3 SUBSYSTEM AND COMPONENT DESIGN
This activity provides design and development of the subsystem and component hardware.
A portion of these activities are performed by major subcontractors. OSE design is
accomplished within this activity by the same engineering groups responsible for flight
hardware design. Subsystems Functional Specifications are prepared and engineering model
hardware are developed and tested. Designs and test requirements for subsystems and
components are prepared and released.
1.4 SUPPORTING TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES
These technical activities support and contribute to design and development in the following
areas:
a. Reliability
b. Producibility
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c. Test & Support Equipment Interfaces
d. Parts, Materials, Processes
e. Assembly, Checkoutand LaunchRequirements
f. Safety Design Considerations
g. Computer Operation
h. Model and Mockup Construction.
1.5 CONCEPTUAL STAGE
The design concept stage of the Voyager Project encompassesthe Phase IA Studyand will
continue in an iterative manner through the early months of Phase IB. The scope of
analytical and preliminary design activities is best illustrated by reference to the technical
portions of Volumes B, C, D, and E of this study. Implementation of this activity will
generally follow the flow of Figure 1-1, with very heavy interaction betweenGE andJPL as
defined in the PasadenaEngineering Office Plan.
Transition from the conceptual to hardware stageswill be a gradual process, highly depen-
dent on the outcome of individual engineering developmenttests.
Detailed planning of engineering activity during this conceptual period - beyondthat given
in the PEO Plan and in the generic procedural plans - will be primarily a function of specific
JPL direction and the requirements and constraints of the Phase IB contract. Phase IA
Design and DevelopmentPlanning has, therefore, concentrated on the better-defined
development test area.
!.6 ENGINEERINGDEVELOPMENT TEST PLAN
The EDTP includes the major ground developmenttests which will be performed from the
initiation of preliminary designup to but not including the T/A and PTM test program.
This includes tests of breadboards, engineering model hardware and test models for both
the Spacecraft andits related OSEfor '69 and '71.
All phases of interface testing are summarized in a separate, single document. Those
performed during design and developmentrequiring the use of engineering model hardware
are described herein. The test program related to parts and materials is presented as
part of the reliability plan andis not repeated in this document.
2.0 GENERAL
This plan is based on the current definition of the preferred spacecraft design as defined in
Volume A, and Volume D, of this report.
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2.1 PURPOSE
The Engineering Development Test Plan (EDTP) documents and details the test activities
which will be a part of the Design and Development activities. It will serve as a manage-
ment tool in establishing a test program with uniform and sufficient objectives and require-
ments applicable to the various development phases. It later will provide important
reference for appraising design status and progress.
The Integrated Test Plan summarizes the above test programs with others (i. e., Life
Test, EMI Testing) and establishes the chronology and inter-relationship between them and
the total test program.
2.2 SUMMARY
The EDTP describes the progressive test activities required to support the respective design
stages. During Stage II, breadboard tests are conducted which concentrate primarily on
the functional aspect of performance at circuit, component and subsystem levels. During
early Stage I I I component and subsystem tests are continued on packaged hardware to
evaluate both the environmental and functional aspects of the design. Later in Stage I I I
system tests are conducted to verify compatibility and evaluate overall performance; and,
final hardware assemblies are subjected to pre TA environments. Throughout late Stage H
and Stage II I, test models are fabricated to develop and verify the design with respect to
particular technologies. Although the TA and PTM tests of Stage IV are considered the
formal demonstration of design certification, the Engineering Development Test Program
is intended to develop a high confidence in successfully completing that test phase. For the
Summary Development Test Schedule, see Figure 2-1.
3.0 PHASE IB BREADBOARD TESTS
3.1 DEFINITION OF BREADBOARD TESTS
The activity described herein encompasses development testing at the component and sub-
system levels which will be performed during the design and development cycle of Phase IB
and early Phase II. Breadboard tests will be performed on hardware fabricated to Stage II
releases and will be essentially complete prior to the initiation of Stage III activities.
The term breadboard used herein refers to an assemblage of electronic and/or electro-
mechanical parts into circuits and functional elements used solely for test purposes.
Early test specimens of structures and mechanisms are discussed in the following Section
4.0 under the appropriate technology independent of whether they are performed during
Phase IB or Phase II.
3.2 OBJECTIVE
The objective of breadboard testing is to determine the suitability of the design to meet its
performance requirements (and to complete testing early enough that deficiencies may
7 of 62
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readily be corrected). As a minimum, breadboard tests will:
a. Establish functional performance (demonstrate state-of-art)
b. Identify critical areas in terms of marginal performance or life
c. Establish preliminary EMI and Magnetic suitability
d. Begin identification of key performance indicators (for subsequenttesting and
ultimate ly launch-hold crite ria)
e. Investigate degradedperformance for various failure modes
f. Investigate methods of test for automatic (non-sensing) redundancyschemes.
3.3 HARDWAREREQUIREMENTS
In order to establish a reasonable trade-off betweenearly establishment of the suitability
of design through breadboard tests versus the desire to be reasonably certain that the
designverified is representative of the final design, the following ground rules will be
adhered to:
a. A "first cut" approved parts list will be drafted during Phase IA and issued in
preliminary form during Phase IB. This list will consist of parts selected from
previous experience with a history of suitable performance for Voyager application.
Maximum effort shall be made to use these type parts wherever possible in new
circuit designs.
Do Approved parts (on Approved Parts List) need not be used for breadboard fabri-
cation. Commercial equivalents may be substituted if time and dollar savings are
significant.
e. Where non-approved part requirements are identified, they shall be submitted for
approval as early as possible in the design cycle (refer to Reliability CII-VBll0
VP010).
d° Uniform parts derating will be established through design standards published and
and approved specifically for Voyager. Derating factors shall be adhered to
whenever practical in breadboards. Exceptions will be identified, and communicated
to design standards.
e. Where practical, standardized circuits will be established through published and
approved design standards. These circuits will demonstrate long life through
previous experience or extensive functional and environmental testing. They shall
be incorporated into breadboard designs whenever possible.
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fo Standardized digital logic modules will be established through design standards
published and approved specifically for Voyager. Breadboard logic shall be
functionally equivalent.
go Components will be designed to incorporate test monitor and stimulus points at a
test connector, such points being isolated from the functional circuitry. These
test features will be incorporated into all breadboards.
h. Fabrication of individual breadboards is the responsibility of the cognizant design
engineer and will be performed under his direction. He (design engineer) will use
the processes and personnel which are planned for final hardware design.
i. The concept of three-dimensional breadboards (packaged but not potted or con-
formal coated) shall be used where possible for final breadboard hardware.
j. Breadboards of each type of component will be fabricated for component level
testing. After breadboard tests are completed, it will be maintained and up-dated
as required to evaluate subsequent changes.
k. Additional breadboards of each component will be fabricated, functionally tested
and delivered to the subsystem engineer for subsystem tests.
3.4 TEST REQUIREMENTS
In order to insure a uniform and adequate breadboard test program, the following will
establish the minimum test requirements for components and subsystems.
3.4.1 COMPONENT TEST REQUIREMENTS
The Component Test Requirements are as follows:
a. Performance
1. Establish complete functional performance capability.
b. Power
1. Maximum and minimum requirements
2. Performance at extremes of regulation, ripple, etc.
3. Characteristics and levels of noise produced on power lines
4. Transient and switching effects.
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c. Thermal
1. Performance at high and low temperature extremes (to TA levels).
d. Magnetic
1. Preliminary magnetic field survey.
e
e. EMI (depending on component history)
1. Limited conducted susceptibility
2. Interference (on components suspected to produce significant interference).
f. Isolation
1. Verify effective isolation of test and telemetry points.
3.4.2 SUBSYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS
The Subsystem Test Requirements are as follows:
a. Initial Power
1. Harness compatibility
2. Power requirements
3. Grounding verification.
b. Performance
1. Component compatibility
2. Quantitative performance (determined individually for each subsystem)
3. Inter-subsystem compatibility.
c. Special
1. Special investigation tests resulting from problems, marginal performance
or changes.
3.5 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS
It is intended that sufficient documentation during and preceding breadboard testing will be
provided to meet the need of all concerned but not in quantity and formality that would
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hinder the respective design engineers from accomplishing his development with maximum
latitude and in a timely manner. To this end, the following ground rules will be used:
a. A uniform set of minimum test requirements will be applied to all breadboard
tests. These will be issued by System Engineering.
b. In addition to the above, the respective subystem and component engineers will
add those requirements he deems appropriate for his subsystem/component.
C. The subsystem/component engineer will issue a pre-test plan summarizing the
tests to be performed.
d. Detailed pre-test reports will not be written.
e. At the conclusion of each major phase of testing, an Engineering Test Report will
be written summarizing the test performed, description of the test set-up, signifi-
cant data obtained and results or conclusions.
f. At the conclusion of breadboard tests, a summary report (primarily a compilation
of individual Engineering Test Reports) will be issued by the subsystem/component
engineer.
g. Complete engineering notebooks will be maintained for all development breadboard
activity. (Early failure data will be included.)
4.0 ENGINEERING MODEL DEVELOPMENT TESTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Development tests on engineering model hardware include those test activities which follow
breadboard testing and lead into but do not include formal TA and PTM tests (see Figure
4-1). • These tests, performed during Stage I I I, include both functional and environmental
aspects at various levels of assembly. They are discussed herein by individual technology
(i. e., structural, thermal,etc. ) and by functional subsystem (i. e., G&C, power, etc.).
System level tests of the complete Development Spacecraft are discussed in the following
Section 5.0.
4.1.1 HARDWARE DEFINITION
In the individual technology areas the test models are complete only to the extent necessary
to evaluate the particular aspect of performance under investigation. Each test model will
be defined by drawings for this specific purpose.
In the functional subsystem areas two groups of test hardware are referred to and defined
as follows:
a. Engineering Model (EM) Components are built to early Stage III definition and used
by the component design engineer for functional and environmental evaluation of
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the design. At least one component of each type will be fabricated for test.
The hardware will be updated as required to incorporate design changes so that
the hardware tested is representative of the final design. Separate engineering
models will be built for '69 peculiar hardware and for components significantly
modified for the '69 mission.
b. Engineering Model Subsystems will consist of complete bay assemblies built during
early Stage III and will be used for component compatibility, subsystem perfor-
mance and OSE compatibility. Schedule constraints require that the subsystem
hardware be initially configured for '69, tested, and then updated and retested as
required in its '71 configuration.
The Development Spacecraft will be a complete spacecraft system fabricated to definition
late in the Stage I I I activity and used for functional and environmental system tests and
compatibility checks. As with the subsystem hardware, initial configuration is for '69.
Fabrication of the above hardware will be processed through the development and/or pro-
duction manufacturing facilities. Configuration changes will be documented by Alteration
Notice (AN) but without the formal approval signatures. Parts and materials used in the
initial EM hardware may have exceptions from the approved type (with the concurrence of
Reliability Engineering); however, the final prototype models will adhere to the use of only
approved parts, materials and processes.
4.2 THERMAL TESTS (See Table 4-1 and Figure 4-2)
4.2.1 COMPONENT TESTS
Component tests are referred to as follows:
a. Superinsulation Conductivity Tests - Little information is available on conduction
coefficients for superinsulations when applied at high temperatures. (i. e., in
vicinity of thrust chambers. ) Specimens of superinsulating materials considered
for Voyager application will be tested to accurately establish these coefficients.
b. Flexible Electrical Conductors - Flexible conductors are anticipated to be required
between movable structures (antenna, scan platform, etc. ) and the bus structure.
To supplement thermal analysis, models of these flexible joints and conductors will
be fabricated including insulation cove rings, heaters, terminal heat sinks and
varying electrical loads (if significant). Test will be conducted to verify thermal
design and particularly heater power requirements. This test hardware will be
fabricated during Stage II so that results are available early in Phase II.
After verification of the thermal design, models of these devices will be put on life
tests.
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Table 4-1. Thermal Test Summary
Technology or
Thermal
Thermal
and
Others
Thermal
"l_lermLal
Thermal
Thermal
"l_ermal
Thermal
Thermal/
Power
"l_ermal/
Structure/
Telecom.
Therr..]
Thermal
Test
Superinsula-
tion Conduc-
tivity
Flexible
Ccqanectors
Appendage
Conductance
Critical
Component
Conductance
Louver
Controller
Bus Thermal
Model
Thermal
Control
Scale Model
Scan Plat-
form Model
Solar Array
Model
Antenna
Deflection
Prelaunch
Cooling
Spacecraft
Thermal-
Vacuum
To determine con-
ductivity of super-
insulation materials
(eg, Kapten) at high
temperatures.
To determine heater
& insulation design
requirements on
flexible electrical
conductors.
To determine thermal
conductance thru com-
plex appendage attach-
ment points (array
hingcs, antenna
supports, magnetometer
boom, etc.)
To evaluate inter-
nal thermal conductanees
or special heat sink
requirements in areas
where design margines
are small or difficult
to determine.
To determine effec-
tive solar absorptivity
and emissivity as a
function of louver
angle.
To verify bus thermal
design & investigate
shutter failure modes
and equipment failure
modes.
To verify overall
thermal design for
various operating
modes.
To verify complex
thermal design of
scan platform
thermal control
under simulated
orbital conditions.
To verify thermal
design ofarray
and attitude con-
trol gas lines.
To determine thermal
distortion in high gain
antenna dish and
support structure
To determine air
flow rate and dis-
tribution required
for all phases of
pre-launch.
To vertfyoverall
thermal design
under realistic
duty cycles.
Hardware
Identification
Typical insu-
lation assemblies
as required.
Special models
from Stage II
or III release.
Thermal models
as required.
Eng. model as
required.
Eng. model
from Stage H.
Eng. Thermal
model of bus
(including
tankage)
One-third
scale model of
overall flight
spacecraft.
Eng. model of
scan platform,
thermal model
of science pay-
load & partial
thermal mock-
up of bus and
_ular _xray.
Thermal model
of array seg-
ment & partial
bus and capsule
I mock-upo &
associated
attitude ccm-
!tr01gas
plumbing.
Eng. model of
aatenna & sup-
pert structure
from Stage Ill
Spacecraft bus
with thermal
model of cap-
sule, plus
interstage
and shroud.
Spacecraft w/
slm. capsule
(appendages
detached)
Test Facilities
Special instru- Smsll TV
me, ration Chamber
(no solar
simulation
Drive Mech- 5 x 5
anization Chamber
Generally
5x5
Chamber
(no solar
simulation}
Generally
5x5
Chamber
no solar
simulation)
Schedule
Phase IB
Phase II
Late
Phase IB
or early
Phase II
Phase II
Movable 5 x 6 TV Late
Fixture Chamber Phase IV
(24 Dia
Solar
Simulator)
IR Heaters 10 x 12 Early
Special Chamber Phase H
test rack (no solar
Special simulation)
instru-
mentation
Malta Data
System
Movable Space En- Phase II
Fixture vir onmental
Special Simulator
Test Rack with full
Special sun.
instru-
mentation
Malta Data
System
Heaters I0 x 12 Phase II
Special w/o sun
Test Rack
Special
instru-
mentuttun
Malta Data
Special Space Phase II
instru- Environ-
mentution mental
Movable I Simulator
Fixture i with full
Multa Data sun.
System
Special Space Phase II
instru- environ-
mentation mmtal
Movable Simulator
Fixture Malta wlt_ full
Data Sys. sun.
AHSE High Bay Phase II
Ground Cool- Lab
ing Equip-
ment
Radiant
heaters
Malta Data
Syalem
Special SETF 39' Phase II
test rack Chamber
Special (no solar
test in- sire.)
strmn_m -
tetion
OSE/Malta
Data
System/IR
Heaters
* Required for all tests: Standard Lab. Equipment/ Fixture with Heaters/Multipoint Recorders
Comments
Assume 3 tests of
this type. Test
duration may be
extended for life
data.
Assume 5 tests
of this type.
Approx. 3 such
tests required
based on past
experience.
Similar tests have
not previously been
made over wide
angles of solar
incidence expected
during maneuvers.
Tests are required
for both '69 & '71
configurations.
(Same as above)
(Same a_ above)
(Same as above)
(Same as above)
Developmemt
spacecraft used
for '69 configur-
ation teste PTM
used for '71
Development
spacecraft used
for '69. May
use SES.
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co Appendage Conductance Tests - Appendages such as solar arrays, booms, etc. will
be attached to the bus structure through mechanical joints (which will also be thermal
insulators) through which thermal conductance is difficult to determine with certainty.
Since an accurate knowledge of these heat leaks are required for overall thermal
design, models will be fabricated and tested to provide quantitative data relative
to these thermal paths. These tests will be performed sufficiently early to update
the analytical model prior to the major thermal model tests.
d, Critical Component Conductance Tests - Where design margins are small on
individual components or sub-assemblies, special tests will be run on instrumented
engineering model hardware in order to verify the adequacy of the thermal conductance
paths and heat sinks. These tests will be performed during the component develop-
ment cycle on Stage I I I hardware.
e° Controller Tests - Active temperature controllers of the louver type are expected
to be required in the bus in order to maintain the temperature range to reasonably
small values. A working model of the controller will be fabricated for test in late
Phase IB or early Phase II. The tests will be run in a thermal vacuum chamber
equipped with solar simulation. The incidence angle will be varied to simulate
solar impingement during varying maneuvers and orbital operation so that effective
absorptivity and emissivity characteristics may be verified. These tests will
precede thermal model tests.
4.2.2 MODEL TESTS
In order to verify the thermal design of the bus and the overall flight spacecraft, several
thermal model tests are anticipated. All or portions of each of the following test will be
required for both the '69 and '71 configurations.
a° Bus Thermal Model - The main bus section design is expected to be relatively
independent from a thermal viewpoint (i. e., superinsulation on capsule and launch
vehicle ends of the vehicle, insulated appendages, etc. ). in urde_ " to vw,u,_'..... its"
overall thermal design a thermal model bus will be fabricated from Stage II
definitions. This model will contain working louvers, superinsulation coverings,
simulated heat leaks on its external surface. (Appendages will not be included in
the model. ) Internal heat sources will be simulated using dummy components with
programmable heaters. Tankage integral to the bus structure will be included.
The model will be fully instrumented and placed in a vacuum chamber without
solar simulation. Normal operating modes and failure modes (both louver and
internal component) will be simulated to evaluate the thermal design. An automatic
recording system will be used so that the numerous instrumentation readouts may
be controlled, recorded and directly processed by a computer for data analysis.
b. Scan Platform Model - Present design configurations indicate a thermally indepen-
dent scan platform. An approach similar to that used in testing the bus thermal
model will be used to evaluate the scan platform thermal design. A partial bus and
solar array mock-up will be included to simulate the expected view factor from the
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scanplatform to its surroundings. Thermal mock-ups of the science payloads will
be required.
C. Solar Array Model - Detailed thermal analyses of the solar array can only approxi-
mate the actual heat paths and contact resistances inherent to solar array con-
struction. A thermal vacuum test of a solar array panel including attached
attitude control gas plumbing in conjunction with a partial mock*up of the bus and
bio-barrier sections is required to identify localized thermal problems within the
array and the adequacy of the attitude control equipment thermal design. Solar
simulation is highly desirable and has been planned.
do Thermal Control Model - A scaled thermal model of the overall spacecraft, including
capsule and appendages will be fabricated to verify the overall spacecraft thermal
design. A dimensional scaling of approximately 3 to 1 will be used to reduce the
overall spacecraft size to fit existing facilities. This model will be tested initially
in the '69 configuration, updated and then retested in the '71 configuration. The
validity of the thermal modeling will be partially verified from the full scale
thermal tests and more thoroughly validated from the '69 flight data.
eo Antenna Deflection Test - In order to verify the thermal distortions of the high gain
antenna and its support structure, a full scale model will be fabricated to final
Stage III definition. It will be installed in a large thermal vacuum chamber so
that the angle of solar incidence may be varied. The specimen will be fully instru-
mented for both temperature and distortion measurements with particular caution
to minimize gravitational distortions.
4.2.3 PROOF TESTS OF FLIGHT CONFIGURATION VEHICLES
Following model testing, the Development Spacecraft {for the '69 configuration) and the PTM
(for the '71 configuration) will be instrumented and subjected to a prelaunch cooling test
and a spacecraft thermal vacuum test. The prelaunch cooling test will be conducted with
the spacecraft operating in the appropriate mode inside the shroud so that air flow distri-
bution and rates may be determined. The complete thermal vacuum tests are intended to
verify the final thermal design using real electronic components operating under represen-
tative duty cycles in the various flight modes. Full space simulation testing, using real-
istic solar inputs, is possible for the smaller '69 configuration with existing facilities.
This would provide an excellent early validation of thermal modeling process.
4.3 STRUCTURAL TESTS (See Table 4-2 and Figure 4-3)
Structural development tests will be performed in conjunction with analysis to arrive at a
minimum weight design capable of reliably meeting its requirements.
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4.3.1 MODEL TESTS
Four groups of tests are referred to and definedas follows.
ao Mechanical Analog Test - As early as practical during Stage II design, a develop-
ment structure of the overall spacecraft will be fabricated with simulated masses
for the major assemblies, tankage and components. The structure will be instru-
mented to measure acceleration response along three axes and subjected to low
level constant base acceleration sinusoidal sweeps from approximately 5 cps to
200 cps. Data obtained from these sweeps will be reduced to obtain the component
of response 90 ° out of phase with the input acceleration. Model frequencies will
be identified as those frequencies at which the quadrature response peaks at a
significant number of transducers. Data for definition of mode shapes will be
obtained by recording data during a dwell at each resonant frequency. Prior to
obtaining data in the dwell tests the frequency will be adjusted to tune the peaks
in the quadrature component of response. Acceleration mode shapes will be
established from the quadrature components of response. Model testing will be
performed using excitation along three mutually perpendicular axes and a
torsional excitation about the thrust axis. The experimentally determined mode
shapes and frequencies will be supplied to the launch vehicle manufacturer for his
use in conducting dynamic analysis of the combined launch vehicle system.
At the conclusion of model testing, the structure will be subjected to both random
and sinusoidal inputs along the launch axis at anticipated PTM levels. This test-
ing will provide information re the change of damping characteristics under higher
loads and overall adequacy of the design concept.
Model tests will also be made on this early structural model in the configuration
representative of midcourse and retropropulsion firings. The testing techniques
will be identical to that of the launch configuration. Response coordinates at the
points of load application and control system sensor locations will be specifically
included for use in later analysis. For autopilot system stability analysis, dynamic
characteristics of the structure will be required in a frequency range below that
typically used in model surveys. Special tests, in the 0 to 10 cps range, will
therefore be included to assure that resonances do not exist in this region.
b. Static Tests - The same structure used during Mechanical Analog Tests, modified
as necessary, will be subjected to static load tests. The most severe combinations
of quasi-static and dynamic loads, derived from analysis and test, will be applied
to the test model as simulated steady state loads. Loading will be in the longitudinal,
lateral and torsional directions. A nominal amount of instrumentation will be used
to verify major load paths and to uncover potential problems due to excessive
deflections. The results of these tests are needed in time to incorporate changes
into the final structural design.
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C. Structure Magnetic Test - Prior to assembly of the components and subassemblies
into the Structural Test Model (STM), the basic structural skeleton will be magne-
tically mapped. This test will verify the adequacy of the manufacturing process
and controls used to build a magnetically clean structure.
d. Structural Test Model - The STM will be a prime design structure (including capsule
and fairing )incorporating design changes from all previous testing and analytical
studies. Assemblies and components need not be operative but will be dynamically
similar to flight hardware. The STM will be subjected to a full dynamic test pro-
gram including model testing and all PTM requirements. Model testing may be
curtailed from the program performed on the early model if the character of the
data shows that no significant differences exist. This model will be fully instru-
mented to provide data for definition of the structural parameters of the space-
craft under dynamic conditions including:
o Mode shapes and frequencies and damping parameters for refinement of both
launch and maneuver conditions. Specific coordinates will be included in the
mode shape data to verity clearances between the fairin_g and spacecra_ft under
launch conditions.
2. Identification of structurally critical areas.
3. Verification of individual component and assembly acceleration levels.
The STM, as well as the earlier structure for analog tests, will be initially
configured to the '69 spacecraft design and after testing be updated to the '71
configuration and retested prior to '71 PTM testing.
4.3.2 STRUCTURAL COMPONENT TESTS
Structural Component Tests are defined and referred to as follows:
al Static Tests - Static tests of basic load carrying components will be conducted to
verify their stress and deflection analyses. Load will be applied in increments of
the basic steady state loads, until failure, and instrumentation used to measure
deflections and strain distributions and levels. These tests will be made sufficiently
early to permit design changes to be incorporated prior to STM tests. Typical
components would include honeycomb shear panels and attachments, tankage and
tank trunnion fittings, propulsion module attachment fittings, antenna support
fittings, etc.
b° Dynamic Tests - Vibration tests of structural components not included or
significantly changed since the Mechanical Analog Tests will be performed prior to
the prime STM tests. Inputs will be determined from the analog tests and
sufficient instrumentation provided to insure survival through PTM level tests.
Typical specimens may include the array mounting panels, the thermal control
(louver) mounting panels and the high gain antenna.
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4.3.3 FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURALTESTS
Functional Structural Tests are defined and referred to as follows:
a. Separation Tests (S/C - L/V) - A MDF initiated separation system is proposed for
S/C - L/V separation. Full scale ambient tests will be performed to demonstrate
operation of the system and to measure shock levels transmitted to the S/C struc-
ture. The STM (with replacement lower separation rings) will be instrumented and
used for this purpose.
b° Separation Tests (Capsule - S/C) - Combined tests of the capsule supplied sepa-
ration system using the structural models of the capsule and S/C bus are con-
sidered necessary. Depending on the separating scheme selected, these tests may
require the experimental determination of linear and angular separation rates and
include the effects of long-term space environment storage in addition to those
discussed above. The capsule and separation mechanism would be supplied by
the capsule contractor.
C* Deployment Tests - Deployment tests will be performed to determine the effects of
the release mechanism, the successful operation (i.e., rotating, unfolding, etc.),
and the securing or latching into the desired position. Such tests will include
environments and simulate actual spacecraft use. Test specimens may include
the scan platform, solar arrays, high gain antenna and magnetometer boom.
d. Motion Tests - Tests will be run in order to demonstrate satisfactory operation
of mechanisms such as antenna gimbals, scan platform gimbals and jet vane
devices after or during sustained exposure to simulated environments.
4.4 R. F. MODEL TESTS
R: F. Model test are defined by Motorola (Refer to separate Appendix).
4.5 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM TESTS (See Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4)
The Guidance and Control equipment for Voyager may be divided into the following functional
groupings:
a. Spacecraft Control - Which includes control of the S/C during initial orientation,
cruise and turning of the S/C prior to midcourse and orbit insertion maneuvers and
capsule separation.
b. Autopilot - Which includes control during midcourse and retro firing.
c. Articulation - Which permits antenna pointing and instrument platform pointing.
d. Approach Guidance - which provides three-axis reference data.
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In many respects the Spacecraft Control will be similar to that of the Mariner Spacecraft.
In addition to similar design approaches (e. g., derived rate and cold gas cruise control),
there are areas where common hardware may be used (i. e., Canopus tracker). The major
G & C design and development problems for Voyager are anticipated in areas where additional
or more stringent requirements exist over the Mariner design. These include development
of the autopilot system, long life requirements particularly for the antenna and scan plat-
form articulation devices, gyros and star tracker and test problems associated with the autopilot.
Modifications to the G & C equipment for the '69 mission are considered minor and with the
possible exception of system level autopilot tests, no major '69 peculiar G & C development
tests are anticipated. G & C development tests will include both component and subsystem
tests as follows:
a° EM Component Tests - Engineering Models built to early Stage III design will be
fabricated for each type of component. This hardware will be subjected to a series
of functional and environmental tests to verify its design. These tests will contain
complete performance and the more stringent environmental requirements that
need to be demonstrated during TA. Where separable components are involved
(i. e., sun sensor), each component will individually be subjected to environments.
Where several components are integrally packaged into bay assemblies, combined
environmental tests at the bay level are preferred.
Component test will be performed on each of the following packaged entities :
1. Electronic Subassemblies
Control Electronics
Autopilot Electronics
2. Gyro and Accelerometer Package
3. Sensors
Sun Sensors
Canopus Sensor
Approach Guidance Sensor
Mars Vertical Sensor
4. Actuators
Gimbal Actuator and Controller
5. Gas Jet S/S Components
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b.
6. Electronic Assembly (Bay 12)
Includes item (1) and (2), the Approach Guidance Sensor
Electronics and the C & S.
The EM Component test program will include as a minimum:
1. Wt. (CG on separable components)
2. Comprehensive performance tests
3. EMI Tests
4. Vibration
5. Temperature or TV
6. Magnetic Tests (On separable components and on the complete bay. )
Tests peculiar to particular components (i. e., solar impingement of star trackers)
will be added to the above minimum requirements. Life tests will be performed
on components with limited previous test or flight history.
EM Subsystem Tests - A complete G & C subsystem fabricated to Stage III will
undergo development tests. Individual components or subassemblies will be
checked out by the cognizant component engineer prior to integration into the
subsystem. Development OSE will be used for testing and to simulate other space-
craft subsystems. Testing will be performed in each of the four listed functional
groupings as well as a complete integrated tests. Testing in each group will
include initial power tests to .... _;'_ ..... " ..... _o _,,_ _,_ _g,,l_r_n
characteristics, and to determine compatibility and tolerance limit operation.
Performance tests will include frequency _esponse, response to input parameters,
response to initial errors, effects of cross coupling and response to sequential
events. Specific development anticipated in each of the functional groups follow:
1. Spacecraft Control
The major areas of investigation are r?ference acquisition, gas consumption,
effects of solar pressure disturbance torques and of capsule tip off rates and
S/C turn maneuvers. Tests of the reflective and absorbtive characteristics of
solar panels and other surfaces will be made to establish solar pressure
disturbance torque loads. Other test methods which will be used to evaluate
spacec raft control performance include :
(a) Static bench tests
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(b) Hardware - analog computer simulations
(c) Dynamic - motion simulator tests
2. Autopilot
The major problems to be evaluated are the effects of the S/C flexibility, cross-
coupling, and time response on autopilot stability and performance. Most
likely, the hardware-analog computer simulation will be the preferred test
method. One approach would be to use position transducers on the throttling
valves and jet vanes, to simulate the control torques and S/C response with
the computer, and position the gyros on a computer driven gimballed platform.
These tests will be combined with the TVC tests of the propulsion subsystem
for overall verification of the autopilot design.
3. Articulation
(a) Antenna Pointing - The gimbal structure, the actuators and controller will
be tested for accuracy, power consumption, and speed of response.
(b) Scan Platform Pointing - These tests are similar to the above with the
addition of the third gimballed controlled by the Mars Vertical Sensor.
Mars acquisition and tracking accuracy will be tested.
(c) Approach Guidance - These tests may be performed entirely on a component
level.
4.6 POWER SUBSYSTEM TESTS (See Table 4-4 and Figure 4-5)
The development program for the power subsystem hardware is expected to follow relatively
standard paths. The design approaches for the inverters, regulators and arrays are well
defined. Conservative designs, well within the state of the art are anticipated. Develop-
ment testing will concentrate on establishing the capability of the specific design selected
for Voyager application. A few areas of concern have been identified from preliminary
analysis. They include the overall long life requirement, the particular long life problem
for batteries of the non-magnetic variety and the potential temperature extremes expected
for the solar arrays (particularly during Mars shade).
The array configuration and total power requirements differ significantly for the '69 mission.
Separate array development (and therefore development tests) will be required for each
array. Although common components will exist, differences in capacity, control and distri-
bution indicate that development of '69 peculiar hardware will be required. The power
switching and logic and pyro controller are examples.
The power subsystem equipment will be contained in three equipment bays plus the solar
arrays. Two of these bays (Nos. 1 and 5) will be identical and contain the following
components :
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a. Batte_r
b. Charge Regulator
c. Main Re_o_lator (subdivided into three subassemblies)
d. 400 cps, 3 phase inverter
e. 2400 cps, 1 phase inverter
f. Power Harness.
In the third bay (No. 2) the synchronizer, power switching and logic (PS&L), and pyro
controller are added and the main regulator and inverters are excluded.
4.6.1 E. M. COMPONENT TESTS
Engineering Models of each of the above components and of the bay assemblies will be
fabricated during the early Stage I I I activity for development testing. The test program
will be similar in content to that discussed in Section 3.5-a. for G&C components (i. e.,
complete performance and the more stringent TA environments on all components plus
additional tests appropriate to specific components). Tests in this latter category include:
a. Battery Life Tests - Beginning in Phase IB and continuing well into Phase II, and
extensive program of battery life tests will be conducted. Groups of batteries
will be placed on various charge/discharge cycles where their performance and
life capability will be monitored during extended periods of time. The charging
rate and depth of discharge will be varied on different groups of batteries. Addit-
ional batteries will be subjected to long duration trickle charge at various levels.
The effects of single and multiple cell degradation will be examined. The data
from these tests will guide final battery selection and provide criteria for the
selection of the final design values for the Charge Regulator.
b. Fault Sensor Tests - Within the Main Regulator and the Inverters various techniques
(and hardware to implement these techniques) for fault sensing are under consider-
ation. Tests are required to demonstrate the performance capability of the
alternative approaches including the inclusion of redundant sensing circuits. These
tests will provide data for selection of the final design.
C. Switch Selection Tests - The PS&L unit incorporates numerous power switching
functions which will be implemented with latching relays. Test will be made of
various packaging configurations and shielding arrangements in order to develop
a design which meets the magnetic cleanliness requirements.
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4.6.2 EM SUBSYSTEMTESTS
A complete set of Engineering Model hardware will be fabricated for subsystem tests.
Interconnecting harnessing will, to the maximum practical extent, duplicate the system
harness as to wire types, sizing, lengths, shielding and grounding in order that noise
determinations and magnetic measurements are realistic. Inter-component compatibility,
OSE compatibility, and subsystem performance will be established during these tests.
Performance test will include end-to-end tests (from radiant input to simulated loads)
for various modes and power profiles. Throughout these tests particular emphasis will be
placed on various failure modes in order to demonstrate the design suitability with respect
to failure sensing, redundant switching and fault protection. A capsule load simulator will
be required for these tests.
Due to subsystem differences, these tests will be repeated as required for the '69 and '71
c onfignrations.
4.6.3 ARRAY DEVELOPMENT TESTS
a. Interconnecting Material Tests - The interconnection of the silicone solar cells
into submodules requires a material which is a suitable conductor, is non-magnetic,
has a coefficient of expansion similar to the solar cells and can be easily electrically
interconnected. Tests of samples of various designs will be made in order to
determine their suitability. These tests will investigate mechanical, thermal and
electrical properties of the designs. Since these tests are made at the submodule
level, they will be applicable to either the '69 or '71 array configurations.
b. Solar Array Thermal Cycle Test - In order to verify the integrity of the overall
mechanical design (and manufacturing processes) for the solar array under the
anticipated thermal extremes, sections of the array will be fabricated during
Stage III and will be thermally cycled in a vacuum environment. The test will be
continued through sufficient deep thermal cycles to preclude premature failure of
the design. Similar tests may be required for both the '69 and '71 configurations.
C. Array Performanoe - Sections of the solar array fabricated during Stage I II will
be tested at Table Mountain {or an equivalent facility) in order to accurately
establish their performance under a realistic radiant input. These test structures
will also serve as calibration references for in-house testing.
d. Array Magnetic Properties - The solar arrays are a potential source of magnetic
fields and particular care must be taken in the routing of interconnections between
cells, submodules, modules and subassemblies. Early configurations will be
tested to determine their suitability from a magnetic field standpoint. Failure
modes will be considered in these tests. Detailed magnetic mapping will also
be performed on the complete array panels built during Stage II'I. This test will
be repeated for both the '69 and '71 array configurations.
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4.7 CONTROLLER AND SEQUENCER (See Table 4-5 and Figure 4-6)
The C&S subsystem contains no functionally separable components. It is packaged in two
subassemblies on equipment bay 12, one containing the memory, the other containing the
logic circuitry. It is composed primarily of digital logic elements with associated power
supplies and oscillators, and a core logic unit with associated drivers and sense amplifiers.
It will undergo development as an integral subsystem. No significant changes are anticipated
in the C&S subsystem for the t69 and t71 missions.
4.7 1 BREADBOARD TESTS
The logic elements used in the C kS subsystem will be the standardized logic modules
selected for Voyager. Individual circuit breadboarding, even for the power supplies and
oscillators, will not be required. The initial breadboard hardware will require preliminary
packaging design and will be built fromthe standardized logic circuit modules. In addition
to both functional and limited environmental testing, the breadboard C&S subsystem will be
used in conjunction with OSE development.
The C&S OSE is a punch type controlled systematic test set. Its hardware development and
the initial software development and checkout will be performed utilizing the breadboard S&C.
4.7.2 ENGINEERING MODEL DEVELOPMENT TESTS
A C&S subsystem will be fabricated from Stage III design and subjected to complete perfor-
mance, EMI, vibration, high and low temperature and magnetic tests. Performance tests
will be accomplished using the OSE test set offer first software checkout. The OSE test set
will have the capability of testing the C&S subsystem under both nominal and marginal con-
ditions where input pulse frequency, rise and fall time, and pulse width and amplitudes
may be varied.
_,._,_.... __v_,_p,,,-_'v.,_ __,,nnli_.s_,___..... will be incorporated in the C&S subsystem to permit testing of all
elements of its triply redundant logic during the test cycle.
4.7.3 INTERSUBSYSTEM TESTS
The major electrical interface with the C&S subsystem is with the command subsystem.
These two subsystems will be electrically mated to verify compatibility prior to the inte-
gration of all subsystems in the Development Spacecraft.
4.8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEM TESTS
T/C subsystem development tests are defined by Motorola and TI (Refer to separate
Appendix).
4.9 SCIENCE AND DATA AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT (DAE)
The Science and DAE is GFE which interfaces directly with many of the spacecraft subsystems.
Integration of this equipment into the spacecraft as well as its OSE with the STC and LCE is
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assumed to be the responsibility of the spacecraft contractor. Mock-ups, simulators and
development models of this equipment and its OSE will be required for both f69 and '71
configured hardware.
4.9.1 MOCK-UPS
The major mock-up requirements are:
a. Dimensional mock-ups for clearance, mounting interface, and harness layout
b. Thermal mock-ups for bus and scan platform tests. Thermal or scaled
thermal models for TCM tests.
c. Dynamic mock-ups for STM testing.
4.9.2 SIMULATORS
Simulators will be required to verify the electrical interface with other subsystem (i. e.,
power, telecommunications) during subsystem development testing and with system STC
equipment.
4.9.3 DEVELOPMENT HARDWARE
Complete engineering model hardware will be required for testing in the Development
Spacecraft. Development OSE will be required to support these tests and to verify com-
patibility with the STC.
4.10 PROPULSION TESTS
The design and development of the propulsion subsystem for midcourse correction and orbit
injection will be subcontracted to one or more propulsion vendors depending orL final system
selection. Development tests of the liquid systems for either the mono-propellant midcourse
and bi-propellant retropulsion system (preferred) or the single bi-propellant or the mono-
propellant midcourse with solid retropulsion system (alternates} will contain similar
elements and are discussed together. The development test program for the solid engine
is discussed separately. In both cases, testing will be performed by the sub-contractor at
his facilities with close liaison and surveillance by GE.
The following contains the elements of the propulsion development test program. These
are detailed in the propulsion studies of Phase IA and will be further defined after sub-
contractor(s) selection and system definition during Phase IB.
4.10. 1 LIQUID PROPULSION TESTS (See Table 4-6 and Figure 4-7)
a. Component Development Tests will be conducted on individual components selected
for potential use in the subsystem. It is anticipated that many of these components
will have been qualified and used on other programs. For these devices, development
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tests will be concerned with their suitability for the Voyager application (i. e.,
environments, performance, storage life and reliability}. More extensive tests
on greater quantities of hardware will be required on other components such as
thrust chambers, squib valves, jet vanes and oxidizer bladders (if required}.
b. Pre TA Component Tests will be performed on several of each type of component
used in the system. These tests will demonstrate the adequacy of the final com-
ponent design to meet the more stringent TA environments prior to committing to
initiation of the formal TA program. Groups of components packaged as integral
subassemblies (modules) will similarly undergo pre TA testing in their modular
configuration.
Co Subsystem Sea Level Tests will initially be run with heavy-walled hardware and
sea level nozzles. The subsystem will be installed in a structure simulating the
Voyager spacecraft with tubing sizes and lengths adhered to. These tests will
demonstrate system operation, including system activation, firings and deactivation,
which simulates Voyager mission requirements. This system will also be used for
system servicing tests to establish procedures and OSE compatibility for loading
and unloading and, in particular, establishing repeatable propellant weights.
d. Subsystem Altitude Tests will be performed to verify overall system performance
under a simulated space environment.
eo Subsystem Pre TA Tests will be performed to environmental levels anticipated for
the propulsion package during formal PTM tests. Like the component pre TA
tests, these tests will demonstrate the adequacy of the system design and provide
added confidence in passing the formal subsystem TA and system level PTM test
with minimum difficulty.
4.10 2 SOLID PROPULSION TESTS (See Table 4-7 and Figure 4-8}
In the event that a solid orbit injection system is selected, it is anticipated that a single
propulsion subcontractor will be given overall development and integration responsibility
for the engine, ignition and thrust vector control, including' associated OSE.
ao Solid Engine Tests will initially be made on boiler plate hardware at s:_a level
conditions to evaluate basic engine design. These tests will be completed by the
time flight weight test hardware is available. Initial flight weight tests will be
similar to the previous boiler plate tests, evaluating basic engine design. Later
tests will incorporate the TVC system. Final development tests will be a pre
TA environmental series to demonstrate the overall design adequacy.
b. TVC Tests will vary depending on the type of system selected.
c. Ignitor Tests will be closely integrated with the overall pyrotechnic development in
order to apply the standardized Voyager pyrotechnic cartridge for engine ignition.
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4.10.3 LONG LIFE STORAGETESTS
Independent of the type of propulsion system selected, long life storage and/or deactivation
cycle requirement exists. Flight type hardware model(s) will be subjected to long term
storage including periodic performance tests.
4.10.4 AUTOPILOT CONTROL TEST
Autopilot control tests are being considered at the propulsion subcontractor's facilities.
Various alternative approaches are under consideration for full system level interaction
tests. At the subsystem level specific data will be required during TVC tests. These
include step and frequency response data required for dynamic system analysis.
4.11 PYROTECHNIC TESTS fSee Table 4-8 and Figure 4-9)
Voyager design is expected to incorporate about 100 pyrotechnic devices for the various
functions of Valve Control, deployment and separation. These devices will generally be
pin pullers or thrustors, cable cutters, normally open or closed valves, release nuts and
completely confined linear explosive cords. All of the type devices listed have been
qualified and used with high reliability on classified military programs by the Spacecraft
Department.
4.11.1 ELECTRO-EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (EED'S)
In 1965, the Spacecraft Department initiated a program to standardize EED's and thus
simplify control devices in operational Vehicles and OSE. The purpose of this program
was to evaluate the feasibility of standardizing a cartridge envelope and match head
configuration for both deflagratin_ and detonating explosive mixes capable of surviving
sterilization temperatures of 300 F for extended periods. The design characteristics for
these cartridges satisfy all of the pyronetwork equipment design constraints of Voyager
1971 Mission Specification V-MA-004-001-14-03 Paragraphs II G 9a and b and Sub-
paragraph II G 9c4.
A total of 245 cartridges were fabricated and tested, using a single cartridge envelope, pin
and bridgewire configuration, and ignition mix. (Figure 4-10) The only variable in these
tests was the output charge weight and material. Output charges tested were varying
charge weights of Lead Hexanitro-Oxanilide, Lead Azide and HMX. The test program
demonstrated conclusively the ability to satisfy the desired design characteristics.
Additional testing will be carried on to fully define and develop the potential of this standard-
ized cartridge design, including:
a. Fabrication of 250 cartridges to establish all fire/no fire with Direct Current and
Capacitor Discharge firing circuits.
b. Fabrication of 500 cartridges for hi-temperature (sterilization) testing and evalu-
ation of degradation rates plus long term storage.
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c. Fabrication of 250 to 1000 cartridges for environmental testing to type approval
levels and for engineering proof testing in various end item mechanisms contem-
plated, valves, release nuts, pin pullers, etc.
Further investigations are contemplated for incorporation of piezo type crystals and/or
strain gages in place of the continuity loop piston for a self contained output monitor or long
life degradation rate monitor.
4.11.2 LINEAR DETONATING CORDS
In 1964, investigations were started to find a mechanism that would reduce the shock pulse
induced in vehicle structures using linear detonating cords for staging. These investigations
led to the development of a Sealed Explosive Application to Linear Separation (SEALS) for
Vehicle Staging that:
a. Confines all of the explosion by-products
b. Reduces shock pulses into structures
c. Utilizes the total energy available in the detonating cord thus greatly reducing the
weight of explosives needed for separation
d. With choice of proper materials can survive thermal sterilization temperatures
e. Rugidizes the linear cords making them less subject to handling and installation
damage.
Testing performed to date on this concept has been directed to:
a. Structural element tests of various joint configurations to gain a better under-
standing of the separation dynamics
b. Emperical evaluation of parting forces available for a given weight of explosive
c. Determination of encapsulating jacket wall thickness necessary to confine the by-
products
d. Obtaining data for Vehicle design studies.
The design criteria for initiation and propogation of MDF has been tested and qualified on
various programs such as Gemini, Mercury and Minuteman. Additional testing for use on
Voyager will be carried on with structural element tests to:
a. Select encapsulating jackets for hard vacuum
b. Determine performance margins in selected separation joint configuration
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c. Determine initiation and propagation margins,
d. Evaluate overall reliability.
Full scale ring separation tests will be performed. (See Section 4.3)
4.12 HARNESS
The design and development of the interconnecting harnesses will be treated similar to other
components. The Cognizant Engineer will be responsible for establishing wire type, size,
shielding, ground, grouping, clamping and connector pin layout as well as the acceptability
of the overall harness design with respect to EMI and Magnetic Fields. The individual
(functional) cable approach being used for Voyager will minimize manufacture and test
problems associated with large tree-type harnesses. Development tests on sample harness
designs will be used to arrive at the optimum configuration (i. e., wire grouping, twists,
etc. ) for both magnetic and EMI effects. Production samples will be subjected to flexing
tests (from mating and demating) and teardown analysis. (For development tests of flexible
appendage conductors see Section 3.3)
4.13 OSE DEVELOPMENT TESTS (See Figure 4-11)
The design and development of the OSE will closely parallel and in several areas precede
that of the spacecraft. Engineering development models of assembly and handling equipment
and subsystem OSE will be fabricated for use during early model, subsystem and system
testing. This will establish, early as possible, its suitability and capatibility. OSE/Space-
craft compatibility will be enhanced by the policy of locating subsystem OSE design
responsibility in the same group responsible for the mating vehicle design. Integration
areas will be primarily, subsystem OSE/system OSE rather than OSE/Spacecraft.
4.13.1 AHSE TESTS
Engineering models of AHSE end items will be used initially with the STM and bus TCM.
Experience with these models will allow design improvements to be made prior to mating
with the development spacecraft. A complete set of AHSE, built to Stage III information,
will be used throughout the Development Spacecraft assembly, checkout and test cycles.
Prior to mating with the spacecraft appropriate inspection and proof load tests will be
pe rforme d.
4.13.2 STC DEVELOPMENT TESTS
End items of OSE will undergo development tests compatible with its design (i. e., a collection
of standard commercial instruments will not require as extensive a development test cycle
as a set of special purpose automatic or semi-automatic test equipment). While each
development cycle will be different, they will all contain some aspects of the following three
phases;tests on the units themselves, tests with their mating spacecraft subsystem, and tests
with the STC.
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Tests performed on the units themselves will consist of the following:
a. Self check tests to demonstrate the capability to distinquish between a good and bad
set of equipment, including the self check circuits
b. Ground loop tests
c. Tests with a simulated subsystem (Required only if the self check circuits do not
give a close approximation to the vehicle subsystem)
d. OSE EMI tests.
Tests performed on the units with the spacecraft development subsystems will include:
a. Cabling tests
b. Ground loop tests
c. Power on tests
d. Signal compatibility
e. Conducted EMI tests
f. Subsystem fault detection capability (i. e., capability to distinquish between a good
and a faulty vehicle subsystem)
g. OSE fault modes.
Tests performed on the OSE in the STC will include:
a. OSE/STC compatibility (using a S/C Simulator)
1. Ground loop
2. Cabling tests
3. Power On
4. Signal interchange-primarily between OSE and Computer Data System (CDS).
b. Tests with the Development Spacecraft
1. Cabling tests
2. Ground loop
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3. Power
4. Signal interchange
5. Performance/Mission Profile Sequence Verification
6. OSE sating tests
7. Capability to uncover vehicle faults
8. OSE failure modes
9. EMI.
Two development sets of OSE will be required to support the above tests. One will be used
for the subsystems test s, the other for the STC tests. These tests will be performed in
parallel with the subsystem tests preceding the STC tests slightly. As changes are made
in one area, they will be documented, made in the other area, and verified as not altering
previous test results in that area. Once the initial debugging in both areas is accomplished
and changes are factored into both sets, a "buy-off" demonstration will occur at which time
the final OSE configuration is approved. This test will include verification that both OSE
sets are interchangeable by physically interchanging the sets. After this time the formal
Alteration Notice (AN) procedure will be used for design changes.
The capability for inserting faults into the OSE or into the development spacecraft subsystems
is required during failure mode tests. It is not practical to simulate all conceivable failures;
however these tests will include a reasonably large representative sample. Failures will be
simulated by inserting known faulty modules into the spacecraft and into the OSE.
A significant development problem peculiar to the CDS will be the development of the computer
program. This development may require a computer simulation program in which the STC
itself is simulated in its proper and its faulty modes. The extent of this undertaking may
be kept to manageable proportions by using the Mariner C experience and software and by
developing simple mnemonic coding to simplify the programming.
4.13.3 LCE DEVELOPMENT TESTS
One set of Engineering Model LCE will be fabricated for development tests. As with the
STC, each end item of LCE will be tested by itself and then assembled into groups according
to its end use location (ESF or LC). There it will be tested with its own spacecraft simulator
prior to compatibility tests with the Development Spacecraft.
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5.0 DEVELOPMENT SPACECRAFT TESTS
5.1 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the Development Spacecraft (DS) system tests are to.
a. Establish subsystem compatibility
b. Evaluate spacecraft performance (functional and environmental)
c. Identify potential spacecraft life problems (through identification of low margin
areas and/or trends)
d. Establish spacecraft/OSE compatibility
e. Establish spacecraft/capsule compatibility (for '71)
f. Accomplish spacecraft/science integration
g. Establish spacecraft/launch vehicle compatibility
h. Demonstrate back-up failure mode operation
i. Provide operational data and design information
j. Develop processes, procedures and personnel for flight type spacecraft.
5.2 TEST PHILOSOPHY
The philosophy governing the systems development testing will be to determine total per-
formance capability of the system by test and to assure agreement of these test results
with design analysis, in instances where ........J.-_a_,_,_,_,_._'_^agreement n_......¢_t and _nalysis does
not exist, the cause of the discrepancies will be determined and corrected.
The development Spacecraft will be fabricated during stage HI and will be electrically and
mechanically complete. Two configurations will be required, one for '69 and one for '71.
In both cases final assembly and systems test of the DS will begin after a major portion of
their individual subsystems development tests have been completed in order to preclude
major individual subsystems problems from occurring during systems test.
For the '69 Test Flight, no separate PTM is planned. The DS will be used in this capacity
and will be updated as required to incorporate design changes. Electrical and mechanical
subsystem compatibility will be demonstrated on this DS prior to initiation of the final
assembly and check-out cycle of the '69 Flight Spacecraft. The '69 DS will undergo both
functional and environmental testing using development OSE in order to establish its early
compatibility. After completion of the systems development tests for '69 the DS may be
used for a walk-through at ETR and/or compatibility and operational practice with the MOS.
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(As an alternative, the '69 backup spacecraft and S/C simulators may be used for these
purposes. ) It is planned to maintain the '69 DS as a ground test vehicle in the event of
anomalies during the '69 Flight Test Program.
The most significant differences between the '69 and '71 configurations are anticipated to
be brought about by the addition of the capsule and science instrumentation and by mechanical
changes caused by launch vehicle differences. Both the STM and the TCM will be updated
and retested in the '71 configuration in order to reverify the structural and thermal designs
of the new configuration. These tests will precede the '71 DS tests. The '71 DS test cycle
will retrace the appropriate portions of the '69 test cycle with the addition of capsule and
science tests (see Figures 5-1 and 5-2}. Generally the electrical tests required for sub-
system integration and system performance will be repeated and the environmental tests
will not. These are demonstrated during PTM tests. The schedule overlap and configuration
differences preclude the use of a single DS for both '69 and '71 development.
The propulsion subsystem development will be performed at the propulsion subcontractor(s)
facility in parallel with other subsystem and system development. During the Development
Spacecraft testing, emphasis will be placed on verification of the propulsion package/bus
interface so that the requirements of the separate propulsion development test program
are compatible.
5.3 HARDWARE DEFINITION
The DS will begin final assembly and test after much of the component and subsystem de-
velopment activities are completed so that design changes as a result of these tests may
be incorporated into the DS hardware. Each of the DS subsystems will be complete, in-
cluding redundant elements. A possible exception is the power subsystem where all of
the array surfaces may not be covered with solar cells for test purposes.
In addition to the DS and its adapter, models of the Centaur/Spacecraft support structure
and the spacecraft fairing will be required during DS system tests. A complete set of de-
velopment OSE including the STC, AHSE and LCE will also be required. For '71 a develop-
ment capsule including its adapter and biobarrier and science hardware will be required.
5.4 TEST PLAN AND SEQUENCE
5.4.1 ASSEMBLY
The DS will be the first complete spacecraft through the assembly and test cycle and will
be used to checkout and improve the methods and procedures and AHSE for later PTM and
flight vehicles. In-process tests, such as pneumatic tests, alignments and harness checks,
will be integrated into the assembly cycle as accessibility or rework considerations dictate.
Individual subsystems (as bay assemblies} will be functionally tested prior to their assembly
into the equipment module. Assembly will progress up to the point of final assembly of the
major structural units and prior to installation of insulation blankets, appendages. Final
assembly will be completed after cabled system tests.
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5.4.2 TEST
For the test schedule see Figure 5-3.
5.4.2.1 CABLED SYSTEM TEST
After checkout of the development STC with a S/C simulator, it will be mated with the DS.
Test harnesses will be used to provide additional hard line monitoring and control points
during the initial systems checkout and debugging. Cabled tests will include:
a. Prepower Grounding Tests - All power and signal return lines and cable shielding
will be checked to verify that the unipoint grounding system has not been violated.
Chassis - vehicle return paths will be checked to assure they do not form alternate
return paths. Line resistance will be check on critical returns. (Similar tests
will have previously been performed on the STC. )
bo Initial Power Test - Prior to application of power to the spacecraft subsystems
from the STC, the presence and absence of voltage on all connector pins will be
verified. Where presence is indicated, the polarity and amplitude will be verified.
Co STC Compatibility - With power still supplied by the STC, each subsystem will be
operated individually to demonstrate operation of STC control and monitoring
functions.
d. Subsystem Operation - Beginning with the power subsystem, each subsystem will
be tested sequentially using the bus power subsystem. Prior to reconnecting power
connectors to the various subsystems initial power checks (per b.above} will be
reverffied. Individual subsystem power loads will be verified and operation of
each subsystem over a range of bus voltages will be ascertained.
et Inter-subsystem Compatibility - Subsystems will be operated simultaneously.
While one subsystem is exercised others wfi! be concurrently monitored for ex-
traneous effects or interactions. Those noted will be investigated and corrected
or determined to be acceptable.
f. Instrumentation - The telemetry system operation and accuracy will be checked
by simulating appropriate inputs from the various subsystems and instrumentation
transducers. The test and telemetry connectors from the various subsystems
and the various transducers will then be connected to the telemetry system and
proper operation and channel allocation verified. Where possible an end to end
calibration will be made and compared to the individual telemetry point calibration
made at the subsystem and component level.
go System Tests - The subsystems will be systematically interconnected with each
other as the STC simulated interfaces are removed. This process will be continued
until all STC simulated interfaces are removed and interface operation has been
verified. A complete sequence of normal and selected abnormal events will be
verified. Redundant and back up modes will be checked.
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h. Hardline Effects - During the previous tests numerous hardline monitors will
be connected to test connectors. Their effects will be investigated by monitoring
subsystem performance via the spacecraft RF link with and without these hardlines
connected.
5.4.2.2 INITIAL SYSTEM TEST
After final assembly of the spacecraft, the test sequence followed during the previous
cabled test will be repeated in order to reconfirm system performance after assembly and
elimination of test harness interconnection. The final system test will establish base-line
performance information for the remainder of the test cycle and will be used for later
performance comparisons. For the '71 spacecraft, bus/capsule electrical compatibility
will be established at this point by electrically mating the two and demonstrating system
operation in the various modes from prelaunch through orbital operation.
5.4.2.3 MISSION SEQUENCE
The spacecraft will be cycled through a complete mission profile, exercising both on-board
sequencing and ground commands, with the quiescent portions of the profile eliminated.
This profile, beginning from the prelaunch mode of operation and continuing through re-
peatitive orbital cycles, will constitute a Dynamic Mission Equivalent (DME) and will be
used for life test verifications on subsequent spacecraft. The Development Spacecraft will
be used to develop the procedures for this DME and to assess the stresses applied during
the dynamic transitions.
5.4.2.4 PARAMETER VARIATION
The effects on performance will be determined as selected electrical parameters are in-
dividually varied to extreme values. The variables considered are bus voltage, frequency
and noise. Tests on the Development Spacecraft will go beyond the specification require-
ments in order to verify the limits of safe operation within which the variables must remain.
5.4.2.5 EMI
Complete system level tests will be run to assure that no incompatibilities exist and to
determine that adequate margins do exist. Suspected vunerable points within the spacecraft
will be identified based on analysis of the spacecraft design and previous experience with
similar types of hardware. These points will be monitored while interference sources are
energized and will be used to determine the margin which exists before a system malfunc-
tion occurs. Transient and radiated susceptibility tests will be performed as well as in-
terference tests to determine the spacecraft's EMI characteristics.
5.4.2.6 WEIGHT AND CENTER OF GRAVITY
The dry spacecraft will be weighed and the center of gravity determined. Appendages,
such as solar arrays, may be tested separately. The data will be verified with weight
control calculations. Products and moments of inertia will be calculated but not verified
by test unless greater accuracy is required.
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5.4.2.7 MAGNETIC MAPPING
Both the '69 and '71 Development Spacecraft will be tested for magnetic characteristics.
Although the '69 configuration may not include a magnetometer, it will be used to verify the
adequacy of the magnetic cleanliness program and evaluate the test methods used. A
quiescent profile will be obtained without power applied to the spacecraft by placing the
spacecraft in various orientations in the earth's field and measuring the resulting fields.
This process will be performed again for appropriate appendage deployments and articula-
tion device positions. Field measurements will also be made by the magnetometer with the
spacecraft powered and operating in various modes. Helmholtz coils will be used to negate
the ambient earths field during this test.
5.4.2.8 VIBRA TION
The spacecraft will be subjected to a vibration test consisting of low level resonant surveys
and random vibration tests with inputs in the spacecraft's three major axes. Torsional
vibration tests will also be conducted about the spacecraft roll axis. All random vibration
tests will be conducted at levels exceeding those predicted for the powered flight phase.
During the vibration test, the spacecraft will be operated electrically as it normally is in
the powered flight phase.
Prior to the conduct of the vibration test, an abbreviated mission profile test sequence will
be accomplished to determine the spacecraft base-line operating characteristics. The
results of this test will be compared to one conducted after vibration to determine whether
or not system performance had been degraded by the vibration test. A pneumatic leak
test of the hot and cold gas systems and checks of the critical alignments will also be
made during the post-vibration test.
5.4.2.9 SPACE SIMULATION
The space simulation test will be conducted in two phases. The first phase will provide
for adequate instrumentation to perform diagnostic as well as control functions for the
spacecraft during the test. The second phase will be conducted with a minimum of in-
strumentation but sufficient enough for control of the test. The results of these tests will
be utilized not only for evaluation of the spacecraft operational characteristics but also
for comparison purposes to verify that the results of the first test were not influenced by
the added instrumentation.
Both tests will be performed in a similar manner regarding spacecraft operational sequences.
Each test will consist of a simulated mission profile starting with the powered flight se-
quences through earth orbit injection, Earth to Mars transition, midcourse maneuvers, Mars
encounter, and Mars. Erection of appendages and firing of the engines will be simulated
by appropriate means.
Thermal simulation will be programmed to provide the proper environment for the space-
craft during the simulated flight. This will include simulation of the thermal conditions
existing from the firing of the retropropulsion engine.
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Special instrumentation installed for this test will monitor the power used by the various
subsystems, determine the spacecraft temperature profile and monitor the ambient pres-
sure levels within the spacecraft. Evaluation of the vehicle operational characteristics
will be made primarily from the data provided by the on-board telemetry system.
5.4.2.10 FREE MODE
To evaluate the effects of the support equipment electrically connected to the spacecraft
during most of the systems tests, the Free Mode test will be conducted without any exterior
connections to the spacecraft. This will be accomplished by using air link communication
both to and from the spacecraft. It will be operated solely on its own internal power supply.
This test will be conducted by performing an abbreviated mission profile which will be of fairly
short duration because of reliance on the spacecraft battery system and as augmented to
the greatest practical extent possible by the spacecraft solar arrays. Stimulation of the
solar arrays may be accomplished by water filtered tungsten lamps in lieu of the sun.
Test indoors is preferred over testing out-of-doors primarily due to the excessive space-
craft handling required and because of weather constraints. The results of this test will
be compared to others wherein external equipment is connected to the vehicle in order to
assess their affects on the operational characteristics of the spacecraft.
5.4.2.11 LCE COMPATIBILITY
The S/C-LCE compatibility test can be separated into two elements; that associated with
the blockhouse - launch pad equipment and that associated with the ESF equipment. Each
group of equipment will have been checked out with a S/C simulator prior to mating with
the DS. The test set-up in each case will duplicate to the maximum practical extent cable
lengths, junction boxes, etc° which will be encountered in the actual field installation. The
test will consist of demonstrating all control, monitoring and servicing capabilities in
accordance with expected field operating procedures. A complete simulated countdown will
be performed with the blockhouse, launch pad LCE.
Oe s'_. f'. J./. .E" J[ .L_,l,.) J. _t:.aLJ _. a$
The Live Pyro tests will be concerned with those pyrotechnics associated with deployment
of the various extendables such as the scan package, atennae and solar paddles. Also,
simulated during this test will be the pyrotechnic firings associated with the activation of
the cold gas attitude control system and the firings of the engines. The Shroud separation
and the booster separation will be tested using the Structural Test Model.
Instrumentation of the vehicle will include current monitoring of the various squibs, ac-
celerometers and strain gages for determination of shock and stress levels. The test
procedure will provide for operation of the vehicle in the normal mission sequence with
particular attention being paid to monitoring of the spacecraft telemetry and hardwire data
points to determine affects of pyrotechnic firings on the operation of the spacecraft systems.
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5.4.2.13 SPACECRAFT-- LV COMPATIBILITY
A compatibility test between the LV adapter, spacecraft fairing and the spacecraft will be
performed. The test will consider mechanical fit, electrical RF and the ground cooling
compatibilities.
The tests to be conducted will be pin to pin continuity checks of the electrical interfaces,
a step by step mechanical assembly of the spacecraft hardware, electrical ground checks,
electrical systems operation, telecommunication performance checks and ground cooling
tests. All operations conducted in these tests will duplicate the procedures utilized at
the launch site.
Although sequence of tests have not been finalized at this time, it is considered that this
test may be conducted immediately after the thermal vacuum test since instrumentation
for the ground cooling test and the thermal vacuum test will be similar.
5.4.2.14 A UTOPILOT INTERACTION TEST
Tests to determine the interaction of the autopilot, propulsion system and structure during
mid-course and retro engine firings will be conducted. The method of test has not been de-
termined. Investigations will be made during the Phase IB study to determine the most
practical method. Studies for this particular test will be done in conjunction with those
anticipated for the '71 PTM tests. The method chosen will probably be the same for each
vehicle but since the '69 DS will have a difference in configuration and weight from the '71
spacecraft, it is considered the test will be required for both configurations.
5.4.2.15 FAILURE MODE
Various failure modes will be simulated in order to exercise and observe the effects of
redundant elements or back-up modes of operation. This test will accomplish the following:
a. Verify operation of redundant equipment and back-up modes of operation.
b. Develop the procedures for checkout of these modes in subsequent spacecraft.
c. Provide data to assist in the analysis of failures in future operations.
5.4.2.16 FIELD WALK-THROUGH
Prior to delivery of the flight spacecraft to the field, for the '69 test flight, the DS may be
used to check out procedures and equipment at the Spacecraft Checkout Facility, ESF and
Pad.
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I.0 INTRODUCTION
I.i GENERAL
This test plan presents the proposed approach for carrying out an effective and timely Type
Approval (TA) and Proof Test Model (PTM) Spacecraft test program during the Phase II Voy-
ager effort in support of the 1971 Voyager Mission. It is preliminary in nature and will be
re-evaluated and thoroughly definitized during the Phase IB definition period following detailed
study of all aspects of the test requirements.
Its relationship with the other test plans with which it interfaces can be established by review
of the overall Integrated Test Plan (ITP), identified as CII-VBll0VP002
1.2 PURPOSE
This plan which will clearly define the test philosophies, test objectives, procedures and
accep,+ance criteria relating to all phases of TA and PTM testing, will be considered as a
controlling document and will be maintained current relative to these areas.
1.3 SCOPE
This plan defines functional, environmental and compatibility tests which will be required at
the component, assembly, subsystem and system levels to achieve mission essential product
type-approval with a minimum testing of hardware.
It does not cover the testing which will be required to validate the basic design and capability
of the Flight Capsule as an entity, since this is outside the scope of the present contractual
test requirements. It does, however, cover those tests relating to the Capsule's integration
and compatibility with the Flight Spacecraft.
To avoid redundancy in documentation, the test plan for the PTM as herein presented covers
the test effort from the delivery of an acceptance tested Spacecraft up to the time of shipment
to AFETR for Validation Testing. The details associated with the Acceptance and Checkout
Phase as well as the Field Checkout Phase are covered in CII-VBll0VP005 nnd CII-VBll0VP006
respectively, of Volume A, Section V.
For the benefit of brevity all references in this plan to "Spacecraft" shall be considered as
applying to the PTM Flight Spacecraft, and "Capsule" as being synonomous with the Flight
Capsule. The mated Spncecrnft,"Capsule conli_ll'ntion shall be t'efe_re(1 to ns "Overall
Spacecraft"
1.4 GENERAL TEST OBJECTIVES
• Establish performance margins of safety beyond ex_pected flight environments.
• Derive performance data for measuring assembly reliability and for predicting flight
reliability.
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• Induce and isolate assembly faults.
• Determine effects of combinations of tolerances and drift of design parameters.
• Determine effects of varied stress levels.
• Obtain empirical test data to confirm analytical methods employed in arriving at
designs.
• Demonstrate satisfactory workmanship and adequate material life in hardware design.
• Demonstrate design adequacy and compatibility between major interfaces.
• Verify correctness of procedures and provide rehearsals for testing and handling of
flight hardware.
1.5 CONTRACTUAL TEST REQUIREMENTS
The requirements directly related to both TA and PTM testing are stated in Section 1 of the
Preliminary Voyager 1971 Mission Specification, dated 1 May 1965 (JPL Project Document
#45. V-MA-004-001-14-003). These requirements are identified in the specification as
applicable to the Spacecraft only, with requirements applicable to the capsule to be forth-
coming at a later date. A summarized version of these requirements is included herein for
reference purposes.
"The Spacecraft test program is intended to demonstrate the capability of the Spacecraft to
meet the requirements for all phases of the mission profile, as well as in all flight and
ground-handling environments."
a. Environmental Tests - "FA levels shall exceed the expected environment, and TA
levels shall exceed FA levels."
b. Type Approval Tests - "TA tests shall be required on all components, assemblies,
subassemblies and spacecraft test models."
"TA tests are those tests which demonstrate the adequacy of the design for its in-
tended usage, including performance tests, environmental tests, life tests, margin
tests and other similar tests."
c. _,u_v_....a"_"... _-,_,_ t_mn_flhillhrvv...r_. ...... J T_qt_..... -'_]lectrical and mechanical compatibility between
subsystems of flight configuration shall be demonstrated in the PTM prior to assem-
bly of the Flight Spacecraft hardware."
d. Design Verification Tests - "The PTM shall also be utilized to demonstrate system
design adequacy by performance of TA systems tests, including:"
i. Mission Sequencing
2. Parameter Variations Test
3. Magnetometer Mappings
4. Space Simulation Test
5. Vibration Testing - Acoustic and vibration levels greater than those expected
during the boost phase of the flight.
6. Simulation Mid-course and Retro Interaction
7. Free Mode Test
8. Failure Mode Tests
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e. Spacecraft Interface Tests (using PTM) - "The Spacecraft shall perform a series of
tests with all its own OSE and with other System elements at an early date relative
to the launch period."
1. Spacecraft Subsystems - OSE Compatibility
2. Intersubsystem - STC Compatibility
3. Spacecraft- LCE Compatibility
4. Spacecraft- Capsule Compatibility
5. Spacecraft - DSN Mission Dependent Equipment compatibility, including space-
craft communication - DSIF compatibility.
6. Spacecraft - MOS compatibility with MDE and software
7. Spacecraft- LV compatibility
(a.) Interface adapter, Overall Spacecraft - LV
(b.) Nose Fairing - Overall Spacecraft
(c.) Overall Spacecraft - Launch Complex (using a LV electrical simulator)
(d.) Overall Spacecraft - LV System compatibility at AFETR using PTM and
LV test vehicle.
8. AHSE - Spacecraft compatibility
f. "The testing requirements listed above are not meant to be all inclusive at this writing
and will be supplemented at a later date."
2.0 APPROACH
The basic philosophy underlying the proposed approach to the 1971 Voyager TA and PTM test
program is that the validity, capability and reliability of the Spacecraft design be demonstrated
at various levels of assembly ranging from component through system.
This test plan is intended to provide the most efficient use of the schedule time (See Figure
2-1). The tests chosen to date have been established to furnish the greatest amount of
data for evaluation of the Spacecraft design and to reveal design deficiencies requiring
lead-time for investigation, possible redesign, rework and retest.
The criteria employed for establishing the precedence of tests are based on the objectives listed
below in order of reference.
a. Permit detailed examination, evaluation and verification of design adequacy.
b. Establishment of compatibility between Spacecraft, equipment, facilities used for test.
c. Generation of operability standards for flight Spacecraft performance.
d. Contingency explorations.
e. Procedure generation and validation
f. Early establishment of booster interface compatibilities.
g. Other interface compatibilities.
h. Personnel training for flight Spacecraft testing.
The methodology which will be followed in carrying out the test program will consider the
task in two major efforts:
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a. Type Approval testing of flight quality components, subassemblies and assemblies.
b. Type Approval testing of a flight quality PTM.
Samples of components, subassemblies and assemblies and two PTM's will be provided for
type approval, with one set each to be tested by G.E. and JPL.
The coordination of the test specifications, procedures, etc., relating to the effective
execution of the dual test efforts will be centered in an Integrated Test Board with JPL's
p artic ip at ion.
TA will follow the approach that a general environmental specification for TA testing at the
assembly level will be gengrated which provides a standardized series of environmental tests
to be performed, with the proviso that deviations from the requirements could be obtained
for individual test items where deemed essential and valid.
PTM testing, on the other hand, will follow a logical sequence beginning with the Assembly
and Checkout phase, which will employ assembly and test procedures similar to those used
on flight spacecraft. It will then b¢ followed by special performance tests such as Parameter
Variations and Failure Modes, as well as tests of major Interface Compatibilities and Envir-
onmental Proofing.
2.1 GENERAL TEST SUMMARY
2.1. I TATESTS
ae The tests to be performed during the TA test program on components and assemblies
are listed below. Details pertaining to these tests are defined in the TA test section
of this plan.
• Cable Harness Tests
• Magnetic Field Tests
• Vibration Tests
• Shock Tests
• Acoustic Noise Tests
• Acceleration Test
• Temperature-Humidity Test
• EMI Test
• High and Low Temperature Test
• Corona and Arcing Test
• Thermal Vacuum Test
2.102 PTMTESTS
a. Tests listed below are performed as part of the assembly and checkout phase on the
PTM, prior to the start of the formal PTM tests, and are described in the Assembly
and Checkout Plan, CIIVBll0VP005.
• Grounding Integrity
• Weight and CG
• Alignment
• Pneumatic Testing
• Initial Power Application
be
• Intersubsystem Test
• System performance Test
• Individual Subsystem Test
• Telemetry Channels Calibration
Tests below are categorized as PTM design verification and compatibility tests and
are defined in the PTM test section of this plan.
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• Magnetic Field Test
• Parameter Variations Test
• Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility Test
• Free-Mode Test
• Failure Modes Test
• Mission Sequencing Test
• Vibration Test
• Acoustic Noise Test
• Space Simulation Test
• Live Pyrotechnic Separation Test
• Simulated Mid-Course and Retro-Interaction Test
• Science Payload-Spacecraft Compatibility Tests
• LCE - Spacecraft Compatibility Test
• Science Payload - Capsule Compatibility Test
• LV - Spacecraft Compatibility Test
• MDE - Spacecraft Compatibility Test
• AHSE - Spacecraft Compatibility Tests
2.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The PTM test plan as presented here has been based on the assumptions that:
a. GE/MSD's role would be dual, that of the Spacecraft contractor, as well as that of
integrator for the Overall Spacecraft.
b. Wherever possible, primarily because of the dependency of the Capsule on the Space-
craft, both structurally and functionally, the tests on the PTM would be performed
with an actual Capsule instead of a dummy.
c. Compatibility tests between PTM subsystems shall have been successfully demon-
strated on the "71 Engineering Development Model using prototype subsystems prior
to assembly of the PTM.
2.3 APPLICABILITY OF '69 FLIGHT RESULTS
a. All components, assemblies and subsystems whose design and construction are com-
mon to both the 1969 and 1971 flight spacecraft, and which were type-approved for
the "69 effort, will be considered as having been type approved for the "71 design
based on satisfactory performance during the '69 flight.
bo In addition to individual hardware performance, the ability of the Spacecraft to sat-
isfactorily withstand the launch environment, e. g., vibration, acoustic noise,
acceleration, staging and separation shocks, will also have a related bearing on the
future evaluation of the '71 Spacecraft capability and reliability.
c. The performance of certain ground tests on the '71 Spacecraft which are not present-
ly considered practical due to the facility or technological limitations, or whose
method of performance is not considered optimum, such as separation, acquisition,
attitude control testing, autopilot stability, will also be verified during the '69 flight.
The degree of applicability will be evaluated.
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3.0 TYPE APPROVAL TESTS
All test specimens will be subjected to a comprehensive Type Approval test program, com-
prising a series of functional and environmental tests to verify design adequacy and to demon-
strate a minimum level of equipment capability under environmental stresses exceeding those
which may be encountered by the hardware during shipment, handling, test and flight. The
test conditions will be intentionally made more severe than operating conditions in order to
introduce a greater probability of locating incipient faults, thus compensating to some extent
for the statistical limitations of the small sample size. These conditions, however, will not
be severe enough to exceed reasonable safety margins or to excite unrealistic modes of fail-
ure. The type-approved hardware will, therefore, be considered as having demonstrated an
inherent margin of safety which will contribute to its reliability in use.
The test requirements, which will be delineated in a general environmental specification for
TA testing, will employ test levels of sufficient severity and/or duration to compensate for the
absence of combined environments during testing and to allow for normal variations in both
equipment and operational conditions.
3.1 TA TEST OBJECTIVES
a. Verify that the hardware designs comply with applicable design intent and speci-
fication performance requirements under flight environmental conditions.
b. Establish a performance margin of safety beyond the expected flight environments.
c. Derive performance data for predicting flight reliability.
d. Determine significant hardware failure modes for use in reliability improvement.
e. Determine the effects of combinations of tolerance and drift.
3.2 GROUND RULES
a. A requirement of the TA Program will be to complete the qualification of all hard-
ware prior to first flight.
b. If any significant change is incorporated into the design or in the manufacturing
processes after type approval, the hardware will be resubmitted for type approval
testing.
c. All hardware submitted for TA testing will be flight quality units which will receive
complete quality control inspection and acceptance testing to assure that the hard-
ware conforms to applicable drawings and specification requirements prior to
environmental type approval tests.
d. All hardware which will be TA tested by their respective subcontractors will have
appropriate GE/MSD Vendor Surveillance. To provide further verification that
the test results are adequate, it will be required that the details of the test pro-
cedures and means for evaluating the test data be approved by GE/MSD.
e. Any modification to the designs resulting from the type approval tests will be
incorporated into the flight hardware.
O
nf 46;
VBIIOVP004
f. All testing will be performed in accordance with detailed test specifications.
Allowances will be made during generation of the test specification requirements
to provide for all possible normal and contingent conditions and to allow for the
integrated conditions which result when the complete system is operated. Allow-
ances will also be made for the unknown environment by qualification through
ranges that are believed to exceed the worst case conditions.
g. The TA test program will generally not provide for testing of equipment in more
than a single critical environment at a time since identification of failures as
either random or due to a specific environment, or as degradation resulting from
exposure to a previous environment, will be difficult if more than one environment
is experienced at a time.
h. Preliminary test information shall be provided not later than one week following
the completion of the tests. A final report providing the data required shall be
provided within two weeks following the completion of the test.
i. Items to be tested shall be identical to each other and shall be representative of
flight hardware. Any change in the hardware design following these tests shall be
subject to review for retesting based upon the nature of the change.
j. Component and Assembly specifications will be presented to the ITB for review
prior to conducting the test to assure that the test requirements are adequate and
consistent with the intent of the general environmental specification. Approval of
the test requirements of each specification by the ITB will be reflected by the
signed approval by the Chairman of the ITB.
k. At the conclusion of the testing of each specimen, a complete data package (con-
sisting of test results as well as requirements} approved by the responsible de-
sign engineer shall be presented to the ITB for Project Buy-off. Subject to the
discretion of the Board, the test hardware may be required to be presented to the
Board for visual examination.
1. Subsequent to the approval of any test deviations from the applicable specification,
such deviations shall be reflected in the applicable specification, as required, prior
to submittal of the test results to the ITB. In these cases, where approval of the
deviation by the ITB has not been obta_med prior to test, the specification shall be
effected within the time period designated by the ITB buyoff.
3.3 TEST SPECIMEN CONFIGURATION
The extensive history of type approval (qualification) testing which has been compiled by
GE/MSD as the result of its many varied aerospace programs tends to confirm the philoso-
phy that type approval testing below the system level should be conducted at the lowest mean-
ingful and practical level of assembly. In essence, this has meant testing at the component
level; not the subsystem level. By so doing, the inherent capability and/or limitations of the
basic "building blocks" of the system are explored and verified. The "cement" between these
"building blocks" is subsequently investigated and verified at the system level of assembly.
With respect to the Voyager TA program, strict adherence to the above approach becomes
questionable due to the packaging concept of standardized assemblies, wherein a subsystem
can be confined to a single assembly. The traditional "component" thus becomes difficult to
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isolate, except for the discrete components, such as sensors, antennas, etc., which are quite
obvious.
It is therefore proposed, that the type approval test program for the Voyager spacecraft be
accomplished, wherever practical, at the major assembly level. This will be supplemented
by the individual testing of those components, e.g., antenna, sensors, etc., which are physi-
cally divorced from their parent subsystem, but which are still cabled to it electrically, Any
deviations from the above which may be required during the course of the program, for what-
ever reasons, will be considered on an individual basis by the ITB. Specific test configura-
tions are defined as follows:
The propulsion subsystem will be tested as a complete subsystem by the subcontractor.
All electronic subsystems located in the various torridL bays will be tested as complete
bay assemblies.
Where a subsystem or a functional subassembly is received from a vendor which will
not complete an entire bay, then the missing hardware will be mechanically and
thermally simulated, and the entire assembly tested as a bay.
In the case where a bay is comprised of functional subassemblies coming from more
than a single vendor, the bay will be assembled and so tested.
Where a functional subassembly may become available prior to its companion sub-
assemblies in the bay, consideration may be given to testing it by itself, rather
than delay its validation.
For all bay testing, a fixture simulating as closely as possible an actual bay structure will
be employed to support the test hardware in their normal mounting configuration.
3.4 NUMBER OF SAMPLES FOR TEST
a. The number of samples of each new design to be type-approved will depend on its
history and function. In general, two (2) flight quality samples of each new non-
pyrotechnic component or assembly design which has not been qualified on previous
programs of a similar nature will be subjected to applicable environmental tests.
In the case of previously qualified designs, the Integrated Test Board (ITB) will
determine the quantity and enironments required for type approval.
b. The number of samples of pyrotechnic or "one-shot" devices which will require
type approval will be established by the applicable design specification. Generally
speaking, type approval of pyrotechnics will require representative lot sampling.
All such components will be subjected to special consideration during the formu-
lation of test requirements and in the execution of their test programs.
3.5 TEST SEQUENCE
Unless otherwise specified in the applicable component assembly specification, the tests may
be performed in any order. However, the sequence specified is the preferred sequence and
shall be followed when test facility availability permits.
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3.6 TEST DESCRIPTIONS
All components and assemblies will be subjected to the following test conditions, as applic-
able. These test conditions have been designated for the express purpose of demonstrating
that the equipment shall withstand the environmental conditions described herein independent
of the order in which conducted.
3.6.1 ENVIRONMENTAL PROOF TESTS
a. Visual Examination and Performance Tests - Unless otherwise specified, all test
articles shall be inspected, operated, and subjected to a performance test before,
during, and after exposure to each environment. The details of the visual examin-
ations and performance tests, required as part of the tests specified herein, shall
be in accordance with the applicable specification. Whenever possible, the perform-
ance tests shall be defined in terms of quantitative measurements of each significant
parameter with the parameter test limits stated in the applicable specification.
b. Vibration - All test articles will be subjected to a vibration test simulating the vibra-
tion environment which they will experience during the transportation, launch and
powered flight phases of the mission. Test levels will be established at 5 db above
the FA levels which, in turn, will be conducted at the envelope of the 95th percent-
ile predicted flight environment. The specimens will be mounted to the table of a
vibration machine by means of fixtures which will provide the necessary rigidity.
Vibration will be applied along each of the three major perpendicular axes, in turn.
Sine wave and random vibration testing will be performed in accordance with the
requirements of the particular specification.
Those specimens which are normally operative during launch and powered flight
phase will be energized and performance monitored during the vibration. All test
articles will be inspected and performance tested at the completion of the test.
c. Shock - All test articles will be subjected to shock tests to simulate the
normal handling, transportation, and powered flight phase of the mission (staging).
The specimens will be mounted on the platform of a shock testing machine using
a resonant-free mounting fixture. The shocks will then be applied in each direction
of the three major perpendicular axes. The characteristics of the applied shock
pulses will be as specified in the particular specification. Those components which
are operating during the powered flight phase will be energized during the test. A
visual inspection followed by a performance test will be performed at the completion
of the shocks.
d. Acoustic Noise - All test articles will be subjected to an acoustic noise test to simu-
late the environment which they will experience during the launch and powered flight
phase of the mission. The components will be suspended within the acoustic test
chamber by soft suspensions having a low natural frequency and subjected to random
noise sound pressure levels over the spectrum of 50 cps to 10 Kc, with the intensity
and duration as specified in the component specification. Those components which
are normally operative during the launch powered flight phases will be energized
and operated during the test. At the completion of the test, all components will be
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inspected for evidence of damage and operationally rechecked for indications of mal-
functioning.
e. Acceleration Test - All test articles will be subjected to an acceleration test simula-
ting the environment which they will experience during the powered flight phase.
The components will be mounted to the arm of a centrifuge by means of a rigid test
fixture and subjected to acceleration directed along both directions of three mutually
perpendicular axes for the duration and levels specified in the particular component
specification. Those components which will normally be operative during the powered
flight phase will be energized and their performance monitored. At the completion
of the test, the components will be inspected for damage and operationally tested for
evidence of malfunctioning.
f. Temperature-Humidity - Selected components and assemblies will be subjected to a
temperature-humidity test simulating the environment which they can experience
during unprotected phases of the factory through launch sequence. The components
will be installed in an automatically programmed temperature-humidity chamber
and subjected to temperature and humidity as required by a particular component
specification. At the completion of the test period, the components will be moved
from the chamber, visually inspected and operationally checked for evidence of
malfunctioning.
g. High and Low Temperature Tests - All test articles will be subjected to tests at
both high and low temperatures to simulate transportation as well as the operational
phases. The specimens will be installed in suitable chambers and subjected to oper-
ation at the high and low temperatures as specified in the individual component
specifications. Tests of subsystems will be conducted at 40°C above the maximum
and 30°C below the minimum temperatures expected in flight. At the completion
of the tests, the components will be visually inspected for damage and operationally
rechecked at room ambient for indications of malfunctioning or degradation in per-
formance°
h. Thermal Vacuum - All test articles will be subjected to simulated orbital environ-
ments of temperature and vacuum to determine the prolonged effect of such expos-
ure on their material and performance characteristics. The components will be
mounted on special thermally controlled fixtures located within the vacuum test
chamber and exposed to the vacuum and temperature conditions specified in the
individual component specification. Special consideration will be given to differ-
entiation between internally and externally vehicle-mounted components. At the
completion of the test, the components will be removed from the chamber, visually
inspected for indications of damage or deterioration and operationally rechecked for
evidence of malfunctioning or performance degradation.
i. Salt Spray, Sand and Dust, Fungus - These tests which are a consideration for many
equipments will not be performed on components since adequate protection will be
provided to prevent their influence. Should further investigation disclose that test-
ing under any one of these conditions is required, plans to do so will be incorporated
into the individual component specification.
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assembly will be required. The complete cable harness set will be assembled and
installed by production, using the identical procedures as for flight O/C.
I. Hi-pot, Megger and Continuity Tests - These tests will be performed prior to a
and at the conclusion of the start of the other tests using the methods and voltages
normally employed.
2. Disconnect Tests - To simulate the connecting and disconnecting which takes
place during the overall assembly and checkout phase, each connector assembly
shall be demated and remated several times (exact number which shall be de-
termined at a later date). At the completion of the specified number of operations
(de-energized) the assembly shall be visually inspected for damage and re-
checked for hi-pot and continuity.
3. Corona and Arcing Tests - Testing of the harness assemblies will be reformed
under vacuum conditions simulating the corona region to uncover any potential
problem areas due to corona or breakdown.
4. Vibration Tests - The test bed, with the mated cable harnesses in place, shall
be installed on a vibration machine and subjected to both a sinusoidal and random
vibratory input for the specified levels and durations. At the completion of the
test, the cable harness's assembly shall be visually inspected and subjected to
hi-pot and continuity tests.
3.6.3 TEST FIXTURES
All test fixtures utilized for the type approval testing shall be designed to take into account
ttie exact mounting means of the specimen within the Spacecraft and its relationship to ad-
jacent hardware or structure. The requirements for the fixturing will be incorporated into
the individual test specifications for the various TA configurations.
4.0 PROOF TEST MODEL (PTM) TESTS
An in-house system-level type approval test program of a PTM is here proposed to support
the 1971 mission, based on the contractual test requirements outlined in the JPL Preliminary
Voyager Mission Specification. These PTM-level requirements are summarized in para-
graph 1.5 of this plan. In addition to these JPL stated requirements, further testing is also
planned based on the Spacecraft design and mission requirements.
This PTM test program is designed to provide an evaluation of the Spacecraft including its
subsystems under simulated mission conditions. The PTM vehicle will also serve as a
tool for evaluating and establishing compatibility with all its varied interfaces. Figure 4-1
PTM Test Program - In-House, lists the various tests which will be performed according
to their categories.
The proof level tests which will be performed on the PTM will be accomplished within
practical limits of test facilities and economy, and will be conducted to verify that the
spacecraft can be expected to meet the critical environments to which it will be exposed
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3.6.2 SPECIAL TESTS
ae Magnetic Field Tests - All TA designated units will be evaluated for both the perman-
ent and induced (electrically energized condition) magnetic fields. The magnetic
test requirements delineated herein are based on the techniques established by JPL
for the Mariner C Program and outlined in JPL Specification #31252, dated 19 March
1963.
Magnetic testing will be performed prior to and following the vibration testing of the
articles. Testing will be performed in a shielded room, or coil facility, or both hav-
ing an ambient magnetic field of less than 100 gamma (10 -3 gauss), DC to 10.0 cps.
The test magnetometer sensor will be fixed, for purposes of reference, with its
axis along which the field is sensed, in the horizontal plane and with the magneto-
meter indicating zero field. The test specimen will be measured at a distance of
three times the average dimension of the hardware item from the magnetometer
sensor. The specimen will then be rotated about a vertical axis through its approx-
imate geometric center, with maximum values of the indicated magnetic field
recorded. This procedure will be performed for both the operating and non-operating
conditions of the specimen. The dynamic magnetic field is here defined as the vector
difference between the total magnetic fields when the specimen is operating and when
not operating.
1. Magnitude
• Total field from DC thru 10.0 cps of a subassembly shall not exceed 1.0 gamma
(10 "5 gauss) measured at 3.0 times the average dimension after deperming.
• Fields above 10.0 cps are of no significance.
• Current loop contribution to Spacecraft magnetic field shall at no time exceed
1.0 gamma measured at 2.0 feet from the subassembly.
2. Stability
• Total magnetic field of a subassembly shall not change by more than a factor
of 10 after perming in a static magnetic field of 100 gauss.
b. EMI Tests - All specimens will be tested to verify their compliance with the establish-
ed requirements (EMI Plan CII-V_l10VP016_ for electromagnetic interference gener-
ation and susceptibility. All information derived from these tests will ultimately be
required for the system EMI tests. Tests will be performed in shielded enclosures.
c. Corona and Arcing Test - The TA specification shall provide for a check for corona
and arcing at pressures considered critical for those components that are particul-
arly susceptible to corona and arcing at the reduced pressures.
d. Cable Harness Tests - To verify the basic design, fabrication, assembly and space-
craft mounting arrangements and techniques associated with the major cable harness
configurations by subjecting representative sample cable harnesses to functional and
environmental conditions capable of exposing incipient failures. The tests outlined
below will be performed with all test specimens simultaneously,installed and connect-
ed as they would normally be on a Flight Vehicle Bus. In this instance, the Space-
craft structural model will serve as the test bed with dummy components provided.
All connectors, receptacles, clamps, etc., which will be utilized for a flight vehicle
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during an actual mission, as well as during ground handling. These tests will be conducted in
a sequence providing progressive levels of type approval commensurate with the various flight
phases.
Since no one facility can provide all environmental parameters, a series of separate tests
will be conducted. These tests, in conjunction with component, assemblies, and subsystem
tests, will provide the desired assurance of the Spacecraft's suitability for flight operation.
4.1 PTM TEST OBJECTIVES
Major objectives established for the PTM type approval test program are:
a. Obtain empirical test data to confirm analytical methods employed in arriving at the
designs.
b. Demonstrate the capability of flight quality hardware to withstand and to perform
properly within required limits under simulated end-use environmental conditions.
c. Contribute to the achievement of reliability through test, location of significant
failure modes and redesign and to the measurement of reliability through test failure
reporting and analysis.
d. Demonstrate that satisfactory workmanship is inherent in the hardware design.
e. Establish confidence in the performance of the system, while demonstrating the
attainment of the design performance under simulated emergency modes of operation.
f. Establish complete electrical and mechanical compatibility between the PTM space-
craft and all its varied interfaces.
g. Provide test data to be employed as a standard against which the flight Spacecraft
data will be compared.
h. Validate all procedures to be employed for succeeding flight vehicles
4.2 GROUND RULES
a. Prior to the delivery for test, the PTM vehicle will be subjected to all normal in-
process inspection procedures and acceptance tests to assure that the vehicle
system conforms to the applicable specifications and drawings and that it is
representative of the flight hardware.
b. Modifications made to the vehicle for environmental test purposes will basically
consist of temporary instrumentation and special test harnessing. However, such
instrumentation and harnessing will not be allowed to detract from its "prime"
status or to compromise the ability of the system to survive the environmental
expo sure s.
c. All hardware changes to the vehicle which may be required as a result of tests will
be introduced through formally controlled procedures.
d. The employment of existing test facilities at GE/MSD, wherever possible, will be
an objective.
e. All detailed trouble shooting, exploratory testing, and problem solving which is
required for flight Spacecraft assembly and checkout shall be performed on the PTM.
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f. Throughout the PTM test program, records shall be maintained of all connector
makes and breaks as a result of disassembly for testing and troubleshooting.
g. All testing on the PTM will be integrated and performed under the direct control of
a Test Director appointed specifically for this task.
h. A critique shall be held at the completion of each major test for discussion of test
results, problems and recommendations, conducted by the Test Director, the crew
directly associated with the test, and the in-house JPL assignees.
4.3 PTM TEST CONFIGURATION
The PTM Spacecraft will be comprised of flight quality hardware assembled by the Manu-
facturing group and completely operational.
4.4 TEST SEQUENCE
In general, all testing will be performed in the sequence as that indicated for flight vehicles
except for additional tests that are required to be accomplished on the PTM vehicle. Figure
4-2 shows the sequence in which the PTM tests will be performed.
4.5 SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND CHECKOUT PHASE
The assembly methods and mechanical/electrical checkout procedures which will be followed
on the PTM Spacecraft will be identical to those which will subsequently be employed on
succeeding flight vehicles, with the PTM acting as the test bed for validating these various
techniques and procedures. To avoid unnecessary redundancy in the writeup of the present
plan, only reference to the various assembly and checkout tasks required will be indicated
All details pertaining to these tasks can then be referenced to the Assembly and Checkout
Plan located in CII-V B-110VP005. Some variations to the sequence of the various tasks may
occur for the PTM vehicle relative to flight vehicles and will be so indicated in this writeup.
4.6 PTM VERIFICATION AND COMPATIBILITY TESTS
The in-house test program proposed for the Spacecraft will be as outlined in Figure
4-1. The details associated with the various tests follow.
4.6.1 SPECIAL PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION TESTS
a. Parameter Variation Test
1, Objectives - Determine the performance of the PTM Spacecraft for controlled
variations of selected system parameters in excess of nominally specified
limits.
. Test Description - This test will be performed by varying first individual
and then multiple system parameters while carrying out system performance
tests to briefly e_ercise the Spacecraft through its operating modes.
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Where degradation or malfunctioning is experienced as a result of the variation
in parameters, then the parameters will be reduced towards the nominal values
to establish the thresholds where the malfunctioning is experienced.
Specific parameters to be varied will be specified later.
b. Mission Sequencing Test
. Objective - To perform a detailed evaluation and analysis of the Spacecraft's
behavior relative to its monitoring, switching and inhibiting functions when
exercised through all possible normal and backup flight operating modes in
a compressed time scale.
. Test Descritpion - The intent of this test is to verify the correct operation of
the Spacecraft by virtue of its logic circuits during a simulated mission profile.
In essence, this test will go beyond the system testtype of verification which
is intended primarily to establish the functional integrity of the Spacecraft.
As such, the testing will be performed in a manner where all the possible
Spacecraft normal, as well as backup, modes which can occur during the
course of a mission will be exercised to verify the Spacecraft response on
entering or leaving any of these modes. The testing will, therefore, be
restricted to these transition phases only.
The testing will be carried out by conditioning the Spacecraft logic circuits to
various selected states which will allow the exercising of the different sub-
systems for all possible normal and contingency conditions either by automatic
on-board sequencing or by ground command. The specific combinations of
conditions to be investigated will be defined during Phase IB and II.
1. Objective - Investigate the effects on the PTM Spacecraft performance of selected
failures that cannot be easily analyzed otherwise.
. Test Description - These tests will be performed by simulating possible failure-
mode conditions which could occur during the mission to degrade the system
performance. Non-destructive forms of degradation, e.g., noise spikes,
transients, etc., will be introduced at various critical circuitry to determine
the resultant response. A detailed study of possible failure modes will be
carried out for establishing the types of failures or degradation which will be
simulated during the tests.
d. Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility Tests
1. General - The electromagnetic interference and compatibility test effort at
the system level will be accomplished as part of the overall EMI Control
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Program {CII-VB110VP016} which will be established for Voyager. Test
planning will be predicted to a considerable degree on the assumption that
components and subsystems will have been qualified to specified applicable
EMI requirements prior to the start of the system tests, and that various
noise generating sources and points of potential vulnerability to high level
EMI will have already been identified. Where compliance to specifications
will not be possible or practical to attain, at least the spectrum signature,
with malfunction levels of the critical circuitry for the components and sub-
systems, will be required.
Testing will essentially be accomplished by exercising the Spacecraft through
various operating modes while simultaneously monitoring circuitry previously
established as critical for any possible indications of undesired interactions
and/or malfunctioning of electronic and electrical subsystems, regardless
of their ultimate outputs, i.e., electrical, video, mechanical, pneumatic, etc.
The process will be carried out conservatively, and a sufficient number of
times, to determine if degradation of system performance has, or has not,
occurred.
Time abbreviated mission profiles will be performed to determine the simul-
taneous effect of a multiplicity of possible interference sources.
Monitoring techniques will be of a type which will indicate deviations from
normal operation, as well as system malfunction. Test instr_lmentation will
be capable of monitoring all designated circuits simultaneously and of accept-
ing event and time correlation inputs to properly identify and correlate result-
ing test data. The data recording equipment will be time based such that
records will be continuous. The selection of the proper methods for inter-
cepting power and signal leads in the system for monitoring will be accomplished
by using a combination of tee cables, breakout boxes, etc., whichever approach
lends itself most readily to the particular application.
2. Test Objectives
(a) Verify the inherent electromagnetic compatibility of the integrated
Spacecraft system and the Overall Spacecraft system by establishing
through operation under all modes, that no degradation in system per-
formance, nor indications of malfunctioning, will result from internally
or externally generated interference.
(b) Establish malfunction levels for all suspected points of RF susceptibility.
(c) Verify that interference present at critical points within the vehicle is
adequately below that level which will produce undesired or untimely
operation, actuation or functioning within the system.
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(d) Obtain steady state and transient data on the electrical power and distri -
bution subsystem during a simulated mission profile.
(e) Determine the RF susceptibility of the Spacecraft and OSE when sub-
jected to an RF environment similar to that expected at ETR.
(f) Obtain the RF signature of the Spacecraft while its transmitter is not
operating.
(g) Measure the RF susceptibility and RF power absorption of the pyrotechnic
subsystem.
(h) Determine the RF noise levels of the STC and the conducted interference
of the OSE power cables.
3. Test Description - Testing will be performed in several phases as follows:
• Establishment of the Spacecraft system malfunction levels
• Radiated Susceptibility
• Radiated Interference
• Conducted Interference
• Pyrotechnics subsystem RF Susceptibility
(a) Establishment of Spacecraft Malfunction Levels. If malfunction levels
for critical circuitry have not been fully established prior to the scheduled
date for the Systems Test, it will be necessary to establish these levels
before attempting to determine safety margins.
Interference will be intentionally injected at the critical points using
interference generating instrumentation at a level higher than existing
noise levels to determine if malfunctioning wiil be experienced.
Two (2) interference-signal to operating-signal level ratios will be estab-
lished for the circuitry:
(1) Background interference to operating signal and
(2) Minimum induced interference level which produces a malfunction
to operating signal level.
A comparison of these ratios will verify the minimum interference safety
margins. The practical objective of the testing will be not only to demon-
strate compatibility of the various combinations of noise generating sources
and vulnerable points, but the degree, or tolerance level, by which mal-
functioning can be avoided.
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(b) Radiated Susceptibility
The purposeof this test is to verify that the Spacecraft doespossess an
adequatesafety margin and will not exhibit any degradationof performance,
malfunction, or other undesirable effects when immersed in anRF field
similar to the RF environment expectedat the launch area.
Signal source antennaswill be positioned around the vehicle at a distance
of one meter. Susceptibility signals will be selected for maximum effect
on the Spacecraftwhile simulating knownlaunch area signals. Different
modulationswill be tried to determine the best modulation for test pur-
poses. The susceptibility test signals will be synchronized with known
sequencesof Spacecraft events so that gates and other timed circuits
are open. Scanswill be performed through the required frequency range.
At those frequencies where problems are found, the susceptibility level
that just causesthe problem will be recorded. If no problems are found,
the test will be repeated with the signal sources adjusted for more power.
Specific attention will be paid to sisals at frequencies within the internal
or external Spacecraft environment.
(c) Radiated Interference
This test will measure the electromagnetic interference being radiated
from the Spacecraft during SimulatedMission Profile testing. Radiated
measurementswill be taken with the receiving antennas located at a
distanceof one meter from the Spacecraft. The antennaswill be connected
to RI-FI meters which will in turn be connectedto X-Y recorders. Prior
to actual testing, a cut-and-try test run will be made in an attempt to locate
the measurementantennaat the point, one meter away, of maximum inter-
ference. After trying several locations, a compromise position may have
to be used for each frequency band. To save time and to ensure adequate
coverage, all antennaswill be used simultaneously - each being connected
to a separateRI-FI meter and X-Y recorder.
In general, the Spacecraft shall not generate any radiated interference
higher than the specified limits. However, the specific requirement of
this test is that databe collected and time-event recorded so that possible
system malfunctions may be comparedwith excessive radiated signals
emanating from the Spacecraft.
(d) ConductedInterference Measurements
Testing will be conductedby operating the system in a manner which will
ensure that all loops are fully exercised throughout their dynamic ranges,
during which time the most critically vulnerable points will be monitored
to determine any possible degradation in system performance or evidence
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of malfunctioning, as well as the levels at which these conditions are
experienced.
Acceptance criteria will be:
Normal response of applicable systems to all inserted and simulated
mission commands, as monitored on the STC, including indication of
the actuation of subsystem devices at normal mission times.
No evidence of actuation (neither momentary nor constant) of any system
components as • result of noise generated within the vehicle. Any actua-
tion at incorrect mission time shall be analyzed to verify whether such
actuation was caused by system EMI.
e. Magnetic Field Tests
1. Test Objectives
al
Do
To determine the components of the permanent magnetic field of the
Spacecraft.
To measure the magnetic fields produced at the magnetometer sensor by
current flow in the various Spacecraft subsystems.
. Test Description - Testing of the Spacecraft will be performed in a "relatively
stable" low gradient, geomagnetic environment, with night operations to re-
ceive preference.
Because of the large size and configuration of the Overall Spacecraft, testing
of complete assembly as an integral unit is difficult. Instead, it is proposed
that the Capsule and Spacecraft be separately tested.
To perform the magnetic mapping portion of the test, special holding and test
fixtures will be designed for supporting the specimen and test magnetometer.
The design has taken into consideration the approach employed by JPL for
their testing. The Spacecraft will be positioned on the fixture in sequentially
designated orientations relative to the test magnetometer. The mapping
sequence will consist of measurements of the Spacecraft magnetic fields as
the deenergized Spacecraft is moved through a sequence of orientations in
space in two axes. Magnetic field measurements will be made a few seconds
after each Spacecraft orientation so that induced eddy currents can disappear.
The mapping sequence will be repeated until sufficient data is obtained to
accurately determine the magnetic characteristics of the Spacecraft.
A similar procedure may possibly be considered for the solar panels if
further analysis bears out the need for the test, considering all aspects.
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Testing will also be performed with the deployables extendedand
articulated.
The dynamic, or current loop portion of the test will be performed without
a special fixture. The Spacecraft magnetometer sensor will be adjusted
initially to bias out the effects of the earth's magnetic field. The analogue
voltages from the magnetometerwill be connectedto a multi-channel recorder.
The Spacecraft will thenbe operated through a simulated mission sequenceso that
all current modes (primary andback-up) are exercised. Subsystemswhich
have more thanone modeof operation will be operated in their worst-case
mode (from a magnetic standpoint). At various intervals, recording will be
madeof the magnetometeranaloguevoltages for indications of variations.
f. Free ModeTest
lo Test Objectives
a) Demonstrate performance capability of the Spacecraft on
_simulated} solar power, as generated by the solar arrays.
b) Verify the functional integrity of the Spacecraft in the absence of
any support equipment electrical connections.
c) To verify that the STC and its associated cabling do not in influence
Spacecraft readout of data.
. Test Description - This test, which is basically qualitative in nature,
is not intended to provide detailed information about either system or
subsystem performance. As many varying operational modes as possible,
including pre-launch, will be exercised through the RF command link
and the system will be monitored for proper response via visual observa-
tion and telemetry data. Due to handling problems resulting from the size
and configuration of the Overall Spacecraft, as well as the constraints im-
posed due to weather and the requirement for unobstructed view of the sun,
the testing will be performed in-doors, where these constraints will not
be present, utilizing tungsten lamp banks, or equivalent, which will
produce sufficient response from the solar arrays to adequately operate
all Spacecraft subsystems.
To perform the test, the Overall Spacecraft assembly will be installed
vertically on a floor-positioned fixture so that the array plane is horizontal.
Beneath the solar array will be placed sufficient lamp banks to provide
all the required illumination.
Only one class of support equipment will be connected to the Spacecraft:
that equipment required to simulate events, or conditions, not possible in
an earth environment without external use of special test equipment or
fixtures.
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4.6.2
After complete installationand hookup a simulated mission profile test will
be performed and the test data compared with that accumulated during previous
testingwith the STC.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROOFING TESTS
a. Vibration Test
. General - The large size of Voyager requires that consideration be given to
treating the structure in a different manner than that which smaller Spacecraft
have often been treated, i.e., as a component for the purpose of vibration
T.A. testing.
The difficulties attendant with subjecting a spacecraft possessing the overall
size, weight, configuration and distributed flexibility of this Overall Spacecraft
to a vibration environment such as will be experienced during powered flight
necessitates a careful and considered review relative to what information is
really desired, what alternative approaches exist for obtaining this information,
when taking into account the state of the art, and the relative tradeoffs in the
areas of facility capability, cost, time, effort, etc. As a result of a pre-
liminary evaluation of the problem, two approaches are here being proposed:
the preferred approach, and the alternate approach. Each of these methods
will be outlined in the paragraphs which follow.
2. Preferred Approach
(a) Test Objectives
(I) Determine the dynamic response of the Overall Spacecraft structure
to vibratory excitation in terms of normal modes, resonant frequencies
and transfer functions, in both fine launch configuration and the mid-
course configuration.
(2) Determine the dynamic response of the Spacecraft by itself.
(3) Verify empirically the analytically derived response predictions.
(4) Determine relative vibration levels experienced by selected compo-
nents, subassemblies and assemblies from the standpoint of their
mounting arrangements and locations. This applies particularly to
assemblies which are structurally responsive to low frequency inputs
as a result of their mounting arrangements and locations.
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(b)
(5) Develop component response data which can be employed in the
formulation of vibration specifications for the component test phase.
(6) Verify the integrity of the Spacecraft components on their actual
mounts when subjected to flight proof test vibratory environments with
excitation levels controlled to prevent overstressing of the structure.
Test Description - Initially, the Spacecraft by itself, and then the Overall
Spacecraft configuration, will be mounted on a shaker system and sub-
jected to low level sinusoidal vibration inputs, adequate to fully excite
the structure normal responses. This will be repeated for three input
levels to fully investigate any non-linear responses to higher level inputs.
At all major resonances, dwells will take place to fully record the outputs
of all spacecraft's vibration transducers. Indications of resonance will
also be observed using stroboscopic devices and hand probes, as required.
From this information, resonant frequencies, transfer functions and
structural mode shapes will be determined. The data will be in the form
of normalized model plots and transfer amplification vs. frequency for the
various vehicle locations.
The above procedure will be carried out along the three major mutually
perpendicular axes.
Following the sinusoidal surveys, both Spacecraft configurations will be sub-
jected to a similar type of search with the vibration applied torsionally about
the thrust axis, also at low levels.
Following the survey period, the Spacecraft will be subjected sequentially
to a random vibration input in its three major axes at high enough levels
to stress the basic assembly {components, subassemblies, cabling, piping,
etc. ). Particular attention will be paid to ensure that the structure is
not subjected to overstressing due to resonances. All inputs will be applied
at the booster interface.
The dynamic data obtained during the entire survey will be submitted to
the booster contractor for use with the computer prog-rams to evaluate
the response of the entire vehicle during the powered flight mode. The
data subsequently received will then be employed for determining the
levels of static testing which will be run by G.E. to verify structural
integrity.
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3. Alternate Approach
(a) Test Objectives
(1) The objectives outlined for the "Preferred Approach".
(2) Demonstrate empirically the capability of the Overall Spacecraft
to withstand simulated vibration inputs considered representative of
the environment experienced during powered flight.
(b) Test Description -As indicated earlier, this is considered as a 'q0rute
force" approach which will require the employment of an extremely
high level force capacity. The vibration would be applied to the booster
interface of the Overall Spacecraft.
The test levels to be employed for this "Proof" type test would be based
on preceding wind tunnel model tests, structural model tests and the
predictions supplied by the booster contractor's evaluation of the data
derived from our survey.
In addition to the linear sinusoidal testing in all three axes of the
Spacecraft, random and torsional vibration will also be performed with
the specific levels to be developed at a later date.
At the completion of the testing, the Overall Spacecraft will be inspected
and subjected to a performance test, as well as leak and alignment.
During the vibration, the Spacecraft will be placed on internal power, with
communication to be through the RF link.
b. Acoustic Noise Test
1. Test Objectives
(a) Verify the operational reliability of the Overall Flight Spacecraft
when subjected to acoustically induced vibration in excess of the
acoustic environment produced by the booster propulsion system and
the aerodynamically induced noise fields experienced during the launch
and boost phases of flight.
(b) Verify the structural integrity of the Overall Flight Spacecraft
and the possible effects on critical alignments when subjected
to the acoustically induced vibration.
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(c) Determine the acoustic transmission loss characteristics of the shroud and
obtain sound pressure level distribution data including the spectral proper-
ties of attenuating structures.
(d) Verify empirically the analytically derived response predictions.
Test Description - Testing will be performed in a large reverberation
chamber (50' x 70' x 40') located at Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio.
The Overall Flight Spacecraft will be heavily instrumented to monitor
and record the sound pressure levels of the noise field at representative
critical locations, both external and internal to the vehicle, as well as
the resulting strain and acceleration levels at selected vehicle locations. A
microphone system will be employed to monitor and record the sound pressure
levels of the noise field at representative critical locations. In addition,
strain gage and accelerometer recording systems will be utilized to monitor
and record the strain and acceleration levels experienced on and within the
Spacecraft at critical locations.
With the physical installation completed, a performance test will be performed
of the Overall Flight Spacecraft subsystems to verify their proper operation
and to provide a basis for comparison with post-test performance data. Follow-
ing this, the vehicle will be subjected to a pneurm tic leak test to verify the
integrity of the vehicle. All instrumentation hookups will then be checked a
out and calibrated.
Mter checkout of all vehicle subsystems, and with those subsystems which
are normally energized during powered flight turned on, the facility sound
generation system will be activated to produce a reverberent noise field
within acoustic chamber of the specifiec overall sound pressure level and
broad brand random noise spectrum. This environment will be maintained
for the specified period of time. During this period of time, the vehicle
performance will be monitored by means of its telemetry for any indications
of performance degradation or possible malfunctioning. Concurrently with
the monitoring of the vehicle subsystems, dynamic test data will be obtained
of the structural response of internal and external vehicle structure, sub-
assemblies and individual components in terms of peak strain and acceleration
levels and correlated with the acoustical spectra at which they occur.
Transmission loss characteristics of the entire Overall Flight Spacecraft will
also be obtained in terms of sound pressure levels in db versus frequency,
as well as individual spectra for specific areas of criticality. The random
noise spectra will be recorded on tape, analyzed in 1/3 octave bands
and plotted automatically on spectrograms providing sound pressure levels
in decibels versus frequency. Oscillographs and a magnetic tape system
will be employed to record the strain and acceleration data for subsequent
reduction and analysis.
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At the completion of the acoustic noise testing, Overall Flight Spacecraft
will be subjected to a complete operational check and the resultant data com-
pared against that recorded prior to the test.
Following this, the Overall Flight Spacecraft will be given a pneumatic leak
test, followed by a detailed visual examination for indications of damage or
deterioration. All critical alignments will also be rechecked.
Space Simulation Test
General - This test of the PTM unit will be performed as the culmination of a
series of individual engineering development thermal tests which will have preceded
it, including a test on a reduced scale thermal model of the Overall Spacecraft
in the 54' Space Environmental Simulator at GE/MSD using a simulated solar
source. A comparison will subsequently be made between the results of this
latter test and that of the Space Simulation Test results on the PTM for
extrapolation of the thermal model data to the Overall Spacecraft relative to thermal
balance.
As presently proposed, the PTM Test will be conducted in one of the 39' space
environment chambers at GE/MSD using IR simulation techniques in lieu of solar
simulation. The testing, which is presently planned for 60 days duration, will be
conducted in two major phases; Phase I simulating the cruise configuration and
Phase II simulating the Mars orbit configuration. The tests will simulate the dif-
ferent environmental parameters and Spacecraft configurations which will exist
during these two major phases of the mission profile.
2. Test Objectives
(a.) Develop assurance that the Spacecraft _,_.o..,_n p,rticularlvv the environmental
control subsystem, is capable of satisfactory operation when exposed to an
environment simulating the temperature and vacuum conditions of space.
(b.) Measure, evaluate and develop confidence in the performance of the various
components and subsystems comprising the Spacecraft system when subjected
to space conditions for a duration of 60 days.
(c.) Verify the estimated power requirement of the Overall Spacecraft under
loading representative of actual operational conditions.
(d.) Emperically verify analytical thermal calculations relating to the Spacecraft
thermal balance.
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3. Test Description
(a) Approach - Phase I Testing (hot test) is intended to represent the environ-
mental conditions which will be experienced by the Overall Spacecraft
during the early portion (near Earth) of its transit period from Earth to Mars.
Throughout this period of time, the Overall Spacecraft attitude will be oriented
so that the Centaur adapter-end of the Spacecraft will always be directed
towards the Sun and experiencing a solar energy input of approximately 134
watts/ft 2.
Phase II Testing (cold test) will simulate the environmental conditions to
which the Spacecraft will be exposed during its approach to Mars, followed
by the conditions resulting from a Mars orbit. For both of these latter cases,
the Spacecraft will have been separated from the Capsule. The attitude of
the Spacecraft will still be such that its adapter end faces the Sun. The solar
energy input when viewing the Sun at this distance will be approximately
52 Watts/ft 2. The Mars orbit, as experienced by the Spacecraft, will eventual-
ly experience cycles of approximately 3 hours shade and 12 hours sunlight.
In addition to the tests simulating the conditions for the two previously men-
tioned major phases, simulation of the conditions as experienced by the
Spacecraft during the post-injection maneuver mode will be introduced at the
beginning of the Phase I testing for a long enough period of time to develop the
required data.
Environmental simulation of the boost phase is considered as impractical
primarily because of the inability to perform a realistic real-time launch
profile in a large thermal vacuum chamber, since chamber pump-down to
orbital levels requires considerably more time (hours) than the expected boost
period (minutes). In addition, the Spacecraft is protected from high thermal
inputs during the powered flight phase, as well as the fact that the heat inputs
are of such short duration. Instead the thermal state of the Spacecraft at the
conclusion of the Earth orbit phase will be employed when establishing the
initial thermal conditions for the test.
The particular test conditions were chosen where distinct and significant
changes in environmental parameters occur which can substantially affect
the thermal and/or functional capabilities of the Spacecraft.
The start of the Phase I testing will take place after the Spacecraft has been
thermally conditioned in the test chamber. The spacecraft operating sequence,
however will start with that of launch and will continue on through the various
sequences of acquisition, cruise, early mid-course maneuver, quiescent
cruise, pre-encounter and up to capsule separation.
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(b.)
A vacuum of at least 10-5 torr will be maintained throughout all testing.
The Spacecraftoperational sequencefor the PhaseII Testing will begin immediately
after simulated Capsule separation and will continue on through simulated Mars
orbits. The initial thermal conditioning of the Spacecraftwill simulate the near
Mars vicinity prior to orbit. TheIR simulation sources will be "on" constantly
for the required duration. For orbital simulation, where the Spacecraftwill be
constantly viewing the sun, the IR energy to the Spacecraftwill be reduced to
simulate what itwill experienceat that distance from the sun (approx. 52watts/ft. 2).
During the simulated occultation period of the Mars orbit, the heaters will be
programmed "on" and "off" for the required durations to produce the simulated
shadowportion of the orbit. The Mars albedo and IR radiation is considered in-
significant and will not be simulated.
Configuration - The configuration to be employed for the Phase I testing will con-
sist of the Soacecraft together with the matedbottom portion of the Capsulebarrier.
The solar panels will be replaced with thermally controllable aluminim panels
which will be secured to the solar array support frame. The bottom section of the
barrier will be required to provide the proper "shading" of the S9acecraft from
that of "cold black space". Strip heaters and super insulation will be addedto the
inside of the barrier to simulate the normal capsuleheat contribution. The
actual Capsule, or its electrical simulator, will be positioned outside the test
chamber and electrically cabled to the Spacecraft in-flight disconnect.
(c.)
For the Phase II testing, the configuration will be essentially the same, except
that the bottom section of the barrier will be replaced by a smaller section simu-
lating the diameter of the barrier which will remain with the Spacecraft after
Capsuleseparation. The strip heaters, and insulation of the barrier will be
omitted, as well as the connectionto the Capsule simulator.
Simulation - Simulators will be provided at various locations in the chamber to
produce the necessary stimulation for exercising the Vehicle attitude control sensors,
i.e. horizon sensors, star sensor, etc.
To qualitatively evaluate the functions of the attitude control system under the con-
straints imposed by the chamber, a nozzle manifold and detection system will be
provided in the chamber and coupled to the various control system nozzles for
ducting the expelled gas to the chamber exterior. Similar type simulation will also
be considered for the engines, with a solution, such as water-glycol, employed
instead of the hypergolic propellants.
The characteristics of cold, black space will be provided by the chamber walls
equipped with black cryopanels cooled to below 100°K. A gaseous helium pumping
system which is part of the cryogenic system will provide the lower vacuum levels
of space.
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(d,)
Solar radiation will be simulated by programmable radiant heat flux equipment,
which will bepositioned below the vehicle. In this manner, the thermal flux
incident to thevehicle surfaces will be controlled to simulate both steady and
cyclical thermal variation which it will normally experience in transit and in orbit.
Vehicle environmental temperatures will be varied and maintained through radiant
transfer betweenthe external vehicle surfaces, the cryogenically cooled chamber
walls and the solar IR simulators.
Vehicle temperatures will be monitored through the use of the Spacecraft's own
thermal sensors as well as supplementary thermocouples, and the data, transmitted
via telemetry andby hardware, will be used for determination and control of the
incident thermal flux.
Communicationbetween the Spacecraft and ground stations will be accomplished
via radio link betweenthe Spacecraft antennasand chamber receiving and trans-
mitting antennas. Commandsto the Vehicle and the data received from it will be
processed throughthe control center ground station.
Preparation andCheckout - Prior to installation of the Spacecraft in the test chamber,
a dry run will beperformed to verify the adequacyand completeness of test planning
in which lifting fixtures and cranes will bepreloaded, vehicle transport clearances
and silhouette clearances for transferring the Spacecraft into the vacuum chamber
will be checked, and a simulated pumpdowncarried out with personnel performing
their "in test" functions.
The Spacecraftwill be installed vertically in the chamber on a thermally insulated
fixture, or suspended,and connectedto all electrical, mechanical, and servicing
interfaces required for the test. Preparation and servicing will be performed
in a manner simulating the techniques and procedures which will eventually be
employed at the launch site, using actual support equipment and procedures wherever
possible.
Prior to closing the chamber door, anabbreviated mission profile operational check
will be madeof all vehicle subsystems to provide a yardstick to be employed for
comparing with the vehicle performance during and following the orbital phase.
Thus, whenexercising the vehicle in the chamber during the space simulation test,
any interactions which appear abnormal relative to what was experiences prior
to pump-downcanbe attributed to the simulated environment.
Oncethe integrity and performance capability of the Spacecraft has been established,
a full-scale dress rehearsal will be undertaken, preceded by demonstrations of
readiness to include hardware, software and personnel. The precedure for estab-
lishing readiness will employ a count-down sequencesimulating the launch area
procedure as closely as possible. Checkoutof the vehicle will take place in real
time.
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When satisfactory functioning of all subsystems has been established, all equipment, except
that which will be "on" normally during the powered flight phase, will be de-energized.
Performance of active subsystems will be monitored during the continuation of the pump-
down via the RF links.
Operation during the chamber pump-down will be restricted to the powered flight mode.
Careful attention will be required during this time period to prevent overheating of tempera-
ture sensitive componenta
Near the simulated orbital insertion time, the pre-programmed thermal radiation simulators
will be energized. Once proper orbit environmental conditions of temperature and pressure
have been reached, official "orbit injection" will be considered as having been attained and the
simulated mission test will begin. Step by step sequencing of the various vehicle functions
with their proper time labels will then follow.
d. Simulated Mid-Course And Retro-Interaction Test
1. General - This test, to be realistically performed, would require the presence of a
zero-G field and a large enough thermal vacuum facility whose pumping capacity
would be more than adequate to maintain the vacuum conditions of space, in spite
of the vacuum degrading conditions of the retro-engine firing. The need for the
test to be run under vacuum conditions is based on the requirement to maintain a
"full" flow in the engine nozzle so that abnormal vibrations are not introduced
during engine burn. However, conduct of this test in a vacuum chamber is not
considered practical at this time when considering the amount of expelled gases
which will be produced (8 lbs. /sec.) during the engine firing. Hence, considera-
tion will be given to alternate methods of accomplishing the test under ambient
conditions.
2. TEST OBJECTIVES
(a) Verify that the autopilot subsystem in conjunction with the propulsion subsystem
is capable of maintaining and controlling the Spacecraft attitude during the
burn phase of the trajectory correcting motor.
(b) Verify that the dynamic response properties of the Spacecraft structure do not
degrade the autopilot performance.
(o} Determine possible effects on the operability of the autopilot in the Spacecraft
system environment, resulting from such factors as electrical noise and
transients, as well as electromechanical interactions induced by motor burn.
(d) Determine the performance of the autopilot when subjected to inter-axis cross
coupling resulting from variations in the Spacecraft CG, or other conditions.
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3. TEST DESCRIPTION
(a} For the first method of test, the rocket engines will be provided with nozzles
sized for ground ambient environmental conditions. The Spacecraft will be
suspended from a system of cables and counterbalanced allowing the Spacecraft
the required necessary degrees of freedom to properly provide for the resulting
responses to various signal generations and inputs to the autopilot system while
the Spacecraft is subjected to mid-course and retro rocket engine firing. Error
signals will be intentionally injected into the autopilot system to determine the
operational boundaries, the attitude control responsiveness, and the cross-
coupling effects during propulsion firing.
The difficulty associated with this approach will be due to the problem of sizing
of the engine nozzles, Insuffieient levels of thrust may be produced and reduced
vibration levels resulting from the engine burn may occu_ as well as the effects
of acoustical feedback and tether line tensions.
(b) The second method which will be investigated for feasibility during Phase IB
will require that the Spacecraft be mounted on a vibration machine, whose
input will be programmed to yield vibration output frequencies and levels
representative of the vibrations produced by the retro-rocket firing in a vacuum
as determined during the engine development tests. Stimuli to the autopilot
system would be provided by a servo loop mechanism designed to produce the
necessary signal input levels when acted upon by the resulting output of the
autopilot. A means of providing the preprogrammed error signals to the
autopilot would be included in order to determine operational boundaries,
attitude control responsiveness and cross-coupling effects.
®
An advantage of this letter approach is that the problem associated with acousti-
cal feedback experienced during ambient testing is eliminated.
e. Live Pyrotechnic Separation And Shock Test
,
General - The proof-type separation tests on the PTM proposed here, using live
pyrotechnics, will be the culmination of extensive engineering design and develop-
ment pyrotechnic tests. The exact method (s) which will be followed will be care-
fully evaluated and definitized during the Phase IB effort. Ideally, these tests
should be performed under vacuum and zero - "G" conditions. The effect onthe
test results of less than ideal test conditions will be carefully considered during
the definition phase.
The various pyrotechnic-induced shock impulses which will be experienced by the
Spacecraft during its mission profile are varied and include the following:
(a) Booster staging
(b) Shroud separation
(c) Spacecraft from booster
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(d) Spacecraft deployments of various extendables
(c) Engine firings
(f) Capsule separation sequence.
The significant separation shocks considered relative to the PTM test phase will be
only (c) and (f). The remaining shocks are considered insignificant, or not within
the scope of the present plan, e.g., shroud separation.
'2. Objectives
(a) Verify that Spacecraft performance is unaffected by detonation of the pyrotech-
nics.
0_) Determine the nature of the pyrotechnic initiated shocks using suitable instru-
mentation.
(c) Determine the possible structurally damaging effects of the shocks on the solar
array cells, as well as on the entire spacecraft structure.
(d) Verify that the dynamics of separation comply with specified requirements
relative to velocity, acceleration, pitch rate and angular impulse.
.
Test Methods - The exact method which will be employed will be defined during
Phase IB. Two methods currently proposed which will be considered are as
follows:
(a) Pendulum - The Spacecraft will be secured to simulated Centaur and Capsule
dummys, having the same mass and triaxial moments of inertia equivalent
to those of the actual hardware, by means of their respective adapters. The
entire assembly will then be suspended horizontally from the ceiling in a
high-bay area by means of three iong cables which will be attached to the
center of mass of each of the systems, i.e., Centaur, Spacecraft, Capsule.
Suitable instrumentation and high speed photographic coverage will be em-
ployed to record and photograph the results of the various separations.
The first separation which will be carried out will be on the adapter between
the Soacecraft and the Centaur. The actual cutting action, separation velocity
and tip-off rates will be obtained.
Following the Centaur Separation, the Centaur mass will be removed and the
Spacecraft-capsule separation sequence then performed. Similar test data
will be recorded for these tests.
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During the tests, all Spacecraft equipment normally operating will be
energized to determine possible indications of malfunctioning resulting from
the shock impulses. At the completion of the tests, the Spacecraftwill be
subjectedto a performance test and visually examined for indications of
damage.
(3 Vertical Separation - This test method would be performed under vacuum in
a space chamber. The basic test specimen configuration would be similar to
the preceding method except that it would now be vertical with the centaur
mass resting on the bottom of the chamber on a fixture possessing the required
resiliency. The Spacecraft, in turn, would be attached along its sides to
counter balanced weights suspended by means of cables from the top of the
chamber. The intent here would be to supply sufficient upward force on the
Spacecraft and Capsule after separation to just overcome the effects of
gravity, cable weight and pully friction, so that the separation from the adapter
would permit the free movement upward of the Spacecraft.
This approach would also be followed for the Spacecraft-Capsule separation.
Performance of the Spacecraft would also be investigated during and following
separation.
INTERFACE COMPATIBILITY TESTS (IN-HOUSE)
Spacecraft - Spacecraft Science Payload Compatibility
1. Objective - Verify design and performance compatibility between the Space-
craft and the Science Payload.
. Test Description - The compatibility testing of the Science Payload will begin
with the establishment of compatibility between each individual science
instrument (and its Spacecraft Data Automation Subsystem), relative to
control and data encoding. A complete and orderly test sequence will be
carried out to accomplish this integration.
(a) Tests will be performed to demonstrate that regulated power is properly
supplied by the Spacecraft to all the Data Automation Equipment (DAE)
of the Spacecraft Science payload.
(b) Verification of the accuracy of the formatted data from the DAE to the
data handling subsystem of the Spacecraft bus.
(c) Proper response by the various science instruments to command signals
eminating from the Spacecraft.
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(d) Adequacyof the field of view provided by the Spacecraft for the science
instruments.
(e) EMI compatibility betweenscience instruments and the remainder of the
Overall Spacecraft for all the modes of operation. This will be accomplished
during the course of the Overall Spacecraft Electromagnetic Compatibility
Test.
b. Spacecraft - Capsule Compatibility
C.
1. Objective - Verify complete mechanical and electrical compatibility between
the Flight Spacecraft and Flight Capsule.
. Test Description - The tests employing an actual capsule and barrier will be
performed following a series of engineering mechanical and electrical develop-
ment and verification tests using engineering hardware and simulators.
Compatibility tests which will be conducted with the PTM and a Flight Quality
Capsule and barrier will consist of an all-system test using the STC. This
will thenbe followed by a test where the control and checkout of the Capsule
through the Spacecraft will be carried out using the Launch Checkout Equipment.
In addition, Spacecraft-Capsule environmental compatibility will be verified
during several of the environmental phases.
Spacecraft - Launch Complex Equipment Compatibility
. Objective - Demonstrate the compatibility and capability of the Launch Checkout
Equipment (LCE) to power, command and monitor the Overall Spacecraft in
flight configuration.
o Test Description - The LCE will be interconnected to the Overall Spacecraft
with simulated umbilical and transfer cables. A simulated launch countdown
will then be performed using the procedures and sequences to be employed at
ETR. Employment of the STC will be required in conjunction with the Launch
Checkout Equipment in order to assist in communicating with the Spacecraft.
The ability of the LCE to power and command the Overall Flight Spacecraft
and to monitor and record the spacecraft functions, as well as the capability
of the STC to analyze subsystem performance will be demonstrated.
d. Overall Spacecraft - Launch Vehicle Interface Compatibility
1. Objectives
(a) Verify mechanical and electrical compatibility between the mating surfaces
of the Sgacecraft Adapter and the Centaur Launch Vehicle Adapter.
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(b) Demonstrate adequacy of clearances between nose fairing and Overall
Spacecraft.
(c) Demonstrate satisfactory performance of the Spacecraft telecommunica-
tions subsystem via the nose fairing parasitic antenna.
(d) Verify the proper flow of Spacecraft generated signals to the Launch
Vehicle telemetry system as well as the relaying of power and signals
between the Spacecraft and Launch Complex Equipment through the
Launch Vehicle inflight connector.
(e) Verify the separation initiating circuitry.
Test Description - Mechanical compatibility between mating surfaces will be
demonstrated by the use of a match-mate tool, duplicating the mating surface
of the Centaur launch vehicle adapter, which will be fitted to the field joint face
of the Spacecraft adapter to verify compliance with the specified mating require-
ments.
A pin-to-pin electrical continuity test will also be performed on the mated in-
flight connector.
An electrical simulator, which will represent the Launch Vehicle operational
interface, as well as provide inter-connection to the Spacecraft Launch
Checkout Equipment, will be employed in conjunction with the STC and external
power to perform an all-systems test for verification of the launch area check-
out sequence.
Adequacy of clearances between the nose fairing and Spacecraft will be verified
during their installation on the transporter to verify required spacing.
The Spacecraft telecommunication subsystem performance will be investigated
while the Overall Spacecraft is encapsulated by the nose fairing to verify proper
performance and to measure the effect of the nose fairing parasitic antenna.
Dummy solar panels will be employed for the entire test to preclude the possi-
bility of inadvertent damage.
The tests described here will have been previously carried out using the Engi-
neering development model.
e. Overall Spacecraft - DSN Mission Dependent Equipment Compatibility
o Objective - Verify functional compatibility between the PTM telecom-
munication subsystem and the Mission Dependent Equipment (MDE)
which comprises part of the in-house STC.
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o Test Description - During flight, the functional interfaces of the Spacecraft
with the DSIF are at the tracking stations, and consist essentially of equipment
for the demodulation and decommutation of data sub-carrier and command
generation.
Equipment similar to what is employed at the various tracking stations to
perform these tasks are also incorporated as part of the STC.
Verification of functional compatibility between the telecommunication sub-
system of the PTM and this equipment is required as early in the program
as possible. Checkout will take place during the initial system test where
MDE generated signals will be introduced into the Spacecraft telecommunica-
tion subsystem and the Spacecraft response subjected to power measurements
and signal demodulation. Performance data relative to propagation and fre-
quency shifts, measurement time to lock, data transmission command recep-
tion and mode switching will be accomplished at this time.
Spacecraft - AHSE Compatibility
. Objective - To verify that the AHSE will be compatible with the Spacecraft
with respect to their mechanical interfaces and the intended procedures for
the AHSE use.
1 Test Description - Determination of the compatibility of the Spacecraft-AHSE
will, to a great extent, be accomplished through the development phase of the
program. Initial compatibilities may be assessed for the Assembly and
Handling Equipment during fabrication and testing of vehicle mockups, develop-
ment test models, and engineering models. By the time that the PTM is ready
for assembly, most of the assembly and handling equipment will have had the
opportunity to be checked out in the development stage.
Deliverable AHSE will be utilized throughout the flow cycle for the PTM.
Since the PTM will be flight quality, and the assembly and test cycle will
duplicate that of a flight vehicle, it is considered that most, if not all, Space-
craft-AHSE compatibilities will be verified during the normal flow cycle of
the PTM. For example, during the assembly phase, the Assembly Equipment
and procedures will be verified. During the testing cycle most of the Handling
Equipment and procedures should be verified since the PTM goes through
similar tests in the factory and is subsequently shipped to the ETR for Field
Validation Tests. When the PTM is shipped to AFETR, the Shipping Equip-
ment and procedures will also be verified. Shipment of the PTM to WADC and
Dayton, Ohio for the Acoustic Noise tests and shipment of PTM #2 to Pasadena,
California for the JPL testing program will provide an early checkpoint on
the Shipping Equipment and procedures.
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To determine that all Spacecraft-AHSE compatibilities will be verified during
the test cycle of the PTM, an assessment will be madeof the AHSEto be
utilized and the procedures of their use in the PTM assembly and test cycle.
The results of this study will be factored into the determination as to what
specific tests may be required to accomplish at any particular time in the flow
cycle. Sinceit is expectedthat most of theprime AHSEand the procedures of
their usewill be verified during the PTM assembly andtest cycle, no specific
time period is allocated in the testing cycle of the PTM for these verifications.
Where it is determined that special tests may be required to verify the Space-
craft-AHSE compatibility, those tests will be interspersed in the flow cycle at
the most opportunetime.
4.7 AFETR VALIDATION
Although the PTM vehicle will be exercised at AFETR for validation of the various launch
area procedures and for verification of required compatability, the scope and details of
this effort will not be covered in this plan, but will, instead reference the LaunchOperation
Plan in CII-VBll0VP006.
4.8 PTM LIFE TEST
The extreme emphasisof the long life aspectof the Voyager program makes this phaseof
the PTM vehicle important enoughto warrant discussion of the philosophy and proposed
methodologyassociatedwith this test in a separate and distinct section. For reference to
this phaseof the program, seeCII-VBll0VP008.
4.9 ASSOCIATECONTRACTORSTEST INTERFACE
During all phasesof the system-level PTM test program which directly involves the Flight
Capsule and Experiments, associate contractor assistance in the form of knowledgeable
test personnel together with their specialized test equipment and detailed test procedures
may be required to provide assistance in evaluating the performance of their respective
hardware. Procedures, equipment andpersonnel will be integrated with the General Electric
equipment, procedures andtest team to provide a coordinated test effort.
4. I0 TEST CONSTRAINTS
4.I0. I GENERAL
Discussed below are those constraints which apply to the PTM Test Program either by
virtue of specified test requirements, schedule, hardware availability or inherent limitations
in test facilities or test technology.
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h.
Schedule - It shall be considered mandatory that the program established for the
PTM be completed far enough in advance of the 1971 scheduled flight to allow the
use of the PTM for the ETR validation cycle, as well as for Life Testing (See
Figure 4-3). Early completion of the TA program shall also be considered as
falling within this constraint.
Safety - To limit hazardous conditions in the systems test area, as well as to
comply with local safety ordinances, all safety measures specified in the Voyager
Safety Implementation Plan CII-VBl10VP012, shall be adhered to during test.
Configuration Control - All design changes incorporated in flight hardware must be
incorporated initially in the PTM. Where warranted in the opinion of the ITB,
testing to determine the effect of these design changes shall be carried out initially
on the PTM.
Attitude Control Tests - No suitable method is presently available in the presence
of a lg field for dynamically testing the control system while installed in the
Spacecraft due to the PTM vehicle's large size and general flexibility.
Engineering development tests and analysis as well as the results of the 1969
Voyager flight test will be depended on for further and more realistic evaluation.
Qualitative evaluation of its performance will be accomplished during the Space
Simulation test, to the degree of verifying the operation of the control jets.
Acceleration Test - As a result of facility capability limitation, a centrifuge test
of the entire PTM in flight configuration will not be carried out. Instead, the
results of Engineering development static loathing tests on the STM, supplemented
by centrifuge and status load test on subassemblies will be utilized to develop the
required assurance. The results of the 1969 flight will also be considered for
applicablity relative to validation of the basic design.
Solar Simulation - The testing of the PTM with solar simulation is precluded at the
present time due to the large diameter of its solar array (approximately 20'). If
a space simulation capability becomes available in time, then consideration will be
given to its employment.
Zero-G Field - The absence of a Zero-G field will impose limitations relative to
several of the tests, e.g., separation mid-course and retropropulsion firing,
attitude control subsystem testing, etc. Mechanical methods for compensating the
effect of the gravity during these tests will be employed.
Launch - Profile Depressurization - The real-time launch-profile which will be
experienced by the Overall Spacecraft within the fairing during the powered flight
phase of the mission may result in structural damage to the Spacecraft due to the
rapid depressurization which will ensue.
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TASKS
PROCURE, FABRICATE, FA TEST PTM HARDWARE
SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY & CHECKOUT/STC COMPATIBILITY A
TELEMETRY CHANNELS CALIBRATION A
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE TEST A
WEIGHT AND C.G. A
PNEUMATIC TESTING A
ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TEST A
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST A
SPACECRAFT/CAPSULE MATE
SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE TEST B
WEIGHT AND CIG. B
A LIGNMENT CHECKS B
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY TEST B
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST B
FREE MODE TEST
PARAMETER VARIATIONS TEST
MISSION SEQUENCING TEST
FAILURE MODES TEST B
LCE-SPACECRAFT COMPATIBILITY B
VIBRATION TESTS A, B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST B
MAGNETIC FIELD TEST B
ALIGNMENT CHECKS B
PNEUMATIC TEST B
I SIMULATED MIDCOURSE & _'_ t_ntJttT.._Tc_N TEST A
ACOUSTIC NOISE TEST B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST B
PNEUMATIC TEST B
ALIGNMENT CHECKS B
SPACE SIMULATION TEST A
LIVE PYRO SEPARATION SHOCK TEST B
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TEST B
LV-SPACECRAFT COMPATIBILITY TEST B
MDE-SPACEC RAFT COMPATIBILITY TEST B
DISASSEMBLE, BAG, PACK & SHIP TO ETR FOR VALIDATION
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Figure 4-3. Voyager PTM Test Schedule
_._ 43/44 of 46
VB110VP004
Another possible failure mode may be that provided by the corona region of
atmospheric pressure where electrical malfunctioning or breakdown occurs.
Simulation of the actual launch-profile in large space simulation chambers is at
present difficult, if not impossible, to attain. The need for performing this
test on the full scale vehicle/shroud will be further explored during Phase IB,
as well as the possibility of a test on a scaled down model.
i, Antenna Pattern Test - Primarily because of the large size and weight of the Overall
Spacecraft, all antenna pattern testing will be performed on a scale model during
the engineering development test phase. The data will be extrapolated to the full
scale vehicle.
4.11 SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
The emphasis placed on the safety aspects by JPL relative to handling and testing has resulted in
in the generation of a separate Safety Plan as described in CII-VBl10VP012. The safety
requirements specified in this plan will be adhered to throughout the PTM test phase.
5.0 FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
The special test facility requirements applicable to the TA and PTM test program are
outlined in the Facility Plan CII-VBll0VP018.
6.0 TEST PROGRAM CONTROL
6.1 QUALIFICATION MONITORING BOARD
An Integrated Test Board (ITB) representing the Project Manager, Engineering, System
Test, Quality Assurance, ReliabilityAssurance, and Manufacturing will monitor the overall
TA program. Its function will include the review of all pretest plans and reports for
acceptance or rejection, and to recommend to the Program Manager any changes in the pro-
gram or test levels that may be dictatedby experience and/or new information.
6.2 LOG AND REPORTING
A chronological log will be maintained current throughout the PTM test program which will
contain all test data, identification, procedure descriptions and a record of all pertinent
events during the test program. After each phase of the program, the responsible test
engineer will prepare and submit the log and test report. This report will be submitted to
the ITB for review. Decisions pertaining to finalacceptance or rejection of the vehicle
will be made to the Project Manager as advised by the Integrated Test Board.
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7.0 TEST FAILURES
7.1 PROCEDURE IN EVENT OF FAILURE
In the event of failure during any phase of this test program, continuation of test, retest,
or disposition of the test article shall be at the direction of the ITB. A failure report shall
be prepared on each failure in accordance with established Voyager procedures.
7.2 FAILURES
Any reading which is not within the tolerances specified by the applicable test specification
when inputs are in tolerances, and any deterioration or damage which could in any manner
prevent the test article from meeting its operational requirements during service life,
shall be reported to the responsible engineer or Test Director who will, in turn, be account-
able for the analysis as to the cause of the failure. Failures resulting from faults of as-
sembly or manufacture shall not constitute a failure for the purpose of establishing qualifi-
catioaunless the design is such as to make high quality manufacture impossible. Failures
resulting from faults of assembly or manufacture shall be repaired and testing continued
in accordance with ITB approved test plan.
8.0 POST QUALIFICATION HARDWARE UTILIZATION
ao Upon successful completion of the Type Approval testing, the test hardware will
be utilized for upgrading the Engineering Development Model where required,
or for the performance of additional tests, e.g., test-to-failure. It shall not,
however, be employed for flight.
b° The PTM Spacecraft will be shipped to AFETR for the validation exercise; and
upon its return, will be employed for the Life Testing Program. Ultimately,
it will be upgraded to reflect the 1973 flight configuration and employed for future
design verification tests.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Assembly and Checkout requirements for the Voyager Project have been integrated to establish
a basic plan for hardware assembly, acceptance, and delivery.
The purpose of this plan is to describe the baseline concept to be utilized during Phase IB for
expansion and detail definition of each requirement essential for implementation of all phases
of Overall Spacecraft processing. The plan specifically covers all elements necessary for
release of Spacecraft or OSE assemblies from bonded stock, through integrated assembly,
inspection, test, acceptance, final buy-off, preparation for shipment, and delivery.
The total plan concentrates on the selected '71 Overall Flight Spacecraft configuration,
emphasizh_ application of conservative assembly and test techniques which establish
progressive confidence levels in satisfying long life reliability requirements.
Fundamental concepts embraced by this plan will be applied to the '69 S/C and the '71 PTM
assembly and test phases. Minor variations of the '71 assembly and test flow are necessary
for the '69 assembly and test sequence to compensate for variables assiciated with S/C
configuration.
Assembly and Checkout planning approach has included considerations relative to the effect
of assembly stages and test requirements on design configuration. Design has been in-
fluenced to provide maximum accessibility to spacecraft test and service points (such as
pyrotechnic installation and propellant/cold gas loading) during and following assembly stages.
Examples of these influences are:
a. Location of system test harness and associated test points
b. Modular design of the torus structure and spacecraft support shell which
permit parallel assembly and test sequences.
2.0 OBJECTIVES
2.1 GENERAL
The overall objective of Assembly and Checkout is to establish integrated assembly and
test operations which will assess the degree of hardware compliance (under various
operational conditions) with performance specifications and workmanship requirements,
and which will accrue system operational time consistent with reliability constraints.
It is also an objective of this plan to define the resources and capabilities necessary to
complete and deliver, on schedule, two flight spacecraft and a backup spacecraft.
2.2 SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
The specific objectives are as follows:
a. To plan, schedule, control and implement all phases of spacecraft assembly in a
sequence consistent with assembly/checkout procedures and program schedules
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b_ To coordinate the flow of equipment assemblies into an integrated structure in
controlled stages, and to provide for the acquisition of data necessary to verify
assembly compliance to drawings and specifications
el To implement assembly procedures, controls, and techniques developed for use in
manufacturing high quality, reliable equipment that is free of workmanship defects
do To verify that all flight spacecraft are capable of performing mission functions
within specified limits and to establish the existence of adequate margins
eo To detect and correct unexpected interactions while simulating powered-flight
events
fo To subject the spacecraft and all support system equipment to an operational situation
within which the system must operate satisfactorily for an extended period of time
g° To accumulate operating times at all levels of assembly under dynamic performance
conditions equivalent to predicted mission sequences
h. To minimize delays due to malfunctions of any type, by providing experienced spares
from the backup spacecraft.
3.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
3.1 SPECIFICATION AND TEST PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS
The System Design Specification is the controlling document to which the Voyager Space-
craft hardware is designed. To supplement this document and to provide specific require-
ments for testing of the Voyager spacecraft, a System Acceptance Test Specification will be
•,_-ri_en. The sys_m Test !>rocedures (TP's) will be designed to test the various oper-
ational characteristics of the spacecraft to determine its compliance with the Systems
Acceptance Test Specification.
As part of the acceptance criteria, the Systems Acceptance Test Specification will call
out detail requirements for the operational characteristics of the interface between the
Spacecraft and the Lander Capsule and the scientific payload.
For the Final Acceptance of the Spacecraft, GE will present to JPL, for concurrence,
requirements regarding the buy-off of the spacecraft, the procedures utilized, and the
data to support the acceptance of the spacecraft.
The System Acceptance Test Specification will be the working document to which operational
compliance of the Spacecraft is directed. All (TP's) will be designed to furnish data assuring
that the Spacecraft does function in accordance with the System Acceptance Test Specification.
The requirements of this document will include, but not be limited, to the following
considerations:
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a. Test Facilities and Equipment
b. Lander Capsule Interface
c. Scientific Payload Interface
d. Measurements and Tolerances
e. Test Documentation
f. Rejection and Retest.
g. Applicable Documents_
h. Classification of Tests
i. Technical Requirements of each test.
Primary concern in the acceptance specification will be the definition of the technical
requirements for each of the tests. This will include detail requirements concerning
such parameters as telemetry response to S/C commands, voltage levels, stabilization
responses, tempera_res, pressure levels, component ON/OFF cycles, etc.
To satisfy technical requirements, the TP's will be generated in such detail that all
parameters will be checked in a step-by-step process. Data sheets will be generated
throughout the testing for analysis and evaluation of the S/C responses.
3.2 ACCEPTANCE PROCEDURES
This procedure will apply to JPL and General Electric/Spacecraft Department personnel
directly associated with production, inspection, testing, and acceptance of Voyager
Spacecraft.
The procedure will provide for JPL review, as well as technical and quality assurance
(QA) inspection of each spacecraft prior to shipment from the factory to the launch site.
Performance requirements for evaluation of the spacecraft will be contained in the System
Acceptance Test Specifications, and the applicable Test Procedures which will be supplied
to JPL for review.
Specific requirements for each portion of the inspection/acceptance activity are defined
in the following sections:
3.2.1 ACCEPTANCE TEAM
The responsibility of the Acceptance Team will be to establish the technical adequacy
of the S/C in terms of its configuration and operating performance characteristics
prior to approval and shipment to the launch site. The team will include JPL, Procuring
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Contracting Officer or his designated representative, GE representatives, and other
selected delegates. The Acceptance Team must concur on the acceptability of the Voyager
Spacecraft prior to shipment to the launch site.
3.2.2 SOURCE INSPECTION AT PLANT
Using the available contractor data, JPL Quality Assurance personnel or delegated re-
presentatives will conduct normal quality control functions with emphasis on final assembly
and systems test. Results of this inspection activity will be available to the Acceptance
Team during their pre-shipment acceptance.
3.2.3 CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVES AT PLANT
Beginning with assembly testing, and ex_ending through final systems tests, Acceptance
Team Members or their representatives will, at their discretion, observe tests and review
data which will ultimately become part of the acceptance documents.
3.2.4 GE'S RESPONSIBILITY
GE will provide the Acceptsnce Team with all S/C performance test data and other document-
ation for review at their request. This information will be made available for the formal
acceptance meeting as back up information for the Acceptance Summary Document.
The acceptance procedure will provide for scheduling of all final inspection and buy-off.
GE will provide, prior to shipment of the hardware, Schedules, Hardware Status/Con-
figuration Documentation, Test Specifications, Detail Test Procedures and delineation
of all assembly and specification changes which occurred during hardware assembly and
test.
3.2.5 FINAL BUY-OFF
At the time of release for shipment, the spacecraft condition will have been demonstrated
as meeting the System Acceptance Test Specification and will be ready for field processing
to incorporate normal field-installed hardware, such as expendable items. To assure that
this will be accomplished, the following requirements will be satisfied"
a. All spacecraft assemblies will have successfully completed test requirements
as defined by the applicable test specifications
b. A final acceptance test will have been accomplis_ d for acceptance without
significant deviation from specified performance
c. The contractor's ITB will review all final spacecraft test and retest results
for specification compliance
do The contractor will provide for the Acceptance Team the documents listed
below. This is known as the Acceptance Summary Document and will contain
the following:
5 of 64
VBIIOVP005
1. List of all tests performed on the Spacecraft with non-prime hardware
installed
2. List of Spacecraft field installations
3. A summary listing of all components having an accumulated operating time
of more than 50 percent of the Red Line Limit at time of shipment
4. Flow diagram of all assembly and systems testing performed on the S/C
5. Test Status Summary. This summary will provide "Quick Look" status
of all S/C testing
6. Assembly and system test summary reports summarizing the results of each
test performed
. S/C Test Manager Summary Report. This report will summarize all
testing performed on the S/C and explain specific problems that arose
during the test cycle
8. Acceptance Team Systems Certification Report, certifying that the spacecraft
has been accepted for shipment
e. A list of required documentation for field processing shall be presented to the
Acceptance Team by the contractor.
4.0 ASSEMBLY PLAN
4.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of the Assembly Plan is to provide the elements to meet the following require-
ments in the assembly of the Voyager Spacecraft:
a. Assemble Proof Test Models and all Flight Spacecraft
b. Provide the capability of safety handling and positioning subsystems and
systems during assembly and test
c. Prevent formation of magnetic fields in the Spacecraft caused by inadvertent
inclusion of magnetic materials during assembly and test
d. Maintain cleanliness and ease of inspection during assembly and test.
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4.2 ELEMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY PLAN
+
The Voyager Assembly Plan will provide the basic elements explained in the following paragraphs.
4.2.1 INTEGRATED ASSEMBLY AND TEST
This plan delineates the work of assembling the Spacecraft with a logical series of inspection
and checkout operations. This work will be performed in a central area with access to
handling equipment, assembly fixtures, inspection gages, fixtures and test equipment.
The major advantages of this method are:
a. Transport of the spacecraft or any of its subassemblies is minimized
b. Correction of problems axe easily implemented
c. A common schedule governs all operations, whether assembly or test
d. The interchange of information between crews during assembly and testing
promotes efficiency and broadens the experience of each crew
e. The use of centralized facilities reduces cost.
4.2.2 COORDINATED FIXTURES AND TOOLING
The assembly and checkout of the spacecraft will be accomplished with the aid of coordinated
tooling. This means that a system of tooling is derived which satisfies the functions of
support, placement, reference, accuracy, protection, positioning, transport, environment
and interchangeability.
,4 c}
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An important element of the assembly plan will be the control imposed on the release of
sub-assemblies to the assembly operation. A "toll-gate" control will be used which
wiI1 require verification of configuration and performance of the assembly prior to initiating
the next event.
4.2.4 "TOLL-GATE" CONTROL OF TOOLS AND FIXTURES
The same kind of control is placed on fixtures and tools which are used for spacecraft
assemby. The "toll-gate" will assure the same verification of the configuration of the tool
as performed for the hardware. No tool will be released for use on the assembly floor until
its current configuration has been verified. This procedure will provide the assurance that
the status of the fixtures, tooling and handling equipment is compatible with the hardware
on which they are to be used.
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4.2.5 PARALLEL ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS
The design is arranged so that the assembly of the spacecraft can be performed in a number
of parallel operations. This shortens cycle time and permits progressive checkout of built-
up assemblies.
4.3 ASSEMBLY CONCEPTS
Detailed assembly concepts are described below. The procedures and the precautions
outlined will be applied to the PTM and Flight Spacecraft.
4.3.1 ACCUMULATION AND DISBURSEMENT OF ASSEMBLY MATERIAL
The sub-assemblies and materials to be used in the assembly of the spacecraft will be
accumulated from a bonded stock room located as close to the point of use as possible.
The means by which these items arrived at bonded stock are given in the Fabrication
and Subsystem Assembly Plan.
The disbursement of items required for the spacecraft final assembly will be controlled
to assure that the configuration performance and quality of the completed vehicle will meet
all the design requirements. Figure 4-1 illustrates the procedure by which a sub-assembly
or assembly will be released from bonded stock for use in the assembly area. The major
feature of this procedure is the "Toll-gate" which will completely control the release of any
item. The configuration check assures that the specified drawing requirements have been
met. Serial number verification assures that the correct subassembly has been built-up
of its serialized parts, and vehicle assignment verification assures that the correct item
has been assigned to a given Spacecraft.
4.3.2 INTEGRATION OF ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS
Assembly of Voyager will achieve the integration of assembly, inspection, and checkout
operations. Assembly and checkout will be performed at a fixed station in an area which
will permit access to the spacecraft under construction for handling equipment, assembly
fixtures, inspections, tools, and test equipment.
The spacecraft will be moved out of the assembly area for certain operations, such as,
final alignment, vibration, thermal vacuum, EMI, weight, and balance tests.
Advantages of assembly and test integration are:
a. Reduced assembly time by the use of common assembly/test schedules and
central facilities
b. Protection of the spacecraft by minimizing transfer from one location to another
c. Promotion of smooth interface between assembly, inspection and test.
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4.3.3 ASSEMBLY TOOLING AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT
Tooling and fixtures to be used in the assembly of the spacecraft will provide the following:
a. Multiple Usage - The use of a fixture for different operations by the addition
or removal of auxiliary parts
b. Common Usage - The use of a fixture for an assembly operation, a checkout
operation or a launch site operation
Co Compatibility - The use of a tool design standard which will result in a system
of assembly fixtures and handling devices compatible with tl_ requirements
for AHSE, STC and LCE
d. Basic Reference - The provision of basic reference points and surfaces from
which alignment operations can be performed and inspected
Four classes of fixtures will be required for assembly operations:
o Assembly Fixture - This will have the function of supporting the
spacecraft or portions of it during the process of assembly, and of
providing means for accurately positioning the various portions
. Alignment Fixture - Thiswill be an auxiliary device which will attach
to the reference surfaces of the assembly fixture and provide means for
positioning the component or sub-assembly to be aligned
. Checking Fixture - This will be a tool for checking the accuracy of the
mounting surfaces and holes for sub-assemblies and components prior
to their attachment to the spacecraft
. Handling Fixture - Thi§ will be a device for lifting, transporting or
positioning the spacecraft, or portions of it, in the assembly and test
area.
4.3.4 CONTROL OF TOOLS AND FIXTURES
Tool control procedures will be employed to assure that each item is currently compatible
with the hardware. These procedures are as follows:
ao Toll Gate - Before a fixture is released for use on the assembly floor, it will
be subjected to a "toll-gate" inspection which will verify configuration, point
of use, and the physical condition of the item.
b. Procedures - The procedures for tool design, inspection, and checkout are fully
described in the Fabrication and Subsystem Assembly Plan.
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4.3.5 ALIGNMENT
Two levels of alignment will be employed and they are as follows:
ao Initial Alignment - Assembly fixtures will contain provisions for positioning
items to be aligned, such as attitude control nozzles and sensors, and for
checking alignment within coarse limits on the assembly floor.
Certain operations, such as the mating of the equipment structure to the
support shell, will require the use of reference planes built into the fixture.
Such reference points will also be used for positioning of solar panels,
antenna, and scan assemblies.
be Final Alignment - The final alignment of the spacecraft will be done in an
alignment facility which will be provided with environmental control and
protection against external disturbances.
Final alignment checking will be accomplished by optical techniques, where
required: initial alignment of the spacecraft structural parts will have been
accomplished on the assembly fix_.u-e, by the maintenance of manufacturing
accuracy, and by shimming techniques. Fixturing will be employed for
establishing reference planes and support of targets and mirrors.
The panels andthe lander capsule will be aligned to the Spacecraft in
separate operations.
4.3.6 PROTECTION DURING ASSEMBLY
Protection for the various subassemblies and components of the Spacecraft during assembly
wu_ be provided in the _-_'_^^ _11 .... ._..........
ao Fixtures - Assembly fixture design will include protective features, such as
support guard rails, removeable covers, and dummy structural elements.
Staging and mechanical handling devices will be prevented from contacting the
spacecraft by stops and rails on the assembly fixture.
b. Protective Covers and Containers - Spacecraft components and sub-assemblies
will be protected during storage and assembly by contsiners and covers which
will preserve their flight quality. Examples of protective devices of this type
are shown in Figure 4-2.
Co Care by Assembly and C/O Personnel - Every person handling Spacecraft
material, components, and sub-assemblies or working near or on the assembly
will receive continuing indoctrination in the care and precautions to be employed
with the hardware.
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For critical assembly operations, training and rehearsals will be carried out.
The use of protective devices will be strictly enforced. Protective clothing
will be required for operations in the Spacecraft assembly and test area.
4.3.7 CLEAN ENVIRONMENTS
The Spacecraft assembly will be accomplished in a controlled environment. The environ-
mental requirements vary with respect to allowable particle content in the atmosphere.
Figure 4-3 indicates proposed environments to be used for the various stages of assembly.
4.3.8 WORKMANSHIP AND QUALITY
High standards of workmanship in the assembly of the Spacecraft will be provided and
maintained by the following means:
a. Assembly Planning - Detailed instructions for each assembly operation will be
prepared, thereby assuring repeatability from one vehicle to another and providing
the best methods compatible with the tooling. The planning will give the operations,
sequence, tools to be used, any special processes to be employed and precautions
to be taken.
be Operator Training - Assembly operators will be trained in the methods they will
use and in the use of the fixtures and tools. They will participate in tool check-
outs, and will provide support to the checkout operations for removal and replace-
ment of sub-assemblies and components.
Co Special Skills- Support will be provided to the assembly operations by skilled
personnel for special processes, such as conformal coating, paint touch-up,
harness or wiring repairs or changes, cleaning, etc.
de Quality Assurance - Throughout the assembly cycle of the vehiole, inspection
processes will be conducted to determine that the quality of the material and
components being received in the Assembly area is of prime quality, that the
sub-assemblies are of the proper configuration, and that they have the proper
documentation.
Other functions of the Quality Assurance Program that will play an important part in the
assembly of the vehicle are the control exercised over the quality of the manufacturing
and inspection tooling, training and certification of specialized personnel, monitoring and
inspection of handling and packaging of vehicle parts and the auditing of the department
manufacturing and Q.C. operating procedures.
The "toll-gate,, function referred to in the assembly and test flow plan is a Quality Assurance
function that will be accomplished prior to release of the vehicle for further assembly work.
The "toll-gate" function is primarily a review of completed inspection and/or test records
conducted to assure compliance of the assembled vehicle to the drawings. The specific
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operations conducted at each toll gate will vary depending upon the point in the assembly
cycle; for example, the operations conducted immediately prior to assembly will be
concerned with assurance that the units are ready for installation are as follows:
1. Determination that all brackets, shelves, webs, etc. to be installed are
of the proper configuration and have been completely accepted by Quality
Control
2. No damage was sustained to any part during its handling and storage
3. Proper procedures will be utilized for part installation
4. All previous documentation is satisfactory
5. All pre-installation inspection operations have been accomplished.
"Toll-gate" stations between assemblies/tests, will assure that all previous work has been
completed and accepted prior to initiating the next operation as follows:
1. Inspection records indicate complete and satisfactory previous assembly/test
2. No damage had been sustained during previous operations
3. Vehicle records are complete and correct
4. No outstanding defect reports.
5.0 TEST PLAN
5.1 GENERAL
Testing of Voyager Spacecraft is directed toward the acceptance of a particular system
intended for flight. This testing is designed to demonstrate compliance with performance
specifications, to discover and correct any defects in material or workmanship, to detect
and correct unexpected interactions, and to detect and evaluate deviations, (if any), from
PTM characteristics.
Experience and results from '69 S/C and '71 PTM tests will be factored into test planning
for '71 FS/C to optimize assembly and test sequences. Detail test plans will define details
of each test, including purpose of test, description, data to be obtained, and documentation
required. Test descriptions will identify the use and extent of simulation (and stimulation)
required to complete the subsystem/system interfaces.
During tests involving interface verification with GFE and/or subcontractor equipment, test
control will remain with the Test Director; however, the detailed test will be supported/
conducted by personnel representing each element of tile interface.
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5.2 OSE INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
The object of this operation is to install and test the STC, LCE, AHSE, and related FSE
prior to interconnection with the spacecraft.
Operational Support Equipment (OSE) will be located to assure a minimum of movement
from place-to-place during spacecraft assembly and checkout. There will be one set of
OSE available for each spacecraft during the assembly and checkout phase.
OSE will be installed, grounds verified, power connected, and interface connections checked
as part of, or in addition to, the OSE self-check tests.
The results of the OSE checkout phase will be presented to the spacecraft Test Director
for his approval before any connections are made to the spacecraft.
5.2.1 SYSTEM TEST COMPLEX (STC)
5.2. I. 1 INSTALLATION
The STC and related facility support equipment cables will be emplaced below a raised
floor. Power, signal, and control cables will be separated as far as possible from each
other to minimize cross-coupling and interaction. A preliminary survey will be made to
verify that the respective mating connectors mate and demate properly and are clearly
identified.
5.2.1.2 CABLE CONTINUITY
Cable continuity tests will be performed where junction boxes, line amplifiers, or signal
conditioners are utilized.
5.2. I. 3 GROUND VERIFICATION
STC - Spacecraft ground verification tests will be performed to verify that the STC consoles
do not introduce ground loops when interconnected to each other or to the spacecraft.
5.2.1.4 POWER APPLICATION
During initial power application the power loads will be balanced among the three phases
of the 60 cps facility power. The instrumentation ground will be connected to building
ground before power is applied.
A_er power application, AC and DC current measurements will be made between STC
subsystem grounds and building ground to assure that ground integrity is maintained.
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5.2.1.5 SELF TEST
The STC subsystem groups will be capable of performing a self test that will verify operation
of all of its interfaces. This will be accomplished by making open circuit measurements at
the remote end of each interface connector. An operational test will be performed in which
the STC subsystem equipment will be verified by operating into dummy loads or simulators
before mating to the flight spacecraft.
5.2.1.6 FINAL GROUND VERIFICATION
After all connectors and interfaces have been mated between STC-Spacecraft-Facilities,
a final ground verification test will be performed. Facility power will be turned off and
the resistance between each pin of each connector at the spacecraft end and instrument
ground will be measured and recorded. Facility power will then be turned on, and AC and
DC currents measured between facility ground and each STC sybsystem group.
5.2.1.7 (EI_H)ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TEST
An EMI test of the STC will be performed to determine that it will not interfere, bias, or
in any other way prevent the proper and accurate readout or operation of the spacecraft.
5.2.2 LAUNCH COMPLEX EQUIPMENT (LCE)
5.2.2.1 INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
The LCE and required simulators will be installed in the vicinity of _e spacecraft for
interface testing. Power, signal, and control cables will be installed to simulate (to
the extent possible) the launch area orientation.
Simulation of the LCE interconnections between the PAD and Blockhouse will be accomplished
_" provide _------_-_o eq,,_.,_l_,t tn _,_1 installation Cable continuity, interface connector
checks, ground verification, power application, and self test will be completed prior to
interconnection of LCE and spacecraft.
5.2.3 ASSEMBLY, HANDLING AND SHIPPING EQUIPMENT (AHSE)
Checkout of the AHSE will be a continuing test as portions of it are utilized in the early
phases of spacecraft assembly and checkout.
AHSE will provide the capability to position the spacecraft, provide proper working levels
for personnel, and means for lifting and transporting the spacecraft to various test
facilities.
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5.2.4 FACILITY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (FSE)
Facility support equipment will include equipment such as the station clock and data
processing equipment.
Tests will be performed on FSE similar to those performed on the STC and LCE to verify
that no ground loops or EMI problems exist that could in any way degrade or bias the
spacecraft testing and operation.
5.3 FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
Facility characteristics required for assembly operations and test sequences, may be divided
into three categories:
a. Support of Hazardous Activity
b. Simulation of Operational Environments
c. Assembly rand In-Process Activity.
Requirements for a Proof Pressure Cell are based on planned tests for retropropulsion
and pneumatic assemblies at high pressures, thus creating a need for special containment
of the test item to provide for safety of personnel.
Operational environments to be simulated include Vibration, Thermal Vacuum, EMI, and
Magnetic Mapping. Existing capabilities at GE for Vibration and T/V will be utilized, with
changes as required to support testing. Schedule definition includes conduct of multiple
F S/C under Thermal/Vacuum conditions during the same time period. Two (of four)
chambers capable of housing the Overall Spacecraft will be provided to support this
parallel test phase. EMI testing and Magnetic Mapping create special facility/procedure
requirements which may be satisfied by existing installations; however, additional analyses
of these requirements will be conducted prior to final decisions.
Assembly and In-Process activities place other constraints on the area characteristics to
be satisfied during multiple spacecraft processing. Spacecraft assembly and test stations
must be centrally located and large enough to permit assembly of several spacecraft
simultaneously. In addition, the assembly and test complex must provide for visual and
audio (intercom) communication between the Assembly Area and the STC.
Cleanliness provisions must be incorporated into the spacecraft pneumatic assembly and test
sequences, as well as during most spacecraft test activities (See Figure 4-3).
Specific requirements as defined in the assembly plan are based on Federal Specification -
Federal Standard No. 909. Facility provisions for compliance with FS 209 will include
clean rooms and/or laminar flow tents.
18 of 64
VBll0VP005
Other facility planning, including conceptual layout for Assembly and Checkout activities
are further described in the Facilities Plan, CII-VBl10VP018.
5.4 HARDWARE AND TEST EQUIPMENT CONTROL
5.4.1 STATUS OF HARDWARE IN BONDED STOCK
All spacecraft hardware will be delivered to spacecraft assembly, through a "toll-gate"
inspection, from Bonded Stock. Flight Acceptance testing of the hardware is accomplished
prior to its delivery to Bonded Stock.
The acceptance testing procedure for any given hardware item will be dependent upon the
level of assembly of the item as stocked for final assembly. For example, the electronic
assemblies will be stocked and delivered to vehicle assembly ready for installation into
the spacecraft structure. During fabrication all sub-assemblies will be preliminary
acceptance tested. Tests will have been conducted at reduced environmental stress levels,
with the final flight acceptance test performed at the assembly level. End items, such as
sensors and scanners will be individually FA tested.
FA testing at the electronic sub-assembly level will be conducted on those sub-assemblies
to be used as spares or replacements in the electronic assemblies, in order that the entire
assembly will not have to undergo more than one test at the FA level. After the installation
of a replacement subassembly, the assembly will be given an Operational Test at a level
lower than the FA test.
All FA testing will be performed at the General Electric Space Technology Center,
with the exception of the propulsion unit, regardless of the source of manufacture. The
details of the flow of hardware through the procurement, fabrication and test cycle is
described in the Procurement and Fabrication Plan and the Q_mlity Assurance Plan.
A o SPACECP_._r HARDWAR_ CONTR.nT,
To assure that the spacecraft is maintained in a prime condition throughout the test period,
a rigid control of the configuration of the spacecraft will be maintained by the Quality
Assurance Group. Unauthorized removal of the components or parts will not be permitted
during the testing cycle. Articles to be removed from the spacecraft will be documented
by means of a Break of inspection (BOI) report. These articles will be removed only by
authorized manufacturing personnel. Replacement of this article will be effected only by use
of systems experienced articles in the case of electrical and mechanical subassemblies.
Initiation of the BOI, for example, may be by Test Director authorization due to a test
malfunction. Upon replacement of subassemblies during the test cycle, the Test Director
will be responsible for determination of the necessary system retesting.
5.4.3 TEST EQUIPMENT AND OSE CONTROL
All Test Equipment and OSE utilized in the Systems Test Area will be of prime configuration.
Responsibility for configuration control of these items will be within Quality Assurance.
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5.5 TEST CONTROL
During the assembly and check out phase, certain controls are necessary in order to assure
that proper procedures have been followed, the necessary tests have been conducted, prime
equipment has been utilized in the tests, and the proper data has been accumulated.
5.5.1 TEST PROCEDURES
Origination of the TP's will be by the responsible testing groups. The requirements to
which the TP's are written are specified within the Systems Acceptance Test Specification.
Acceptance Team approval of the TP's must be granted prior to submittal to JPL for
approval and their subsequent use with the Voyager S/C. Changes to the TP's must be
generated, documented, and subsequently approved by the Acceptance Team and JPL prior
to their use in the S/C Test Cycle. In order to assure uniformity of the S/C test programs,
identical TP's will be utilized for all prime S/C built for the same mission. The TP's
will define the detail procedures and sequences to be used in the test, the test equipment
to be used, the data required, the accuracy of the data, and the conditions for acceptance
or rejection. The Test Director for the particular S/C will have the responsibility to
determine the acceptability of the vehicle tested and to determine if the S/C is satisfactory
for starting the next phase of testing.
5.5.2 TOLL GATES
Test toll gates will be utilized as check points to assess the quality of the S/C test results.
Acceptance Team approval will be required before continuation of the testing cycle. Toll
gates are located at key intervals in the test cycle, such as prior to the Systems Vibration
Test, prior to the Thermal Vacuum Test and prior to the Final Systems Test, At the last
test toll gate, the Acceptance Team will make a thorough evaluation of all the test results
prior to approval and commitment of the S/C to the Final Systems test. Upon completion
of the Final Systems Test, the Acceptance Team will make an evaluation of the S/C.
Approval of this board must be given prior to shipment of the vehicle to the launch site.
5.6 TEST SELECTION AND ORDER OF CONDUCT CRITERIA
Testing is incorporated into various stages of manufacture to establish confidence that the
design, fabrication, and assembly processes have resulted in a product that will operate
satisfactorily during the intended mission. Final assurance is acquired by testing the
assembled spacecraft in simulated operational environments.
Due to schedule delays, costs, and the complexity of operations necessary to correct
possible malfunctions noted during tests in a simulated environment, the system also
receives prior testing to establish confidence that it will successfully pass the operational
environments type of testing. The most economical method of achieving this assurance
is by a planned sequential build-up of confidence throughout the various stages of fabrication,
assembly, and test. The selected stages of build-up considered for the '71 spacecraft are:
the assembly of subsystems during the processing of major spacecraft assemblies, following
completion of the major manufacturin_ effort, and concurrent with exposure to simulated
operational situation.
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5.6.1 TEST SELECTION
Five types of tests have been selected for the Spacecraft: Operational Assurance,Systems,
Inter-subsystem, Subsystem, and In-pr0cess Tests.
OPerational Assurance Tests are those tests that exercise the spacecraft in a simulated
operational situation, which includes the utilization of all equipment intended to be used in
support of the spacecraft during prelaunch, launch and flight. These tests provide assurance
that the spacecraft can and will perform satisfactorily under anticipated mission conditions.
Systems tests axe those which exercise the vehicle in an ambient environment. These tests
provide assurance that the various subsystems of the spacecraft operate together satisfactorily
in the sequence of events which constitute the planned mission.
Inter-subsystem tests verify the intev- relationships of subsystems in the make-up of the
system capability without the need for a total operating system configuration.
Subsystem tests are those tests which determine the capability of subsystems to operate as
functional units. These tests determine the extent of capability of a given functional sub-
system, rather than how the subsystem reacts in conjunction with other subsystems.
In-process tests verify correct installation rather than the operational capability of the units.
The major function of in-process testing is the verification of correct fabrication and/or
assembly.
5.6.2 ORDER OF CONDUCT
The Operational Assurance type of test should occur as close as possible to shipment date,
since it yields the highest degree of confidence in the capability of the spacecraft to perform
its intended mission, and because it normally requires a fully assembled S/C. Factors
_umJ m.ILb _ _ _ ..............w,,,t_u may for mo_nng Lhese to_t_ fn_-ws_-d in th_ test seouence are the needs for
special tests or test facilities, such as those indicated for magnetic mapping of the space-
craft.
The system category of tests occur at those points in the flow where the spacecraft is in a
relatively complete assembled configuration. System tests occur prior to environmental
testing. Where more than one environmental test is required, a system test is performed
between succeeding environmental tests.
Inter-subsystem tests verify subsystem interaction during stages of manufacture prior to
total S/C assembly; they therefore occur at points in the process where a majority of the
subsystems axe available and prior to the initiation of systems tests.
Subsystem tests are performed during the initial stages of assembly when the subsystems
are installed in the structures of the S/C.
In-process testing occurs in conjunction with assembly/disassembly operations.
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5.7 TEST DESCRIPTION
The following test descriptions delineate the essential/rusks to be performed to establish
the acceptability of S/C. The testing of the S/C will occur as illustrated in Figures 5-1
and 5-2.
5.7.1 HARNESS TEST AND GROUND VERIFICATION
Tests will be performed to assure that installation techniques and workmanship have not
degraded or compromised the system harness. These tests will establish:
a. Continuity of every wire and interconnection
b. Dielectric strength of each wire to every other wire and to ground
c. Insulation resistance of each wire to every other wire and to ground.
Test equipment design must preclude the possibility of damaging connector pins or wiring
due to attachment method or circult design.
5.7.2 SUBSYSTEM TESTS
A functional test of each subsystem will be performed to verify that it is in the same
condition that it was prior to entering bonded stock. These tests will be performed under
control of associated OSE items. Upon completion of individual subsystem performance
evaluations, the subsystems will be sequentially interconnected via the equipment compartment
harnessing.
All power for subsystem tests will be provided by appropriate OSE.
Spacecraft/STC unipoint grounds will be interconnected before power is applied to either
system.
All subsystem interfaces with sensors or instrumentation that are mounted in other parts
of the spacecraft will be simulated.
5.7.2.1 POWER SUBSYSTEM
The power subsystem functional tests will simulate solar array inputs and system loads
via OSE to verify subsystem conditions under all expected mission loads.
The following nominal condition tests will be performed:
a. Regulated DC output for various inputs
b. Regulated DC output for various loads
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c. 2.4 KC Inverters - frequency, voltage, and wave shape for various loads
at several power factors
d. 400 cps Inverters - frequency, voltage and wave shape for various loads
at several power factors
e. Temperatures will be monitored - any abnormalities will be investigated
f. Battery charging currents will be monitored
g. Transient loads on each of the buses (i. e. ; regulated/unregulated DC, 2.4 Kc,
and 400 cps) and the effect on the voltages, frequencies, and wave shapes will
be observed. Transients will include several power factors and load step
ranges.
Solar arrays will be tested on separate assemblies. Telemetry monitors on the arrays
will be simulated to the S/C for power subsystem tests.
5.7.2.2 CONTROLLER AND SEQUENCER
The C & S subsystem functional tests will be performed by loading from a command simulator
which provides decoded commands in binary format. The appearance of an output pulse
on the appropriate line will verify that the command has been generated.
Tests performed will include:
a. Capability of the C & S to store commands up to capacity hours will be verified
by speeding up rite master timer to 1024 times the normal rate
b. The frequencies generated by the C & S for reference by other subsystems
will be checked for frequency, accuracy, amplitude, and wave shape
c. The capability to control loading in all significant modes will be verified
by loading every storage bit with a one and a zero at least once
d. Capability to readout the storage bits properly will be verified
e. Time comparison logic will be verified.
5.7.2.3 COMMAND SUBSYSTEM
A command subsystem functional test will verify the subsystem capability to receive a
composite command signal, accept or reject on the basis of its internal command veri-
fication logic, and to direct it to the proper output line.
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Tests performed will include:
a. Bit error vs. Signal-to-noise ratio
b. Detector Selection and Lock Up
c. Detector Correlation
d. Detector Bankwidth
e. Telemetry Readout
f. Quantitative isolated switch characteristics
g. Automatic qualitative tests of all digital outputs
h. Transformer-rectifier selection
j. Input power.
5.7.2.4 RADIO SUBSYSTEM
The radio subsystem functional tests will verify its capability to transmit and receive a
composite rf signal and to properly modulate or demodulate the information supplied to
it under prescribed signal-to-noise ratio conditions and signal strengths.
Receiver tests will include measurements of:
a. Power supply voltages and currents
b. Command and verification
c. Lock indications
d. Image Rejection
eo Threshold
f. RF Loop Bandwidth
g. AGC Loop Bandwidth
h. Phase Jitter
i. Amplitude Jitter
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j. Spurious Response
k. Inter-channel cross coupling
1. Doppler tracking rate
m. Telemetry channel, output signal levels and signal-to-noise levels
n. Coherent Interference.
Transmitter tests will include measurements of:
a, Power supply voltages and currents
b. Command verification
c. Output power
d. Spurious Output
e. Output Bandwidth
f. Modulation Characteristics
g. VCO Frequency and range
h. Test transmitter
i. Phase Jitter.
Ranging tests will include measurement of:
a. Delay
b. Delay variations
c. Ranging spectrum.
Power Amplifier tests wiU include measurements of:
ao Power supply voltages and currents
b. Output power
c ° Bandwidth
d. Spurious output
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e. Delay
f. Command and verification
g. Transfer characteristics.
5.7.2.5 DATA HANDLING AND STORAGE SUBSYSTEM
The capability of the DH&S subsystem to receive inputs from all subsystem telemetry outputs,
encode in the proper format, store data as required, playback recorded data into a modulator,
and direct the data to the Radio Subsystem input will be verified.
The tests would include the following:
a. Data Format - Continuously check serial data stream for proper frame and sub-
frame synchs. Count the number of bad synchs. (Those occurring at wrong word
count or improper structure at synch word count. )
b. Mode Control - Verify command capability to alter modes
Co Observe wave shapes of digital data stream at several input voltages to and
from the tape recorders
d. Bit Rate - Verify long term (one frame) and short term (one bit) bit rate
f.
go
Verify ability to alter bit rate
Calibrate the A/D converter. Obtain voltages at which the vehicle A/D
converter senses transitions. Voltage source impedance will be varied
Record known data from the science package. Control recorder via command
and verify playback capability. Measure wow and flutter of playback bit rate.
5.7.2.6 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
G & C Subsystem OSE will provide power, command, monitoring, simulated inputs, and
output loads for functioaal tests of electronic assemblies in assigned bays.
The following type tests will be performed:
a. Gyros - The gyros and their associated circuitry will be tested by use of their
torque motor signals and rate-table excitation signals. The time to reach
synchronous speed and direction (as detected by their speed switch) will be
obtained. Coast-down time will also be observed.
b. The operation of the switching amplifiers w111 be tested by adjusting input
signals and noting operating points and hysteresis.
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Ce Combining position/rate signals will be verified in all modes for each sensor
circuitry, with coordination of mode control (command and self contained mode
switching) and sensor signal simulators operations. Lock-out of signals will
be verified as governed by mode.
d. Derived rate circuits will be tested open loop by inserting different step position
errors sufficient to operate solenoids and establishing derived rates from the
solenoid operating times.
e. Rate biases will be established by changing ground torque currents until input
switching amplifiers null out.
f. Back-up Rate Integrators will be verified during search biasing by obtaining
solenoid "on" time required to cause shut down.
l
g. Maneuver torquing will be done at least once in each direction - since the time
involved is essentially a function of C & S timing logic, verification of torquing
current will be obtained by having ground torquing null the airborne source
and measuring and integrating the ground current.
h. Autopilot and inertial modes will be tested by using ground torquing currents
to generate signals as required.
i. Accelerometers will be checked with a centrifuge.
j. Polarities will be verified and logic checked.
5.7.2.7 PYROTECHNIC SUBSYSTEM
Pyrotechnic subsystem functional tests will exercise all modes of the pyro S/S using
squib simulators. OSE will provide loading, command, control, and power.
The types of tests included are:
a. Measure voltage on capacitors
b. Discharge capacitor bank
c. Check for stray voltages on firing lines
d. Set Safe/Arm circuits
e. Determine if squib firing lines are shorted or grounded
f. Measure the resistance of each squib and squib firing line after installation.
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5.7.2.8 SCIENCE AND DATA AUTOMATION SUBSYSTEMS
A functional test of the Science and Data Automation Subsystems will simulate sensor inputs
to the electronics packages and verify proper data format to the DH&S subsystem.
5.7.3 INTER-SUBSYSTEM TESTS
In this series of tests, the electronic assemblies will be connected to the system harness for
preliminary exercises as a system. Gross interference problems will be corrected. Tests
for verification of proper grounds will be performed. Initial verification of the OSE in its
system mode will be accomplished at this time.
5.7.3.1 SYSTEM HARNESS CONNECTION
The system harness will be connected to each electronics assembly in a definite order.
Electrical power will be applied to operate each subsystem from S/C power, thereby
eliminating a major OSE interface.
Command and Telemetry connections will be made to the subsystems to permit control and
monitoring of the vehicle using S/C internal controls. System logic will be the final
connections to be made after which mission sequence type tests will be performed.
a. Initial Power Application - The object of this operation is to safely apply
power to the electronics assemblies.
1. Prerequisites for test:
(a) Power supply subsystem tests have been completed
(b) System harness continuity, Insulation Resistance and
Dielectric Strength tests have been completed.
2. Procedure: The power supply and harness will be protected from accidental
shorting and connector damage by limiting the power supply current and
providing a test connector and meter switchable to each pin.
(a) The power S/S will be connected to the system harness only after
checking the harness connectors for direct shorts.
(b) Open circuit tests - voltage - no voltage tests will be made at every pin
of every connector. The presence or absence of voltage as required
by a power distribution listing will be confirmed.
(c) The correct power polarity, amplitude, and frequency will be
verified at all connectors.
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C.
(d) Measurement with simulated loads will be performed after open
curcuit tests have been satisfactorily completed. Current and
voltage measurements (including oscillograph recordings) will be
made as the loads are connected.
(e) Measurements with Spacecraft circuitry will be performed after open
circuit and simulated load tests have been completed. Voltage and
current measurements (including oscillograph recordings) will be
made as the circuits are connected.
(f) The C & S subsystem will be cmmected so that system synchronizing
signals can be generated and made ready for distribution.
(g) All other subsystems will then be supplied with power(one at a time).
After each interface has been completed, the subsystem will be removed
and its simulated load reconnected before the next subsystem is
supplied with power.
(h) After power has been applied to each subsystem individually, all
simulators will be removed and all electronic assemblies connected
to the power subsystem via the system harness.
(i) A detailed check list will be maintained to show all assemblies that
have or have not been supplied with power. New equipment will not
be connected to the system harness without going through this
initial power application test.
Initial Command and Telemetry Connections - Since the Command and Data
handling subsystems provide control and monitoring of the S/C, they will
next be connected in the system.
1. At each subsystem interface, open circuit measurements will be made
to confirm that no damaging signals are present.
. After connecting any subsystem and the command subsystem together,
a test will be performed to exercise and confirm proper inter-
connections.
3. Command and Telemetry connectors will remain mated to the system
harness while other subsystems are connected.
Remaining Connectors - A check list of connectors will be maintained to assure
that initial mating will be performed as indicated:
1. All other connectors will be mated after open circuit checks have
first been performed to confirm that no damaging signals are present.
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2. After mating a subsystem, all functions will be exercised to reconfirm
proper mating and workmanship.
e As each subsystem is connected and checked out, its connectors will
be left mated while other subsystems are connected. OSE will be
monitored closely as other subsystems are connected to the system
harness.
5.7.3.2 INTER-SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
A complete intersubsystem test will be performed after mating all assemblies to the system
harness. Sensors will be simulated with OSE as required. Subsystem interface connections
will be exercised by stimulating all lines with the proper signals from other subsystems,
This test will be a mission sequence type test with emphasis on exercising each interface
line sufficiently to confirm proper hook-up.
5.7.3.3 GROUND VERIFICATION
Power and signal returns of the spacecraft (return-side tree} and chassis of the spacecraft
(chassis-ground tree} will be checked. No external cables will be connected to the vehicle
at this time. Verification measurements will be conducted as follows:
a. The main return-side tree/spacecraft frame measurements will consist of
resistance measurements to unipoint ground and isolation from chassis grounds.
b. Return-side tree/return-side tree measurements will include isolation resis-
tance measurements to other return trees and chassis ground.
c. Chassis returns will be verified by successful completion of the return side
tree tests plus a chassis bonding and wiring confirmation test.
d. Spacecraft ground current measurements will be measured and recorded, one
assembly at a time, to show that no AC or DC currents flow between an isolated
electronic assembly and the spacecraft frame.
5.7.3.4 Interference Analysis
During the process of inter-subsystem testing each subsystem will be exercised to confirm
proper interface connections. While this test is in progress, every other subsystem will
be observed for possible conducted or radiated interference. Any deviations of subsystem
performance will be investigated and resolved.
5.7.4 PRELIMINARY SYSTEMS TEST
Prior to Preliminary Systems Tests, all sensors and appendages will be interfaced with
the system harness via open circuit tests and dummy load tests. Stimulators will be
attached as required to the sensors to provide a simulated natural stimulus for the
Guidance and Control and Science Subsystems.
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The purpose of preliminary systems testing is to verify power, command, logic, and
telemetry distribution throughout the spacecraft.
Adequacy of OSE stimulators to properly and accurately excite the input of Science and
G & C sensors will be thoroughly checked out to assure proper spacecraft interface
compatibility.
A complete and detailed functional test will be performed on each subsystem, one at a time,
with every other subsystem monitored through associated OSE for interference and mal-
functioning logic operations.
Before the completion of preliminary systems testing, the retro-propulsion and capsule
interfaces will be tested open circuit and with simulators to prepare for mating in the
next assembly stage.
5.7.5 SYSTEMS TEST (ELECTRICAL MATE)
The actual interface c_mections between S/C and Lander Capsule and S/C and propulsion
package will be made and a systems test performed in an electrically mated/mechanically
separate configuration.
5.7.5.1 PROPULSION - SPACECRAFT
Using test cables, the prime propulsion package and spacecraft will be interconnected.
System exercises will be performed which stimulate all electrical equipment on the
propulsion S/S to assure complete interface compatibility with the spacecraft.
5.7.5.2 CAPSULE - SPACECRAFT
Prior to electrical mating of the prime capsule with the spacecraft the interface connectors
will be/_oronghly tested, both from the spacecraft side and the capsule side.
The capsule will be electrically mated with the spacecraft and system testing performed to
assure complete compatibility between them. All modes will be exercised according to
a detailed test plan under the direction of the Test Director.
5.7.6 ALL SYSTEMS TEST
The All Systems Test will consist of routines that exercise the whole spacecraft system
through all of its possible modes (mission sequence). Variations of the mission sequence
will be included to demonstrate how the vehicle parameters vary as other parameters are
varied. These variations include, but are not limited to, variations in regulated bus
voltages, use of redundant components, simulated disturbance torques, and command sequence
type tests.
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Data reduction will be partially automat_. Manual capability to test subsystems will
exist with data outputs from subsystem OSE feeding system data processing facilities,
which will provide printed data outputs for systems evaluation, and limit checking of
spacecraft TLM parameters to warn of any out-of-spec readings.
During system functional tests, certain subassemblies will be removed from the spacecraft
for functional tests. Whenever this is done, special consideration, care, and inspection
will be applied.
Special test considerations will be given to subassemblies, assemblies or subsystems
which have a finite life, such as squibs, G and C fuel, vidicons or science sensors.
Elements of the All Systems Test are shown below.
5.7.6.1 TELEMETRY CALIBRATION
A complete telemetry calibration will be performed on the assembled spacecraft to verify
subsystem telemetry channel calibration. The following tasks will be performed.*
a. Data Encoder Calibration - Known signals will be inputed to the data encoder
and the corresponding outputs recorded via isolated circuitry. This calibration
produces an accurate definition of the relationship between the data encoder
output and the engineering parameters that the data encoder monitors.
bl System Calibration - Sensor inputs will be stimulated with calibration standards
and subsystem telemetry inputs to the data encoder and the corresponding T/M
output to the ground station recorded and compared with the known input stimuli.
5.7.6.2 FINAL GROUND VERIFICATION
Portions of the ground verification test that have not been performed previously due to
S/C assembly, hardware availability, and/or test sequence constraints, will be completed.
Spacecraft circulating currents will be measured.
5.7.6.3 POWER PROFILE
A power profile record of the S/C will be made for use in system analysis and power
management. This profile will include an oscillograph record of the signal characteristics
on the power and ground lines as the S/C is exercised through a mission sequence.
Correlation of the power profile record with power telemetry outputs through the mission
sequence will be performed.
5.7.6.4 PARAMETER VARIATION
Selected parameters will be varied within system design tolerances to study their character-
istics and to determine whether system performance is unfavorably affected. This will be
accomplished as follows:
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a. Voltage and frequency of the 2.4KC 50VAC Power output from the power
subsystem
b. Voltage and frequency of the 38.4 KC generated by the C & S for reference
by other subsystems.
A number of abbreviated mission sequences will be performed with key parameters varied
while others are held at nominal values. Should a subsystem become inoperative, the
parameter will be adjusted toward nominal until system operation returns to normal and
system failure analysis and corrective actions can be instituted.
5.7.6.5 REDUNDANT MODES
Redundant circuits will be exercised as a special test associated with a mission sequence.
All redundant equipment will receive sufficient system operating time to fulfill DME and
other reliability requirements.
5.7.6.6 MISSION SEQUENCE
All spacecraft subsystems will be exercised through a mission sequence that will include
all operations that occur during:
a. l>re-launch
b. Lift off
c. Acquisition
d. Cruise
e. Early mid-cotu-se maneuvers
f. Quiescent cruise
g. Later mid-course maneuver
h. Pre-encounter
i. Pre-encounter capsule separation
j. Capsule entry
k. Orbit injection
1. Orbit operations
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m. Sunor Canopus occultation
n. Earth exclusion
o. Science pass
p. Lander contact
q. Orbital period up-date.
Compensation for deployments in a one "G" field and the need for personnel and spacecraft
safety will require appropriate variations of the mission sequence.
5.7.6.7 FREE MODE TEST
A free mode test will be performed to demonstrate operation of the Spacecraft on solar power.
At the start of the test, pre-launch type systems test will be performed via the inflight dis-
connect. The S/C will then be controlled via RF command link to execute selected sequences.
Special care will be exercised to insure the safety of the overall spacecraft, especially the
solar arrays. The same facilities and techniques as used for the PTM spacecraft will be
provided for the '71 spacecraft.
5.7.6.8 CAPSULE TESTS
The lander Capsule will be exercised through a complete mission sequence test and all
information that passes through the interface will be verified. The capability of the space-
craft to supply power, and commands to the capsule will be confirmed. The ability to
acquire, process, store, and transmit capsule telemetry information via the interface
connector and the RF relay link will be verified.
5.7.6.9 DEPLOYMENT CHECKS
Deployment of all appendages will be performed. The spacecraft will be positioned so that
the plane of deployment is in a horizontal direction to minimize the effects of gravity. Space-
craft and personnel safety rules and techniques will be rigidly adhered to.
5.7.6.10 SCIENCE PAYLOAD TESTS
Functional tests will be performed on all science payload equipment. Sensor stimulation
will be provided by appropriate OSE. Science data collection, processing, storage, and
transmission through the interfacing spacecraft subsystems will be verified.
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5.7.7 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE TEST
EMI testing will be performed to provide evidence of cornpliance of the flightspacecraft with
the acceptance criteria. Maximum use willbe made of data and results from the PTM tests.
EMI Acceptance tests will not be as extensive as PTM since they will be based on analysis
and evaluation of those more criticalpoints discovered during extended PTM EMI tests.
Overall S/C requirements include susceptibilityand interference measurements.
Susceptibilitytests are:
a. Transient conducted
b. RF conducted
c. Auido conducted
d. Radiated
e. Receiver front end rejection.
Interference tests are:
a. Conducted
b. Radiated
c. Antenna conducted
d. Transient interference.
Testing will be based upon detailed requirements derived from the E _vH Implen-Lentation Pl_,n_ °
5.7.8 WEIGHT AND CG
Weight, center of gravity and final alignment will be performed on the S/C before the
environmental phase of the Operational Assurance testing.
This information will be utilized to facilitate Vibration Test setup, and adjustments to the
retropropulsion, mid-course propulsion and sensors.
The Weight and CG will be determined for several S/C configurations as follows:
a. Spacecraft launch configuration (excluding capsule)
b. Post-separation configurations °
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5.7.9 PRE-VIBRATION SYSTEMS CONFIDENCE TEST
Immediately prior to the initiation of Vibration Testing, the Spacecraft will be
exercised through a Mission Sequence to establish pre-vibration confidence in the system
operation. The Mission Sequence will be similar to that which was run for All-Systems Test.
5.7.10 VIBRATION TEST
A vibration assurance test will be performed to verify quality workmanship and the capability
of each spacecraft to operate satisfactorily during and after exposure to dynamic excitation.
The spacecraft will be subjected to random vibration along the roll axis and one lateral axis
selected via analysis of data obtained during PTM vibration testing. System confidence tests
will be conducted prior to and following each phase of vibration; spacecraft testing during
excitation will be limited to those sequences associated with the launch phase.
Spacecraft configuration will include simulation of pyrotechnic devices, retropropulsion fuel,
etc. to reduce hazardous conditions. Deployable items will be secured in their launch positions.
Communication with the spacecraft will be via hardwire to the STC; Capsule functions will be
simulated to provide for required data transfer across the Spacecraft/Capsule interface.
5.7. Ii POST VIBRATION SYSTEMS CONFIDENCE TEST
A systems confidence test will be performed on the vehicle at the completion of the vibration
environment. This test will duplicate the previous confidence test except that deployment of
all appendages will be included.
A check of alignments will be performed to verify the integrity of the adjustment locks.
5.7.12 THERMAL VACUUM TEST
Thermal Vacuum environmental test will be performed to demonstrate that the functional
integrity of the Overall Spacecraft can be maintained throughout a simulated space flight,
and that the thermal control subsystem maintains spacecraft temperatures within established
margins. Chamber temperature and vacuum conditions will be adjusted to simulate the maximum
and minimum space conditions to be experienced by the Overall Flight Spacecraft.
System power and Spacecraft thermal inputs will be simulated during the thirty days of
continuous thermal vacuum testing planned for the acceptance cycle.
Performance testing will include acquisition and evaluation of all S/C data and initiation of
mission sequences via normal systems programming and/or hardwire command, to demon-
strate capability of completing spacecraft events. Dynamic functions, such as deployment,
will be initiated but not completed (restrained) due to presence of the earth 1G field and the
physical restraints of the chamber-S/C installation.
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5.7.13 SPACECRAFT - LCE INTERFACE CHECKS
At the completion of the Thermal-Vacuum Test, and prior to Magnetic Mapping, checks will
be made to verify correct performance across the Spacecraft/LCE interface.
NOTE: Spacecraft-LCE Interface Checks will be performed with the S/C connected
to Complex Equipment with cable length, junction boxes and all interfaces
provided or adequately simulated to demonstrate all phases of LCE command,
monitoring, and control functions.
Thermal cor_rol of the S/C through the LCE will verify proper operation of the required
ground cooling equipment to be utilized during spacecraft encapsulation in the fairing and
transportation of the S/C from the Explosive Safe Facility to the Pad.
Command and Power Control of the S/C through the LCE will be verified by switching from
external power to internal power and monitoring the system values. Command loops will be
exercised to demonstrate proper transmission, receipt, verification, and execution of
selected commands. The Spacecraft/Capsule combination will be monitored through T/M
response to assure the appropriate status.
A simulated count down will be performed in which the LCE will provide power, command
control, and monitoring, of spacecraft data between the spacecraft and system test complex.
5.7.14 MAGNETIC MAPPING
A series of magnetic mapping tests will be performed to determine the magnetic characteristics
of the spacecraft. They will demonstrate that the fields around the magnetometer are of
sufficiently low magnitude so as to not inhibit the measurements this instrument must make
during the mission.
The tests will determine the am___nt of interference with the magnetometer caused by the
residual magnetism of structural materials, and the effects of induced magnetic fields
created during S/C operation.
The spacecraft will be magnetically mapped in two modes: Quiescent and Selected Operating
Modes.
5.7.14.1 SPACECRAFT QUIESCENT PROFILE
The spacecraft will be placed on the magnetic mapping fixture in a non-operating condition
(inert and not connected to STC). Measurements will be obtained of the spacecraft permanent
magnetic field, rotating the spacecraft in discrete intervals about a vertical (Z) axis and one
horizontal (X or Y) axes. The center of rotation will pass through the flight magnetometer.
Effects of deployment items will be determined by manually deploying them in a series of
small movements and monitoring results with a delay between movement and measurement
to remove possible effects of eddy currents.
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The spacecraft will be permed in a 25 gauss field and remapped to determine the change in
field at the magnetometer. The spacecraft will then be depermed and mapped sufficiently to
determine that effective deperming has been accomplished.
5.7.14.2 SPACECRAFT SELECTED MODE PROFILE
The selected mode magnetic profile of the spacecraft will be obtained with a current loop test
by compensating the Earth's magnetic field at the Magnetometer Sensor with Helmholtz coils
and measuring the outputs of the Magnetometer while the Over-all Flight Spacecraft is operated
through a simulated mission sequence which exercises all current modes.
5.7.15 FINAL SYSTEMS TESTS
This is the final electrical test to be performed on the flight spacecraft before preparing for
shipment to AFETR.
The final systems test will consist of detailed S/S functional tests, a check of all sensor
alignments, telemetry calibration, and a final mission sequence. In conjunction with mission
sequence testing, it is planned to provide low level vibration inputs to the spacecraft. This
VtGeneral Excitation" will establish final equipment integrity, and will provide final confidence
in all S/C adjustments, calibrations and performance.
5.8 TEST DOCUMENTATION CONTROL
As a general aid to assuring the long life reliability of the Voyager S/C, an evaluation of all
data collected during the System Test cycle will be made to determine that no anamolous
transient or steady state condition existed during the test cycle. During System tests, the
most practical means of accomplishing such a task is to utilize automated means in the data
reduction process. For sub-systems tests, automated data acquisition and reduction are not
considered as practical because the T/M system will not be tied in with the various subsystems
at this point in the assembly of the spacecraft. Hence, subsystem data handling will be done
by manual methods.
5.8.1 DATA ACQUISITION AND REDUCTION SYSTEM
During sub-system testing, the acquisition of data will normally be done by reading the various
meters and panels and then manually recording the pertinent values. If in the course of later
subsystem testing, the T/M system may be used in conjunction with the testing, then automatic
data acquisition and reduction will be utilized. This will depend upon the type of testing
accomplished at the time.
For system tests, the block diagram of figure 5-3 shows the basic elements comprising the
data reduction system that will be used.
The main element is a computer which is expected to be the Univac 1218 or 1219. The computer
is considered as a data reduction device but will have some control functions for the operation
of the OSE sub-system Consoles.
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A magnetic tape recorder will be used to record all data that is generated during the tests
for subsequent processing and an on-line high speed printer will be used for displaying and
recording pertinent real-time information necessary for the Test Director to evaluate test
progress.
5.8.2 SUB-SYSTEM TEST DATA HANDLING
Data acquisition during sub-system tests such as pneumatic pressure and leak tests, thermal
control, sensor checks, and various intra sub-system testing will be accomplished by reading
the various panel meters, guages and measuring devices and recording this information on
data sheets specially designed for that particular test. The data sheets will be formated in
a manner to preclude any additional reformating of the information for record purposes or
as summary data sheets for Acceptance Item Buy-Off.
A summary write-up of the general test results will be written to accompany the TP and
data sheets as a complete data package of the test for buy-off purposes.
5.8.3 SYSTEM TEST DATA HANDLING
The automatic data system will be used as an effective tool to handle the large amount of
data to be evaluated while the test is in progress. With the high speed - on the line printer,
test results and status can be printed out for display in real time and copies of the final data
report available within hours of the completion of the test.
During test, real-time printout of test data will be accomplished for a limited number of
data channels; the specific channels monitored will depend upon the particular operations
or sub-systems being exercised at that time, and will be pre-programmed on the computer
for the proper selection of these channels. The number of channels being monitored will
be restricted to reduce the amount of data the Test Director and subsystem engineers must
evaluate and to prevent overloading of the computer.
Since the computer will be pre-programmed for basic control of the test progress, all test
sequences will be defined and documented in the computer program. Computer monitoring
will be a process of selecting the desired data channels, accepting the data, converting the
information to the desired units, making a comparison of the actual data with the expected
results, and printing out the test results and any anomolis. Anomalies will be brought to
the attention of the Test Director by proper flagging of the data and sounding of a warning
signal. The final real-time printout will be a complete record of the data channels selected
for immediate evaluation except that redundant data pulses will be suppressed. Actual
values of T/M levels and anomalies appear on the printout.
For purposes of rapid fault isolation during tests without the necessity of rerunning tests
with more complete instrumentation, a standard practice of recording all data information
available will be utilized. This will include all T/M data, hardwire test points on components,
and umbilical hardwire test points. Through this information, utilizing the computer
capabilities, failures may be determined readily and accurately without considerable time
in test.
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Upon detection of a fault, anomaly or failure in a vehicle sub-system, the test may be stopped
and a printout obtained of all the data concerned with the sub-system for engineering evaluation.
Testing or retesting will be resumed after correction of the fault.
Upon completion of the test, real-time results will be available for detail evaluation and a
history of all data will be obtained for additional evaluation. The history will be a suppressed
printout whereby changes in levels appear. As in the real-time data, any anomalies will be
flagged. In addition, specific data summaries may be utilized to show averages, difference,
slopes, etc. for evaluation purposes. Comparison of data between tests that are similar or
exactly alike may be desired; this can be accomplished by a comparison routine, where actual
data is compared to expected results.
During the test the specific data being monitored appears on the high speed on-line printer
and may be presented at any one of the sub-system consoles for the subsystem engineers
evaluation. Additional data is available at the consoles in the form of analog strip charts
for the hardwire test points. Patching of this information into the analog recorders will be
done at the discretion of the sub-system engineer.
Data to be utilized for the test buy-off by the Acceptance Test will be the real-time data
printouts and the complete final data history printout. Data summaries compiled for test
comparisons, means, deviators, averages etc. will also be used. These data sheets plus
the written test summary compiled by the Test Director and TP used for describing the
test will make up the final data package used for the test buy-off by the Acceptance Team.
5.8.4 CALIBRATION BOOKS
During sub-assembly and subsystem testing, Quality Assurance will prepare a calibration
book for the spacecraft showing sensor ranges, sensor locations, channel allocation and
calibration curves for each type of measurement made in the spacecraft; this will include
event levels, temperature levels, pressure levels, rates, etc., along with weight, center
of gravity, and moments and products of inert.i_ data. This information will be utilized for
evaluation of data during assembly and checkout, at AFETR, and in-flight data analysis
operations.
5.8.5 SPACECRAFT LOG BOOKS
Quality Assurance will prepare and maintain a formal log book documenting the identity of
the spacecraft sub-assemblies and test history. The information included in this document
will be as follows:
a. Date of test
b. Type of test
c. Name and applicable test procedure number for the sub-system under test
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d. S/C serial number and drawing number (or subassembly, as applicable )
e. System operating time
f. Subsystem operating time
g. Information on any test discrepancies including failures and a detailed
identification of the failed item.
6.0 FLIGHT SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND TEST FLOW
As a means of illustrating the application of the Assembly and Test Planning to a given
S/C configuration, an Assembly and Test Flow (Figure 5-1) chart and descriptions of
certain mechanical assembly steps has been prepared to supplement the test descriptions
presented in the previous sections.
The flow chart also provides visual definition of the inspection and test control points for
each phase of integrated assembly and test. In addition, hardware configuration has been
illustrated for the significant assembly levels.
6.1 INSTALL SOLAR CELL SUPPORTS HARDWARE & DEVELOPMENT ACTUATORS
Support hardware for the solar panels will be installed on the Spacecraft Support Structure.
The installation will essentially be of two different types: the installation of four support webs
and their associated bracketry at the pitch and yaw axes (these webs will be utilized later
for the mounting of Attitude Control nozzles and piping) ; and the installation of support web
bracketry only. Installation of full webs is limited to four at this time to permit ease of
handling and transport.
Prior to installation, both the Spacecraft Support Structure and Solar Panel Support hardware
will be processed through Inspection Toll-Gates to assure proper configuration and complete
acceptance for all previous operations.
The Spacecraft Support Structure will be installed in the Spacecraft Assembly Handling
Fixture on the Spacecraft Assembly Handling Dolly. The bracketry for all Solar Panel
supports will be attached and the supports along the pitch and yaw axes will be installed.
Actuator mechanisms for deployable items, such as the Scan Package and High Gain Antenna,
will be installed. Specific portions of the thermal insulation blanket may be installed at this
time. Using the Spacecraft Assembly Dolly Tow Unit, the assembly will be moved to a
clean-room facility for the installation of attitude control pneumatics.
6.2 INSTALL ATTITUDE CONTROL TANKS, NOZZLES AND PIPING
Upon completion of Solar Panel Support Installation, the Attitude Control tanks will be in-
stalled in the Spacecraft Support Structure, utilizing the Assembly and Alignment Fixture.
The A/C nozzles will then be mounted on the four Solar Panel Supports and the necessary
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pneumatic tubing, regulators, etc. will be installed and interconnected to complete the
Attitude Control Pneumatics. All components will be processed through an inspection toll-
gate prior to assembly and each step of the installation will be inspected.
6.3 MECHANICAL ALIGNMENT AND LEAK TEST
The assembled Spacecraft Support Structure, with the Attitude Control Pneumatics installed,
will undergo an in-process type mechanical alignment, wherein the Attitude Control nozzles
will be aligned to the Spacecraft Support Structure interface plans and the Spacecraft roll
axis with the Attitude Control Nozzle Alignment set. The objective of this alignment will be
to provide a closer approximation of the final alignment positions of the nozzles than would
be possible with assembly fixtures.
At the completion of alignments, the pneumatics subsystem will be cleaned, purged, and
subjected to leak-tests to determine its pneumatic integrity and then subjected to high-pressure
proof-testing to verify safety factors. The System Cleaning Unit, Purging Kit, System
Charging Unit, and the Leak Check Kit will be required for this operation. The pneumatics
will then be sealed to maintain internal cleanliness and the assembly will be moved to the
assembly area for installation of associated wiring.
6.4 SUPPORT STRUCTURE
The various wiring and harnessing associated with the Attitude Control pneumatics will be
installed after successful completion of alignment and leak testing. Harnessing will be
installed, connected, clamped in position, and submitted to harness checks.
Insulation will be installedin the Spacecraft Support Structure to complete operations on
the assembly prior to mating with the Torus.
6.5 TORUS HARNESS INSTALLATION
After being processed through a toll-gate to assure that it is complete, properly accepted,
and of the correct configuration, the Torus Structure will be installed in its Handling Fixture
on its Dolly. The system harness will be installed and securely tied down to the structure
in the first operation on the Torus.
6.6 INSTALL ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES AND SENSORS
Flight Acceptance (F/A) qualified electronics assemblies will be drawn from bonded stock,
processed through inspection Toll-gates, inspected for mechanical fit, and installed mechani-
cally in the Torus structure. Where a given subsystem is made up of more than one assembly,
its inter-bay subsystem harness will be connected. OSE test cables will be attached to the
appropriate test and interface connectors.
At the completion of installation of a subsystem in its bay (or bays), a functional test of the
subsystem will be performed to verify that it is in the same condition that it was upon
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entering bonded stock and that no damage or degradation occurred during this period. This
test will also verify inter-subsystem harnessing integrity after installation and the accept-
ability of the installation.
Each assembly will be inspected for correct installation prior to the installation of the next
assembly. The Guidance and Control assemblies will be aligned to meet the requirements
imposed by the gyros.
The subsystems will not be connected to the system harnessing at this time.
6.7 ASSEMBLE AND ALIGN SPACECRAFT SUPPORT SHELL STRUCTURE, SEPARATION
RING, AND TORUS
The first major assembly step will occur when the Spacecraft Support Shell Structure and
the Torus are mated and aligned. This operation will establish a serial-numbered space-
craft assembly, which will undergo sequential handling rather than parallel activities
from this point throughout the in-house assembly and test flow.
The Spacecraft Separation Ring, having been processed through an inspection toll-gate, will
be installed in a Fixture on the Transport Dolly. After the Spacecraft Separation Ring has
been installed in the handling equipment, the Spacecraft Support Shell Structure, containing
the Attitude Control Pneumatics, will be utilized for match-mate checks with the adapter and
harness interface checks. The Support Shell Structure will then be hoisted with the Space-
craft Assembly Lift Sling, mated on the Separation Ring, and aligned with the Spacecraft
Assembly Master Alignment Check Fixture.
Following the mating of the Separation Ring and Support Shell Structure, the Torus will
undergo match-mate checks and harness interface checks with the Support Shell Structure
Separation Ring and will then be lifted with the Lift Sling, mated, and aligned to the Support
Shell Structure with the Spacecraft Assembly Master Alignment Check Fixture.
6.8 MATE AND ALIGN FLIGHT CAPSULE (F/C) SUPPORT STRUCTURE
Upon completion of the inspection toll-gate, the F/C Support Structure will be subjected to
match-mate checks with the previously assembled Spacecraft. The F/C Support Structure
will then be mated to the attachment points on the Torus Structure and aligned to the Spacecraft.
6.9 INSTALL ALL SENSOR ASSEMBLIES/SIMULATORS AS REQUIRED
Prior to the initiation of the Preliminary Systems Test, it will be necessary to install sensor
assemblies or simulators for the Science Subsystem, certain Guidance and Control Sensors,
and a number of thermal sensing elements. In general, any sensor assembly not previously
installed for reasons of lead-time, and accessibility, will be installed at this time. Any
sensor assemblies not available, or of such a nature as to preclude practical installation or
handling at this portion of the flow, will be substituted for by simulators.
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6.10 SPACECRAFT ASSEMBLY AND ALIGNMENTS
At the completion of the Electrically Mated Systems Test, the Retropropulsion Unit, Antennas,
Solar Arrays, and deployable items will be mated to the Spacecraft using their AHSE. The
Spacecraft will then be aligned to flight requirements with the Spacecraft Master Alignment
Check Fixture.
6. ii MATE FLIGHT CAPSULE AND SPACECRAFT
Following the assembly and alignment of the Spacecraft, the Flight Capsule Assembly will
be mated and aligned to the Spacecraft with the Spacecraft Master Alignment Check Fixture.
7.0 SAFETY PLAN
Assembly and test operations, particularly those involving high-pressure pneumatics testing,
vibration, thermal vacuum, and activities requiring lifting and transporting of the spacecraft,
are recognized as involving potentially hazardous tasks.
In recognition of this fact, the Voyager Safety Manual will be utilized in the detailed preparation
of procedures for assembly, test, and set-up of facilities.
Construction, arrangment, and utilization of facilities such as those required to leak-check
and proof-pressure test pneumatics subsystems will be reviewed to assure compliance with
the established safety requirements of the safety manual.
Human Engineering support during the system design will be directed toward including safety
provisions into the system. Guides for this effort will be derived from accepted safety
standards noted in MIL-STC-803 (Human Engineering Criteria), AFBSD 64-9 (Detail Require-
ments for System Safety Engineering), and MIL-S-31380 (General Requirements for Safety
Engineering).
L
The Safety Plan contained in CH VBll0VP012 of this Phase 1-A report, further delineates
the over-all safety implementation plan.
8.0 SCHEDULE
Figures 8-1 and 8-2 are presented to show the elapsed time (weeks) for processing the '69
and '71 S/C; the relationship of these schedules to the overall schedule is shown in the
Master Schedule (Volume VB110VP001).
The schedules show the approximate times required to complete major assembly and test
operations and the cumulative elapsed time from the initial assembly operation to preparation
for delivery.
Identification of each spacecraft is provided to identify the backup unit (thus assuring experienced
spares) as the first assembly and test sequence.
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Overlap of sequences such as illustrated during thermal vacuum will be satisfied by use of
duplicate facilities (two 39' chambers), or by schedule rephasing if required.
9.0 KEY PROCEDURES
9.1 SCHEDULING AND WORK PLANNING
Scheduling of in-house installation of OSE, OSE checkout, and Spacecraft assembly and test
operations will be accomplished on a program milestone basis and projected through to a
weekly and daily work schedule. Milestone schedules will be prepared to show major events
and activities which affect other contractors, facilities, or related schedules. The weekly
schedule will note specific assembly or test operations to be performed, the location of
work areas, and facilities and OSE requirems nts. Weekly schedules will be monitored for
possible revisions during the assembly and test cycle.
9.2 DOCUMENTATION/STATUS REPORTING
The Spacecraft Test Director's team will provide daily status information to Project Control.
This information will include schedule performance, milestone progress, and weekly and
daily schedules. Hardware status, OSE and logistics status will be monitored.
Special tests and assembly operations to the Spacecraft or prime OSE will require complete
documentation. These operations will be accomplished by written procedures reviewed
for approval by the ITB, and the Acceptance Test Team. The satisfactory completion of
special test and assembly operations will be verified by the signature of the Test Director.
Procedures and documentation to be used will include the following:
a. Test Procedures - Detailed step-by-step procedures for electrical test of the
spacecraft or OSE. Upon completion of these procedures, a data report will
be issued to be attached to the procedure to form a complete package of the test
that was run and the results and analysis of that test.
be Operations Procedures - Detailed step-by-step procedures defining a mechanical
assembly or operation on the spacecraft, such as spacecraft mating, handling,
leak check or assembly.
C. Calibration Book - Contains calibration curves and information for all spacecraft
instrumentation. This work is a working document that travels with the vehicle
and is always kept up to date.
at Spacecraft Logbook - This contains the component operating data, sensor calibration
data, running time, configuration by serial number of parts, and detailed history of
the spacecraft components and parts.
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e. Data Control Sheets (DCS) - A DCS is a form designed for recording major events
relating to the processing of the spacecraft. Thus, a DCS would be prepared on
each test performed, component replacement, failure, deviation and inspection
report. The form is designed to allow a computer to keep track of configuration,
calibration, performance, discrepancies, and schedules.
9.3 CONFIGURATION CONTROL
All hardware is defined by drawings and specifications. All changes to drawings and
specifications are controlled. A complete up-to-date set of drawings and specifications
will be shipped with each spacecraft and every OSE End Item to the launch site. All
changes made will be by Alteration Notice (AN).
An Alternation Notice is the standard way to implement a change and is not approved until
it has been completely integrated and approved by all affected operations and checked for
compliance with all applicable procedures, directives, and contractual requirements.
Implementation of a change will only be by written procedure defining the change in detail
and approved by signature of the Test Director/ITB. The change will then become a
permanent part of the documentation.
9.4 INSPECTION
Inspection of all operations performed on the spacecraft will be mandatory. This will be
done by inspection personnel who have followed the spacecraft through its factory cycle.
Inspectors will witness all mechanical handling, retrofitting, assembly, testing, or other
operations performed physically on the spacecraft. Documentation procedures will
provide a place for an official inspection stamp that will certify that the task was completed
in compliance with all Quality Assurance and Reliability procedures and specifications.
Work on the Spacecraft will progress from one major block on the flow plan to the next ode
only after the previous block has been completed accepted by the inspection process and
authorized by the Test Director. This provides a toll-gate type inspection and acceptance
procedure for each major flow plan block.
10.0 PERSONNEL PLAN
i0.1 TEAM CONCEPT
The problems associated with the simultaneous or near-simultaneous processing of three
spacecraft through the assembly and test sequence, both in-house and in the field, indicate
a need for a planned, team approach in both areas.
Under the team concept, each spacecraft will be supported by an assembly and test team,
comprised of a Test Director, who will act as a focal point for all decisions relative to
assembly and test of a given spacecraft, and an assembly and test crew, which will include
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assembly, handling, and Lest personnel for the spacecraft. See Figure 10-1 for a typical
crew composition.
During the assembly and test of the three spacecraft at the contractorts plant, the three
Test Directors and their test crews will be responsible to a Test Manager, who will provide
over-all guidance and coordination of test. The assembly and test teams will be assigned
to a given spacecraft and will be responsible for all activity related to it. They will proceed
to the launch site with their spacecraft at the completion of the in-house processing and will
be integrated with the launch team during field processing of the spacecraft.
I0.2 TEST ACCEPTANCE TEAM
The Acceptance Test Team willbe responsible for reviewing, analyzing and approving the
acceptance test records for all spacecraft. The Test Directors will also provide acceptance
test liaisonbetween the three test teams.
Included in the Test Acceptance Team willbe the three Test Directors, the Test Manager,
and the representatives or representative of ITB.
II. 0 TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT PLAN
11.1 VOYAGER FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Shipping configuration indicates that the packaged-for-shipment 1971 Flight Spacecraft
will consist of a metal, hermetically sealed, shockmounted container having outside
dimensions approximately 22 feet long by 22 feet wide by 7 feel high, weighing an estimated
7,000 pounds gross. The dimensions provide adequate margins of safety to include internal
shockmounting and other devices necessary to support the spacecraft in transit, and in
addition, suitable skids and/or lifting devices which will be installed on the outside of the
container.
Based on these dimensions, safe transportation can be provided to Cape Kennedy, Florida,
via the following routes:
a. Movement via highways from King of Prussia, Pa., to Naval Air Station, Willow
Grove, Pa., over state highways, then via air to Patrick AFB, Florida, utilizing
the B-377 (Very Pregnant Guppy), a specialized Air Cargo-modified Boeing
Stratocruiser. Movement via highway from Patrick AFB to Cape Kennedy
(Hanger A-0) would complete the movement.
This method of shipment has many advantages. Itprovides, for example, minimum
highway movement. Investigationshows a well-defined highway route is available
to Willow Grove Airport. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Highway Department
has indicated itwould provide fullsupport to the movement, arranging allnecessary
highway protection (policeescort, etc.) required to complete movement without
endangering shipment. Information received from Aero Spacelines, Van Nuys,
California, indicates this aircraftwill be able to accommodate thisload within
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its 25 foot inside dimension. Loading problems are minimized because of the
unique use of pallets which are utilized for loads of this type.
Since this aircraft will be under contract to NASA, with control exercised through
its Huntsville, Alabama offices, we have the assurances that this VPG aircraft
would be available for use in moving the Spacecraft.
Movement from Patrick AFB to the Cape Kennedy facility would be via highway
trailer under full control of escort personnel at all times.
Disadvantage of this method of transuortation is limited to the availability of the
aircraft. At this time, this is the only aircraft with this capacity
to accept the 22 foot width. The one-of-a-kind feature of this aircraft places
any potential user at a major disadvantage should it prove unairworthy, meet
with an accident, or, in any other way be withdrawn from service.
Because of this single, but very important disadvantage of preparing all planning
effort upon use of the VPG aircraft, an alternate, and equally safe, plan for
transporting the flight spacecraft is mandatory. Alternate plans have been
completed, and except for additional time in transit, (6 days vs. 1 day) no
transportation hazards would be encountered.
Alternate route would be via highway routing from King of Prussia, Pa., to the
Port of Philadelphia, Pa., where shipment would be loaded into a barge or self-
propelled vessel for movement via inland waterway to Cape Kennedy, Florida,
where it would be placed aboard a highway truck to be moved into its pre-
designated facility. (Hangar AO).
The Highway Department, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has indicated that
sufficient clearances are available, and state and local protection would be
pro_._ded to insure safe movement from the General Electric Company facility
to the waterfront in the Port of Philadelphia, Pa.
Water transportation can be provided by numerous commercial transportation
companies serving the East Coast via Ocean vessels or those utilizing the inland
waterway. The study indicates that the more sheltered inland waterway v_uld
afford greater over-all protection for projected winter shipments and appropriate
arrangements for this type transportation would be used. Transit time from
Philadelphia, Pa., to ETR would be approximately six (6) days to cover the
1012.2 nautical miles. A self-propelled vessel would reduce transit time
approximately four (4) days. Except for the time savings, each method of water
movement affords the same degree of safety.
A short highway haul would be required between the ETR dock unloading
facility and hangar facility A-0.
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he An evaluation of transporting the Flight Spacecraft via highway from origin to
destination indicates this method of transport must remain a method of last
resort. The movement over 1300 miles by highway is possible, but at great
risk and hazard to the shipment. The problems created by:
1. Extreme width of the package
2. The distance to be traveled
3. The controls required over traffic on highways
4. The time in transit
. The precautions which must be taken during periods when the unit
must be removed from the highway dictate that this method of shipment
be avoided.
Short highway movements, such as those necessary to move from the factory
to a long haul air or water terminal can be done at minimum risk to the
shipment.
i. Railroad shipment of a 22 foot wide package is impossible.
11.2 ELECTRONIC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS (OSE)
Padded vans, equipped with air-ride or similar suspension systems will be used to trans-
port Electronic OSE systems.
The many advantages ofutilizingpadded vans are:
a. Expensive unitpackaging is avoided
b. Handling is minimized in transit
e. The method of transport is proven reliable and safe
d. Equipment (vans) are readily available
e. Loading can be planned to reduce handling at original and destination
f. Alternate transportation is available;however, none approach the use of
padded van for economy. Motor Freight, for example, could be utilized
after each unit (console, rack) is properly skidded and prepared for trans-
portation in accordance with packaging requirements outlined inMotor
Carrier Regulations. The cost of packaging combined with the Motor Freight
cost make the use of Motor Freight alternatetransportation a poor second
choice.
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Air shipment would require multi-handling, a factor which should be avoided.
Cost for air movement would also make this method of transportation as a
poor alternate.
II. 3 MECHANICAL OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (AHSE)
Equipment falling within the generic category "AHSE" is best described as that equipment
which generally does not require the same packaging or transportation considerations that
would be given delicate electronic equipment or vehicles. However, it is not impled that
structural items would receive less attention or concern during transportation.
The most practical method of transportation of "AHSE" equipment is Common Carrier
Motor Freight. This choice is made for the following reasons:
a. Door-to-Door transportation service is provided
b. It is economical transportation service
c. Transit time is reasonable
d. Normal vibration/shock encountered in tl_ack transpo_ation win not affect the
integrity of the equipment
e. Availability of trucking services and equipment is excellent.
Alternate transportation which would provide many of the same advantages found in
motor freight would include:
ao Railroad Piggyback service. In this type of transportation the "AHSE,,
equipment would be Ioaded at Spacecraft Department aboard highway trailers.
The loaded trailers would be loaded aboard railroad trailer type cars for
delivery to destination.
b. Piggyback transportation is rated an excellent alternate to highway move.
From the standpoint of cost and safety both services are competitive. Time
in transit is the only distinction which can be made between the prime and
alternate choices of transportation.
Co Other transportation alternates which could be utilized include Railroad,
Freight taking advantage of railroad cars equipped with "Evans" loading or
other shock prevention equipment, or the additional space/weight available
in the aircraft or vessel used to transport the Flight Spacecraft. This latter
method of transportation would receive serious consideration if schedules
permit arrival of the handling equipment at the time the spacecraft is shipped,
since any expenses for shipment would be absorbed as part of the charter cost.
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Ii.4 MISCELLANEOUS
Within this category, we include those pieces of equipment, components, and parts which
cannot be placed into the three major classifications (Spacecraft, Electronic, or AHSE)
used to establish the broad transportation plan. Primarily, we are concerned with those
items considered as stockroom, maintenance, and similar supplies.
Packaging of miscellaneous materials will be performed at King of Prussia to insure that:
a. Parts are readily identifiable
b. Breakage or loss in transit is avoided
c. Materials arrive at destination in an orderly manner
d. Storage in original containers is possible
e. Shipping costs for transportation are minimized
f. Shipments conform to packaging (carrier) requirements.
Prime method will be motor freight to take advantage of the most econimical transportation
costs, and to avoid handling in transit at transfer points. The speed in transit coupled with
the door-to-door features offered by truck, make truck shipment a desirable method of
delivery.
Alternate transportation is no problem. The choice would depend on conditions which existed
at the time shipment was to be made and the schedule materials were to be available at
destination. For example:
Rail Freight using hydro-cushion or equivalent railroad cars could be used without
increasing expenses, and still provide the safety required. To use this alternate,
however, lead time between shipment and delivery would be in excess of that planned
for motor freight.
Household goods carrier, although expensive, (when compared with truck) could be
used to achieve a similar schedule as motor freight.
11.5 GENERAL COMMENTS
The above transportation plan considers only that group of spacecraft consigned to Kennedy
Space Center, Florida, in 1971, and the logistics associated with this move.
The purpose of this approach was to establish a general plan based on the largest possible
shipping configuration which would be encountered and from that, establish that trans-
portation could be accomplished without endangering the spacecraft, and associated
equipment.
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With this firmly established, plans for shipment of the 1969 configuration, its associated
equipment, and the 1971 configuration to the West Coast become less complex, since no
single package nears the dimensions of those of the Flight Spacecraft (1971) to Kennedy
Space Center, Florida. Planning (design) indicates shipping configurations of all other
spacecraft will be smaller than the estimated 22 x 22 x 7 feet shipping container used as the
'_vorst condition,, in this transportation plan.
It is also recognized that water transportation would not be considered realistic for ship-
ment of the 1969 nor 1971 Flight Spacecraft to the West Coast facility. Air shipment, using
the two modified Boeing Stratocruisers, or certain military-type aircraft is recommended.
The selection of aircraft becomes greater as the size of the spacecraft and its container is
reduced.
A summary of Voyager transportation is presented in Figure 11-1, including consideration
for 1969 spacecraft.
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1.0 LAUNCH OPERATIONS PLAN
i. 1 INTRODUCTION
The Launch Operations Plan (LOP) is prepared in response to Section 1(a)9 of the Voyager
Spacecraft Phase IA work statement with further reference to appropriate sections of the
specimen Phase IB and Phase II work statements. It will be further developed and com-
pleted during Phase IB.
i.1.1 PURPOSE OF PLAN
The LOP is a management tool. It describes the manner in which GE proposes to support
JPL for the launch operation. It further establishes policy, and serves to identify, organize
and control the operations and tests on the overall flight S/C at A FETR. Each test and
operation is described and scheduled, as in the site activation. Managerial control and
key operating procedures which govern launch operations are identified, and a personnel plan
presented. Facilities, OSE and design requirements are determined, the launch site PTM
plan is presented and alternate methods are discussed.
2.0 LAUNCH OPERATIONS AND TESTS
These include all operations and tests performed at A FETR on Voyager overall flight S/C,
to prepare and launch them during the 1971 opportunity.
2.1 REQUIREMENTS
The basic requirement is to present two fully qualified, flight ready, overall S/C for launch
on the first day of the 1971 launch period, to launch the first during its two hour window and
the second in two days or later as required. Specific requirements are:
a. Prepare three overall S/C for flight and launch two successfully.
b. Demonstrate functional performance capability and operability of all possible
elements of the overall flight S/C prior to launch including redundant features.
c. Demonstrate compatibility with the MOS, DSN, Cape DSIF Station, LOS, LC, LV,
SCF, ESF, and AFETR supporting functions prior to launch.
d. Identify and resolve any degradation in performance capability incurred during
shipment to A FETR.
2.2 APPROACH
The following policies and ground rules determine the nature of launch operations and tests:
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The Launch Operations System (LOS) is responsible for all operations at AFETR
and for launch through injection. JPL is in charge and is supported by the LV con-
tractors, Spacecraft contractor; Capsule contractor, Experiment contractors, etc.
Testing at AFETR is directed primarily toward demonstrating overall S/C operability
and compatibility. No simulated environmental tests are run.
Tests are run at sub-system and higher levels only. Failures or troubles are
traced to sub-system hardware bays and corrected by replacement of the entire
bay.
End-to-end testing is utilized and confidence is increased by a building block test
policy of not permitting decabling of a system or subsystem after it has been tested.
Field tests are identical to factory tests wherever possible and all procedures are
run at the factory prior to running in the field.
OSE is matched to each overall S/C and accompanies it to the field. Insofar as is
practical, tests and operations at AFETR are repetitious of those performed
earlier, with the same OSE and personnel, at the factory. Field test results are
directly comparable with earlier factory test results.
An early "dry run" is made through the ESF and LC, by both primary flight S/C
prior to start of the actual launch preparation sequence.
The overall S/C is processed in "clean" SCF and ESF, covered to maintain cleanli-
ness during transport, and "encapsulated" in the payload fairing while at the LC.
Basic evaluation of overall S/C operability is by programmed "system test" using
the STC. Link between overall S/C and STC is as follows:
at SCF - hardwire with open loop back-up
at ESF - Open-loop RF only
at LC - Open-loop RF with hardwire back-up
Safety considerations are given first priority at ESF and LC--in operations in-
volving propellants, high pressure gases, pyrotechnic devices, and radioactive
materials.
Capsule bio-barrier is not violated after sterilization.
Rigid quality, configuration, and data controls are maintained -- consistent with NCP
200-2, JPL CII, and GE in-house procedures.
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I. Rigid safety, cleanliness, and sterilityoperating procedures are followed.
m. Three personnel teams, one for each overall S/C, work concurrently.
2.3 LAUNCH WINDOW CONSTRAINT PROVISIONS
Itis required to launch two overall S/C within the specified 45 to 60 day period. In addition,
these launches are restricted to a two hour daily launch window. Major provisions are
made in the Launch Operations Plan to deal with fieldincurred contingencies and assure
meeting the irrevocable launch constraint. These provisions are:
a. A fully qualified flight ready back-up is provided for each primary flight S/C. S/C
2 backs up S/C 1 and S/C 3 backs up S/C 2.
b. Schedule and flow is such that the second S/C can be launched a minimum of two
days after the first launch if necessary.
Co Both primary flight S/C go through an early dry run at the SCF, ESF and LC, to
uncover any incompatibility in ample time to resolve it, and to train and check
personnel for the actual launch.
do Operations at AFETR are scheduled on a 5 day, 40 hour week basis. Additional
shifts and weekends can be used to accelerate the schedule by as much as 300%
for short periods when necessary to resolve problems and "get back on schedule."
2.4 LAUNCH OPERATIONS AND TESTS SUMMARY
Launch operations and tests at KSC/AFETR require approximately six months and accomplish
the processing of two overall flight spacecraft through to simultaneous countdown on launch
complexes 34 and 37B. A third S/C is used for the immediate provision of system tested
spares and as a back up S/C. Operations are performed at three locations, the SCF, the
ESF, and the LC located as shown on Figure 2-1. After OSE is installed and checked out,
the S/C and capsule are dry run through the SCF, the ESF, and the LC to establish com-
patibility and operability. The S/C is then returned to the SCF where final tests are run.
The decision as to flight readiness is made at this point. The overall S/C is then processed
through the ESF where the capsule is sterilized, -- and pyrotechnics and gases are loaded.
Next the overall S/C is encapsulated in the payload fairing and transported to the pad at
the LC where it is mated with the L/V. Final S/C pad tests are run, followed by a J-FACT
demonstrating compatibility of all S/V systems. The S/C is then returned to the ESF for
propellant loading and cold gas top-off. Final mate to the L/V and a final S/C-L/V con-
fidence test is then run prior to the countdown and launch. The spacecraft Monitoring
Station of the DSIF ties the S/C into the SFOF during launch operations and tracks the S/C
to horizon after lift-off. The key elements of work to be performed are:
a. Receiving and Inspection
b. OSE Installation and Checkout
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c. S/C Compatibility Tests
d. S/C System Tests
e. Propellant, Pyrotechnic and Gas Loading
f. S/C Assembly and Handling
g. J-FACT Test and Countdown
2.5 FLOW CHART
A Launch Operations and Tests Flow Chart is presented in Figure 2-2. It illustrates the
steps performed in processing an overall S/C through the SCF, ESF, and LC, for both
"dry run" and actual launch.
2.6 SCHEDULE
The Facilities Utilization Schedule of Figure 2-3 depicts the flow on a time basis showing
parallel facilities use and major electrical tests. The Launch Operations and Tests Schedule
in Figure 2-4 shows in detail the nominal time for each step, for each S/C. All three over-
all flight S/C, _gether with matched OSE, arrive at the SCF and are received mud inspected
in sequence within a four week period. Three teams of test personnel arrive with the hard-
ware. Primary flight S/C 1 and 2 proceed together, one following the other through each
step of the operations and tests sequence to countdown on their respective pads. Back-up
S/C 3 is also processed in parallel. It starts the sequence last, but skips the ESF and LC
dry run, and proceeds through final launch preparations.
2.7 LAUNCH OPERATIONS AND TEST DESCRIPTIONS
The following descriptions relate to steps in the Flow Plan and line items in the schedule.
a. Receiving, inspection and installation {SCF)
Each complete, assembled flight S/C, its solar arrays and supports, the antennas and
scan package is received in a single shipping container. The capsule is received
separately. OSE end items, including portions of the STC, AHSE and all LCE not
previously installed during pad activation, are also received at this time. All
items are received, removed from their containers, and inspected for proper
shipping documentation and possible damage. Work stands are set up at the SCF,
and the S/C and capsule mounted. The STC is put in place and all cables installed.
OSE for ESF labs and launch complex are forwarded to those locations and installed.
b. STC Checkout (SCF)
Prior to any test with the S/C, continuity checks and ground integrity tests are
made. Power is applied to the STC and it is self-tested. A S/C simulator is
employed and compatibility of the STC with associated FSE equipment and the DSN
tie-in ascertained. Any damage incurred in shipment or incompatibility is detected.
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c. S/C Incoming Confidence Test (SCF)
After a pin to pin voltage check of the connectors, accomplished with a special
piece of OSE that attaches to the end connectors, the STC is cabled to the S/C and
a brief system level test is run to demonstrate the operability of each functional
subsystem. The object is to determine any damage incurred in shipment.
d. Capsule Incoming Confidence Test (.SCF)
Same as S/C Incoming Confidence Test but applied to capsule.
e. Electrically Mated System Test (SCF)
The objective of this test is to establish the functional integrity of the overall
flight S/C. The Capsule is electrically connected with the S/C using special test
cables. It is not physically mated at this time. The STC is then connected, and
power is applied. A test identical to the last factory test is run. Quantitative
results obtained by telemetry, CDS printout, OSE indication and visual observation,
are recorded and checked against factory results. Redundant modes are also checked
where possible using special test setups. The DSIF is used during the mission
sequence to demonstrate the compatibility prior to mechanical assembly.
f. Transport to ESF
The S/C and capsule are loaded on their respective Transporters in the air lock of
the SCF and the air-tight covers installed and sealed prior to leaving the SCF
clean area. These are then moved, with the appropriate escort, to the ESF area.
g. OSE Checkout at ESF (ESF Instrument Lab and Other Labs)
Before any tests are made with the S/C, continuity checks and ground integrity
tests are made on the LCE installed at the instrument lab. The long cables running
from the instrumentation lab to the various test areas are also wrung out. Power
is applied to the LCE consoles, and these are checked out using self-check modes,
and S/C and capsule simulators. Gas pressurizing, propellant loading, and cap-
sule servicing systems and procedures are exercised and checked out prior to
connection with the flight hardware. Samples of pressurizing gas and propellants
are taken to determine cleanliness.
h. Propellant Loading and Gas Pressure Test
Propellant loading checks are made with a propellant tank unit during site activation
prior to arrival of the S/C at the ESF. The flight S/C propellant tanks are not
loaded at this time.
The propulsion and attitude control gas systems are pressurized for leak tests.
These tests are accomplished with mass spectrometers to detect any possible leaks.
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i. S/C Hazardous Preparation Dry. Run (ESF Assembly Lab)
At the ESF assembly lab the S/C is removed from its transporter and placed on the
work stand where dummy squibs and pyrotechnic devices are installed. No voltage
checks are made on S/C connectors before installing each dummy pyrotechnic de-
vice. AFETR General Range Safety Plan 80-2 and applicable Voyager safety pro-
cedures are followed. Next, all non-flight equipment is removed and logged.
j. S/C - ESF Compatibility Test IESF Assembly Lab)
While the capsule is going through its sterilization dry run, the S/C is connected to
the simulated LCE console after connector pin voltage checks and power is applied.
The RF link is established between the spacecraft and SCF. This link goes via
hardwire from the S/C to an antenna on the roof of the assembly lab. LCE console
controls are exercised and the responses monitored with the STC back at the SCF.
k. Capsule Hazard Prep & _terilizati0n Dry Run (ESF Capsule Lab and SterilizationLab)
Support for JPL in processing the capsule in the capsule lab and sterilizarion lab is
the respov.sibility of the capsule contractor. GE will support before and after
sterilization functional tests of the capsule, employing the LCE and the STC. When
the sterilization dry run is completed, the capsule is moved on its transporter to
the assembly lab where it rejoinsthe S/C.
1. Overall S/C Assembly (ESF Assembly Lab)
When the "sterile" capsule in its bio-barrier cannister arrives at the assembly lab,
it is mated with the S/C. Alignment checks are made. The launch vehicle contractor
delivers the payload fairing and stands by to install it during the ESF Final Con-
fidence Test which follows next.
m. Post-Assembly Confidence Test and Fairing Installation (ESF Assembly Lab)
The LCE is connected to the overall S/C. Power is applied and the RF linkwith
the SCF is established. LCE console controls are exercised and results monitored
at the console and at the STC. The launch vehicle contractor then installsthe pay-
load fairing. Effect of the fairingand its parasitic antenna coupling on the RF link
is determined. All telemetered instrumentation data is recorded at the STC and
checked against proper ambient values.
n. Transport to LC
The overall flight S/C, encapsulated in the payload fairing, is purged with dry
nitrogen and loaded on the overall S/C transporter. No cover is employed other
than the fairing. The transporter is then moved, with proper safety and security
escorts, to the launch complex.
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o. Mating with LV at Pad (LC Pad)
At the base of the pad gantry, the overall S/C is turned over to the Munch vehicle
( LV ) contractor who lifts it into place and performs the mating. The procedure
is monitored and installation inspected by GE and JPL. Before making the S/C-LV
electrical interface connection, LV tests are made with a S/C simulator, and a
pin by pin voltage check is made of the LV connector while the LV power bus is
energized.
p. LCE Checkout (LC Blockhouse)
Before tests are made on the S/C at the pad, continuity checks and ground integrity
tests are performed on the blockhouse LCE and the long cables running from block-
house to pad transfer room and up the umbilical tower to the S/C. The LCE is
then self-checked and an overall S/C simulator is connected to the S/C umbilical,
power is applied, and all LCE console functions are checked.
q. SC-LC Compatibility Tests - Mechanical/Electrical
Mechanical compatibility tests such as cooling air supply, umbilical release and
S/C-LC mechanical interface checks are performed. Following this electrical
compatibility tests are run to check umbilical functions and to establish the S-Band
RF links with the DSIF, SCF, and AFETR monitoring and tracking stations. Gantry
removal is checked.
r. LC Final Confidence Tests (LC)
The S/C S-Band telemetry is transmitted to the STC by open RF link. Directional
antennas, installed on the gantry and aimed at the SCF, are coupled to both the
omni-directional and high-gain S/C antennas to permit operational checks through
the RF link. Transmitter output is checked and S/C performance is evaluated at the
STC via this RF link. All telemetered instrumentation readings are recorded, and
compared with the proper ambient value. The television subsystem is verified
operating through the RF link.
The S/C is next programmed through dry run countdowns to verify countdown pro-
cedure and train personnel.
s. Combined System Test (LC)
The object of this test is to demonstrate compatibility and operability of all systems
and personnel involved in launching the SVo First, all events of the countdown and
launch to injection sequence are simulated in an accelerated test, with the gantry in
place to permit special test hookups. This is the Joint Flight Acceptance Composit
Test, or J-FACT. During this test, the overall S/C receives programmed event
signals or "Discretes" from the LV. Next, a simulated launch, down to T-0, is
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performed during which the gantry is removed to more closely approximate the
actual launch and provide a clear path for RF and radar links. The S-band tracking
and telemetry RF links from the S/C to the STC, and DSIF and AFETR monitoring
stations are again verified, this time with all other SV systems operating--i, e.,
the actual launch RFI environment. A simulated mission sequence is also run.
t. Demate and Load S/C ILC Pad)
The overall S/C, with payload fairing in place, is demated from the LV, lowered
to the base of the pad, and placed aboard the overall S/C transporter by LV con-
tractor personnel. These operations are monitored by GE and JPL personnel.
u. Transport to ESF
The overall flight S/C, still encapsulated in the payload fairing, is secured aboard
its transporter. Safety and security escorts are assembled and the transporter is
moved to the ESF.
v. Remove Payload Fairing and Disassembly (ESF)
The overall S/C is removed from the transporter, brought into the clean high-bay
areas and placed on its work stand. The payload fairing is removed by the LV
contractor and sent to storage. Non-flight articles removed from the S/C and cap-
sule are replaced and their installation properly documented. The S/C and capsule
are demated for magnetic mapping.
w. Magnetic Mapping (ESF)
The object of this test is to measure the magnetic field at the flight magnetometer
sensor caused by components of the permanent magnetic field of the spacecraft
and its coefficient of induction for an external __m_a___eticfield. The test is per-
formed at the ESF where less disturbance of the earth's induced electrical fields
is expected due to moving vehicles induced electrical fields and relocation of
magnetic equipment. The test requires a 70' x 125' area oriented in an East-West
direction in order to rotate the vehicle about 2 axis of the magnetometer. The two
(2) axis are: the axis parallel to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, and the axis
perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the vehicle, which includes the magnetometer.
During both tests, the magnetometer is held in a fixed point of the earth's magnetic
field. Because of the structural limitations, the capsule will be mapped separate
from the spacecraft. A spot check of the overall S/C with S/C and capsule mated
is made to confirm the combined test data. The results of the magnetic mapping
are compared with similar measurements made prior to shipment to the field and
must be within specified limits. After magnetic mapping, the S/C and capsule are
demated and transported to the SCF.
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X. Science Instruments Calibrations (SCF)
Those science instruments which require final calibrations that cannot be performed
on the S/C are removed at this time. Each instrument is taken to the lab or other
area prepared for its calibration and the calibration is performed. Upon completion,
instruments are reinstalled on the S/C. JPL or their supporting contractor per-
forms the calibrations on all instruments in the S/C (and capsule} science payloads.
y. Final Systems Flight Acceptance Test (SCF)
The object of this test is to permit a final detailed examination and verification of
the overall S/C readiness for the mission. The test is essentially the same as that
run earlier at the SC F on the electrically mated capsule and S/C. The STC is
connected and an accelerated mission sequence is followed exercising all functions
of the overall S/C including redundant modes and playback of television picture data.
Quantitative results are obtained and compared with those of previous system tests
on this same S/C. All anomalies or failures are individually reviewed. After care-
ful analysis of this test, a final recommendation is made as to the flight readiness
of the S/C.
z. Transport to ESF
The S/C and capsule are demated for transport to the ESF. Procedure is the same
as item g above.
aa. S/C Hazardous Preparation (ESF Assembly Lab)
S/C pyrotechnic devices are delivered from storage by the AFETR sub-support con-
tractor who also tests each device, measuring resistance of squib wires with a
blasting galvanometer. A no-voltage check is made on each pertinent S/C connector
and the pyrotechnic device installed. These operations are performed in strict
accordance with AFETR General Range Safety Plan 80-2, and Voyager safety pro-
cedures. Next, all non-flight equipment is removed and logged against a checkoff
list.
ab. S/C Explosive Confidence Test (ESF Assembly Lab)
After again checking pin voltages at the LCE connector, the LCE is cabled to the
S/C, personnel are evacuated from the vicinity of the S/C, and all subsystems are
energized including telemetry. Outputs are monitored at the STC. The object of
this test is to assure that the pyrotechnic devices are not ignited by induced currents.
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ac. Capsule Hazardous Preparation and Sterilization (ESF Capsule Lab and Sterilization
Lab)
Support for JPL in processing the capsule in the capsule lab and sterilization lab is
the responsibility of the capsule contractor. GE will support the before and after
sterilization functional tests with the STC or LCE as required.
ad. Post-Sterilization Confidence Test (ESF Assembly Lab)
When the sterile capsule in its bio-barrier cannister arrives at the Assembly Lab,
it is connected with the LCE and a test demonstrating operability of each capsule
subsystem is run. The object of this test is to detect possible damage incurred during
the sterilization process.
ae. Overall S/C Assembly, Alignment and CG Measurement (ESF Assembly Lab}
Weight and lateral cg are checked prior to capsule mating and after, if necessary.
Alignment checks are made of all crtically aligned subsystems including propulsion.
The sterile capsule is now mated with the S/C.
af. Post-Assembly Confidence Test and Fairing Installation (ESF Assembly Lab}
ag.
The LCE is connected to the overall S/C, power is applied and the RF link with the
SCF is established. LCE console controls are exercised and results monitored
at the console and at the STC. Solar panels are individually excited by an external
source and checked for proper electrical operation with the system at this time.
Telemetry instrumentation data is recorded at the STC and checked against proper
ambient values. The payload fairing is installed and the effect of the parasitic
antenna coupling on the RF link is checked.
Transport to Launch Complex
The overall S/C with fairing is placed on its transporter and moved with the required
security and safety escorts to the base of the gantry at the LC.
ah. Mate with LV at Pad
At the base of the pad gantry, the overall S/C is turned over to the LV contractor
who lifts it into place and performs the physical mating. The procedure is monitored
and inspected by GE and JPL. Before making the S/C - LV electrical interface
connection, a pin by pin voltage check is made of the LV connector while the LV
power bus is energized.
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ai. S/C-LC CompatibiliW Tests, Mechanical/Electrical (LC)
Compatibility tests identical to those of i_¢m q above are run. The length of
this final pad cycle prior to launch is governed primarily by the Saturn pre-launch
checkout requirements which include having the S/C mated to the LV for approximately
seven (7) weeks prior to launch.
aj. LC Final Confidence Tests
ak.
With the gantry in place, the RF link is established with the STC via directional
antennas installed on the gantry and coupled to the omni and high-gain S/C antennas.
This establishes a precision RF loop. Calibrations are made, telemetry trans-
mitter output checked, and S/C performance evaluated at the STC. Telemetered
instrumentation readings are recorded and compared with the proper ambient
value. The television data transmission system is verified.
J-FACT
The Joint Flight Acceptance Composite Test is performed to demonstrate compati-
bility and operability of all systems and personnel involved in the launch. Events
of the countdown and launch to injection sequence are simulated in an accelerated
test paying particular attention to electrical interface events. During this test, the
overall S/C receives programmed event signals, or "discretes", from the LV.
Proper receipt of and response to these discretes is monitored.
al. Propellant Loading and Pressurizing (ESF Propellant Lab)
The overall S/C is demated from the LV and moved to the Prouellant Lab where
propellant loading and cold gas top-off is performed. The 2.2 to 1 Gas Tank safety
factor and other safety considerations make this necessary. Trained personnel
following proven procedures and utilizing special protective clothing and equipment
to guard against toxicity perform these operations. Requirements of A FETR
General Range Safety Plan 80-2, and Voyager Safety procedures are met. The
OSE has been exercised and checked out earlier during actual loading operations
with non-flight hardware. Propellants are loaded one at a time. All traces of one
propellant are removed by flushing lines and lab floor with water before introducing
the next. Top-off of the attitude control gas system is also accomplished and the
S/C is returned to the pad and mated to the LV. If experience and Safety Require-
ments permit earlier completion of this step (much can be learned by 1971), it
can be done just prior to leaving the ESF for the last time, thereby eliminating a
mating and demating operation.
If experience and Safety Requirements permit earlier completion of this step
_much can be learned by 1971), it can be done just prior to leaving the ESF for the
last time, thereby eliminating a mating and demating operation
18 of 58
VBll0VP006
am. Final Confidence Test and Launch Preparations
After mating to the LV, interface and S/C confidence tests are run to assure system
operability and no degradation due to handling or propellant and gas loading, final
launch preparations such as battery charging, pre-launch command loading and
temperature stabilization are performed. Time is also allowed if necessary for
S/C #2 to catch up and protect the 2-day minimum launch interval requirement.
an. Countdown and Launch
The SV terminal countdown is conducted in accordance with a detailed time-events
sequence procedure that is directed by a test conductor at the LC blockhouse. The
LOS is in overall charge and makes the launch or hold decision. During the count-
down, S/C is controlled with the LCE at the blockhouse, and its performance mon-
itored at the STC and SFOF. Most countdown events concern the LV, but at the
specified times, the S/C is energized on external power, the RF link is established
and confirmed, and performance evaluated. The S/C is next placed on internal
power and locked in, RF link and performance reconfirmed, and the launch or hold
decision made. After lift-off, the S/C S-band RF signal is monitored to radio hor-
izon by the DSIF S/C Monitoring Station. It is also monitored by AFETR S-band
receivers which provide coverage until well past injection. Look angle information
is transmitted in real time to the SFOF. AFETR Station telemetry tapes are ob-
tained from down range for post launch analysis within 36 hours.
2.8 ABORT AND RECYCLE OPERATIONS
In the event a launch attempt is aborted, launch activity is immediately directed to achieve
the following:
a. Restore the SV and LC to a safe "holding" condition.
be Analyze the cause of the abort, determine corrective action and time required to
effect it.
c. Reschedule the launch with official AFETR and MOS concurrence.
d. Effect the corrective action and retest the system as necessary.
e. Resume launch preparations or countdown at the appropriate point and time, and
proceed toward launch during the rescheduled window.
Depending on the cause of the abort, and the nature of the corrective action needed, the overall
S/C either remains in place on the LV, or is demated and returned to the ESF.
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i. Stay Mated
If the overall S/C is in "go" condition, and does not have to be removed to
correct an LV problem, it remains in place, mated to the LV. It is taken off
internal and placed on external power. Pyros are "disarmed" and overall
S/C condition is monitored at the blockhouse via the LCE . Prior to resumption
of the launch countdown, RF links with the STC, DSIF station and AFETR
stations are reconfirmed, pyros are rearmed. During countdown all previous
commands are removed and required pre-launch commands are loaded into the
S/C via the LCE or STC.
Demate :
When the overall S/C contains the problem requiring correction, it is replaced
by the back-up S/C which is waiting, ready for mating, at the ESF. The
defective S/C is "disarmed", electrically disconnected, and demated. It is
then lowered to the foot of the gantry, loaded on its transporter and moved to
the ESF propellant lab. The back-up S/C is moved to the launch pad on its
transporter and mated as soon as the way is clear.
Launch complex tests, including compatibility, final confidence and J-FACT,
are rerun on an accelerated 24-hour schedule, ff necessary, permiRing early
launch from this pad after the abort. The trouble in the defective S/C at the
SCF is corrected on an accelerated 24-hour work schedule and the overall S/C
is readied to back-up the new launch attempt.
Meanwhile, S/C #2 at the second launch pad is available and ready for launch,
the only task remaining being the countdown.
2.9 FORMAL ACCEPTANCE FOR FLIGHT
Following analysis of results of the Final System Flight Acceptance Test on an overall S/C,
key data bearing on its flight readiness is assembled and presented to the JPL project
manager. This is accompanied by the considered recommendation of the LOS. The GE in-
put to this recommendation is based on total review of acceptance test data and S/C history,
and is forwarded by the GE program manager. At this point, JPL formally accepts the over-
all S/C and releases it for flight. Subsequent testing and decisions regarding launch are the
responsibility of the LOS and are made by the launch team test director as required. He is
supported by the test team and uses prepared analyses -- such as the Launch and Hold Cri-
teria. The purpose of this formal acceptance is to obtain agreement among all concerned
parties that the S/C is flight ready based on all testing to date, recognizing that subsequent
processing does not anticipate or allow any S/C changes.
Also indicated on the Flow Chart are the toll gate points at which a formal review is held and
a decision is made confirming the satisfactory completion of all previous operations. The
S/C is held in its test configuration during this activity. This decision is made after a
thorough data analysis and is based on a GE (and, if applicable, other contractor such as
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capsule) recommendation and concurrence and approval by JPL. These toll gates are
arranged such that reviews are conducted just prior to leaving a particular facility or
building and their purpose is to assure that all tests and operations done in that facility are
complete and correct.
In addition, a "running buy-off" will be conducted for each separate test or operation. This
will include listing of all discrepancies and resolution on each accompanied by in-process sign
offs on each item by GE and JPL.
2.10 LAUNCH AND HOLD CRITERIA
This is the formally documented and approved criteria on which are based the decisions to
"launch" as is, or "hold" for correction and scrub the launch attempt. It is applied at the LC
during countdown, when there is no time or opportunity for orderly troubleshooting and
correction procedures. The purpose is to predefine possible failure and preplan the action
to be taken. The criteria classifies each S/C function as either "mandatory" or "not man-
datory." It also defines for each and every data measurement:
a. Effect of loss of measurement
b. Effect of loss of function being measured
c. Method to determine if function is lost or not.
Voyager Launch and Hold Criteria is based on JPL's proven Mariner C approach, with each
measurement analyzed In greater depth. It is produced as one part of a broader analysis
which yields the trouble analysis and corrective action criteria for the space flight operations,
used by the SPAT at the SFOF. The SFO criteria is necessarily computer programmed and
the Launch and Hold Criteria might best be handled in this same way.
3.0 KEY OPERATING PROCEDURES
Management methods, controls and the operating procedures which govern the manner in
which launch operations and tests are executed at AFETR are described in the following:
3.1 RELIABILITY
Reliability procedures governing conduct of launch operations at AFETR meet two require-
ments of NPC 250-1 as identified in the Voyager Reliability Plan _VBll0VP007 of this
report. Reliability procedures in the areas of inspection, operating runs, calibrations of
instruments, audits and failure and reliability reports are emphasized. The reliability
effort on Voyager at the launch site is given particular attention in the following areas:
a. Daily reporting of all activity on the flight S/C, and in particular, failures, dis-
crepancies, operating times, and configuration changes. This is done automatically
as one function of the field Data Control System. This contributes to the measure-
ment of reliability.
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Do Performance of key compatibility and performance tests at the actual launch com-
plex and in conjunction with the actual LV, DSN, and AFETR supporting elements.
Key procedures are reviewed by the Integrated Test Program Board (ITPB), which
includes a representative from the Reliability office, prior to S/C shipment to
the launch site. This set of procedures defines the conditions to be met for flight
readiness and mission success. The Reliability Plan also shows how constructive
actions follow to "close the loop" and add to the assurance of mission success.
3.2 QUALITY ASSURANCE
Quality Assurance Procedures governing conduct of launch operations at AFETR meet the
basic requirements of NASA A6824 and NPC 200-2, as identified in the Voyager Quality
Assurance Plan -- Section VBll0VP010 of this Phase IA report. Major areas controlled
by QA procedures are: Inspection, Test, Assembly, Packaging, Shipping, Storage, Non-
Conforming Material, Certification of Personnel, Retrofit Installation, Field Repairs,
Calibration of Instruments, Quality Audits, Quality Data and Reports, and Failure and
Reliability Reports. These procedures are formally documented and submitted to JPL and
the cognizant NASA Quality Control Representative's office at AFETR for review and approval.
3.3 INSPECTION
Inspection of all operations performed on the S/C will be mandatory. This will be done by
inspection personnel who have followed the S/C through its factory cycle. Inspectors will
witness all mechanical handling, retro-fitting, assembly, testing, or other operations per-
formed physically on the S/C. Documentation procedures will provide a place for an official
inspection stamp that will certify that the task was completed in compliance with all Quality
Assurance and Reliability procedures and specifications.
Work on the S/C will progress from one major block on the flow plan to the next one only
after the previous block has been completely accepted by the inspection process described,
and also authorized by the JPL Test Director and the Launch Team Leader. This provides
a toll gate type inspection and acceptance procedure for each major flow plan block.
3.4 CONFIGURATION CONTROL
All hardware is defined by drawings and specifications. All changes to drawings and speci-
fications are controlled. A complete up-to-date set of drawings and specifications is shipped
with each S/C and every OSE End Item to the launch site. Configuration Control is main-
tained by adherence to the same procedures utilized in the factory requiring complete docu-
mentation, review and approval prior to initiation of any change. Each S/C has a List of
Materials (LM) that specifies all components, modules and structures by Part Number and
Serial Number for that S/C. This list is kept current by use of the DCS procedure requiring
configuration information that automatically updates the LM every time a change occurs.
Hardware changes to the S/C are done only at the Electronics Assembly (Bay) level and
these bays come from S/C #3 and have prior systems test experience.
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Field Design Changes will be few due to having previously checked and tested most S/C
interfaces in the factory. Any necessary Field changes will be subject to factory Design
Change Control Board review and also to Field Design Change Control Board review and
approval by JPL. Implementation of a change will only be by a written Retrofit procedure
defining the change in detail and approved by signature of the J'PL Test Director and the
Launch Team Leader. The retrofit will then become a permanent part of the documentation.
The Logistics Organization at the factory will coordinate and provide the retrofit instruction,
necessary material and parts and control.
3.5 LOGISTICS AND SPARES
An in-house Field Support Operation provides the following services to the Launch Operations
and Tests effort:
a. Field Shipment Control
b. Spares provisioning, including return and repair
c. Field test equipment procurement and control
d. Central property inventory, control and accountability
e. Hardware modification, retrofit instructions, material and parts, and control
f. Field Data Control System in-house support
g. Field site communications support
h. Retrofit Status Report
All services are rendered in full accord with pertinent provisions of the Procurement Plan,
Manufacturing Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, Engineering Development Plan, and Project
Control Plan. An on-site Administrative Support Unit at AFETR provides local property
control and accountability, transportation, packaging, shipping, storage and stockroom
services to support the technical test teams at the launch site.
In accord with the Voyager Mission Specification, back-up S/C 3 serves as the source of
system tested spares. If a failure occurs on primary flight S/C i or S/C 2 at AFETR,
the failed subsystem bay is removed and returned to the factory for failure analysis and
disposition. The replacement subsystem bay is taken from S/C 3 and installed in the
primary flight S/C. The replacement for S/C 3 comes from a complete set of spare sub-
system bays maintained in bonded stock at A FETR. These spare subsystems have been FA
tested, and, where possible, have had system operating experience in the PTM S/C.
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3.6 DOCUMENTATION/STATUS/REPORTING
The Launch Project Engineer's Team will provide real time spacecraft test and processing
status information to the central JPL and GE Project Control Center. This will include
performance on all schedules, milestone, weekly and daily, and submission of the daily and
weekly schedules. Specific hardware status on each spacecraft and status of all OSE and
Logistics Spares items will be provided. This function will be such that at any time work is
being done at the launch site, its progress will be reported on a real time basis to the JPL
and GE Project Control Center.
Documentation of all tests, assembly operations, or retrofits to the S/C or prime OSE will
be required. All such operations will be done by written procedure previously approved by
the JPL Test Director and the Launch Team Leader. Acceptance of satisfactory com-
pletion of tests, operations or retrofits will be by signature of the above and the person in
charge of conducting that test or operation and the Quality Assurance Engineer. Following
is a listof procedures and documentation to be used with a general description of each type.
a. Launch Operations Plan
The baseline document describing the S/C launch operation of which this item is
a part.
b. Test Procedure
Detailed step-by-step procedures for electrical test of the S/C or OSE. Upon
completion of these procedures a data report will be issued to be attached to the
procedure to form a completed package of the test that was run and the results
and analysis of that test.
c. Operations Procedures
Detailed step-by-step procedures defining a mechanical assembly or operation on
the S/C, such as S/C mating, handling, leak check or assembly.
d. Calibration Book
Contains calibration curves and information for all S/C instrumentation. This is
a working document that travels with the vehicle and is always kept up to date.
e. Field Test Specification
Defines all S/C operating limits and required and expected responses to various
stimuli. This is the Engineering operating description of the spacecraft.
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This contains the component operating data, sensor calibration data, running time,
configuration by serial number of parts and detailed history of the S/C components
and parts.
g. Data Control
The field Data Control System (DCS) captures launch site operations, tests, and
inspection data, programs it and transmits it via teledata into the GE and JPL
home plant computer data handling systems. Four types of data are handled by the
DCS. These are:
lo
.
.
Performance Data -- from all testing done at the AFETR, includes operating
time accumulation.
Discrepancy Data -- including failure, discrepancy and non-conformance re-
ports; material reviews and analyses; and dispositions, remedial and long
range corrective actions.
Configuration Data -- including equipment change records, and the Log Books
for each S/C.
4. Calibration Data -- including calibration logbooks for each S/C.
in addition to the foregoing, GE will support JPL by providing inputs to, or review of, re-
quired AFETR Range Documents, as follows:
Planning Estimate (PE)
Program Requirements Document (PRD)
Program Support Plan (PSP)
Operations Requirements (OR)
Operations Directive (OD)
Test Schedule Requests
Six Month Forecast
Countdown
Pad Safety Plans
Input
Input
Review
input
Review
input if needed
Input if needed
Input
Input
25 of 58
VBIlOVP006
3.7 SCHEDULINGANDWORKPLANNING
Schedulingof all OSE installation and checkout and S/C test and processing activity at
the launch site will be done on a total cycle milestone basis and, also, on a daily and
weekly working basis. Milestone schedules will be prepared in advance and show major
events and activities that, if missed, affect other contractors, facilities utilization or
endanger total program schedules. Weekly schedules will show specific tests to be per-
formed, location, facilities, range support and OSE required, and will be done prior to
arrival of the spacecraft. Weekly schedules will be subject to revision during S/C
processing.
Daily schedules will be issued at the end of each working day and will detail the next day's
planned activities. They will show hourly activities and specific information relative to
equipment and personnel.
These schedules will be arrived at by the JPL Test Director for each spacecraft, the
Spacecraft Team Leader and the assigned Project Engineer Team Member. All new or
revised schedules will be incorporated in the Project Control Center Master Schedule.
3.8 CLEANLINESS
Rigid clean area operating procedures control personnel and equipment in SCF and ESF
clean work areas. Equipment and personnel permitted in the areas are identified. Require-
ments for entrance and exit, preparations before entering, restrictions on clothing,
smoking, eating, etc., are established. Voyager clean area operating procedures are
adapted from the proven JPL procedures now governing SCF and ESF operations at AFETR.
Magnetic cleanliness procedures will also be defined and followed. Procedures for
S/C transport between work areas and for LC operations are also designed to maintain
S/C cleanliness. The S/C transporter has an air-tight cover which is installed at the
clean area air lock and purged with clean dry nitrogen. The payload fairing is used to
encapsulate the S/C during some moves on the transporter and while at the LC. "Clean"
cooling air is supplied to the S/C by the LV contractor at the pad.
3.9 STERILITY
The Capsule is enclosed in its bio-barrier cannister. After sterilization, this barrier is
not violated until capsule separation during the mission. Any penetration of the barrier at
AFETR before or after sterilization is the responsibility of the Capsule Contractor, who
also is responsible for Capsule Sterilization.
Effective Capsule Sterilization is recognized to be a first priority requirement of the
Program. Voyager launch operations procedures are designed to assure the integrity of
the capsule bio-barrier. Maintenance of S/C cleanliness reduces potential biological con-
tamination in the vicinity of the capsule bio-barrier. If necessary, this might be further
reduced by external sterilization of the S/C using ethylene-oxide gas at the ESF assembly
lab.
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3.10 SAFETY
Launch operations, particularly those involving pyrotechnics, propellants, high pressure
gases, and radioactive materials are recognized to be potentially the most hazardous of the
Voyager Program. The Voyager Safety Office assures thorough consideration of, and
high priority for safety in hardware design, operating procedures, equipment and training
of personnel. A Safe .ty Manual establishes the safe approach and sets requirements on all
potentially hazardous activities. An on-site Safety Specialist at AFETR supports local
JPL personnel in coordinating Voyager safety matters with USAF Range Safety -- and as-
sures compliance with the Range Safety Manual 80-2. Specialists from the GE safety office
accompany the test teams to the field as needed. The Safety Plan, section of this
Phase 1A report further delineates these safety controls.
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4.0 FACILITIES AND OSE
4.1 DEFINITIONS
Facilities described in this section are those existing structures and emplacements presently
at the Cape Kennedy Air Force Station required to support the Voyager test servicing and
launch during the 1971 launch opportunity.
Base facilities are those services required to support Voyager test servicing and launch
tasks that are provided by established Base agencies. Included in Base facilities are
electrical and mechanical calibration to traceable standards, laboratory services for the
analysis of fluids and gases and pneumatic/propellants component cleaning. Base facilities
requirements to support Voyager processing will be listed in the General Electric input to
the Program Requirements Document.
Operational Support Equipment (OSE) is that ground based equipment required at Cape
Kennedy to test, service, assemble and handle the Voyager spacecraft. OSE is treated as
three groups of equipment as follows:
1. Systems Test Complex (STC) - Interconneets with the S/C by RF and umbilical
links. Provides overall S/C test capability down to subsystem level.
o Launch Complex Equipment (LCE) - Includes that OSE necessary to command
and monitor S/C functions at both the launch complex and at the ESF. Also
included are those items of service OSE necessary to load, test and maintain
the various pyros, pneumatic and propellant subsystems.
. Assembly, Handling and Servicing Equipment (AHSE) - Includes all shipping
containers, assembly fixtures, handling equipment, stimulators and environmental
service equipment needed to process a Voyager spacecraft at Cape Kennedy.
4.2 APPROACH
The following basic assumptions establish the guide lines for tasks and schedules listed in
the remainder of this section.
a. Space at Launch Complexes 34 and 37B, the SCF (Hanger AO) andthe new Explosive
Safe Facility will be available for the required OSE emplacement, storage and
handling.
b. All long-run cables between facilities will be provided by an integrating or base
contractor and will meet OSE interface requirements.
c. Required radio frequency allocations and usage will be supported by Base agencies
for test as well as launch tasks.
d.
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4.3 FACILITIES
The facilities required to support OSE installations and Voyager S/C testing at Cape Kennedy
will be the Spacecraft Checkout Facility (SCF), the Explosive Safe Facility (ESF), and
Launch Complexes 34 and 37B.
a. The SCF is Hanger ,,AO,' located in the original Cape industrial area. The SCF
is a two-story building. The first floor includes a high-bay clean room, approx-
imately 180 feet long and 47 feet wide with 15-minute change of 10 micron air
exchange capability. The high-bay area is equipped with two 10-ton bridge cranes
which have a 45 foot maximum hook height. S/C access to the high-bay area is
through an air lock room. The air lock is approximately 26 feet by 32 feet and is
equipped with a 10-ton hoist with a 45 foot maximum hook height. Access into
the air lock and out of the air lock to the high bay is through doors 25 feet _ide
by 40 feet high.
Four STC areas are located on the first floor adjacent to the high bay. Each STC
area measures approximately 39 feet long by 33 feet wide ¢¢ith a 15 foot ceiling.
The balance of the SCF consists of shop rooms, stock rooms, office spare, and a
communications room.
The SCF facility is adequate for S/C processing as it is presently configured.
The facility is inadequate for storage. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the first and
second floor plan of the SCF.
b. The Explosives Safe Facility (ESF) is a group of related buildings located in an
isolated area about two miles north of the SCF. It includes an Assembly and
Sterilization Lab, a Propellant Lab and an Instrument Lab which directly serve
the S/C. The balance of the ESF consists of other buildings to sterilize and
process the capsule. Figure 4-3 shows the layout of the ESF.
The Assembly and Sterilization Lab has a total of 6600 square feet floor space.
The lab consists of two high-bay clean rooms served by a common air lock.
Each bay is approximately 58 feet long by 40 feet wide. Each bay is served by
a 5-ton capacity hoist with a 35 foot maximum hook height. Access to both
bays is through doors from the common air lock. These doors are approximately
20 feet wide.
C. The Assembly and Sterilization Lab is inadequate for S/C processing for the
following reasons:
. Doors too narrow. The S/C in its container is 22 feet wide and must have
a door larger than the present 20 foot door in the Assembly and Sterilization
Lab. A 24 foot door is considered adequate.
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Figure 4-3. Explosive Safe Area
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2. Hook height inadequate. The S/C will require a 60 foot hook height to
assemble the fairing to the S/C.
Figure 4-4 shows the floor plan of the Assembly and Sterilization Lab.
d. Additional requirements for the facility are:
e.
1. Must be capable of handling two (2) S/C at a time.
2. Must be a "clean room" in accordance with S/C clean requirements and
capsule sterility requirements.
. One of the S/C areas must be 70 x 125 feet oriented in a Magnetic East-
West direction to accommodate magnetic mapping and the other S/C area
need be only 40 x 40 feet to accommodate the S/C.
The Propellant Lab has a total floor space of 1568 square feet. It has no air lock.
It is air conditioned and all fixtures are of the explosion proof type. The main lab
room is 38 feet long by 30 feet wide. Access to the main lab room is through a
20 foot wide door.
The Propellant Lab is marginal for S/C processing and would require a widening
of the 20 foot door to admit the 22 foot diameter S/C. Building schematics
indicate that this v_uld not be too difficult. An additional requirement is a
35 foot ceiling and door height to allow entrance of the S/C with fairing in-
stalled. The present facility does not allow parallel processing and the S/C
flow is structured accordingly. Figure 4-5 shows the floor plan of the ESF
Propellant Lab.
The Instrument Lab is a 1976 square foot air conditioned building used to house
the LCE equipment required for test and loading operations at *_^L,,__*o_,jA.... ,.1.. and
Sterilization Lab and the Propellant Lab. The Instrument Lab is about 300 feet
from the Propellant Lab and about 700 feet from the Assembly and Sterilization
Lab. Cable trays are provided from the Instrument Lab to the other labs.
Launch Complexes 34 and 37Bare Saturn pads located about 4 miles NE of the
SCF and about 3 miles NE from the ESF. A site plan for each is shown in
Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7. These pads have a fixed umbilical tower and a
removable service tower. Separate Launch Control Centers (blockhouses) are
located about 1000 feet from the pads. Voyager LCE will be installed on the
umbilical tower and service tower, in the base of the pad, and in the blockhouse.
These areas are readily accessible to maintenance and operations personnel.
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The pad has connecting roads and adequate space to permit Voyager
transporter maneuvering andapproach. Mating of the Voyager Spacecraft to the
Centaur will be accomplishedusing the bridge crane installed on the service tower.
Additional facility for storage of AHSE and shipping containers will be required.
Facility requirements are:
1. 24 foot door opening
2. 35 foot ceiling to accommodate fairing
3. Approximately 4000 square feet of storage area
4. Enclosed from the elements with humidity and filter control to protect
equipment from rust and salt damage.
4.4 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
a. System Test Complex (STC}
The STC will consist of selected subsystem test sets and additional support
equipment as necessary for completely evaluating the space vehicle condition.
The STC will be capable of isolating S/C malfunctions down to the subsystem
level and will include appropriate self-check functions.
The STC will be installed in an STC room at the SCF. It will be arranged in
a rectangular pattern _ith the test sets forming the periphery. A raised floor
will be provided to facilitate the routing of interconnecting cables.
The STC will interface with the S/C through RF links and umbilical cables when
the S/C is at the SCF. When the S/C is at the launch complex, the STC will
interface through RF links and a hardwire cable through the LCE.
The electrical LCE will interface with the S/C through the umbilical connector
at both the pad and the ESF.
The electrical LCE will interface with the STC with a hardline connecting cable
from the pads to the SCF only. No connections between LCE and STC will be
required for the LCE at the ESF.
The Spacecraft Simulator will be portable to facilitate use at the pad, SCF or
ESF as required.
b. Launch Complex Equipment (LCE)
The LCE will support all pad operations related to the Voyager spacecraft including
normal test and launch operations and unscheduled operations made necessary by
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malfunctions in the spacecraft. The LCE will also support all test and service
operations conducted at the ESF.
c. Assembly, Handling and Servicing Equipment (AHSE)
AHSE is allmechanical OSE required to assemble, handle and service the
S/C at Cape Kennedy. Included in AHSE are the following functional types of
equipment:
1. Shipping Containers
2. Assembly and Alignment Fixtures
3. Handling Equipment
4. Subsystem Stimulator Equipment
5. Service Equipment
6. Tool Kits
7. Accountability Kits
All AHSE will be used in the manufacture of the S/C at Philadelphia and then
shipped to Cape Kennedy with itsassigned S/C.
4.5 LAUNCH SITE PREPARATION AND OSE INSTALLATION SCHEDULE
Launch site preparation consists of those tasks required to prepare the KSC/AFETR for
the installationof OSE. These tasks are facilitymodifications, long run (between facility)
cable installationand checkout, and antenna and RF equipment installation.
OSE installationcovers the tasks required to installand checkout the various OSE groups
at the facilitiesin preparation for processing the PTM and S/CWs.
Figure 4-8 is the Launch SitePreparation and OSE Installationschedule.
4.6 SAFETY AFETR (CAPE KENNEDY)
The ESF (Explosive Safe Area) includes the areas and facilitiesdescribed in the following
paragraphs.
4.6.1 PROPELLANT HANDLING AREA
This area insures the safety of personnel when working with the propellants for the Midcourse
and Retro-Package engines.
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The propulsion unit will be worked with on a "Hardstand" of high-density concrete with a sealed
surface. The area will be of sufficient size to hold the propulsion unit and propellant tankage
with additional area permitting the personnel to operate on the same surface. The floor will
slope toward a central drain and be surrounded by a curbing. This will comprise an enclosure
of sufficient size to completely contain the propellant in case of spillage, plus the water
deluge for dilution, and the chemicals for neutralization. This amounts to a minimum of
150 cubic feet, based upon the following possible usage:
a. Hydrazine - 7 cubic feet
b. Aerozene - 50 - 16 cubic feet
c. Nitrous Tetraoxide - 16 cubic feet.
The water deluge volume shall be at least 8 to 1, compared to the combined volume of
propellant's given above Drums of neutralizers will be stored on racks at the edge of the
area 30 as to be immediately available. These will be as follows:
a. Sodium Bicarbonate to neutralize the Hydrazine and/or Aerozene-50.
b. Anhydrous Ammonium Hydrozide to neutralize the nitrous tetraoxide.
The entire solution will be drained to holding dump tanks, where it will be checked for a
contamination level of not more than 1 part per million before being released to the drain
system.
A dressing room provided with suitable lockers will be available for changes into and out of
protective clothing, as the use of protective clothing is an absolute requirement in this area.
4.6.2 OTHER SAFETY FACILITIES
Facilities will be provided, in addition, to insure protection for personnel working in other
areas. These will include breathing apparatus for protection against ethylene oxide contamin-
ation ..._..,,_..... ...,,.,,._'-_..... .,,,.,'1".k^_,l_o_,,_u"*^-"'-A_Lander Capsule Package. BreaLhing apparatus and
protective clothing such as face shields, aprons, boats, and gloves will be provided in a
suitable working area for personnel working with Nickel or Silver Cadmium batteries, to
protect against electrolyte spillage and toxic fumes from the potassium hydroxide.
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5.0 PERSONNEL PLAN
5.1 ORGANIZATION AND TEAM CONCEPT
The Functional Skills Listing of Section 5.2 defines the skills robe supplied at the launch site.
The concept envisions a small permanent launch site crew headed by the Launch Project
Engineer and larger temporarily assigned teams for each S/C for the testing and process-
ing of the spacecraft vehicles. Each team has a leader responsible for a particular S/C.
The Team Leaders and Project Engineer report to the Assembly and Test Manager, who is
responsible for all GE activity at the launch site. All launch site activity and operations
are directed by JPL and GE is responsible for providing spacecraft technical and processing
support to JPL. The Launch Teams are comprised of the same people who did the factory
testing and they are transferred on a temporary basis to the launch site. The Team Leaders
and the Assembly & Test Manager are also the same people who performed in the same
capacities at the factory. The following considerations apply to the Launch Teams:
a. Teams are comprised of same people who did factory test.
b. Separate team for each S/C.
c. Team that accomplishes PTM test cycle at ETR to be utilized for flight S/C
processing, probably on flight S/C #1.
d. Total of four teams available at start of launch processing - a) PTM team,
b) S/C #1 team, c) S/C #2 team, and d) Back-up S/C team.
e. These teams are combined to form 2 or 3 teams during launch cycle (back-up
S/C might not need full time team) to provide ability to work extended hours or
multiple shifts if necessary.
f. The task of the Launch Teams is to accomplish the testing and processing of the
S/C at the launch site.
The Launch Project Engineers Team provides the permanent on-site liaison function prior
to and during S/C processing, both within GE and to other contractors on the program.
The following applies to the Launch Project Engineers Team:
a. Permanent personnel assigned to the launch site.
b. Personnel obtained from Voyager Project and from GE-SD's existing AFETR
Flight Test Operations which has participated in over one hundred launches
during seven years at ETR.
c. Responsible for liaison in the areas of facilities interface, associate and co-
contractors, and base support services and requirements.
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d. Provide the local Logistics and Spares, Stockroom and Accountability functions.
e. Provides major support for early site activation and OSE installation and checkout,
but with considerable technical assistance from the factory.
5.2 FUNCTIONAL SKILLS LISTING
Assembly & Test Manager
Typical Launch Team
a, Launch Team Leader
1. Telecomm. Engr.
Command Sys. Engr.
TLM Engr.
Tracking Sys. Engr.
.
Project Engineering Team
a. Launch Project Engineer
1. Project Control Status/
Sched. Integration
.
Guidance & Control Engr.
Attitude Control Engr. (Elec & Mech)
Power Sys. Engr.
1
Mechanical & Propulsion Engr.
Propellant Systems
Pyrotechnics
Mech. Systems
Mech. Handling
Systems Test Engr.
Computer Sys. Engr.
Central Recorder
Data Display
Quai. Assurance & llelia. Engr.
Inspectors
STC Engr.
LCE Engr.
Technicians
1 SCF Facility Engr.
Mech. Systems
Elect. Systems
. ESF Facility Engr.
Mech. Systems
Elect. Systems
4. Launch,Pad Engr.
LCE Engr.
1 Logistics & Spares
Accountability
Receiving
Stockroom
. Science Systems Engr.
Magnetometer System
TV Camera System
Etc.
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5.3 TRAINING PLAN AND REQUIREMENTS
Training of personnel will be necessary only relative to the minimum amount of new equip-
ment in their new environment. This equipment consists of the RF links between SCR, ESF,
Pad and DSN Station and the interfaces between the S/C test and processing equipment and
its services from the facilities in which it is installed. The Launch Project Engineer' s
Team will be trained in these areas prior to arrival of the S/C and will provide the knowledge
to the test and processing teams as necessary during the S/C processing. The S/C team
members will be the same people that accomplished the factory test and processing and will
require no additional training relative to the S/C and OSE for the launch cycle.
Training exercises for propellants and high pressure gases handling and loading at the ESF
will be held. These will check out personnel with the required procedures and equipments
at the actual site and with actual propellants, etc. Personnel will be "certified" after
training.
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6.0 LAUNCH SITE PTM PLAN
6.1 INTRODUCTION
After completion of the factory test cycle, the PTM is shipped to ETR to be processed
through the launch facility. The PTM is processed through the SCF, the ESF and the LC.
The facilities and procedures used are identical to those planned for the flight S/C.
The PTM is processed through the launch cycle to obtain early S/C processing experience
with the MOS, DSN, Cape DSIF Station, LOS, LC, LV, SCV, ESF and AFETR support
functions. The field processing trains a test team in the actual environment which will be
used to process flight S/C. The PTM processing is performed approximately one year
prior to launch of the first S/C and approximately six months prior to the start of normal
launch operations. This permits incorporation of design changes to the flight S/C, OSE
and procedures as may be required prior to shipment from the factory.
The following ground rules determine the nature of tests to be performed on the PTM.
a. The PTM is used to verify the interface with the LV, DSN, AFETR facilities and
contractor-designed OSE.
b. The Launch Operations Plan, Launch Test Procedures and Key Operating
Procedures used are identical to those planned for flight S/C processing.
c. Testing at AFETR is directed toward demonstrating early S/C compatibility
with the launch cycle. No simulated environmental tests are run.
d. Basic evaluation of overall S/C operability is by programmed "system test"
using the STC.
e u___._ .... 1_,. .... _,-..--o_,,- _,,a _ta onp.t_.nl_ .r_ mAint_in_.d in order to derive
the maximum benefit from the PTM cycle.
f. The time required to perform each task is carefully monitored in order to gain
confidence in the flight S/C Flow Chart and Schedule.
6.2 FLOW CHART
ao PTM Launch Operations and Tests Flow Chart is presented in Figure 6-1.
It illustrates the steps performed in processing the PTM through the SCF,
ESF, and LC. As seen on the Flow Chart, the flow is identical to flight S/C
processing, but the S/C only goes through the cycle once and is terminated
after return to the SCF and Final Flight Acceptance Test. Detailed descriptions
of the Flow Chart blocks are contained in section 2.7 and are not repeated here.
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6.3 SCHEDULE
The PTM Launch Operations and Tests Schedule is presented in Figure 6-2. The schedule
is based on a one team, 5 day, 40 hour _eek similar to the flight S/C schedule. The
detailed steps required to process the S/C are carefully documented with actual measure-
ments of the time required to perform each task in the field environment. The process
history of the PTM is then used to refine the schedule for the flight S/C.
6.4 BENEFITS OF PTM PROCESSING
a. The receiving inspection verifies the adequacy of the packing and shipping
techniques used to transport the S/C from the factory to AFETR.
b* The compatibility of the S/C and STC are demonstrated in the SCF environment.
Checks include physical access to equipment, EMI while testing, interface
connections to facility equipment, and efficiency of equipment locations.
c. The capsule is also demonstrated with its own OSE and while electrically and
mechanically mated to the S/C.
d. All field installed equipment such as pyrotechnics, are installed with specified
handling equipment in the actual field environment.
e.
f.
go
h.
i.
j.
The entire S/C, capsule, and science are operated with the DSN at the SCF
and LC to check data links and data rates under simulated use conditions. The
telemetry, tracking and command links used in all operating modes.
The ESF is used to perform Pressure Integrity Checks, propellant loading, and
guidance gas pressurizing in a safe manner.
Simulated pyrotechnics are installed and monitored to verify inadvertent
detonation does not occur through EMI, handling or normal launch test operations.
The overall S/C is mated to an encapsulated capsule, all flight hardware is
installed and the payload fairing is mated with the vapor barrier. Trans-
poration and mating to the LV is demonstrated while maintaining cleanliness and
environmental control.
The weight and lateral c.g. location is measured and alignments are performed
during final S/C assembly. All procedures and handling equipment are evaluated
during these tasks.
The mechanical and electrical interfaces with the LV are demonstrated during
PTM testing at the LC. Electrical umbilical functions and cooling environment
exercised using launch processing procedures.
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ko During electrical tests, the S/C is controlled and monitored by the LC. The STC
is used to evaluate normal operation with the S-band telemetry data and command
the S/C through normal S-band channels.
lo A combined systems test is performed _here all interfaces, RF interference
and EMI are evaluated in a countdown environment. Proper operation is demon-
strated with the gantry in place and also while it is removed. The DSN is used
to monitor and command the S/C.
mo The handling and calibrating equipment for the science instruments is demonstrated
in the field environment. Those items of the S/C which require precision checks
of calibrations, such as gyros, are also removed, calibrated and reinstalled at
this time.
n. The magnetic mapping facility and handling equipment is used to perform a
magnetic mapping on the PTM. The stability and accuracy of the field install-
ation is compared to earlier checks on the PTM.
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7.0 REQUIREMENTS FROM LOP
The purpose of the LOP as written herein is not only to describe the launch operation but
also to determine the requirements made necessary by the launch operation on the S/C
design and facilities and to schedule the launch operation related activities necessary prior
to S/C arrival at the launch site. The following requirements result from this effort.
7.1 DESIGN
The following are design requirements and restraints made necessary by the Launch
Operations Plan:
a. The capsule bio-barrier may not be violated after sterilization in ESF.
b. The propellant and guidance gas loading is performed in the Propellant Lab of
the ESF with the Fairing installed on the S/C. Access is from the bottom of the
S/C bus only.
c. No physical access to S/C is possible after vapor barrier and payload fairing
installation in the ESF (after propellant loading}.
d. The parasitic antenna in the fairing relays the RF Telemetry link from the S/C
to ground stations.
e. After fairing installation, commands are received by the S/C through umbilical
connections only. Parasitic antennas located in the umbilical tower and
umbilical connected hardlines are necessary
f. The overall S/C, including the propellants and guidance gasses, must be stable
on Pad for up to 10 weeks prior to launch. (45 to 60 day launch period plus 2 weeks
prior to period}.
go Only system loop checks are performed after the S/C leaves the ESF. The space-
craft to blockhouse functions are limited to the control and monitor circuits required
to verify the S/C is in flight configuration.
h. In the event of an abort which does not require access to the S/C, the capability to
launch in the window of the following day is required.
i. No access is permitted on the pad to arm the pyrotechnic circuits; therefore,
adequate safety provisions must be Included in the flight S/C design.
7.2 FACILITIES
The following facility inadequacies exist. Requirements for facilities are listed in
Section 4,
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a. ESF assembly area too small and doors are not big enough for S/C.
b. E SF propellant lab doors too small.
c. There is a requirement for a 4000 sq. ft. storage area in addition to the present
SCF and ESF areas.
7.3 SCHEDULE
Figure 7-1 shows anticipated completion dates for work relative to the Launch Operation
Plan. Starting with the LOP itself and including other planning that is necessary up to and
including processing of the flight S/C. This effort is in support of JPL and is carried out
with their cognizance.
aj Documentation Inputs - Detail planning in many areas must be done prior to S/C
arrival at this launch site to provide ETR and JPL with the necessary information
relative to range and base support, facilities and safety requirements. This planning
has already started with the LOP, which is updated at the program progresses, and
continues through submission of the information required in the documents specified
in the schedule.
b* Facility Modification and OSE Installation - Facility modifications are defined in
more detail and facility interfaces with OSE and this S/C investigation in detail
prior to initiation of modifications. As the roods are completed OSE installation
and checkout at the launch site begins. This total activity is integrated withJPL
and ETR prior to accomplishment.
Co PTM and Flight S/C Processing - This is in the schedule to show relationship of
other activities to this actual S/C processing at ETR. Details of S/C processing are
in Section 2.7 of the LOP.
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8.0 ALTERNATES
The following major alternates havebeen considered during f.hedevelopmentof the Launch'
Operation Plan and are included here for reference. Asthe planning for Voyager continues
it may be desirable or necessary to again consider these alternates.
8.1 PROPELLANT AND GAS LOADING AT PAD
This alternate is considered because of the following advantages:
a. Reduces S/C handling by eliminating demating to load propellants and gases two
weeks prior to launch.
b. Reduced safety hazard because S/C would not be handled loaded and would not be on
pad in a loaded condition for as long. (With early loading S/C is on pad loaded for
seven weeks).
c. Provide a way to unload propellants and gases on the pad should an abort occur.
d. Processing time would be reduced because of less handling.
Some disadvantages are also apparent and are as follows:
a. Modification of pad for installation of loading equipment would be necessary.
b. Longer line length for gases and propellants would make some additional OSE
necessary.
This alternate changes the Launch Operations Plan in the following ways:
a. Propellant and gas loading would be done during the week prior to launch instead of
2 to 7 weeks early
b. Time necessary for this operation would be reduced slightly
c. OSE would be installed at the launch pad rather than the ESF.
d. Handling of the S/C would be reduced.
8.2 SPLIT FAIRING
This advantage of a split fairing lies in the ability to assemble the fairing to the S/C with a
35-foot hook height. This eliminates the requirement for a 60 foot root hook height in the
ESF. The Launch Operations Flow Plan does not change if this alternate becomes an
actuality.
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8.3 COMBINE SCF AND ESF
This is included as an alternate because the requirement already exists for a much larger
ESF than the present facility and addition of the space necessary to perform SCF processing
in the ESF would be small in comparison to the total facility size. Following are the
advantages of combining those facilities:
a. Reduced handling and transporting of S/C with an attendant reduction in S/C
processing time.
Do Elimination of some of the OSE now required such as the LCE at the ESF and the
antenna at the SCF and the hardlines to the SCF and from the instrument lab to the
assembly building at the ESF.
c. The STC equipment would be used for all testing in this single facility.
The flow plan remains much the same except for elimination of the handling and shipping
now necessary between the SCF and ESF.
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i. 0 INTRODUCTION
1971 Space Flight Operations describe that phase of the Voyager mission which occurs
after the first spacecraft is injected into its heliocentric trajectory in transfer to Mars.
It follows the Launch-To-Injection phase which includes ascent and orbital parking.
To successfully establish and regulate SFO events, the DSN operations cannot occur as a
step function at injection. Continuity requirements dictate that these operations be-
gin prior to launch, as indicated in Figure 1-1, when personnel and equipment are in
place. These operations will include monitoring of ETR testing, rehearsals, provision
of command loading instructions prior to lift off, and complete coordination with Launch-
To-Injection activities. The actual start date and definition of these SFO related activities
would be in accord with the JPL mission planning. It is recommended that early system
operations exercises be included which would apply PTM #2 at the Goldstone DSIF.
LAUNCH INJ
PHASE 1-A PHASE I-B A PHASE 2 /_ A SFO PHASEA
I
PREPARATION ACTIVITIES RELATED ACTIA T.
AND OPS.
v
v
• APPLIC.
OF OPS.
EXP. TO
PRELIM.
DESIGN
PROCESS
(S/C AND MDE)
• EXAMINE
DESIGN
AGAINST
EXPECTED
OPS.
• DESIGN ACTIVITIES
OF TEST ACTIVITIES
• TRAINING ACTIVITIES
• PROCEDURE
DEVEL.
• DSN SYS.
INTEG. & VALID.
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
• APPLICATION OF
PERSONNEL AND
DSN FACILITIES
TO OPS.
v
Figure 1-1. SFO Implementation
Figure 1-1 also shows that SFO preparation activities have started at GE-SD in Phase 1-A.
The results of these operational considerations are reflected in the design selections and
their functional descriptions. By virtue of his intimate familiarity with the flight article
performance characteristics and analysis requirements, the S/C Contractor is equipped to
make unique contributions in specific areas of the SFO implementation. This plan delineates
the specific role of GE-SD beginning with the start of Phase 1-B. It is presented in two
major parts as follows:
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a. Plan For Implementation of SFO
Project Activities
Support Activities (planning and conduct of SFO)
Implementation Schedule
b. Operational Systems Task Descriptions
Mission Definition
Flight Analysis Requirements
MDE Requirements Definition
Reliability of Personnel Operations
Training Support
Operational Interface Test Requirements and Support
MOS Support
Mission Evaluation
i.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of the SFO implementation plan is to coordinate the spacecraft contractor's
activity in the implementation of Space Flight operations so that full systems capabilities
are exploited and compatibility exists throughout, aligned with:
a. Prime responsibilities in design, test and manufacture
b. The collateral responsibility to support JPL in the planning and conduct of SFO in
related areas.
i. 2 SCOPE
This plan includes only those aspects of SFO implementation which are related to spacecraft
contractor performance. The participation would be under the direction of JPL.
The scope of the activities planned would be reduced only by those products of the '69
implementation effort which could be directly translated.
3 of 78
VBI10VP007
2.0 PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SFO
2.1 PROJECT ACTIVITIES
The operational considerations of the DSN must be factored into the GE-SD design processes.
JPL personnel responsible for operations must be made aware of any spacecraft or MDE
features which would constrain ground operations. Such information can be communicated
in a timely fashion through the planned liaison channel shown in Figure 2-1. "Operational
Systems Engineering" is shown as a separate function to affirm that an active engineering
effort is planned at GE-SD to assure mutual considerations of SFO.
Although operational systems engineering is shown as a peripheral function in Figure 2-1,
the activity involved will be intimately involved with the other project activities as shown in
Figure 2-2. The engineering personnel will be a part of the systems engineering organ-
ization, but assigned specifically to operational engineering tasks. They will be exper-
ienced in space flight operations - capable of translating design into operations and oper-
ations into design requirements. A similar organizational arrangement was established
and used in Phase 1-A.
JPL I JPL
VOYAGER _I VOYAGER
PROJECT w[ OPERATIONSOFFICE PERSONNEL
o!rD
/
GE - SD |PVOYAGERPROJECTOFFICE
IGN
iT -
GE - SD 1PEO
OPERATIONAL
SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING
SUPPORT
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Figure 2-1. Liaison Channel for Operations Information
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2.2 SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF SFO)
Table 2-1 defines those activities planned for support of J'PL in the preparation and conduct
of space flight operations. Engineering definition, analyses and planning will be conducted
within the organization and liaison framework described in paragraph 2.1.
Table 2-2 describes the planned information exchange with J-PL to successfully implement
SFO. The documentation which GE-SD would provide would be related to the engineering
tasks as shown in Table 2-1. The only information which may not be apparent from its
nomenclature in Table 2-2 would be Item#l, "Operational Concept." This refers to a
series of ground rule statements of operating philosophy by JPL, such as DSIF station usage
criteria. The document nomenclature is intended to be descriptive of content and would be
brought into accord with J-PL established terminology.
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
Figure 2-3 presents the schedule planned for the GE-SD project support to JPL for SFO
implementation. The planned information exchange is also provided and related to the
supporting tasks.
This schedule is compatible with the project baseline schedule and is arranged to factor
the results of the'69 flight into the '71 SFO Implementation Plan.
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3.0 OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS TASK DESCRIPTIONS
The implementation of Space Flight Operations requires performance of the tasks called out
in Table 2-1. Considerations of the spacecraft contractor's prime and collateral responsi-
bilities (see Paragraph 1.1) were the basis for these task selections. Their technical des-
criptions follow.
3.1 MISSION DEFINITION
In Figure 2-2, it was shown that an operational systems engineering function was to provide
"mission operations description." This would be a pool of information, both developed and
obtained through liaison, to communicate operational information of mutual interest to JPL
and GE-SD. It will provide assistance to JPL in the development of the total Voyager mission
plan.
The basic flight mission is described in the Voyager Mission Specification and Guidelines
provided by JPL. This definition is a point of departure from which design and operational
requirements can be developed. Not only does detailed development of the diagram exhibit
greater mission definition but also provides an index and check list for relating operations
to design. This becomes the means for assuring that operational considerations are not
omitted.
The mission definition can be further detailed by separation into spacecraft system, ground
system and flight path. Early pursuit of this definition task will assure the impact of opera-
tions upon design.
Inputs to the Mission Spec. and AFETR requirements will be an output of this task.
3.1.1 SPACECRAFT SYSTEM DEFINITION
To increase its usefulness in analyzing operations, the spacecraft description can be pre-
sented with a unique operational "look." Such descriptions are command and data oriented
because they directly relate to the real interface with ground operations. This definition
will be developed and presented in the Spacecraft Performance Analysis Reference Manual.
Inputs to this manual will also be derived from the "Flight Analysis Requirements" task
described in Paragraph 3.2.
The manual will provide a consolidation of spacecraft operational descriptive information,
a basic textbook for the spacecraft and MDE orientation program (Paragraph 3.5) and a
valuable aid to SPAT analysis operations at the SFOF. It will provide the following infor-
mation:
a. Operational telemetry listing - providing a current list of operational modes of
telemetered functions.
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bo Total telemetry list - This complete list will separate the data requirements into
operational and diagnostic categories, identify link, frame and subframe assign-
ments. It will also include current calibration information.
Co Information flow and telemetry exposition diagrams - These diagrams are func-
tional schematics which illustrate pictorially for each subsystem or major sub-
system element information and/or sensory stimulation sources, signal character-
istics, switching logic, expected functional characteristics of telemetered functions,
performance requirements, related commands, and subsystem interfaces. The
description would exclude such things as detailed schematics and cabling descrip-
tions. Such a description is easier to understand when presented diagrammatically.
do Unique event sequences - A chronological sequence of unique events such as mid-
course correction, separation, capsule entry, descent and landing and spacecraft
orbit insertion with identifying telemetered characteristics so they may be moni-
tored for proper performance.
e. Command definition specification - Description of all commands and operational
sequences; the catalog used by the command program.
f. Hardware/software considerations and limitations - A list of operational limits
and restricted command combinations.
go Input/output specification - Input instructions for the operational computer programs
and descriptions of program output listings.
h. Expendables - Current expected expendable usage rates for the mission being
flown.
i. Contingencies - Description of sample failure modes, related telemetered functions
and their characteristics, ....... ,^,__1^ _.... +_..... _ recomm_n_,_ remedial _ation.
j. Data/information sources - Telemetry, command, flight path and orbit data
formats, aids to analysis, (nomographs, decision trees, etc.)
k. Organization definitions - Chain of command definition, decision routing,
technical and administrative interfaces.
There are "overlay" subsystems such as electrical power and thermal control which have
interfaces with all of the other subsystems and provide gross indications of S/C performance.
If data patterns, derived from ground test programs, permit operational interpretation they
will also be included in the manual.
This manual is intended to be a specific output of the Mission Definition Task (See Table
2-1).
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3. I.2 GROUND SYSTEM DEFINITION
As in the case of the spacecraft description, the ground system can be described from an
operational point of view avoiding the intricacies of hardware schematics, etc. The basic
operations are shown below:
>_
©
© DOWN
_ _ LINK
_ LINK
DATA DATA
RE C EIVING PROC ESSING
COMMAND VERIFICATION
(GROUND SYS)
COMMAND
TRANSMISSION
COMMAND
PREPARATION
PERFORMANCE
AND EXPERIMENT
DATA ANALYSIS
OPERATIONAL
DECISION
©
The operations described include people, activities, hardware and software. The description
must be spacecraft command/data oriented and, in addition, must consider flight evaluation.
This description will simplify the analysis of Voyager operations. As an example, consider
the analysis of video obtained in the Mars orbit. To be meaningful, the video data obtained
must be described in terms of Martian geography, sunlight obliquity, etc. An operational
description of this analytical process permits the development of requirements such as:
Related
Through
Clock
Time
Spacecraft ephimerides (Mars)
Sun angle
Spacecraft Pointing
Video Data
Iris settings
Other
- tracking data and predicts
- telemetry data (if sensed)
or computed
- telemetry data
- telemetry data
- telemetry data
Software requirements
Another example of a requirement which would "fall out" of an extensive ground system
definition is shown below:
RecLuirement - Provide dark/light (sun occultation) operational mode sensing and telemetry
data identifying every change of state with clock time of occurrence.
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Placed Upon - Flight Spacecraft - instrumentation and telemetry.
Imposed By - Ground processing and analysis
Rationale - In data analysis and performance assessment certain parameters must be inter-
preted in light of this operational mode. Examples: solar array bus voltage limit checks
and electrical power balance computations from telemetry data are sensitive to the dark/light
operational mode. In addition, sensing this mode permits a comparison with computed
occultation.
Having evolved such a spacecraft requirement from operational considerations, the cotmter-
part operations on the ground can be further defined.
Table 3-1 defines the activities of SFOF, DSN and ETR in response to the phases of the
mission. From this evolves the time line (dependent on the 1971 spacecraft design)re-
quirements and specifically the 1971 spacecraft design (dependent on some operational
requirements}.
Station selection in Table 3-1 was on the basis of capability and economy of usage. All
stations were designated for flyby and operational pass readiness tests. Station 71 at Cape
Kennedy alone has the capability to receive during launch mud injection. Depending on the
launch azimuth, Joburg, Madrid or Woomera will provide the two-way communication lock
with possible assistance from Ascension. Woomera is intended as the station for transmitting
back-up commands and first two-way communication lock. The advantages of using Goldstone
Mars for mid-course maneuvers are: SFOF control, SFOF computer capability and maximum
communication capability. The 85 foot antennas are specified for the spacecraft up and down
links for the cruise and orbiting phases; the 210 foot antennas are needed for communication
with the capsule and are assigned for all capsule communications.
With the present DSIF configuration and proposed additional capability (scheduled for com-
pletion by 1971} it will be possible to support multi-spacecraft operations simultaneously
with twenty-four hour coverage for each. This is of particular advantage to Voyager whose
mission requires dual spacecraft support.
The capabilities of the DSN are shown in Table 3-2 including augmentations proposed for
1970 to 1979. Present DSN ground communications are shown in Figure 3-1.
• SFOF Capabilities and Responsibilities
The functions of SFOF are divided into three categories:
a. Command and Control
Control is maintained by the Project Manager and Space Flight Operations
Director from the mission control room and operations area.
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b. Operations Functions
The support of operations functions consist of telemetry data processing,
communications, video processing and Deep Space Instrumentation Facility
control room.
c. Technical analysis areas are: Flight path analysis area, spacecraft performance
analysis area, space science analysis area, spacecraft television analysis area.
Launch Site & AFETR
Voyager will be launched from Cape Kennedy of the Air Force Eastern Test Range
(AFETR).
SCF - JPL Hangar "AO" - In the original Cape Installation. Area will serve as the
Spacecraft Checkout Facility. The all-clean high-bay area has 15 minute air change,
10-micron filtration airconditioning. It measures approximately 180 ft. x 47 ft. and
is served by two 10-ton bridge cranes with 45-ft. hook height. The air lock is
approximately 26 ft. x 32 ft. with a 10-ton, 45-ft. hook-height hoist and has doors
25 ft. wide by 40 ft. high.
There are four adjacent STC areas, each of which measures approximately 39 ft.
10 in. x 33 ft. 8 in. with a 15- ft. high ceiling. A partition between two of these can
be removed, providing up to 79 ft. x 33 ft. 8 in. for the STC, if needed. These rooms
have conventional airconditicaing, are well lighted, and supplied by ll0V, 1 _, and
220V, 3 _, 60-cycle power.
The SCF also contains:
a. An operations center and computer room, and has provisions for tying the STC
and S/C i_n_to the GCS so that ground testing at AFETR can be monitored at the
SFOF in Pasadena.
b. A shipping and receiving area and stockroom (for OSE, spares, etc. ) with
8 ft. 4 in.-wide and 8 ft. 6 in.-high doors.
c. Small mechanical and electrical labs, and a small mechanical shop.
d. Offices and office space with usual services, including furniture, commun-
ications, mail, reproduction, etc.
L/C - NASA-KSC Saturn 1 Pads 34 and 37B will serve the 1971 launch. These are
conventional launch complexes located on the original Air Force Cape, 3 to 4 miles
from the SCF. They are essentially alike except that Complex 37 has dual pads
served by a single gantry. The launch complex consists of the launch pad with its
supporting systems, transfer room, fixed umbilical tower, and movable service
gantry and the blockhouse. The pads wi;l be equipped to support the Saturn 1B-Cen-
taur, and the encapsulated Voyager payload. LCE power supplies will be installed in
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the transfer room in the base of the pad. The blockhouse is blast protected and
airconditioned. It contains the S/V launch monitor and control consoles, the NASA
test conductor, and launch personnel. S/C LCE launch consoles will be installed here.
They will control the S/C via hardwire and RF (via the STC). The L/C is tied by RF
link to the STC and operations center at the SCF. It is also tied into the GCS and
S/C performance during pad tests and countdown will be monitored at the SFOF.
DSIF - The present Spacecraft Monitor Station, DSIF 71, is housed in vans which
are parked on the Cape near the SCF. This station is tied into the GCS and enables
the MOS to monitor the S/C While it is at the Cape. It now has L-band telemetry
monitoring and tracking capability, but will be replaced by a station with S-band cap-
ability for Voyager. The new station will be able to track the S/C from liftoff to horizon.
Communication Operation
During launch DSIF 71 will begin receiving S/C telemetry about 4 minutes after lift-
off. Guidance will be provided by the ETR for Saturn via the X-band Mod HI Radio
Guidance System at Cape Kennedy and possibly San Sulvador Island. Range safety
is provided by the Mistram system at Patrick AFB and Eleuthera Island.
The Centaur vehicle carries a C-band beacon which is used for back-up tracking by
the FPQ-6 and TPQ-18 radars of the Eastern test range and possibly a range ship
with FPS-16 radar.
Tracking and telemetry information received at DSIF71 will be transmitted to SFOF
for evaluation and predictions for stations 41, 51, and 61. Depending on the launch
azimuth one or more of these stations will be able to provide a two-way communi-
cation lock with the ascending spacecraft.
ETR will continue tracking support until a DSIF station has two-way communication
lock. DSIF 41 (Woomera) appears to be the first station where spacecraft altitude
will allow back-up commands to be sent.
• DSN interfaces
Interfaces during liftoff, interplanetary cruise, capsule cruise, capsule landing and
spacecraft orbital insertion and operation are shown in Figure 3-2. Further de-
finition is tabulated in Table 3-3.
Two spacecraft will require two antennae when they are not within the beamwidth of
one antenna. This means that two complete DSIF systems at each longitude will be
supporting the Voyager mission simultaneously. Since Goldstone, Madrid and
Canberra will be equipped with an 85 ft. and 210 ft. antenna, they must be specified
for the Voyager mission. However, their duty cycle on the Voyager mission will be
approximately 8 hours per day with the remaining time allocated to other missions.
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@
DSIF support during cruise and mid-course maneuvers will consist of tracking,
telemetry and commands for MCM and cruise science.
The most critical phases of the mission---flight capsule separation, landing and
spacecraft orbital insertion---wiU involve the full capability of the DSN. Five
interfaces and seven links are exercised from the separation until two days after
the capsule lands. Two spacecraft and a capsule operating simultaneously com-
pounds the operational problem by adding three more interfaces and five more links.
Further integration and operational problems will be encountered if the DSN is
committed to additional space projects simultaneously.
The rehearsals and flybys discussed in Paragraph 3.5 are designed to be helpful in
these phases of the mission.
DSIF Mission Dependent Equipment
At the DSIF the telemetry subsystem is required to demodulate the PCM/PSK signal
from the DSIF receiver and to input the NRZ format binary data to the high speed
data modem for transmission to SFOF. Mission dependent equipment consists of the
demodulators (see Par. 3.3).
10
MARS F S/C
LEGEND
B - BOOSTER
F.S/C - FLIGHT S/C
F.C. - FLIGHT CAPSULE
C.E. - CRUISE ENVIRONMENT
DSIF - 71 - CAPE KENNEDY
51 - JOBURG
61 - MADRID
41 - WOOMERA
42 - CANBERRA
11 - GOLDSTONE PIONEER
12 - GOLDSTONE ECHO
13 - GOLDSTONE VENUS
14 - GOLDSTONE MARS
DSIF
EARTH
#2
½
INTERFACE ANTENNA
NO.
2 OMNI NO. 1 OR 2
4 MED-GAIN FIXED
7 RELAY (BOTH FC AND
FS/C)
8 HI-GAIN STEERABLE
9 FC EARTH OMNI
Figure 3-2. Voyager Interfaces
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• Preliminary DSIF Functional Block Diagram
Figure 3-3 depicts the preliminary DSIF functional block diagram incorporating the
Command Verification Equipment and MDE. The mission spec requires that the
spacecraft command equipment be compatable with the CVE. All other equipment
will be in existence as of 1969.
3.1.3 FLIGHT PATH DEFINITION
The flight path definition consists primarily of spacecraft and capsule position with time as
the common denominator. Flight path information which relates to specific operations pro-
vides the focal point for this definition. For example, the spacecraft - sun - earth angle is of
concern to operations because of the up-link blanking which can occur at low angles in the
Type I trajectory. This is of concern in maneuver planning, station scheduling and in many
other operational areas. On the other hand, the spacecraft-Mars-sun angle is of concern in
spacecraft electrical load scheduling and Mars sensor scheduling (as effected by the angle
from the terminator). The capsule - Mars center - earth angle is important from the stand-
point of capsule data storage and special ground data handling requirements caused by Earth
occultation. The fact that two flight spacecraft and two landers are involved in the 71 flight
further complicates the flight path definition.
Figure 3-4 provides an example of a brief SFO mission profile for a type I trajectory with no
flight contingencies. Such a profile is a basic tool for analyzing operations. For example,
a vertical line (fixed time) will test the "conservation of data bits" in the data system for
direct, record or playback operations. Flight contingencies can be factored into the basic
profile. Non contingency, worst case operations can also be evaluated starting with the basic
profiles.
The profile is stratified according to flight article and ground system operations to exhibit the
interrelated functions. To key the flight path position or orientation to the spacecraft and
gound system operations, interrelated functions must be identified. No particular advantage
is accrued from further complicating the profile since flight path definition requires detailed
expansion in all transient phases of the SFO mission. The profile is primarily a systems
overview and index to the mission.
3.1.4 SUMMARY
The basic mission definition expands naturally as detailed operational descriptions of the
spacecraft, ground system and flight path. It is intended to relate operations to spacecraft,
ground system and flight path. It is intended to relate operations to spacecraft and MDE
design - See Figure 3-5. Other things being established, time correlation of events becomes
a common denominator for determining feasibility of operations.
From these expanded definitions, requirements for analyses of operations are identified and
facilitated through consolidation of information. Results of these analysis can be factored
back into the definition. The elements of operations can then be fitted together into a well
planned flight program, and the design can implement the requirements for operations.
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It is important to note that the mission definition describes extremely useful software aids
to the MOS operating and analysis personnel as well as being invaluable for training activities.
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Figure 3-5. Mission Definition Process
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3.2 FLIGHT ANALYSISREQUIREMENTS
To assure a timely, accurate analyses of spacecraft performance throughout the Voyager
mission, extensive operational planningwill be necessary in the following areas:
a. Measurement Requiremen_
b. Information and data flow
c. Telemetry data conversion analysis and display
d. Spacecraft Performance Analysis Reference Manual (see Paragraph 3.1.1)
e. Scientific Data Packages
f. Post Flight Studies, Analyses and Reports (see Paragraph 3.8).
By correlation of the S/C and DSN functions with mission phases as shown in the Mission
profile Figure 3-4 it is possible to plan more thoroughly the analysis tasks involved, part-
icularly with regard to data/information priorities and timing. This task has been in
progress in Phase 1-A and is planned for continuance in SFO implementation.
3.2.1 MEASUREMENT REQUIREMENTS
Analysis requirements and procedures are defined early in a program to assure that the
resulting measurement system requirements are implemented in the spacecraft system
design. Measurement requirements are dictated by the various spacecraft subsystem and
scientific functions during each mission phase. It is necessary that the following character-
istics for each measurement be defined:
a. Sampling Characteristics - specify whether the function is to be monitored by
hardwire or telemetered by RF link.
b. Frequency response and/or sampling rate - Specify the maximum significant
frequency of data variation and/or minimum duration of data signals.
c. Measurement functional range - Specify the actual expected range of the data and
the range of significance.
d. Electrical characteristics - Specify the voltage level, frequency and output
impedance of the signal.
e. Physical location - Denote any special requirements for locating the sensors.
f. Accuracy - Realistic requirement on accuracy of data as received on the ground.
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g. Mission Phase requirements - Variations in any of the above requirements for
each mission phase to allow design of mode selection and command decision
capability.
Specific criteria upon which to base measurement selections are:
a. Factory, Field, Pad tests
1. Ability to isolate problem areas to modular level.
2. Accomplishment of complete system test on the pad without vehicle access.
b. Mission
1. Provide appropriate measurements to permit rapid determination of vehicle
and payload status for the conduct of normal or contingent missions.
c. Post Flight (and long-term analyses during flight)
1. Permit detailed assessment of vehicle and payload launch and mission
performance.
2. Allow comprehensive evaluation of scientific data.
3. Provide sufficient measurements to perform capability analysis of the
total system.
3.2.2 INFORMATION AND DATA FLOW
Information flow from the spacecraft through the various telecommunication stations to the
_'171"1"11_ _r411 1_,-, ,-_ _4_ _;.,..1_.I-'^_ .:_ .l-T,^ _1_-----:--_ .c ..... 1 J-;___ / ....... 1 i.; ........ • ...... _L
_& v.a. vvAJ.J. _ _ I,ILIL_.J_Ji. _UIIOIUGJLablUII 111 bll_ _lalllllll_ IU1 Lt:;_:LI bllII_:_/IIU_;L£- JL't:_LI I*llll_ D.IID.I_/_U_ D.L
the SFOF. The present DSN capabilities are covered in Section 3.1.2 of this report.
A data flow diagram is presented in Figure 3-6. This diagram is intended to show data
interfaces and handling, reduction, conversion, display and analyses requirements.
Data categories have been selected as a means of identifying type and complexity of data
functions throughout the data cycle. These are described below. The specific data category
for each mission phase/function are referenced in Table 3-4.
a. Category C - (Computer Analyses and Plots)
This category involves telemetry data channels which when analyzed separately
do not confirm a performance status within the spacecraft, but require an analysis
to combine the data with other telemetry data, perf. predictions or calculations of
theoretical parameters. Timing of analyses requirements relative to mission events
is the most significant basis for this data category (requiring computer analyses)
and it is considered unique to attitude control, articulation, and autopilot/propulsion
functions.
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions
LAUNCH VEHIC LE
Pre-launch Phase
Subsystem Function
E. C. Instrument unit contains GN 2 cooler/circulator
Shroud confines and directs GN 2 flow
R Parasite antenna (On 260" shroud) transmits.
Corn Umbilical connection
E. Po Umbilical connection to ground power
Launch Phase
E. C. Shroud protects S/C from airflow
Inst. Unit vents pressure as required
R Shroud parasitic antenna transmits; Centaur C-band
transponder. Transmit data from S/C vibration
sensors through L/V telemetry at high sampling rate
G&C Instrument Unit controls 1st Stage and S-IV-B Stage
Centaur inertial unit controls stage
Pyro 1st Stage separation
S-!V-B Stage ullage motor start
260" shroud separation
Separation
Centaur ullage motor start
Separation
Prop 1st Stage burn
Retro
S-IV-B Stage burn
Retro
Centaur 1st burn
2nd burn
Retro
C&S Initiate S/C separation
Telemetry Data
Categories
D
D
D,E
E
D
D
D
D,E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
E
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Telemetry Data Categories
C
D
E
Computer Analysis & Plot
Digital Conversion & Printout
Event & Command Verification
V Video
Tracking data acquired through E TR facilities
System is expended after Phase 2.
OVERALL FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Pre-launch Phase
Complete system checkout, propellant load, install capsule, mate to Centaur,
enshroud. Access limited to umbilical and RF link
Subsystem Function Telemetry Data
Categories
EP Condition ground power. D
DH&S, R Data format and transmit at low power via
shroud parasite antenna. Format includes
10 bps capsule data. Recorders ON
D,E
G&C Gyros ON
Launch
DH&S, R
EC
Data format and transmission, Mode II Format
includes 10 bps capsule data. Change to omni
antenna at shroud separation. V_ration Data
through L/V telemetry at high sampling rate
change to high power at Centaur sep.
Assume control at shroud separation. Maintain temp.
E
D
EP Condition internal battery power. D,E
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Subsystem
C&S
Pyro
sci
G&C
Sep. Timer
Sep. Connec-
tor
C omm
Acquisition Phase
Subsystem
G&C
EP
EC
C&S
DH&S, R
Function
Activate HP Centaur sep. Initiate antenna
change at shroud separation. Warm up G&C,
Initiate orientation. Canopus sensor, Backup,
Cruise Sci ON, Launch Sci OFF.
Separation and extension-explosive bolts, etc
Launch mode ON. Cruise Sci ON, (Launch Mode OFF)
after Sep.
Control boom extension, canopus sensor orientation,
etc.
Backup enable C&S. Initiate opening covers
extending booms & antenna
Arm pyro, enable C&S
Backup C&S, Timer, Connector
Perform orientation nameuver using inertial
reference. Acquire Sun and Canopus. Activate
attitude control; gyros off.
Switch to solar batteries cohen E S > E B. Charge
internal batteries. Condition power. 50_V to
capsule. 400 cy, 1 ¢_ OFF.
Maintain temperature
Initiate maneuver sequence after activating G&C
Data format and transmission. Include 10 bps
capsule eng. data. Transmit on omni antennas.
Recorders OFF.
Telemetry Data
Categories
E
E
D,E
D,E
E
E
(E)
C,D,E
D,E
D
E
C,D,E
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Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Subsystem
Sei
Com
Cruise Phase
Sci
C&S
Com
EP
EC
G&C
DH&S_ R
Function
Calibrate. Gather data and automate.
Be prepared to "fly by wire" if Canopus sensor
inop. Backup C&S
Gather data and automate
Provide commands as required. Calibration schedule,
Canopus sensor, high-gain antenna position update, high-
gain antenna activate
Receive commands, as, change battery charge rate
or bit rate. Backup C&S
Condition power. 50W to capsule. 400 cy, 1 d for
recorder as req.
Maintain temperature
Maintain attitude, antenna/sensor pointing, etc.
Data format and transmission, 100 bps normal
200 flare.
Store flare data in buffers for 200 bps transmission.
Include 10 bps capsule eng. data. Change bit rate
to high-gain antenna on command.
Midcourse Correction Phase
Subsystem
Com Start maneuver sequence. Instruct C&S.
Remove engine inhibit. Backup C&S
Telemetry Data
Categories
D,E
(E)
E
E
D,E
D
D,E
DJE
E
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Capsule Separation Phase
Subsystem Function
Corn Start capsule checkout and separation sequence.
Instruct C&S. Backup C&S.
C&S Store maneuver command and antenna position.
Gyros ON. Sci OFF. Initiate change antenna
position and change antenna. Change to inertial
reference and initiate maneuver. Initiate separation
bottle. Start Capsule C&S, VHF transmitter and
S/C VHF receiver. Gyros OFF, Sci ON
G&C Perform maneuver and acquisition on inertial
reference. Change antenna position as required.
Pyro Sterilization barrier open, jettison reminder of
barrier. Activate separation bottle.
EP Condition power, switch to and from internal
batteries as required, discontinue capsule power.
400 cy, 1 d for recorders as req.
Sci Off during maneuver
DH&S,R
EC
Data format and transmission: 4 BPS _'^_^ I on O_'T
Ant. ; 2000 BPS, Mode 4 and 100 BPS, Mode 2, on
high-gain ant. Change capsule engineering data input
from hardwire to VHF link on (separate) omni antenna.
Maintain temperature
Cruise Phase
Subsystem
Sci Gather data and automate
C&S Provide commands as required. Approach
guidance ON.
Telemetry Data
Categories
E
E
C,D,E
E
D,E
D,E
E
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Subsystem
C&S
G&C
Prop
Pyro
EP
Sci
DH&S, R
EC
Maneuver
Sequence:
Function
Store maneuver command and antenna positen.
Gyros ON, Sci OFF. Initiate change antenna
position and change operating antenna(s) as
required. Change to inertial reference and
initiate maneuver. On attitude verification,
sequence engine, initiate acquisition. Gyros OFF,
Sci ON.
On inertial reference, perform maneuver, act as
autopilot reference source during burn; perform
acquisition sequence. Change antenna position
as required.
Midcourse burn
Explosive valves
Condition power. Capsule power to internal during
maneuver. Switch to and from internal batteries as
required. 400 cy, i d for recorders as required.
OFF during maneuver
Data format and transmission, Mode I, 4 BPS, while
on OMNI antenna, Mode 4, 2000 BPS On high-gain
antenna to empty recorders. Change to and from
omni and highgain antenna as recurred.
Maintain temperature
Roll-to align pitch axis
Pitch-to align thrust axis (roll axis)
Roll-to align high-gain antenna.
Reverse sequence to return
Point high-gain antenna before starting maneuver and
return
Telemetry Data
Categories
E
C,D,E
D,E
E
D,E
C,D,E
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Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Cruise Phase
Subsystem
Com
EP
EC
G&C
DH&S, R
Function
Receive and relay commands. Backup C&S
Condition power, charge batteries. 400 cy as req.
Maintain temperature
Maintain attitude and change antenna/sensor
positions as required.
Data format and transmission. 10 bps from capsule.
Store or change bit rate as required.
Orbit In|ection Phase
Subsyste m
Corn
C&S
G&C
Prop
Pyro
EP
Sci
Start maneuver sequence. Instruct C&S. Remove
engine inhibit.
Store maneuver command and antenna position. Gyros
ON, Approach guidance & Sci OFF. Change operating
antenna. Initiate change and high-gain antenna position
as required. Chaage to inertial reference and initiate
maneuver. On attitude verification, sequence retro
engine. Initiate acquisition. Gyros OFF, Sci ON.
On inertial reference, perform maneuver; act as
autopilot reference source during burn, perform
acquisition sequence. Change antenna position as
required.
Retro burn. Y[idcourse engines control attitude.
Explosive valves
Condition power. Change to and from internal
batteries and 400 cy as required.
Off during maneuver
Telemetry Data
Categories
E
D,E
D
D,E
D,E
E
E
C,D,E
D,E
E
D,E
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Table 3-4. Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Orbit Injection Phase
Subsystem Function
EC Maintain temperature
DH&S,R Data format and transmission: Store 10 BPS
from capsule during maneuver; 2000 BPS Mode 4,
and 100 BPS, Mode 2, on high-gain antenna; 4 BPS,
Mode I, on OMNI antenna. At capsule impact, (or S-
band activate) cut VHF link; fill format with re-
dundant S/C engineering data. Change power and
antenna as required.
Orbit Operation Phase
Subsystem
Com Instruct C&S for orbital operation, orbit
change. Backup C&S
C&S Prepare planetary experiments. Activate planetary
sensor/package (control). Switch G&C to inertial
for sun/canopus occult or orbit change.
Pyro Explosive bolts, valves, etc.
G&C Maintain attitude in sensor/inertial control as
required for Occultation or orbit change maneuver.
Change antenna/sensor position as required. Con-
trol deploy instruments.
Sci Activate planetary package and automate data.
Off during orbit change.
DH&S,R Data format and transmission. Store video in 1st
recorder at 50K bps. Start 2nd when 1st full and
play back 1st at 8K bps rate. Playback 2nd. Store
non-video data during video transmission. Change
antenna, power, bit rate, and mode as required.
Prop Midcourse fire orbit change.
Telemetry Data
Categories
D,E
E
E
E
D,E,C
V,D,E
V,D,E,C
D,E
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Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Subsystem
EP
EC
FLIGHT CAPSULE
Pre-launch Phase
Subsystem
Complete system checkout.
EP
DH&S
Launch Phase
EP
DH&S
G&C
EC
Function
Condition power. Change to and from internal
batteries, charge batteries, 400 cy as required.
Control temperature
Function
Sterilization and mate to S/C.
Condition power for use.
Deliver 10 bps engineering data to S/C DH&S
by hardware.
Internal battery power
Deliver 10 bps engineering data to S/C DH&S
Capsule motion sensors on until after L/V Sep.
Assume control temperature after shroud
separation.
Acquisition Phase
EP
DH&S
EC
Cruise Phase
DH&S
EP
EC
Internal Battery Power
Deliver 10 bps engineering data to S/C DH&S
Control temperature
10 bps to S/C
Condition power
Maintain temperature
Telemetry Data
Categories
D,E
D
Telemetry Data
Categories
D
D,E
D
D,E
D
D
D
D,E
D
D,E
D
D
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Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
Midcourse Correction Phase
Subsystem
DH&S
EP
EC
Separation Phase
G&C
C&S
Prop
EP
EC
DH&S, R
Pyro
Deflection Phase
C&S
Prop
EP
Pyro
EC
DH&S, R
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Function
10 bps to S/C
Condition internal battery power
Maintain temperature
Extend VHF antenna. Separate from S/C
Run complete capsule engineering checkout.
VHF transmitter on. G&C on. Initiate
separation sequence on command. Switch
to internal power and disconnect from spacecraft.
Extend VHF antenna. Start VHF transmission
and fire spin motors after separation.
Spin motor fire.
Condition internal battery power
Maintain temperature
Shift to VHF from hardwire. 10 bps to S/C
Separation from Spacecraft.
Initiate retro fire and separation
Retro fire
Condition battery power
Separate expended retro
Maintain temperature
10 bps to S/C
Telemetry Data
Categories
D,i 
D
D
E
E
E
D
D
D,E
E
E
D,E
D
E
D
D,E
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Operational Description Flight System Functions (Cont'd)
D
Cruise Phase
Subsystem
EP
EC
DH&S
,Entry. Phase
EP
EC
C&S
DH&S
G&C
Pyro
Function
Condition battery power
Maintain temperature
10 bps to S/C
Condition battery power
Maintain temperature (if possible)
Initiate deployment of parachute
10 bps to S/C
Accelerometers/motion sensors on.
deployment of parachute.
Explosive bolts, parachute pack.
Landed Operations Phase
C&S
l_ro
EP
EC
Sci
DH&S, R
G&C
Control
Erect capsule. Separate parachute. Initiate
extension S-band antenna and activate system.
Initiate activation, exposure, extension science
sensors. Discontinue VHF.
Explosive bolts.
Condition battery power
Maintain temperature
Gather data and automate
Data format at low bit rate, transmission on
S-band. Discontinue VHF to S/C.
Control sensor extension, etc.
Telemetry Data
Categories
D
D
D,E
D
D
E
D,E
D,E
E
E
E
D
D
D,E
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b. Category D - (Digital Conversion and Printout)
This category constitutes individual telemetry data channels, the data from which, when
reducedand converted to engineering units, printed out and/or plotted, provide
for analyses of performance by comparison with other data/information without
automatedequipment. In most cases, manual plots of this data from digital
printouts can be maintained. This category will be primarily used to determine
health status andsteady state conditions of vehicle and capsule performance
parameters, for experimental data collection, and as a basis for manual pre-
dictions of status of consumables.
c. Category E - Event andCommandVerification (from telemetered data)
This category is limited to those telemetry functions which signify an on-off,
command or mode status of the various spacecraft systems. Because the
data reduction and display functions require monitoring of the functions for
change of state, this category of data can be handled, recorded and displayed
with more flexibility than other types of data.
d. Category V - (Scientific Video Data)
This constitutes video datafrom the scientific payload only. Because the data
transmission rate, display and analysis tasks involved are significantly different
from other data, they are categorized separately.
Measurement Requirements will define the data handling required within the space-
craft to assure data collection and telemetry transmission modes adequate for
analyses of spacecraft performance, scientific data collection and analyses, and
capsule data through the spacecraft hardwire and VHF interfaces.
Data flow from spacecraft to the DSIF stations is dictated by the various mission
phase requirements. These will result in use of various telemetry modes (or
formats), scheduling of real time or recorded (stored) data for playback and data
transmission rates. In general, all categories of data will be involved in all modes
of data collection except V (Video) data which will be collected only in a single
mode at high bit-transmission rate during selected mission phases (see Mission
Profile Figure 3-4 ). Category "C" data applies to various selected parameters
and will be treated as "D" data during all phases where "C" is not specified for
the given parameter.
Data flow within the DSIF's and between the DSIF's and SFOF will utilize the presently
planned capability for the Mission time period: It is expected that the primary flow
will involve demodulation at the DSIF and transmission to the SFOF via High Speed
data links or RF links for reduction and conversion. In addition, raw telemetry
signals will be recorded on magnetic tape and transported to the SFOF for analysis.
Video data may be restricted to this method of transmission, dependent on frequency
utilized.
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It is recommended that, for convenience, and in the interest of contingency
planning, certain events and performance data be selected for conversion and
display at the DSIF stations to supplement the regular data flow. The information
could be sent over the teletype network during periods of relative spacecraft
inactivity (interplanetary cruise, etc. ) or as backup for the High Speed lines in
emergency.
Data flown within the SFOF will be different for each category of data after initial
TLM processing. A computer program will be utilized to process C, D, and E
type data and display it in the format required for the given parameter. An inter-
face via computer disc storage data from the flight path determination programs
and orbit ephemerides (MARS) will be required for the processing and display
of C-type data.
3.2.3 TELEMETRY DATA CONVERSION ANALYSIS AND DISPLAY
The redundant system design and broad objectives of the Voyager Program are such that
early detection of spacecraft malfunctions or undesirable trends allow certain corrective
actions or decisions to be executed. Under these conditions, it is important that infor-
mation on the status and performance of the Voyager subsystems be kept current. A
computer program must be devised for use at the SFOF for processing and display of this
information. The program will have the following requirements:
a. Convert all spacecraft data received from the SFOF Telemetry Processing Station
(or High Speed line) into appropriate Engineering Units. This requires the storage
of calibration curves for each parameter within the computer. Science Payload
data and Capsule data should be concurrently reduced within the same programs
(while capsule data is interfaced through the spacecraft. )
b. Print out the results in formats specifically useful to the various analysis teams.
--" " rlm_'l-,.l_ 0 I_rrm basic formats can be ue,meu-' as showm m _,_ l.jl _ l.ji.
C. Compute parameters necessary for adequate analyses from telemetry data in
conjunction with flight path and orbital parameters (Category "C" data). This
requirement will most likely involve attitude (during selected phases) control,
articulation and autopilot/propulsion data.
d. Provide automated plots of selected "C" data upon request. (Under conditions
of high priority or urgency).
e. Maintain and printout a time correlation between spacecraft command and event
execution, up-link and down-link times for all data.
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Table 3-5. Reduced Telemetry Data Format Requirements for Analysis
and Display
Analysis Area Data Requirements Data Category
SSAA 1) SCIENCE DATA D, E
(S/C AND CAPSULE)
2} SPACECRAFT DATA C, D, E
(SELECTED)
3) VIDEO V
SPAA-S/C i) G & C DATA
2) COMMAND/CONTROL
3) ENV. CONTROL
4) ELECTRICAL POWER
C,D,E
E
D
D,E
SPAA-CAPSULE i) CAPSULE DATA
2) SPACECRAFT DATA
(SELECTED)
f, Provide a "flagging" capability to indicate undesirable performance conditions,
i.e., parameters which approach or fall outside of preestablished limits by a
selected margin. Printout of the condition should be in a manner providing
ease in detection.
go This program should be designed so that simulated data could be entered on cards
or tape for rehearsal and training purposes. An auxiliary simulation program
should be used in conjunction with this program to predict data which changes
with time and to generate the required values at the selected sampling times
after initial values have been given, or changed by decision commitments,
during the rehearsals.
Prediction computations as a general rule are not worth the time and computer
expense to develop. One basic reason for this situation is that the engineering
analysis personnel will have a pretty good backlog of all pre-flight prediction
curves and during cruise phase, time to update any curves that might require such
an action. However, capability to measure deviations and data trends from a
previous reading or selected blocks of time could be of considerable value; i.e.,
during ascent mode and early injection phase, the memory might hold data from
read-in samples which occurred at two and four minutes previous to the current
sample. During later injection and cruise phase the relative span might be
changed to hours or days, until reaching near encounter phase at which time the
reference interval might be shortened again.
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Figure 3-7. Station View Time Variation with Latitude
Consider the analysis of a situation where several flight articles must be accommodated
simultaneously in the Voyager ' 71 mission.
• Situation:
Flight S/C #1 - in orbit in view of DSIF #n
Flight Capsule #1 - life spent
Flight S/C #2 - in orbit in view of DSIF #n
Flight Capsule #2 - landed, operating and in view of DSIF #n
Interplanetary scientific probe from separate program - in view of DSIF #n
3 May 1971 Launch (#1 S/C) - Type I Trajectory (142 days travel time,
1 Nov. arrival)
Launch (#2 S/C) - (arrival > 10 days after #1)
Capsule #2 has been operating for one day.
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It may be necessary (or perhaps expedient) to incorporate into these programs
predictions of the performance of the system functions as a standard by _¢hich
to measure actual performance. This could enable a near real-time capability
for decision making affecting command software generation, particularly under
emergency modes of operation.
3.2.4 SCIENTIFIC DATA PACKAGES
Scientific data packages, for use by the scientific community, would make available all of
the information required to fully evaluate the scientific data gathered during the mission
on a per experiment basis. A data package would only contain information pertinent to a
specific experiment with the normal extraneous data eliminated. The data packages would
contain (at the discretion of the scientific community} such things as:
a. Processed and annotated raw telemetered scientific data.
b. Processed and interpreted spacecraft performance status information related
to the period over which scientific data pertains, as well as to the experiment
itself (i. e., attitude relative to velocity vector or inertial reference}.
c. Interpreted trajectory/orbit parametric information such as position, velocity
altitude, etc.
d. Supporting video information.
3.2.5 ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS
As described in Paragraph 3.1.3, the mission definition can be further detailed by expansion
in specific areas of the mission profile (Figure 3-4}. Such an expansion is a form of the
analysis required to derive operational requirements and assess their implications.
3.2.5.1 DESCRIPTIVE EXAMPLES
Several examples are provided as follows:
a. Consider Figure 3-7 which describes the view times of the 3 principal DSIF stations
during transfer to Mars for a May 3, launch. The southern position of the sub
spacecraft point gives the Canberra station a greater daily view time. During the
early trajectory phase there are times each day when the S/C is out of view of
any of these 3 stations. Even with the use of other DSIF stations such as Joburg
there will be station coverage gaps (cannot be seen in this figure} in the early
trajectory phase. Operationally, these would be significant during critical phases
such as correction maneuvers. More important, however, is the fact that
station coverage with the 210' dishes is continuous during orbital operations.
The DSN does not, therefore, impose an acquisition constraint in this area.
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• Task:
Examine this hypothesizedcondition to determine the operational implications.
• Situation Parameters
Assume that capsule #2 has been operating for one day on 12 Nov 1971. The
approximate geometry is shown in Figure 3-8. From Figure No. 25 of JPL
Technical Memorandum #33-83 the approximate station coverages (8 ° above
horizon-masked) for the three stations with 210' dishes are as shown in
Figure 3-9. At this time, the Mars footprint on earth is in the vicinity of
10 ° South latitude. Since the Mars-Earth-Sun angle is about 105 °, Mars
is projected on earth at a local time of around 1900 hours. On the other
hand, the earth projection on Mars (at approximately 22 ° South latitude -
Figure 67, AVCO RAD-TR-63-34) is toward its morning terminator and
would intersect the capsule meridian at approximately 0900 hours LOCAL
MARS TIME. Assuming Capsule #2 at 20°N. Mars latitude, it would be in
communication ,¢ith earth for approximately 9 hours daily (Figure 70, AVCO
RAD-TR-63-34). This would cover the hours of 0430 to 1330 Mars time for
capsule communication and 1430 to 2330 earth time.
Spacccrafts #! and #2 will be in nearly (40 min. daily earth occultation)
constant view of the earth and sun at the time of this situation.
Assume the "other" scientific probe in continuous view by the DSN during
the situation.
N
EARTH _':_
/  ,ARS
( o _ _
(AUTUMNAL EQUINOX)
SUN
Figure 3-8. Approximate Geometry 13 Nov. 1971
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TIME L.. 4H4M ___
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7H28M 4HI2M 3HI2M L IH28M_,_ 3H32M ..j
MARS TRACK ON EARTH, 15°/HR
Figure 3-9. Approximate DSIF Station Location and Coverage
The 210' dishes continuously view Mars and are required for capsule communic-
ations.
Assuming that Capsule #2 is near the center of the Goldstone field of view upon
impact and near the center of its time-in-view period, the situation could occur
as shown:
iI Capsule #2 comes in view of DSN Goldstone at 2200 (Z) hours on
12 Nov. 1971 and Madrid-Madrid would contact slightly prior to
Goldstone.
2. Capsule #2 passes from DSN (Goldstone and Canberra) view at 0700 (Z)
hours on 13 Nov. 1971.
• Discussion
During this situation,the Goldstone 210' dish can accommodate Capsule #2
and S/C #2 (commands sent sequentially). The Goldstone 85' dish can accommo-
date S/C #1 and the "other" probe. This seemingly "worst case" situation (no
contingencies) does not appear to present an operational problem. In addition.
Canberra, Woomera, Madrid and Joburg could provide backup due to their over-
lapping fields of view during this situation. Thus, alternating data receipt and
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assigning priorities are not necessary. The collected data would have to be
scheduled for delivery to the SFOF and analyses would have to be scheduled,
but no abnormal operational implications are apparent.
Orbit: Arrival of S/C #1, Nov. 1; period 19.3 hr; 3,000 x 25,000 kin; 40 °
inclination
Occultations will demand special scheduling for power and telemetry purposes.
Their relation to the terminators will be especially important to the t-v mapping
operation. Short Earth occultations occur during the first forty to fifty days
of orbit, and long periods beginning at about 160 days. Due to the Earth-Sun
angle, it is unlikely for both earth and sun occultations to occur at once during thc
first 180 days. (See Figure 3-10)
For example, at 180 days, the periapsis lies at -11 ° Lat, 20 ° Long. before
local noon. This will give an altitude of 4200 km over the morning terminator,
at -36 ° Lat, thus providing good video. Afternoon terminator passage occurs
at an altitude of 12,400 km, at + 36 ° Lab., in the descending mode. Earth
occultation occurs soon after apoapsis, in the descending mode. The solar
occultation occurs later in _e descending mode.
140
120
i00
rj
r,.)
©
N 8o
o
_ 6o
N
40
2O
D
EART_I
I
2O 4O
SUN
I I I I I I
60 80 i00 120 140 160
DAYS IN MARS ORBIT
_ARTH
1S0
Figure 3-10. Occultations
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The scheduling for each orbit is different. Transmission at 8K bps is planned for
the whole orbit time not in occultation. Video is recorded near periapsis, then
played back for the remainder of the orbit that solar power and Earth line-of-
sight are available. During the first minutes of a new input, the last of the
previous periapsis' video will be transmitted.
The commands placed in storage for operating the scan package and telemetry
will be different for each orbit; a short burst can take place between Earth and
Solar occultations. The operating schedule of DSIF will vary accordingly; Non-
transmission time can be used to support other missions, etc.
de The Mars orbital mission profile will extend the basic Voyager mission profile of
events versus flight path position and time to the conclusion of mission operations.
Since the operational considerations and objectives during planetary injection and
orbit are considerably different than during launch or in-transit phases, the
analysis is appropriately divided into two discrete sections.
A number of constraints are imposed upon the Spacecraft during its Planetary
orbital injection. A careful analysis of the orbital mission profile will certify
that these constraints are being met or not met as the case may be. Depending
on the priority of the mission objectives, the Flight Situation may call for an
orbit adjustment to optimize spacecraft position and time for the performance of
Scientific experiments, or to insure that the scientific or engineering data will be
obtainable when needed. An illustrative example of the trade-offs involved during
an operation of this type is given in the following exhibit which discusses the
Operational Considerations for Martian Surface optical/scancoverage:
Exhibit-Operational Considerations for Martian Surface Optical/Scan Coverage
1. Basic Assumptions
(a) It is assumed for the sake of this discussion that the initial orbital
parameters for a Mars injection have been selected with the view
toward minimizing occultations, providing a long orbital lifetime- 50
years minimum, conserving the injection energy required, and ob-
taining an inclination that will allow the spacecraft to be seen from
earth at any point during its orbit around the planet Mars and yet
high enough to provide ground traces of the planet over the midband
areas of interest during the entire mission.
NOTE: These orbit parameters were used for the sample analysis
prior to the selection of the particular orbit discussed elsewhere.
The following is a sample of initial planetary orbit parameters for Mars '71 Mission.
Perigee Height 3,000 Km.
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Apogee Height
Inclination
Eccentricity
Argument Perigee
Latitude Perigee
Longitude Perigee
Longitude Ascending Node
Semimajor Axis
Orbital Period
Perigee Progression Rate
Nodal Regression Rate
Injection Orientation
Injection Time:
20,000 Km.
60 deg.
0.571
60.94 dog.
-49.20 deg
40.35 deg.
82.34 deg.
14,730 nm.
915.45 min.
2.35 x 10 -7 deg/sec.
9.39 x 10 -7 deg/sec.
Southern Hemisphere and
going from South to North.
Such that high noon occurs
over the mid zone of interest
on the first north to south pass.
(b) It is also assumed that typical scientific instruments such as a TV
camera or IR Vidicon might be employed with its optical axis pointing
normal to the planet surface at all points and with a maximum field
view of 5 degrees.
(c) It is assumed that the key Martian surface area of interest is con-
tained within a circumferential band on the planet's surface ranging
from 10 degrees north latitude to 40 degrees south latitude. No re-
striction was made in this sample analysis as to high noon or post
terminator operations. It was assumed that scanning might occur over
the entire useful daylight cycle, i.e. about 15 degrees after the
morning terminator and 15 degrees prior to the evening terminator.
(d) The apogee height is such that experiments may be devised successfully
which relate to the Martian Satellites Phobos and possibly Deimos.
2. Ana_sis
(a) An initial computer run was made with the above parameters as an
input to obtain the optical swath paths generated within the band of
interest. A few typical swath paths are shown in Figure 3-11 and
Figure 3-12. Figure 3-13 shows altitude change versus time during
the orbit period. A few interesting conclusions are at once evident
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Figure 3-13• Orbiting Space Craft Altitude for Voyager Optical
Scan Operations
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from inspection of these curves. A negative gradient is seen in the
vehicle ground trace. As the vehicle approaches the planet, its rela-
tive velocity increases and the ground trace goes through a transition
phase in which the gradient becomes increasingly positive.
(1) There are two distinct types of swath paths resulting from the
proposed injection parameters.
[alType 1 is defined as a North to South pass which crosses the
zone of interest at a relatively low speed and at a considerably
high altitude, i.e. the mean velocity is 0.22 miles/sec, and the
entering altitude is around 6800 nautical miles. The change
in altitude and flight path direction during the traverse is
fairly large dropping to about 2700 nautical miles at the
southern exit boundary. The complete traverse requires
about 120 minutes. This type of traverse is depicted in
Figure 3-11.
Type 2 is defined as a South to North pass which crosses the
zone of interest at a relatively high speed and a relatively
low altitude, i.e. the mean velocity is 1.3 miles/sec with an
entering altitude of around 2600 nautical miles. The change
in altitude is relatively small, and changes in the flight path
direction are negligible. The exit altitude is normally about
3000 nautical miles at the northern boundary. The complete
traverse requires about 20 to 25 minutes. This type of
traverse is depicted in Figure 3-12.
(2) Each Type 1 swath path shows a negative then a change to positive
curvature near the 40 degree south latitude boundary. This is
primarily due to a combination of the prograde injection and the
relatively high eccentricity, i.e. when the spacecraft is leaving
the apogee end of the orbit its ground trace is moving slower
planets rotation, hence refer to paragraph [b].eastward then the
(3) All passes show a wider swath at the northern boundary, then
at the southern boundary. This is due to the initial injection
parameter which places perigee at a 50 degree south latitude,
just below the southern boundary.
(4) An operational decision might be made at this point to adjust the
orbit by moving perigee up to within the lower one third of the
target zone to enable higher resolution TV. Due to the long or-
bital life requirement, the orbital period can not be changed
significantly. This means that a uniform swath coverage, which
is a function of both orbital period and planet rotational period,
will be difficult to obta_m without sacrificing orbit lifetime or
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experiencing degradation in resolution. To handle these com-
putations, it may be expedient to utilize an operational computer
program at the SFOF, in conjunction with the command generation
software, to compute the desired mapping configuration, orbital
change or associated engine burn parameters to compensate for
bad injections and allow for additional operational constraints, and
to serve a training and planning function within the MOS.
(5) If a decision is made to fly with the initial orbit as described, the
following observations are pertinent. Each Type 1 swath is about
16.4 degrees wide at the northern boundary. A Type 2 swath is
only 9 degrees wide at the northern boundary. Adjacent mapping
swaths for Type 1 are obtained every eighth orbit. However, it
should be noted that these adjacent swaths leave uncovered gaps.
These gaps can be filled in by using data from South to North
passes, or by operating for a longer number of revolutions. This
analysis assumes that the TV scanning can be accomplished during
all the useful daylight hours while the spacecraft is moving in
either a north to south or a south to north direction over the tar-
get zone. At the southern extremity, the Type 1 and Type 2
swath are about 7 1/2 degrees wide, however the effective cover-
age is about 5 1/2 degrees per swath which means that 66 passes
or a 40 day operational period would be necessary to obtain a 100
percent coverage of the target zone for either type swath. In the
case of the Type 1 swath, a considerable amount of redundant
coverage, up to 250 percent would be obtained under these con-
ditions.
(6) This type of mapping operation could be repeated about 4 1/2
times during the 6 months of planned orbit operations, thus
allowing excellent opportunities to obtain data on the postulated
Mars surface seasonal changes.
3.2.5.2 GENERAL TASK DISCUSSION
The preceding examples were provided to illustrate the type of analyses planned to determine
the requirements and assess the implications of operations. For these illustrative purposes,
approximations only were used. It is planned that all areas of operations affecting S/C
performance will be investigated. For instance, would the moons, Phobos and Deimos,
of Mars affect communications with Earth at critical times? If investigations prove a
consideration to be trivial, attention would be concentrated in other areas.
During SFO implementation, the support provided in this area would comprise detailed
studies employing computer programs and analyses as required to derive accurate useful
results.
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3.3 MDE REQUIREMENTSDEFINITION
OSEas applied to SpaceFlight Operations (SFO) is referred to as Mission Dependent Equip-
ment (MDE). It includes the hardware and computer programs which must be added to the
Deep Space Network facilities to satisfy the unique Voyager operations requirements.
Based upon the planned DSN facilities and the spacecraft analysis necessary, the MDE re-
quirements are identified and presented. Many areas of analysis are not planned for auto-
mation because reaction time requirements do not provide the justification. The MDE
described must accommodate the dual-spacecraft mission.
Basically, no difference between the Spacecraft Contractor MDE identified here and that for
the Voyager '69 Flight is envisioned. * This is why the schedule (Figure 2-3) plans its
availability prior to that time. The total MDE requirements will be greater for the '71
flight because of the programs necessary for experiment payload and capsule data handling.
A requirement exists that all MDE be included in the STC. This is interpreted as hardware
only. The computer programs would be tested within the DSN on the appropriate processing
equipment.
3.3.1 HARDWARE DEFINITION
The hardware required consists of equipment to demodulate and decode telemetry data at
the SFOF and DSIF stations. It may become desirable for support to be provided to JPL
in defining SPAA displays or consoles. The need for MDE in these areas is not apparent
at this time.
3.3.2 OPERATIONAL COMPUTER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
The flight analysis requirements (Par. 3.2) will require several operational computer pro-
grams. These programs are summarized in Table 3-6. The programs described are
operational only and do not include
1) Data reduction programs for post flight analysis.
2) Simulation programs for systems exercises or rehearsals, S FOF personnel
training or stations pre-pass readiness checkout.
GE-SD plans to provide the design and acceptance specification for these programs as well
as the necessary information such as calibration data while JPL would accomplish the
programming.
3.3.3 MDE APPLICATION IN THE DSN
The composite applications and interfaces of the MDE in the DSN can be seen in the ground
system diagram shown in Figure 3-14.
*The '71 must be of sufficient quantity to support the final S/C mission. The _69 MDE
must include, in addition, that necessary for the VHF uplink (capsule simulation).
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3.4 RELIABILITY OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS
The successful accomplishment of Voyager 1969, 1971, and later missions is related to
vehicle performance of a long sequence of events. A significant factor affecting that vehicle
performance is the reliability of ground monitoring and control operations executed through
the Mission Operations System.
Ground operations reliability may be considered as being comprised of two categories ---
equipment reliability and personnel reliability. With respect to the former, mission-independ-
ent equipment used in the Deep Space Network (DSN) will have been in place and operating
prior to its use for Voyager; therefore, it will be of known reliability. With respect to
project-peculiar hardware and software, on the other hand, reliability measurement must be
based on information from the Systems Test Complex and similar sources.
A certain threat of unreliability is posed by the fact that the Voyager vehicle, being different
from any previously covered by the DSN, will impose new demands and unfamiliar require-
ments on ground personnel. As a step toward insurance of Voyager mission reliability, it
will first be necessary to subject contemplated tasks of ground personnel to a close examination
for purposes of applying techniques of reliability determination and enhancement described
subsequently.
In the past, most human factors evaluations have been performed on a qualitative level (i. e.,
one aspect is '_etter" or "v_rse" than another), recent studies have resulted in the develop-
ment of techniques for quantifying human performance in terms of probability. Quantitative
answers are thus furnished to the following questions:
1) What is the probability that a man will complete a given task without error ?
2) What is the probability that a man will discover and correct his error(s} before
completion of the task ?
3) What is the probability that uncorrected errors will result in mission degradation
or failure ?
3.4.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
A General Electric Spacecraft Department published document bearing the title "The
Quantification of Human Reliability" (TIS NO. 65SD216) treats the DATA STORE and THERP
techniques in detail. A brief summary of their salient features is presented here:
a. DATA STORE is an index of electronic equipment operability developed at the
American Institute for Research. It contains quanitative data concerning time
and reliability with respect to the performance of various human tasks. Individual
tasks are broken down to represent small segments of behavior that lend them-
selves to general application in a multitude of situations . So represented are such
segments of behavior as reading a circular scale, reading a label, connecting a
cable, turning a crank, positioning an object and others. For purposes of quicker
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b.
evaluation, tasks are classified under three categories: input or sensing tasks,
mediating or deciding tasks, and output or control tasks.
Values used in DATA STORE were accumulated as the result of the research of a
large number of comprehensive human engineering studies and refined in accord-
ance with operational experience in the field. The tasks listed are so elemental
as to permit combinations and groupings to represent almost any wark to be
evaluated. This is reminiscent of certain methods engineering techniques de-
veloped by the renowned Gilbreths, whereby all work was viewed as constituted by
a number of basic elements called "therbligs".
Reliability scores obtained by use of DATA STORE are the products of the individual
values estimated and assigned. A basic assumption is that each task is independent
of any other. Analysis pinpoints problem areas, inasmuch as each elemental and
component task value is known as well as the gross score. Elements contributing
to unreliability are apparent and subject to corrective measures. Upon proposal of
corrective action, further analysis may be performed to determine the alteration
in task reliability to be expected from the change.
THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction) has been in use by the
Reliability Department at Sandia Corporation since 1961. It is a method of
providing quantitative predictions of degradation to a man/machine system re-
sulting from human errors. Its application involves these steps:
• Definition of the system or subsystem failure to be evaluated.
Identification of all important human operations performed and their
relationships to system tasks and functions.
• Prediction of error rates for each human operation.
• Determination of the effects of human errors on the system.
Recommendation of changes necessary to reduce the system or subsystem
failure rate (based on estimated effects of such changes).
A model of THERP is a logic box diagram of paths to system success. Human
errors require shifts to alternate paths; that is, given a human error, some
additional action(s) will be necessary to correct the error if a successful mission
is to be achieved. Each branch of the logic box is assigned a probability of success-
ful completion, with assigned values taking into account problems of dependence
versus independence of events, the effects of stress, climate and motivation, and the
impacts of other variables known to affect human performance and decision making.
The model can be expanded to include equipment reliability predictions for purposes
of facilitating tradeoffs between manual and automatic modes of operation. Thus
it can prove a valuable tool for functions allocation early in the development of a
system.
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3.4.2 GENERAL APPLICATION THEORY
Personnel operations reliability values resulting from DATA STORE and THERP analyses
may be combined with existing data concerning equipment or materials inherent reliability,
such as might be based on adequate populations of test results and/or early flight experience.
Inherent reliability is essentially a definitive function that varies with the expected duration
of a mission; it can range from zero to plus one. The combination will provide estimates
of system reliability that are accurate for first flights as well as for later flights, which is
less feasible whenonly inherent reliability data are used in the estimating process.
If reliability predictions are sufficiently low to be unacceptable, the analysis will identify
the areas with lowest human reliability, so that corrective attention may be focused there-
on. After tentative corrective approaches have been worked out, the evaluation cycle may
be repeated for each, in which manner the increase in reliability to be expected from any
change may be approximately determined. Tradeoffs are made with some assurance of
ac curacy.
3.4.3 THE QUANTIFICATION PROGRAM FOR VOYAGER
Human reliability quantification, plus related analyses and corrective action are elements of
the program planned for Voyager by the General Electric Company. DATA STORE, THERP
and others such techniques will be applied during the course of the program. Important
steps to be taken are these:
a. Generation of a detailed flow plan of system activities, from launch to end of
mission.
b. Identification of tasks to be performed by humans.
c. Ordering of tasks from most difficult to easiest.
d. Selection of the most difficult task for evaluation, followed by performance of
a task analysis.
e. Quantification of the probability of elemental task performance without error,
followed by combination of elemental values for determining the probability of
gross task performance without error.
f. Quantitative evaluation of the effects of human errors on mission performance.
g. Identification of low reliability areas and recommendation of corrective measures
for enhancement of human reliability.
h. Review and decision making concerning action to be taken.
i. Selection of the next most difficult task for analysis.
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During the earlier stages of vehicle design, the execution of the program will entail close
relationship of human factors analysts and design engineers, since the design of the system
will not have been completed. This relationship tends to result in clarification of problem
situations which might otherwise remain undetected until the conduct of vehicle tests late
in the program.
3.4.4 ME THODS FOR IMPROVING HUMAN RE LIABILITY
When an area of low reliability is identified, there will be three basic approaches available
for effecting an improvement: 1) change hardware; 2} change operating procedures; 3)
institute training. The first approach is generally the most efficient, since by this method
the human reliability problem may be cleanly eliminated. The second and third approaches
accept the problem and attempt to work around it.
For the Voyager program, changes to DSN hardware will probably not prove justifiable,
since the DSN is designed to handle more than one type of vehicle; however, changes may
be decreed for project-peculiar ground system hardware, software and even the Voyager
vehicle itself (to improve its compatibility with the DSN).
To the extent that problems are precluded by vehicle design, the DSN effort may be relieved;
however, since vehicle designers have many other problems placing constraints on their de-
signs, it is a safe assumption that ground system procedures will require changes. In
order to insure efficient performance of new and changed procedures, then, it will be necessary
to indoctrinate responsible personnel (see Paragraph 3.5).
3.4.5 CONCLUDING EXAMPLE
In summary, a plan has been presented for development and implementation of a program for
optimization of performance of the human element of the operational Voyager complex. Sal-
ient features of the program include: 1} development of a detailed description of human tasks
required during the Voyager mission; 2) a listing and analysis of differences between these
tasks and tasks presently or previously performed by personnel, including the DSN; 3) ini-
tiating action to improve human reliability, such as changes in the hardware (if feasible},
changes in computer programs, operating procedures and other software; 4} implementation
of an effective training program; 5} quantification of human reliability for justification of
tradeoffs and identification of problem areas.
For purposes of demonstrating the potential of the planned program for analysis and improve-
ment of Voyager operations, a description of an adjustment of the vehicle's orbit about Mars,
with attendant human reliability problems, is presented as the concluding example;
a. Given these operational data
1. The time to communicate one way between Earth and the vehicle is 6 minutes.
2. Vehicle battery drain limit is three hours, if the vehicle is not oriented
to the Sun.
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3. Vehicle attitude must be verified by the SFOF before engines are fired.
4. The time required for the vehicle to change attitude from Sun/Canopus
orientation to engine fire orientation is 50 minutes.
5. The time required for the vehicle to change attitude from engine fire
orientation to Sun orientation is 20 minutes.
b. The sequence of vehicle events is
1. Spacecraft receives command to change attitude. It leaves Sun orientation.
Time: Zero
2. Spacecraft arrives at commanded attitude.
Time: 96 minutes Cumulative Time: 96 minutes
3. Earth receives telemetry on status of attitude chsnge.
Time: 6 minutes Cumulative Time: 102 minutes
4. Earth analyzes message and determines that attitude is correct; also
makes up and sends commands to fire engines.
* Time: 127 minutes Cumulative Time: 229 minutes
5. Earth message reaches the spacecraft.
Time: 6 minutes Cumulative Time: 235 minutes
6. Spacecraft completes velocity change.
Time: 6 minutes Cumulative Time: 241 minutes
7. Spacecraft reports change in velocity data and changes attitude to acquire
the Sun.
Time: 20 minutes Cumulative Time: 261 minutes
The problem described by the above analysis really boils down to this question: Do 127
minutes constitute sufficient total time for the DSN to process an incoming message, mmke
a decision and process an outgoing message ?
* This time was obtained by subtraction and, as such, is generated by vehicle constraints.
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To arrive at the answer to the question just posed, certain other questions must first be
answered.
a. How long will it take to transfer incoming telemetry data from a tracking facility
to the SFOF?
b. How long will it take to convert telemetry data to a format that can be used by
SFOF evaluation personnel?
c. How long will it take to convert a decision by the SFOF to a format that can be
transmitted to the vehicle ?
d. How long will it take to send the outgoing message to the tracking site for
transmission to the vehicle ?
ee How much decision-making time is available to the SFOF ? (This is obtained by
subtracting the total time resolved by answers to the preceding four questions
from the available 127 minutes. )
Upon completion of the above line of reasoning, the analyst will have a "feel" for the types of
problems encountered, even when given error-free performance by the vehicle and by
personnel in the complex. He would then proceed to evaluate the probability of errors
which would further lengthen the time required to process the message.
Another aspect of the problem would be posed by determination of the probability that all
hardware would function without failure (both vehicle and ground equipment).
The outcome of the overall evaluation would be to provide an estimate of the confidence
with which one could predict success for performance of the orbit-adjust maneuver.
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3.5 TRAINING SUPPORT
3.5.1 SPACECRAFT AND MDE ORIENTATION PROGRAM
GE-SD plans to supplement the JPL training effort by providing a well-conceived and executed
spacecraft and MDE orientation program. This program will provide JPL supervisory and
operating personnel with a background of the equipment performance in an operations environ-
ment. Other information of an operational nature will be briefly related, particularly the
contents of GE-SD publications such as the Spacecraft Performance Analysis Reference Manual.
The Spacecraft Orientation Program will consist of two parts; an Introduction and an
Indoctrination. The Introduction will require about 3 days. Its purpose will be to provide
DSN managers and supervisors with a functional understanding of the Spacecraft and MDE
(Hardware and Computer Programs) design configurations. The Introduction will be presented
more than once. About 8 months before first launch the presentation would serve as an
introduction to the program. At about three months before first launch it would serve as a
detailed status report. It may, of course, be scheduled as frequently as desired for either
purpose.
The Indoctr_ation _ill require about 2 weeks. Its purpose will be to provide supervisory
and operating personnel from the DSIF stations and SFOF with a comprehensive understanding
of the operation of the Spacecraft and MDE. To achieve this purpose the Indoctrination will
describe (1) how the spacecraft functions and is controlled,(2) how the execution of these
functions, the spacecraft status, appears to users on the ground via telemetry, and (3)
how the operational computer programs are related to these functions.
The Spacecraft portion of the presentation will introduce the vehicle in terms of the mission
it is intended to serve. Vehicle operations and functions will then be related to the various
mission phases on a time basis. This phase of the discussion will start with a description
of the vehicle external configuration and inboard profile. This will be followed by a simplified
block diagram description of the overall flight system. Explanation of the various subsystems
in terms of function, operation, interrelationships and operating restrictions will come next.
The complete command and control operations will be described. The presentation will
conclude with a discussion of MDE located at the DSIF and SFOF facilities to show their
relation to vehicle functions.
The telemetry portion of the presentation will describe the telemetry items available from
the spacecraft, the basis for selecting these particular items, and their channel allocations.
In addition, the various modes of telemetry operation will be explained and the relative
priority of telemetry items by mission phase will be brought out. The telemetry portion
will conclude with a brief discussion of the relationship of the telemetry data to any MDE
located at the DSIF and/or SFOF facilities.
The operational computer programs portion of the presentation will deal with the programs
developed specifically for the Voyager Spacecraft. These program modules fall into the
general categories of event generation, telemetry data handling and command handling.
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The modules in each of these areas will be discussed in terms of their function, operating
procedures, interfaces, inputs, outputs, logic, data flow and equipmentutilization.
As with the Introduction, the Indoctrination will be scheduled more than once. The initial
Indoctrination would occur about 8 months prior to the first launch and would last about
three days. The second Indoctrination would occur about three months prior to launch and
would require 7 to 10 days. In both the Introduction and Indoctrination maximum possible
use would be made of proposed operational documentation to provide the necessary working
familiarity with these documents.
Finally, in addition to providing design engineers to conduct the General Orientation described
above, GE would use these same personnel to support JPL in two other areas. The first
would be in conducting briefing associated with factory visits aimed at providing practical
demonstrations of the vehicles described in the General Orientation. The second would be
in participating in any pre-operations DSN rehearsals exercises schedules by JPL. In both
of the above cases it is anticipated that JPL would provide the agenda for the session and
GE would provide the personnel and material required to support the agenda.
In support of this task, GE-SD plans to furnish:
(1) Training requirements and plan.
(2} Training syllabus
(3) Lesson plans.
3.5.2 OPERATIONS EXERCISES
GE-SD plans to support training through participation in the operations exercises which
JPL plans to conduct. This includes total systems exercises and rehearsals.
While the Proof Test Model (PTM #2) is at DSIF 11 for interface testing, its continued use
for total systems validation exercises and personnel training is recommended. If it cannot
be made available, then tapes can be produced from PTM #2 for this purpose (see Par. 3.6.1).
During these exercises, the SFOF would maintain a suitable plan for control of the spacecraft
by sending command information to DSIF 11. The commands needed to "load" the spacecraft
sensory and video subsystem will be sent via RF link from DSIF 11 to the spacecraft. Space-
craft outputs, adjusted to levels determined by margin computations would be transmitted by
RF link to DSIF 11. Commands, when necessary, can be transmitted by RF link at levels
determined by margin calculations and transmission times dependent on communications
distances.
DSIF 11 would receive, demodulate and transmit to SFOF the following: Spacecraft telemetry,
capsule telemetry, video data and sensor data, taking into account the time required for
communications distances. All data would be recorded on magnetic tapes for future use as
simulation inputs for rehearsals and flyby tests. SFOF would receive, process and analyze
the telemetry, video and sensor data.
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Although this method for rehearsal and flyby is beneficial, it is limited insofar as response
to unforseen situations. Noise can be added to the signals or a fadeout may be simulated,
but no real capability exists for spontaneous system response, which can be accomplished
only by an overall spacecraft simulator.
Aircraft flyby with simulation tapes can serve to check the MDE at each station and provide
tracking, telemetry and command familiarity with the Voyager spacecraft. There is a need
to design and perform operational pass readiness tests of all DSIF stations. Operational
readiness tests would be performed before each station is required to accept communications
responsibility with the spacecraft.
Due to the fact that DSN operations personnel are in place, it is unlikely that procedural
"walk-throughs" will be required. The intent of the GE-SD participation in operations
exercises would be essentially to support the adjustment of the DSN analysis personnel to
operational situations.
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3.6 OPERATIONAL INTERFACE TEST REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPORT
Compatibility of the spacecraft and MDE with the DSN mission independent equipment must
be demonstrated. Previous experience with applications of the STC and '69 implementation will
allow this to be a nearly straightforward process.
3.6.1 VALIDATION REQUIREMENTS
The interfaces which are of operational concern and must be validated prior to flight are:
a. LCE to DSN
b. MDE to DSIF
c. Overall Spacecraft to DSIF
d. MDE to SFOF
The foregoing interfaces are described and specified in Section V of Volume C.
required for validation of each of the interfaces are described below.
The tests
1. LCE to DSN
After the spacecraft has been mated and checked out with the launch vehicle, final
verifications of its condition must be made using telemetry and umbilical lines.
Station 71 and the SI"C/LCE will communicate with the overall spacecraft. The
objects of this test are 1) to verify the capability of Station 71 and the LCE to
provide communication between the spacecraft and the STC and 2) to verify the
capability of Station 71 to provide communication between the spacecraft and the
DSIF. This test will be performed using PTM #1 and its STC, and the OSE
installed in launch complexes #34 and #37B. Subsequent revalidations will be
made during the launch preparations of each flight spacecraft as part of the
launch readiness checkout.
2. MDE to DSIF
At the DSIF tracking stations the radio signals received from the Spacecraft must
be demodulated to extract the information carried by them. The output of the
active tracking/telemetry receiver is connected to MDE which demodulates and
decodes the signal to obtain overall Spacecraft engineering and science data in the
format necessary for local processing and transmission to SFOF. The purpose
of this test is to demonstrate that this equipment, associated procedures and
operational computer programs are functionally adequate and are compatible with
the DSIF. Compatibility tests of the installed DSIF MDE will also be made using
PTM #2 at the Goldstone station. Prior to launch the same compatibility tests
will be run at each of the DSIF stations in which Voyager MDE exists.
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3. Overall Spacecraft to DSIF
During the series of tests performed on the PTM, a test of communication
capability between the spacecraft and a standard tracking station to establish
the effectiveness of the tracking, telemetry and command subsystems is required.
The purpose of this test is to demonstrate 1) the dynamic range of the position
and velocity measuring loops, 2) the telemetry and command functions, under
simulated flight conditions (see Paragraph 3.5).
These tests are performed initially as part of the type approval tests and repeated
with PTM #2 at Goldstone. They will be again performed using the Flight Space-
craft during its launch preparation.
4. MDE to SFOF
The purpose of this test is to verify the adequacy of installed MDE and establish
its compatibility in the SFOF.
3.6.2 TEST SUPPORT
It is planned that GE-SD design and test personnel be made available to support DSN interface
testing under the direction of JPL.
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3.7 MOS SUPPORT
Paragraph 3.1.2 provides a brief description of the SFOF capabilities. The tracking and
interstation communications responsibilities are carried out in their entirety by JPL and
other NASA groups.
In the operational phase, the success of the Voyager mission requires correct command
and control decisions. The information upon which these decisions are based comes from
three primary areas:
a. Spacecraft Performance Analysis Area (SPAA) - which reflects the present and
anticipated performance of all spacecraft subsystems.
b. Flight Path Analysis Area (FPAA) - which depicts conformance or deviations and
perturbations encountered relative to the nominal desired flight path elements.
C. Space Science Analysis Area (SSAA) - which describes the present and predicted
performance for all elements of the scientific payload, both in the Voyager S/C
and in the Voyager Capsule.
The SPAA is principally related to the Spacecraft contractor, whereas the FPAA and the
SSAA are normally handled by JPL and designated science personnel. Because of the
closer relationship to navigation and guidance control GE-SD would logically provide some
personnel in SPAA on a full-time basis. The interpretation of Spacecraft Subsystem per-
formance and extrapolation to subsequent performance is best accomplished by those per-
sonnel that are intimately familiar with the operation, logic, and peculiarities of each
spacecraft subsystem. During anticipated periods of high activity or critical subsystem
anomaly, the resident team in this area would be supported by subsystem design personnel
from the spacecraft contractor's house. The design personnel would be on an on-call basis
during the complete operational period.
The recommendation for action in the Spacecraft will depend on close coordination and under-
standing of the mission implications in all three of these areas. A portion of this task should
be supported by Spacecraft contractor mission operations and analysis personnel who are
cognizant of the problems in each of these three areas and are in a position to make intelligent
decisions and recommendations to the JPL Operations Manager. Once these decisions are
made, the Mission Analysis personnel would assist the Command Generation Support group
and the Data Processing and Display Support Group to insure that all decisions affecting
these areas are properly carried out.
GE-SD plans to provide SPAT and FPAT personnel, as shown in Figure 3-15, in support of
MOS operations. The SPAT team can provide representatives to support other areas of
MOS activities. It would vary in size depending upon the level of activity for the particular
portion of the SFO mission phase. Other support would be on an on-call basis.
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3.8 MISSION EVALUATION
In the context of this plan, mission evaluation refers to the detailed analysis of flight data
during and after the mission. It is a separate and more comprehensive analysis than that
accomplished as portion of the direct operations "decision - making loop." The benefits
of this type of analysis are as follows:
ae Affords diagnosis of malfunctions as to their cause and effect. The natural con-
sequence of such an analysis is recommended corrective action required to preclude
reoccurrence of the problem and to enhance the probability of mission success on
subsequent flights.
b. Permits quantitative evaluation of the inherent capabilities of the spacecraft system.
This information will be used to enhance mission utilization, suggest changes to
improve overall system performance or capability, identify growth, potential, etc.
It is probable that numerous studies will be initiated as a result of any failure or unusual
scientific phenomena encountered during the mission. This may require operational planning
and observation through experimentation to take place concurrent with or in addition to the
pre-planned operations during the mission. The allowed limits of capability with regard to
such experimentation must be determined before launch.
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Report requirements, should be predetermined prior to launch, with specific responsibilities
of the spacecraft contractor and all interfaces clearly delineated. This will assure prompt
dissemination of results which will be utilized on subsequent Voyager missions and other
programs.
Mission evaluation could be accomplished in several parts at different facilities. GE-SD
has considered the requirements for this analysis in the Phase 1-A telemetry selections and
plans to provide support to JPL in the analyses of spacecraft and MDE performance. To
facilitate this work, additional computer programs will be required for the special processing
aligned with this analysis. This would be provided by JPL or GE-SD depending upon the
particular facility selected for this work.
In support of this task, GD-SD plans to provide:
a. An analysis plan
b. Interim Reports
c. A post flight analysis report.
GE-SD will apply S/C design personnel as well as operational systems engineering personnel
to this task.
78 of 78
CII-VB 110VP008
PROJECTPLANS
SPECIAL TEST PLAN - LIFE TEST
_._,
Index
1
2
3
4
5
Introduction
Approach
Test Plan
Schedule
1 of 16
VB110VP008
i.0 INTRODUCTION
A key consideration in the total Voyager test program is the determination and demonstration
of adequate life capability. Life test verification of a flight spacecraft requires:
a. Sufficient prior history or adequate testing of all elements of the system to demon-
strate that the hardware as used in the design has the necessary life capability.
Do Adequate acceptance testing to verify that this capability exists in each flight
spacecraft, i.e., its performance and operating environment are equivalent to
those of the hardware that demonstrated necessary life.
Both types of testing (as well as other related activities) must be considered. The tradi-
tional bath-tub curve illustrates the problem. (See Figure 1-1 below and Section 3.11.2 of
the Reliability Assurance Plan for additional discussion). The time to Point B must be
greater than the combined test and mission life; the time to Point A must be less than the
acceptance test cycle; and the random failure rate must be low enough to allow a reasonable
probability of mission success. Establishing Points A and B and the failure rate is done on
non-flight hardware.
Failure
Rate
Life Capability Tests
( Non-flight hardware}
Tests on flight
hardware
Figure 1-1.
Random Rate
Time l
Failure Rate Versus Time
i.1 SCOPE
The tests described herein are concerned with life capability demonstration for flight space-
craft hardware ( not flight capsule) at all levels of assembly and during all test phases.
Failure rate determinations and flight acceptance tests as such are the subject of other
plans, and they are included and discussed only to the extent that they contribute to the
evaluation or demonstration of life capability.
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1.2 PURPOSEAND OBJECTIVES
Many factors contribute to the total life capability of a spacecraft. Test is one of the pro-
ject activities which will contribute to our knowledge relative to the capability of the design
and will provide demonstrated confidence in this life prior to launch. The objectives of the
Life Test Plan are:
a. To consolidate plans for life testing into a single place to facilitate evaluation
relative to completeness and balance, i.e., placing emphasis where required.
b. To implement review.
c. To aid in the identification of resources required to accomplish life tests.
2.0 APPROACH
Life capability, like performance capability, is designed into spacecraft hardware. It must
be considered and factored into the design from the very beginning. Many activities other
than testing are involved in achieving hardware with adequate life capability. This includes
the application of design standards, design reviews, configuration control, quality assurance
and others.
All failures are attributable to changes in materials. Life, then, is the period of acceptable
performance available before the material is transformed by its total environment to an
unacceptable condition. Environment in this sense is the combination of stresses from all
sources including thermal, mechanical, electrical, radiation, chemical, etc. Basically,
the achievement of life capability reduces to the identification and control of degrading
stresses on materials. If these life degrading influences are known, corrective design
measures can be applied. For maximum assurance and minimum cost, the identification of
environmental limits under which adequate life can be achieved must be drawn from previous
experience ( in the same way that standards are based upon experience).
Testing is a major contributor to the achievement of life in two ways:
a. Where sufficient applicable data relative to the life capability of parts and materials
does not exist, testing must furnish that data.
be Testing must demonstrate that all of the life reducing influences which result from
the complex environment (internally induced and externally imposed) have been
identified and are sufficiently accommodated in the design to permit satisfactory
operation for more than the combined test and mission time.
The development of experience relative to parts and materials is discussed in the Reliability
Assurance Plan, Section 3.11.5. Prior to its inclusion on the Approved Parts and Material
list, a review will be conducted to determine if tests will be performed on the item. Where
applicable, accelerated test techniques will be applied.
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The basic mechanism that has been used on past programs to provide a statistical inference
relative to life capability is the attributes test approach (also called by various other names
including exponential model and chance failure evaluation technique). This mechanism
allows a statement of probability of success and confidence based upon the accumulation of
operating time or cycles.
This technique could reasonably be applied at the systems level when the systems are
relatively simple and the mission times are short. A system as complex as Voyager which
has a combined mission and test time in excess of 18 months makes this system test
approach impractical. Time and cost virtually eliminate a significant life demonstration
if only a system test approach is followed. The approach herein is to use this same basic
proven mechanism for inference but to apply it at a different level than the system.
One objective of all testing at all levels will be to verify the existence of satisfactory en-
vironmental levels where life considerations require that specific limits be imposed. Re-
liability inferences would be based upon (1) the amount of experience available relative to
the life capability (using an attributes approach) and (2) the existence of an adequate margin
in the actual use environment relative to these environmental limits which are suitable for
long life. Proper selection and review as the test program progresses can keep the number
of specific environmental measurements on systems and flight hardware to a manageable
level.
While the verification of acceptable environmental levels is part of the total approach, it
must be supplemented by tests to allow unexpected degrading conditions to become known.
As was noted previously, the application of real-time missions to test Voyager's life
capability is not practicable. This has led to the Static Mission Equivalent (SME) and the
Dynamic Mission Equivalent (DMF), For _ flJrther discussion of the basis and rationale
of the SME and the DME, see Section 3.11.4 of the Reliability Assurance Plan.
To induce failure n_chanisms, SME's and DME's will be applied to appropriate spacecraft
hardware at all levels of assembly and in all test phases including flight acceptance. In
addition, real-time life tests will be conducted on certain components and assemblies where
criticality or experience indicates the desirability of such tests. In general, this will be
done with hardware that has completed its testing for functional performance development
or demonstration.
3.0 TEST PLAN
The tests which will be conducted to evaluate and demonstrate life are contained herein.
3.1 SPECIAL LIFE TESTS
Special life tests will be conducted on selected hardware items to provide data relative to
life capability which supplements the dynamic testing.
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During Phase 113, the design will be reviewed to identify the specific items which should be
tested. Criteria being applied for this selection is the relative criticality of the item and
the function that it performs and experience on similar hardware.
3.1.1 COMPONENTS AND ASSEMBLIES
The following components and assemblies have been identified for special life tests. In
general, electro-mechanical or mechanical devices tend to specific designs for a particular
application. As a result, items of this type currently identified in the design are included in
the list.
a. Batteries - Silver-Cadmium rechargeable batteries are used for energy storage
on the spacecraft. Life information relative to these batteries is not as extensive
as it is for the more commonly used Nickel-Cadmium batteries which are magnetic.
Life tests will be conducted as follows:
1. Storage tests will be conducted with battery at "float" charge•
. A series of discharge tests will be conducted. Various depths of discharge
will be imposed and different charge rates will be applied to ascertain the
optimum for life.
3. Mission simulations will be conducted as a part of the power subsystem which
will be operated into a programmed load for an extended period of time.
Do Attitude Control Valves and Regulators - The attitude control system contains both
valves (solenoid operated) and regulators. Tests will be conducted on both of these
items by cycling them repeatedly under load to demonstrate this life capability.
Co Gyro Package - The Mariner gyros were operated for a relatively short time. The
Vo-y ag _ ....... -' ..... '-- ' ...............Up_mal,_ a Uumm_luvl aumy zu_z_vr tinie because u_ cn_ marger
number of engine firings and because they will be used during the Mars orbiting
phase if spacecraft occultation occurs. Operating life and cyclic tests will be con-
ducted.
do Mars Vertical Sensor - The Mars Vertical Sensor is an IR device which senses the
planet and provides the control reference for the 3rd axis of the scan platform.
It will operate throughout the Mars orbiting phase. Operating life tests will be
conducted.
eo Thermal Control Louvers - Active thermal control louvers are included on most of
the hays of the electronic equipment compartment. It is anticipated that the louvers
will be supported independently and driven by a common actuator (redundant).
Cyclic tests will be conducted to verify life capability.
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f* Bi-metallic Thermal Switch - Bi-metallic switches activate and deactivate heaters
in the spacecraft. Cyclic life tests will be conducted.
go Tape Recorder - The tape recorders operate throughout the Mars orbiting phase in
a record-playback mode of operation. These are reel types recorders and must be
reversed for the record or playback mode of operation. Cyclic life tests will be
conducted to verify adequate life capability.
h* Power Amplifiers - The 50-watt and the combination 50-20 watt power amplifiers
for the telecommunications will be subjected to operating time life tests. Two
phases are anticipated. The first phase will be in thermal-vacuum. This will be
followed by a second period (probably the longer of the two) at ambient pressures,
but under thermal environments comparable to the use condition.
i. Flexible Cables - The cables to both the high gain antenna and the scan platform
must be flexible because of the articulation of these items. Flexing tests w ill be
conducted to demonstrate the flexure life of these cables.
j. Switches (RF) - RF switches included in the telecommunication subsystem will be
subjected to cyclic life tests.
k. Stepper Motors - Stepper motors (identical) are used to drive all three axes of the
scan platform and two axes of the high-gain antenna. The motor with its associated
controller will be subjected to cyclic life tests in a thermal-vacuum environment.
l. Gimbal Bearings - The gimbals on the articulated scan platform and antenna will
be subjected to operating life tests.
me Propulsion System Throttling Valves and Vanes - The throttling valves and vanes
in the monopropellant system will operate during all midcourse firings and the retro-
engine firings. Cyclic life tests of these items will be conducted.
no Explosive Devices - Storage tests of pyrotechnic devices are planned. At regular
intervals during the storage period, portions of the lot will be withdrawn, tested,
and fired to provide data relative to performance degradation with time.
In general, tests will be initiated on development hardware of the flight configuration (i. e.
packaging). Where alterations or changes in the hardware negate test results, similar tests
will be repeated on the improved design. The schedule for these tests is included in Figure
4-1.
3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM
The power, telecommunications and guidance and control subsystems all operate continuously
throughout the mission. Additional life tests will be conducted on all or major portions of
these subsystems. Tests discussed below are assumed to be in ambient conditions. As
facility loading and further test program detail are developed in Phase IB, further con-
sideration will be given to the use of environmental chambers for these tests.
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a. Power Subsystem - Tests of this subsystem will be conducted with all of the
functional sections of the subsystem except the array. After the functional per-
formance development tests have been completed on the breadboard of the sub-
system, it will be operated in ambient conditions. A clock-programmed load will
be provided to simulate representative mission conditions. As development hard-
ware becomes available to the component development program, it will be sub-
stituted into the breadboard and the test will be continued to accumulate operating
time under simulated mission conditions.
bm Guidance and Control Subsystem - The prime loop of the attitude control system
which consists of the sun sensor, the canopus sensor, and the electronics will be
assembled and operated under ambient conditions to accumulate operating time.
This testing will be initiated with development components after the completion of
their functional performance testing.
C. Telecommunication Subsystem - This testing will also be initiated with development
hardware after the completion of functional performance tests. All five bays will
be involved in these ambient tests to accumulate operating time. Since there are
three tape recorders, the test cycle on these items may be varied to provide in-
formation relative to long-term operations as well as operation after a period of
not operating.
3.1.3 SYSTEMS
Six spacecraft systems will be produced prior to the '71 flight spacecraft. Three are of the
'69 configuration; i.e., one development and two flight. One '71 development and two PTM
spacecrafts will be produced. One PTM will be tested by JPL.
The '69 development spacecraft and the '69 back-up spacecraft will both accumulate sig-
nificant test times prior to the '69 flight, but special life tests have not been designated.
1_1_ developn-,ent _l._,w_,z _x_4_*,,,_11..._ha_._US'_v_ ta..........__'_nnnvt-_-,-__ _ the test effort on the flight_ spacecraft._
The '69 test flight will provide life data under actual operating conditions.
The '71 development spacecraft and the PTM tested at GE will both be subjected to life
tests after they have completed their other tests. Tests of both spacecraft will be conducted
in ambient to accumulate operating time to supplement the dynamic tests conducted earlier.
Periodic checks will be made to assess performance for comparison with previous data.
The desirability and practicability of conducting some portion of these tests under T/V space
simulations will be evaluated further in Phase IB°
3.2 PARTS AND MATERIALS TESTING
An extensive parts and materials test program has been planned to assure that the best
available quality is utilized in the Voyager flight systems. Sections 3.5.5 through 3° 5.9 of
the Reliability Assurance Plan describe the detailed plans for parts and materials selection,
type qualification, screening and the selection of better items from the final lot by means of
parametric measurements.
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Life tests at part and materials levels will be conducted over the full range of environments
and stress levels involved in Voyager applications. However, these testing activities will
be restricted to areas of risk for which an adequate history of reliability cannot be obtained
from prior test and application information.
It is essential that life test data be obtained to provide a high level of assurance for the long-
time operational and dormancy periods of the Voyager mission. As noted in Section 5, the
direct measurement of long-life steady-state reliability at system levels is not practicable.
It is essential that these risks be evaluated at the lower cost part and material levels.
During Phase IB critical needs for such tests will be identified. Wherever data cannot be
otherwise obtained, parts and materials life capabilities will be evaluated during Phase II.
3.3 OTHER TESTS CONTRIBUTING TO LIFE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATION
Tests in other phases of the Voyager test program will contribute substantially to the life
capability demonstration for the hardware. A prime objective of all testing at all levels of
assembly will be the identification of life degrading influences. This implies that failure
mechanisms are known. Since all of the complex interactions which may induce failure
cannot be anticipated, the above tests will be augmented by the application of dynamic
mission equivalents (DME) at the component and system levels.
Flight Acceptance tests will include functional and environmental tests, the accumulation
of a minimum operating time (Green Line Limit), and the application of DME to provide
assurance of performance and life capability. Table 3-1 summarizes the minimum time and
DME accumulations for the acceptance and type approval hardware. These time and DME
accumulations will be made on all TA and flight hardware including spares to provide a
measure of the demonstrated capability of each specific item.
4.0 SCHEDULE
The schedule for conducting life tests is shown in Figure 4-1. For comparative purposes,
a summary of the total test program is shown on the same figure.
5.0 MEASUREMENT OF LIFE SIGNIFICANCE
It is necessary that assurance of mission success be obtained prior to launch. The Voyager
mission is too long for total direct validation of reliability by tests in real mission time at
corresponding, sequential environments. In the approach herein the long time steady-state
risks (SME) and the higher stress risks of operational periods (DME) are treated separately
and later combined for a final determination of life significance.
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5.1 DATA FROM TYPE APPROVAL AND PROOF TEST MODEL TESTING
As described in Section 3.11.4.3 of the Reliability Assurance Plan VB110VP010 and as
illustrated in Table 3-1, data will be available from T/A and PTM testing to provide at
least 14 failure-free, dynamic mission equivalents. Thus, insofar as modes of failure
which are dependent upon dynamic portions of the mission profile are concerned, a sig-
nificant level of reliability and confidence will be provided by this data.
The total test period (A 1 and B1) shown in Figure 5-1 provides a failure free terminal
period of 14 DME. If, as is the Voyager plan, all failures or significant performance
discrepancies have been fully investigated prior to this failure free period of test and
corrective action(s) in design, fabrication and test have been taken, the failure-free ter-
minal period of testing represents the most representative and meaningful data available.
Since the test program is one which continues until this level of maturity in design and manu-
facture has been reached, it represents a demonstrated completion of the "infant mortality"
period at Point A in Figure 1-1.
5.1.1 DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY
The statistical significance is provided in Figure 5-2. As shown, this data demonstrates
that the T/A and PTM equipments (and thus, any identically designed and produced systems)
would have a probability of success during a "next" DME test of approximately 90% at 75%
Confidence. It should be noted, that this demonstration is at complete spacecraft system
level (or equivalent). Since these tests are not expected to represent{failure-free) more than
about one fourth of the total mission, the demonstration is incomplete insofar as the risks
involved in long time periods at steady stress levels are concerned.
These steady-state risks must be eliminated and their demonstrated margin of safety and
long-life capability must be provided by a separate test program or by adequate "history
of reliability" for each part and material application involved in the system.
Extensive life test data is available for steady-state conditions. Many of these tests have
been run well beyond 10,000 hours and thus avoid the obvious inadequacy of short time tests.
In addition, extensive data (somewhat less adequately documented) is available indicating that
the dormancy or standby conditions applicable to the Voyager mission represent extremely
small risks for all high usage part and material types required.
Since comparable test data will be required of all parts, materials and components (including
low usage items) approved for use in flight systems; since steady-state risks are of a
degradation nature; and since extensive part "burn-in", stabilization and selection will be
applied in the construction of flight equipment, it is felt that a fully adequate demonstration
of long life capability under steady state conditions will be available from these separate
sources.
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EQUIPMENT
A
P.T. M. f--.-.1_._
T/A
FLIGHT
SYSTEMS
B
C
B 1
A L
B L
t F ' '5 'i0 1 20
CUMULATIVE TEST TIME IN D. M. E. * UNITS
t F = TIME OF LAST FAILURE DURING TEST PERIOD.
"l
.3
v!
i
25
*D. M.E. --- A foreshortened voyager mission profile
containing all commands, actuations, transients etc.
but having steady-state operating and dormancy periods
removed. (For more complete definition see Reliability
Assurance Plan --- Section 3.11. )
A, B, C --- Test times in which failures have occurred
A1, B 1 --- Failure-free test periods during T/A and P. T.M. tests
A L, B L --- Life test periods
C 1 --- Failure free subassembly and subsystem F.A. tests
C 2 --- Failure free systems flight acceptance tests.
Figure 5-1. Summary of Life Significant T/A, P.T.M. and F.A. Test Data
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5. i. 2 MARGINS OF SAFETY
It is important to note that T/A and PTM stress levels are higher than those expected during
flight. These margins provide additional assurance of success and demonstrate that a
greater life capability exists than indicated by Figure 5-2. While systems are always too
few in number to permit any complete demonstration of the quantitative significance of this
margin, such significance is very real and meaningful. The benefit obtained from such
safety margins is illustrated by Figure 5-3. A margin of safety (i. e., a lower percentile of
risk) exists at the stress levels for flight, A2, than at the higher T/A and PTM stress
levels, A 3, for every part or component of the system. The satisfactory completion of these
tests, L 1 represents a greater performance and life capability than the same demonstration,
L 2, at the lower stress level A 2.
5.2 LIFE TESTS OF T/A AND P. T.M. SYSTEMS
The completion of T/A and P. T.M. testing provides the program with two "sets" of flight
quality equipment which are not to be launched. As shown by the Voyager Master Schedule
(Figure 1-1 of Schedule and Rationale VBll0VP001), the P. T.M. system is to be sent to
the launch site to "proof run" these procedures and support systems. Upon completion of
this function, it will be returned and made available for life testing.
5.2.1 MARGIN EFFECTS ON LIFE TESTING
The higher stress levels of T/A and P. T.M. testing together with the shipping, handling
and exercising of the system during launch checkout provide a conservative approach to
life test evaluations. By preceeding any subsequent life test by environmental testing
simulating the launch and initiation of the cruise period, the life demonstrated by subsequent
testing of T/A and P. T.M. systems is particularly valuable since all possible factors and
influences have been actually experienced. The path followed may be illustrated by
L0,1,2,3, 4, of Figure 5-3 in which L 3 is intended to indicate the transportation to the launch
'_)roof run,, above.
5.2.2 DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY BY LIFE TESTING
The periods of life testing, AL, on the P.T.M. system, and, BL, on T/A systems hard-
ware in Figure 5-1 correspond to L 4 on Figure 5-3. The significance of this is, of course,
dependent upon the success or failure history accumulated. If the requirements proposed
in the Reliability Assurance Plan are fulfilled a total of 25 D.M.E., failure-free, would be
provided on each of these two systems by these life tests.
Such a test program, successfully concluded, would provide high design assurance, as
indicated for DME = 50 on Figure 5-2, for dynamic portions of the mission.
If the long-life capability of an individual system, or subsystem, did not permit 25 D. M. E.
failure free to be attained, the failing components would be replaced or repaired and the
test continued to determine whether repetitive failures are present.
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5.3 LIFE SIGNIFICANCEOF FLIGHT ACCEPTANCE TESTS
Noamount of testing of uncorreleated, non-flight systems or components can fully assure
the flight worthiness of a flight system. To assure this correlation, Flight Acceptance
testing will include a verification of the dynamic portions of the mission profile. Some
steady state periods of operation and dormancy will also be included to verify start-up
capabilities. This correlation for steady state {S. M. E. ) periods will be rather limited.
The system is thus almost completely dependent upon part, material and special component
tests together with the "history of reliability" available from prior flights and tests for
steady state risks.
The reliability requirements for acceptance testing of subassemblies and systems are also
shown in Table 3-1.
5.3.1 INDIVIDUAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Without regard to other tests, the reliability of each flight system would be demonstrated
by the successful completion of these tests to be on the order of 69% at 95% confidence.
This is illustrated in Figure 5-2 and is applicable to the dynamic portion of the flight pro-
file.
Prior systems data indicates that more than 80% of the overall mission risk is represented
by the dynamic portions of the mission profile. If a more complete study of prior systems,
and the long life tests of engineering development items, special components, parts and
materials were to confirm this ratio of 4 to 1, or greater, the above probability of mission
success based on these flight acceptance data would become approximately 63%.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
a. Scope - The Interface Test Plan identifies and describes the tests required to
assure that the spacecraft will function adequately with other Voyager Project
elements on the basis of mission specification, schedule and technical perform-
ance. In this plan, "interface" is used to designate that boundary held in
common by the spacecraft and systems not built under the spacecraft contract.
Functions performed in common by elements built under the spacecraft contract
are considered subsystem interfaces and are not described on this plan. An
example of an interface herein described is that with the launch vehicle.
b. Purpose - The purpose of interface testing is to establish (demonstrate) that the
relationships of the spacecraft to systems with which it interfaces are according
to their specifications and are adequate for the Voyager mission. The material
in this plan has been organized to accomplish four objectives:
1. To identify the interface test requirements in the Voyager program that
affect the design of the spacecraft and the OSE.
2. To identify the planning and preparation elements for the subsequent inter-
face test program of the spacecraft.
3. To form a base line for more detailed test planning in Phase 1B of the
program.
4. To provide a reference for initial work by the Interface Control Working
Group.
2.0 APPROACH
Early in the program, the Interface Control Working Group establishes the design goals
for each contractor who is a party to the interface. Later, each contractor's designs are
reviewed and evaluated for conformance to the requirements and for compatibility with
each other. These approved designs are the basis for hardware production. Maintenance
of the interface design configuration is assigned to the Configuration Control Board, but
evaluation of the validity of the interface is the continuing responsibility of the Interface
Control Working Group. For each interface the ICWG defines an overall test program and
establishes the test criteria. Within each program, individual tests are developed to
demonstrate the progressive verification from design through breadboard, hardware
models, and interface testing with the PTM, tothe final interfacing of operational hard-
ware. The test plans of each contractor are reviewed for: purpose of each test;
significance to interface verification; specific hardware tested; time of test; responsi-
bility for accomplishment; procedures; support required; joint participation; and, result
processing.
Figure 2-1 depicts the major classes of interface testing on a time base. The importance
of establishing the validity of the interface in the early phase of the program and retest-
ing for assurance is shown by the increasing complexity of vehicles and functions with
time. With the close relationship between the 69 and 71 vehicles, both in time and in
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Figure 2-1. Interface Test Schedule
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configuration, the establishment of valid interfaces on the 69 is clearly a part of the
assurance of success in 71. This is true of all phases of the program but it is especially
beneficial for the interfaces that are operational during flight. The Launch Vehicle inter-
faces with regard to vibration and flight separations, and the DSN interface with regard
to telecommunications, command and telemetry can be validated on the 69 flight with the
definite advantage to the 71 mission.
Figure 2-2 rearranges the main elements of interface testing in a flow format to illustrate
the growth of confidence as the program progresses. The major tests that must be run
to validate the interfaces are shown in relation to the phases of the development and pro-
duction of the spacecraft.
Mission adequacy assurance comes from progressively evaluating the results of the
entire complex of tests performed from the beginning of the program. This means that
the results of each test and of related tests must be correlated and interpreted into the
body of test data to develop an increasing confidence in the continuing validity of the space-
craft and its interfaces. As each interface design is translated to hardware and is tested,
the ICWG reviews the test results. For each subsequent step in the interface test pro-
gram, the ICWG again reviews the results for adequacy of design and hardware and for
consistency .with earlier test results. Through this growing bo_, of results, the ICWG
develops assurance that each interface will achieve its mission purpose.
In this plan, the interfaces of the spacecraft with other program elements have been
identified and each of the tests in which that interface is measured or verified is described.
Table 2-1 lists the test categories and the tests for spacecraft interfaces with other pro-
gram elements. Table 2-2 lists the corresponding interface tests required by the operation
support equipment.
3.0 LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE
The interface between the spacecraft and launch vehicle is the field joint at Station 00 of
the spacecraft and Station 2048 of the launch vehicle. The mechanical interface is a 10'
diameter ring at the bottom of the spacecraft adapter which is fastened to the top ring of
the Centaur launch vehicle adapter. In addition to the mechanical connection, electrical
connectors at the interface carry telemetry and separation signals between the spacecraft
and the launch vehicle. During launch preparation they also relay power and the signals
exchanged between the spacecraft and the launch complex equipment since the launch
vehicle provides the launch complex umbilical cables and connectors. The spacecraft
also has thermal, EMI, magnetic and functional interfaces with the launch vehicle.
Verification of the total spacecraft interface is finally achieved only by satisfactory orbit
insertion and separation. Since this test is not repeatable for any given spacecraft,
maximum assurance is secured by running a complex of simulation tests on the elements of
the interface using as close a simulation of the effects of the other elements as possible.
These include mating inspections, dynamic and static structural tests, electrical tests,
environmental tests, separation tests and on-pad mating and reverification. Validation
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of all these sub-interfaces starts with the design review, continues thru engineering model
and factory assembly tests, to final verifications made during launch preparation and
countdown. Early testing of this interface is concerned with establishing the parameters of
the structural and environmental designs. Later testing with the PTM is design certi-
fication at levels above expected flight values. Testing after the PTM is hardware
certification in terms of the established designs.
3.1 MODEL TESTS
Model tests which serve to validate the launch vehicle interface are of five kinds:
structural, mechanical, electrical, functional and environmental.
3.2 STRUCTURAL MODEL TESTS
To accurately determine the structural requirements of the launch vehicle interface de-
sign, calculations of the spacecraft structure will be formulated in a structural analog
model. This model will be statically and dynamically loaded and perturbed. The results
of this model exercise, pertinent to the interface, will be sent to the launch vehicle con-
tractor as supplemental requirements. Similarly, the results of his testing of an analog
launch vehicle adapter will be received and incorporated in the spacecraft design.
From the information developed using the analog model, a Structural Test Model (STM)
is contructed. The STM is used to validate the design of the entire spacecraft structure;
spacecraft support section (of which the spacecraft adapter is a part); equipment module,
and capsule support structure. The primary interface test that validates the structural
interface with the launch vehicle is an overall vibration test. It is outlined below. To
perform the interface vibration test, a launch vehicle, simulator and the launch vehicle con-
tractor's specification of launch vehicle-generated vibration, shock and acoustic effects
is required.
A mechanical inspection is first performed on the structural model (less inspection of the
electrical connector) to determine that the model's interface is as specified. The structural
model is then mated to a launch vehicle adapter section and the whole subjected to
vibration and shock tests.
3.3 VIBRATION TEST
a. Objective - To validate structural integrityof the launch vehicle interface for
vibration and shock transmitted thru this interface.
b. Test Description - The spacecraft, mated to the launch vehicle adapter is fasten-
ed to a shake table or shock fixture. Depending on the conditions of the test,
auxiliary fixtures to adapt the table for different axial accelerations will be used.
The spacecraft and the launch vehicle members will be instrumented according
to the specific test conditions. The selected sequence of step, steady state and
random functions will be applied and the outputs of the accelerometers recorded.
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In the structural tests, the effects of the masses of the subsystem elements of the space-
craft are simulated by equivalent masses. The effects of the capsule and bio-barrier are
included by using a capsule structural mass model mated to the capsule adapter of the struc-
tural test model. The applied accelerations shall exceed those expected from the launch
vehicle and specified by the launch vehicle contractor.
The data from structural model testing is used to update the design of the spacecraft for
construction of the Development Spacecraft (DS). This is the first complete model built.
This model is used to validate the enUre design of the spacecraft. To establish the
launch vehicle structural and mechanical interface, the STM is subjected to the vibration
test, but with changed conditions. The development subsystem hardware, a development
capsule and engineering science is incorporated. Tests are run at levels above those
expected in flight, but below those indicated by the design as being destructive. Data from
this test finalizes the structural interface design.
3.4 MECHANICAL MODEL TESTS
The match/mate inspection is the fundamental m echanical test. The test is outlined be-
low. The mechanical test is first used during construction of the structural model and
is repeated throughout the program whenever a mating or demating involving the launch
vehicle interface is accomplished. Since the mechanical interface with the launch vehicle
is the bottom of the spacecraft and the place of attachment for the protective collar used
with the handling fixtures for assembly, testing, and shipping, the interface gets checked
many times.
3.4.1 MECHANICAL INSPECTION
a. Objective - To assess the accuracy and condition of the mating interface between
the spacecraft and the launch vehicle.
b. Test Description - The spacecraft will be suspended above the floor by handling
AHSE fastened to the mating bosses in the spacecraft adapter. The interface
electrical connector will be inspected for signs of wear or damage. All pins
will be checked for alignment. Then the match/mate fixture will be placed under
the bottom of the adapter and the spacecraft lowered using the guide pins for
alignment. When the spacecraft is settled upon the fixture, the concentricity
of the mating rings and closure between them will be gauged.
3.5 ELECTRICAL MODEL TESTS
The electrical interface between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle is made up of
monitoring, control, telecommunication and separation signals, and electrical power.
Testing of the functional aspect of these signals is covered below under the Functional
interface. Checking of the electrical aspect is essentially wire checking between the inter-
face connector and the main electrical harness during its development for correct size,
count, routing and termination of each interface wire.
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The first electrically operative test model will be the Development Spacecraft. With this
model, the electrical interface is tested by measuring the continuity of each wire and the
impedance between each pin and ground. Then, with the model operating, the output at
the interface connector (using a special test harness) is me asured on each pin. The test
will be repeated with the launch vehicle electrical simulator connected and measurements
taken at test points in the simulator.
3.6 FUNCTIONAL
The functions common to the launch vehicle and spacecraft are those in which the launch
vehicle serves an umbilical function for signals or power, telemetry backup and separation
initiation. Verification of the functional interface is performed on the Development
Spacecraft (DS) using an engineering model LCE and the launch vehicle simulator. An
umbilical test, a separation test and a telemetry output check are made.
3.6.1 UMBILICAL SIGNAL TEST
Validation of the umbilical functions is accomplished using the interconnection of a space-
craft, the launch vehicle electrical simulator, anumbiiicai cable simulator and the Launch
Complex Equipment.
a. Objective - To verify that the spacecraft can be adequately monitored and con-
trolled in the launch configuration.
b. Test Description - The spacecraft is mated electrically to the launch vehicle
simulator..An umbilical cable (or simulator) connects the launch vehicle simu-
lator to a launch complex equipment console. Power under the control of the
LCE is supplied to the spacecraft from a 50VDC source thru the umbilical cable.
The input lines to the telecommunication system are connected to signal gener-
ators or a DSIF station simulator and the telecommunications output coupled by
means of the spacecraft antennas to suitable receivers and demodulation equip-
ment. The spacecraft is turned on and operated thru a launch countdown
sequence and measurements made of all monitored functions.
Testing of the launch vehicle telemetry backup function is accomplished using the umbilical
test given above. At the telemetry test point in the launch vehicle electrical simulator
that corresponds to the input to the launch vehicle telemetry input, a line is brought out
and connected to the local telemetry test demodulator. Demonstration of adequate signals
on this line while the spacecraft is operated validates this part of the functional interface.
Test of the separation part of the functional interface requires that the launch vehicle
simulator generate separation initiation signals in the proper sequence and of sufficient
amplitude to detonate the separation ignitors. Measurement of proper ignition currents
validates this part of the interface.
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3.6.2 LAUNCHVEHICLE SEPARATIONTEST
a. Objective - To demonstrate that proper spacecraft separation signals are received
from the launch vehicle.
b. Test Description - The launch vehicle electrical simulator is connected to the
spacecraft. Test squibs are inserted in the detonators of the spacecraft
separation mechanism. The launch vehicle separation safe-arm circuits are
set to safe then operated to arm. Detonation energy is transmitted thru the inter-
face. The resultant ignitor currents are measured.
3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL
The launch vehicle (exclusive of the shroud) does not play a very large part in the environ-
ment of the spacecraft. The significant environmental effects are:
3.7.1 THERMAL
Heat transfer by convection is restricted by means of an encapsulation barrier between
the nose fairing and the bottom of the spacecraft and by means of the superinsulation in-
side the spacecraft adapter. A small amount of heat transfer by conduction will occur
thru the encapsulating diaphragm and thru the interface structure. A further small amount
of heat transfer by radiation will occur across the interface between the spacecraft and
the Centaur tankage.
In the early part of the program, calculations of these effects will be reduced to a thermal
launch vehicle interface for the Thermal Control Models. The effect of the nose fairing,
especially during the time that the spacecraft is on the launch pad and subject to the effect
of the sun on the fairing, will be calculated and incorporated into the thermal models.
Both of these effects will be verified in the Thermal Model tests. Results from these
tests will be used to establish the thermal interface and to establish on-pad cooling re-
quirements.
The Development Spacecraft will be subjected to Thermal-Vacuum tests. While the major
portion of such testing concerns post-injection environments, a part of the test will again
reverify the thermal effects of the launch vehicle for the period of time from mating thru
launch to injection.
3.7.2 CLEANLINESS
The launch vehicle (Centaur) does not affect the spacecraft cleanliness directly since the
spacecraft is encapsulated. However, cooling air supplied to the spacecraft by the launch
vehicle will have to be clean enough to avoid contamination of the scientific equipment,
capsule and solar array during the launch preparation and early flight period. The inter-
face requirements for cooling air will be supplemented by cleanliness specifications
based upon tests made with the Development Test Model in which particle deposition will
12 of 36
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bemeasured using flow configurations basedupon thermal considerations.
3.7.3 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE
The Centaur stage of the launchvehicle andthe spacecraft are enclosed in an opaque
shroud whoseinner surface will have a marked effect onelectromagnetic energy radiated
within the shroud. A comprehensive test of this total environment requires facilities be-
yond the direct needs of the spacecraft contractor. Therefore, as a developmenttest of
this part of the interface, the spacecraft will be tested for radiation at frequencies to
which the launchvehicle is sensitive andwill measure its sensitivity to energy at fre-
quencies radiated by the launchvehicle. Baseduponthe results of these tests, the
electromagnetic interference effects in beth the shroudedand unshroudedconfiguration
will be evaluated.
3.7.4 MAGNETIC
The spacecraft will be affected by magnetic fields inherent in or generated by the launch
vehicle. Early in the program, an evaluation of the magnitude and shapeof the fields of
the launch vehicle andof the shroud is required to estimate the impact on the spacecraft.
The results of the launchvehicle magnetic evaluation will beused to build a mathematical
analog for use in evaluating the effect of the launch vehicle on the magnetic map of the
spacecraft. Then, during the magnetic mapping of the DevelopmentSpacecraft, a
simulator basedon the launch vehicle magnetic evaluation will beused to evaluate the
real effect of such a field.
3.7.5 LAUNCH COMPLEX SPACECRAFTHANDLING
The Structural Test Model will beused to establish the design of handling AHSE. Part
of the requirement is baseduponmating with the launchvehicle. The spacecraft andthe
nose fairing are to be transported from the ESF to the launchpad while the spacecraft re-
mains encapsulated, but does not in anyway mechanically contact the fairing. This same
configuration must bemaintained throughout the lifting andmating process with the
additional complication that mating to the Centaur be accomplished independentlyof mat-
ing the nose fairing to its support.
The AHSE is designedto accomplish all of the above. Using the structural test model
and a launch vehicle adapter, a trial mating test will be run. This test will be run again
with the DevelopmentSpacecraft (andwith each subsequentspacecraft) as part of the
handling andmechanical inspecting test described in Para. 3.4.1 above.
3.8 LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE TESTSWITH PTM
The preceding section developed the launchvehicle interface testing required using de-
velopment models. The designof the interface was validated using a progression of
tests on increasingly complete equipmentup thru the DevelopmentSpacecraft. Basedon
the foregoing validated design, the first complete spacecraft is assembled from flight
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equivalent hardware. This is called the Proof Test Model (PTM) and is to be tested to
type approval levels. The PTM is assembled and tested in the same manner as will be
employed to build the flight spacecraft. During or after final assembly testing, the PTM
is tested for Design Verification. The PTM is then transported to KSC for verification
of Launch Activities.
3.8.1 ASSEMBLY AND TEST
The tests pertinent to the launch vehicle interface performed on the PTM (or a flight
spacecraft) during the assembly cycle are: Mechanical Inspection, identical to the test
described in 3.4.1 above; Electrical tests of the wiring of the interface connector;
Functional tests performed as part of the All-systems test and the LCE Interface test;
Vibration tests; and, Environmental tests.
The vibration and environmental tests are performed in the assembly and test cycle for
all spacecraft, but with higher levels of stimulation for the PTM. These are the design
verification tests. The mechanical interface is reverified in the Vibration test (described
in Para. 3.3) since a part of the test is run to measure the spacecraft under conditions
exceeding those expected during the ascent part of the flight.
The Functional interface is verified in the All-systems test by:
a. Test of the separation electrical system.
b. Operating the spacecraft thru the interface electrical connector in a manner
analogous to that used in the mated condition.
c. Testing the telecommunication system.
d. Measuring the backup telemetry output.
The environmental interfaces with the launch vehicle are tested in:
a. The thermal-vacuum test.
b. The Electromagnetic Interference test.
c. Magnetic mapping.
3.8.2 TESTS ATKSC
The PTM is sent to KSC to verify the spacecraft interfaces with the launch vehicle and
the other program elements involved in launch preparation. It is put thru the procedures
that are to be used for launch to verify them and the quality of the preparation.
After arrival at the Cape, the PTM and each flight spacecraft is subjected to a complete
round of launch preparation and testing. Each vehicle is first prepared and given a com-
plete systems test, run in the SCF. As part of the systems test, another match/mate
inspection of the mechanical interface is performed and a wire check of the interface
connectors is made. Then, the electrical tests between the spacecraft and the launch
vehicle simulator will be rerun.
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After completion of testing at the SCF and ESF, the spacecraft is transported to the launch
complex for initial mating to the launch vehicle. The interface electrical connections are
again checked and the mating surfaces inspected. The spacecraft is mated and the
electrical interface is validated as part of the prelaunch countdown. To validate the
thermal interface, a set of temperature tests is made while the spacecraft is mated and
enclosed. The effectiveness of cooling, cleanness of cooling air and the ability to remain
ready for extended period is verified. An EMI compatibility test involving the launch
vehicle and the equipment operating in the KSC environment is run to determine the charac-
teristics of the EMI interface. When the initial round of launch complex tests has been
completed, the spacecraft is demated and an inspection of the interface (both mechanical
and electrical) is made. Upon return to the SCF a magnetic reverification test is run to
determine the effects on the spacecraft perm field of the launch vehicle and the launch
complex.
3.9 LAUNCH VEHICLE INTERFACE TESTS OF FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
The sequence of tests performed to validate the launch vehicle interface on each flight
spacecraft duplicates those performed on the PTM. The only exception is during assem-
bly testing where the vibration and environmental tests are performed using Flight-
Acceptance stimulation levels instead of the higher TA levels. The sequence starts with
assembly of the structure and harness where the mechanical and electrical interfaces
are first tested and continues thru functional, vibration and environment tests in which
all of the interfaces are tested as part of the All-systems, vibration, thermal vacuum,
and EMI tests and magnetic mapping. Description of these tests is given in the Assembly
and Checkout Plan, CII VBll0VP005 for 1971 and CH VAll0VP005 for 1969.
After completing the Assembly and Test cycle, the Flight spacecraft is shipped to KSC.
The general flow is identical to that given above for the PTM. Further description is
found in the Launch Operations Plan CII VBll0VP006 for 1971 and CII VA110VP006
for 1969.
Readiness for launch requires satisfactory completion of the following launch vehicle
interface tests:
a. Mechanical
1. All-systems in SCF
2. Fueling and Nose Fairing installation
3. Mating to Launch Vehicle
b. Electrical
1. All-systems in SCF
2. Final ESF checkout
3. Pad Checkout
15 of 36
VBIlOVP009
c. Functional
1. All-systems in SCF
2. Fueling and Pyro installation at ESF
3. Final checkout at ESF
4. Operation and monitor at pad
5. Separation pyro tests at pad
6. Telecommunications tests at pad
7. Telemetry tests at pad
d. Environmental
1. Thermal evaluation during pad operations
2. EMItests at pad
3. Magnetic mapping at SCF
4. Encapsulation tests at ESF and pad
3.10 SPACECRAFT SIMULATOR
In the tests identified and described above, the measurements leading to assurance of
launch vehicle compatibility were predominantly made on or with the spacecraft or a model
of it. Another assurance of the adequacv of the interface derives from tests performed
on the launch vehicle using a spacecraft simulator. Such tests are performed both at the
launch vehicle contractors' plant and at the launch complex. They assure that the launch
vehicle and the connections thru it to the launch complex will be ready for the launch
vehicle when it is mated. The requirements for the spacecraft simulator are such that
several sub-simulators will be constructed. These are:
ag Mechamcal - This simulator duplicates the bottom portion of the spacecraft and
provides a base to which a mass duplicating the static mass of the spacecraft
can be fastened. It is used for match/mate inspections and mating tests.
b. Electrical - This is a sub-simulator accurate for input/output electrical wiring
and terminations which is used to validate the launch vehicle cables and circuitry.
Co Structural Analog - This is a mathematical model of the structure of the space-
craft for use in designing the launch vehicle adapter.
4.0 NOSE FAIRING INTERFACE
The nose fairing is used to maintain a suitable environment for the overall flight space-
craft for all transport of the spacecraft from the time of assembly in the ESF to in-flight
shroud jettison. Since no structural connection exists between the nose fairing and the
overall spacecraft, the common mechanical support for both before mating to the launch
vehicle is the transporter and the mating AHSE, which supports both and maintains the
spatial relationship between them. After mating the nose fairing is supported and
16 of 36
VBll0VP009
positioned by the lower shroud to which it is mated after the spacecraft is mated to the
l_nch vehicle. To provide encapsulationbefore the nose fairing is mated to the lower
shroud, a flexible diaphram is attachedbetween the bottom of the fairing and the space-
craft.
The nose fairing carries the parasitic telecommunication antenna subsystem which re-
radiates the signals transmitted by the spacecraft radio system to DSIF Station Cape 71
and the STC.
4.1 MODEL TESTS
During the development of the spacecraft, its interface with the nose fairing, and the
effects of the nose fairing on other characteristics must be determined. To identify the
effects of the fairing a series of model tests are run. All these tests use a development
model capsule, the Development Spacecraft and an engineering model nose fairing.
ao Handling_ Mating and Clearance - The nose fairing is lifted over the capsule/
spacecraft and lowered onto the mating AHSE. The whole is mated to the launch
vehicle adapter. Ciearancesbetween the fairing and the spacecraft and capsule
are measured.
bl Encapsulation, Cooling and Contamination - A spacecraft with capsule attached
is encapsulated in the nose fairing. The system is operated with cooling air
supplied. Temperatures at several key locations, including the exhaust air are
measured and rate of contamination is evaluated.
ee EMI - The encapsulated spacecr_t is operated using the STC to monitor and con-
trol. The intensity of the spacecraft telecommunication output signals radiated
outside the fairing is measured. With the telecommunication receivers cali-
brated, signals are radiated outside the fairing and the response of the receivers
is measured. This test is run at the same time as the measurement of the
parasitic antenna is made.
4.2 PTM AND FLIGHT SPACECRAFT TESTS
During production of the PTMs and the flight spacecraft, as part of the preparation for
spacecraft system test, a test is run to determine the clearances between nose fairing,
capsule and spacecraft, based on the handling and mating AHSE. Then electrical tests
are made to determine the attenuation and reflected impedance parasitic antenna on the
spacecraft telecommunication subsystem. Environmental conditioning, magnetic effect
and EMI tests are run in conjunction with launch vehicle interface tests and require the
same equipment.
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4.3 LAUNCH OPERATIONS
At the ESF, the flight nose fairing is positioned over the overall spacecraft (with mated
capsule) and the whole encapsulated. This process is first performed on the PTM in its
validation cycle of launch operations. The fairing interfaces to the spacecraft, capsule
and AHSE are inspected, clearances are rechecked, and encapsulation verified. The
radio relay using the fairing parasitic antenna is operated and communications with DSIF
Station Cape 71 is established and its attenuation measured. EMI tests are run and thermal
effects measured. This series of tests is repeated for each flight spacecraft at the ESF.
After arrival at the launch pad, the mechanical interfaces of the spacecraft, launch vehicle,
nose fairing and shroud are inspected and mating accomplished. Thermal tests are run
using the PTM to evaluate the internal temperature distribution and control under the
influence of diurnal solar radiation. The parasitic antenna system is connected to the
gantry relay antenna using the removable antenna coupler and signal tests run with the
STC and DSIF Station Cape 71. EMI tests in the KSC electromagnetic environment are
run to evaluate both the influence on and from the spacecraft. The PTM is demated from
the launch vehicle and returned to the ESF where the nose fairing is removed. A post-
mating inspection and test is run to determine that no unpredicted change in the interface
has occurred. Each flight spacecraft follows the same sequence for launch preparation
tests as the PTM.
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5.0 SHROUD INTERFACE
The interface between the spacecraft and the lower shroud is functional rather than mechanical.
During the process of mating the spacecraft to the launch vehicle, the AHSE will support
and lower both the spacecraft and the nose fairing. While the spacecraft is being fastened
to the launch vehicle, the nose fairing is held above its mating position. Then the lower
support arms of the AHSE are withdrawn and mating between the nose fairing and lower
shroud completed. The encapsulation is preserved since access for fastening does not
require penetration of the encapsulation diaphram.
5.1 LAUNCH OPERATIONS
No mechanical or electrical connection is made between the spacecraft and the lower shroud,
therefore, no mechanical and electrical testing of this interface is required. In the PTM-
type approval tests, an inspection of the spacecraft mating AHSE for conformity to approved
interface drawings will be made. This inspection will be again performed during the mating
process at the launch pad. The primary direct test of this interface is trial mating of the
PTM to the launch vehicle test vehicle at the launch complex. Mating AHSE and procedures
are tested for operability and utility. These tests are run as part of the overall launch
pad activity. For each spacecraft the interface compatibility is reverified by the trial mat-
ing and testing in the first cycle of launch preparation.
6.0 CAPSULE INTERFACE
The mechanical interface between the capsule and the spacecraft is the field joint at
Station 59 of the spacecraft. The mating surface is an 80" diameter ring at the top of the
capsule support structure. Enclosing the capsule is a biological barrier that maintains the
capsule in a sterile condition. For the purpose of this plan, the bio-barrier is considered a
part of the capsule. The capsule and spacecraft are enclosed in a nose fairing which provides
environmental protection for ascent through the atmosphere. No mechanical connection is
made between the capsule and the fairing. The spacecraft provides the only support for the
capsule.
Approximately in the mating plane are located the electrical connections that carry separation,
control and data signals, and power. During the part of the flight before capsule separation,
data from the capsule is carried to the spacecraft thru the electrical connections at the
interface. After separation, data is transmitted from the capsule by means of a VHF radio
link to a receiver in the spacecraft. Control of the capsule, including final checkout imme-
diately before separation, is provided by the spacecraft through the electrical interface.
Separation of the capsule is effected by means of a mechanism built into the capsule. Initi-
ation of capsule separation comes from the spacecraft. After separation of the capsule, a
part of the bio-barrier may remain attached to the spacecraft. This is also separated by
initiation from the spacecraft using the mechanism built into the overall capsule bio-barrier
system.
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6.1 MODEL TESTING
The preliminary design of the interface between the capsule and spacecraft is embodied in
several test models built to test particular characteristics (e. g. structural, thermal).
After tests have validated these aspects of the design, the Development Spacecraft is built
and the entire interface design is tested. The preliminary design tests are:
6. i. 1 STRUCTURAL TESTS
Initial requirements for the structural interface between the capsule and the spacecraft are
used to build a Structural Analog. This is a mathematical model of the spacecraft structure
used to establish its preliminary design. Capsule structural analog data from the capsule
contractor is used in the model to determine the characteristics of the interface and to
establish a preliminary hardware design. The results obtained from exercising this model
are embodied in the Structural Test Model (STM). The STM is a full scale model of the
spacecraft used to validate the structural design by static load, vibration and shock testing.
The structural interface between the capsule and spacecraft is tested by mating a dynamically
accurate structural model of the capsule to the STM and performing the Vibration Test
outlined in Para. 3.3 above. Results of the structural model tests are used as the basis of
the final interface structural design for both the capsule and spacecraft.
6.1.2 THERMAL INTERFACE TESTS
The thermal interface between the capsule and the spacecraft is tested during the design
phase by running tests on two different models. These are: the Thermal Control Model
(TCM) and the 1/3 Scale Model. The TCM is a full scale model of the equipment module.
It is used to establish the heat transfer within the equipment portion of the spacecraft. The
effect of the capsule is simulated in performing tests with this model to determine changes
in the thermal environment caused by the capsule. No data about the effect of the spacecraft
on the capsule is obtained with this model. To examine more completely the interface heat
transfer, the 1/3 Scale Model is used. This is an overall spacecraft scaled 1/3 for thermal
characteristics. It requires a similarly scaled capsule for testing. Both the capsule and the
spacecraft are thermally active. Tests on this model are run in a thermal vacuum environ-
ment so that not only heat transfer but also solar shadowing inter-effects can be measured.
The tests with both thermal models are the basis for the final thermal interface design.
6.1.3 RF TELECOMMUNICATION TESTS
To validate the telecommunication portion of the spacecraft to capsule interface, tests are
runusing a capsule RF simulator and the RF model of the spacecraft telecommunications
system. The models are operated together to measure power, sensitivity, data error rate,
EMI sensitivity, and control. Attenuation is inserted in the signal path to determine capa-
bility limits in the operational configuration expected after capsule separation. During this
test, a procedure to monitor the telecommunications system when it is operated with the
capsule mated will be developed. Results from these tests are used to validate the final
design requirements and specifications on the interface telecommunications system.
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6.1.4 DEVELOPMENT SPACECRAFT TESTS
After the complete spacecraft design has been established, including the interface with
the capsule, a complete spacecraft is built. This is the Development Spacecraft (DS).
purpose of this model is complete verification of all characteristics of the spacecraft,
including its interface with the capsule. The following tests will be conducted:
The
a. Mechanical - In the assembly of the DS, the match/mate capsule fixture isused
to check the alignment of the spacecraft structure. After assembly is completed
and the first system test has been run, an engineering model of the capsule will
be mated to the DS. Static and dyimmic load tests, vibration and shock tests will
be run to demonstrate that the structural and mechanical design is adequate and has
been adequately constructed.
b. Electrical - During the early assembly of the DS, the electrical interface between
the capsule and the spacecraft is tested for power and signal transfer by performing
continuity checks and inspection of wire routing and interface connector connections.
When the assembly is complete, an electrical capsule simulator is mated and
signal checks made.
c. Functional - After assembly, an All-systems test is run and the DS is op_
through its entire sequence of functions, monitored and controlled by the System
Test Complex. To test the capsule interface, an engineering model of the capsule
is mated and operated. The capsule is monitored using its checkout equipment in
the STC and the special harnesses and test equipment used for its own All-system
testing and evaluation. Tests to be run range from subsystem tests to full opera-
tions. The functions to be tested are:
1. Separation Signal - The spacecraft initiates separation and sends the signal.
Measurement of proper ignitor action in the capsule verifies the interface.
2. Telecommunications - The telecommunication interface between the capsule
and the spacecraft is tested by operating the capsule transmitter and recording
data received by the spacecraft receiver. The sio_a! poth ,l_d between the
transmitter and receiver and the test procedure to be followed will be those
developed on the RF simulator.
3. Handling and Mating - The procedures and means used to handle the capsule,
mate it to the spacecraft, install the nose fairing, and mate the overall space-
craft to a launch vehicle simulator will be validated by performing these
operations using the engineering capsule and the DS, mating to the launch
vehicle adapter.
4. Data and Command - The capability of the spacecraft to send commands to the
capsule will be tested by generating capsule command sequences in the STC
and transmitting them to the spacecraft. Data from the capsule telemetry
system fed through the spacecraft to the STC will be monitored to verify receipt
and action by the capsule. By sending the full range of commands and monitor-
ing all the telemetry points, the entire data and command interface is verified.
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de Environmental - The DS will be tested for performance in thermal and EMI environ-
ments. These tests will be run using an engineering model of the nose fairing.
Their purpose is to demonstrate that no adverse effect takes place between the
capsule and the spacecraft under the conditions of environment to be experienced
in launch preparation or in flight.
1. Thermal - For thermal tests the nose fairing is installed over the overall
spacecraft and the encapsulation closed. With all systems operating, a simu-
lated thermal environment is applied to the nose fairing and measurements
made on the capsule and spacecraft. Proper umbilical cooling and internal
air distribution are verified by these tests. At the same time, the thermal
interface between the capsule and the spacecraft is revalidated for shrouded
conditions.
2. Electromagnetic Interference - EMI can occur between the spacecraft and
capsule under two conditions: enshrouded, as during launch preparation and
ascent; and, without the shroud, as in interplanetary configuration. Determin-
ation of the EMI in both of these conditions is made in conjunction with the
telecommunications system test by operating all the systems aboard and
observing the effects on radio receivers and the on-board electronic equipment.
3. Magnetic - The field of the spacecraft with and without the capsule is mapped.
From the results of the mapping, the effect of the capsule on the magnetometer
and on the permanent field of the spacecraft is determined.
The interface tests described for the Development Spacecraft and the engineering capsule
validate not only the interface design, but also its translation to hardware. Based on these
tests and the satisfactory results of other system tests, the final design is released and
the PTM is assembled.
6.2 CAPSULE INTERFACE TESTS WITH THE PTM
The interface tests described above for the Development Spacecraft are again run on the
PTM, but with Type Acceptance levels of stimulation and acceptance. After the factory
tests on the PTM have been completed, it is sent to KSC for launch activity verification.
6.2.1 ASSEMBLY AND TEST
Capsule interface tests performed during the assembly and test of the PTM or of a flight
spacecraft are: Mechanical Inspection, Electrical wiring and connector tests, Functional
tests, Vibration, and Environmental tests.
Mechanical inspection is performed during the initial assembly of the structure and, again,
as a part of each mating of a capsule or simulator. The electrical test is performed during
assembly of the equipment module and before each mating or connection to the System Test
Complex or the Launch Complex Equipment. The structural interface is verified by the
Vibration Test.
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The functional interface is verified in the All-system Test by performing the following:
a. Capsule Separation Test
b. Data and Command Test
c. Telecommunication Test
The environmental interfaces are tested in:
a. Thermal-Vacuum Test
b. Electromagnetic Interference Test
c. Magnetic Mapping
6.2.2 TESTS AT KSC
The PTM is sent to KSC to verify the launch preparation sequence and its interfaces with the
facilities used for launch preparation before actual preparation of a flight vehicle. When the
spacecraft arrives at KSC, it is given anAll-systems Test in the SCF. This test again veri-
fies the capsule interface since a capsule is mated and the Mechanical inspection, Electrical
wiring test, and the Functional tests outlined above are performed, and the magnetic field
of the overall spacecraft is mapped. After the capsule is demated, the spacecraft is
transported to the ESF.
At the ESF, the interface is mechanically inspected and electrically tested, and the capsule
remated. The nose fairing is lowered into place and the overall spacecraft is encapsulated.
A checkout with the LCE is run to reverify the functional interface. The encapsulated over-
all spacecraft is then transported to the launch complex.
After mating the overall spacecraft with the launch vehicle, the functional interface with
the capsule is reverified by running a system checkout under the control of the LCE. During
the testing at the launch complex, an EMI test is run to determine the effects of the entire
_h'rnllrl nnrt fh_, l_nnr,,h xl"_h-lr_l_ nn hnfh the, nnp_l,le _nfl fh_, Qn_r._n_ff A÷ fh,_ +._.,,_,_
the spacecraft and capsule are evaluated for EMI effects from, and on, other KSC instru-
mentation.
A thermal environment test is run at the launch pad to determine the effects of the launch
vehicle, pad cooling and solar radiation impinging on the fairing. The temperatures of the
spacecraft and the capsule are monitored, while they are maintained in a launch-ready
condition.
After demating, the overall spacecraft is returned to the ESF where the functional checks
are again performed. The capsule is then demated and another mechanical inspection of the
interface performed. Both are returned to the SCF, where magnetic mapping is rerun to
determine the effect on the permanent field of launch preparation activities.
6.3 CAPSULE INTERFACE TESTS WITH FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
The sequence of tests to validate the capsule interface with a flight spacecraft duplicates
that performed on the PTM, with the exception that the levels of testing are not Type
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Acceptance, but Flight Acceptance. Description of the flow of these tests is given in the
Assembly and Checkout Plan CII-VBll0VP005 for 1971 and CII-VA110VP005 for 1969.
After completing the Assembly and Test cycle, the Flight spacecraft is shipped to KSC. The
general flow is identical to that given above for the PTM. Further description is found in
the Launch Operations Plan CII-VB110VP006 for 1971 and CII-VAll0VP006 for 1969.
Readiness for launch requires satisfactory completion of the following capsule interface tests:
a. Mechanical
1. Mechanical Inspection, Mating and Demating at SCF
2. Mechanical Inspection, Mating and Demating at ESF
3. Nose Fairing Installation
b. Electrical
1. All-systems Test at SCF
2. ESF Checkout
3. Launch Complex Checkout
c. Functional
1. All-systems in SCF
2. Systems Checkout in ESF
3. Systems Checkout at Launch Pad
d. Environmental
1. Thermal Evaluation at Pad
2. EMI Tests at Pad
3. Magnetic Mapping at SCF
6.4 SPACECRAFT SIMULATOR
In the series of tests described above for the capsule interface, the measurements are made
using a spacecraft or a model of it. Another series of tests that verify this interface is run
on the capsule using a spacecraft simulator. The same categories of tests as given above
are run with the addition of a separation test in which separation of the capsule and bio-
barrier is initiated by signals generated by the spacecraft simulator.
The requirements for the spacecraft simulator are:
a. Mechanical - The simulator is a duplicate of the capsule support structure of the
spacecraft. It can be used to support the capsule for structural tests, vibration
tests and mating tests.
b. Electrical - The spacecraft simulator duplicates the electrical interface and provides
proper electrical terminations of all wires for electrical tests.
c. Functional - The simulator provides capsule power from the spacecraft, separation
and command signals, and can be monitored for capsule data. It contains a tele-
communications receiver and antenna suitable for measuring the capsule radio
link.
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7.0 SCIENCE INTERFACE
The science interface is more complex than other interfaces because the science payload is
not a single assembly but instead is made up of instruments and equipment located at
different places on the space vehicle and closely integrated in its design. The interface is,
therefore, the summation of a number of individual interfaces. Because the particular
scientific instruments and their control and data equipment have been only generally speci-
fied, a representative group has been postulated and the required interface testing is based
on their common characteristics. The hardware interfaces making up the science to space
vehicle interface are:
a. Instruments control and data automation equipment located in bays 8 and 10 of the
space vehicle torus.
b. Instruments mounted on the vehicle support structure.
c. Instruments mounted on the scan platform.
d. The magnetometer located on its boom.
All of these interfaces share basic elements; mechanical support and environment control
from the space vehicle, power and signal inputs via the vehicle electrical system and all
feed data through the space vehicle electrical or telecommunications subsystems.
Verification of this interface is achieved by repeated operation of the science instruments
aboard the spacecraft models in a set of environments that closely simulates the expected
flight environment. These tests are run for sufficiently long periods of time to give statis-
tical assurance of satisfactory flight results. To reduce the probability of initial failures of
flight instruments, individual mechanical, electrical and functional tests are performed on
the parts of the science payload as they are integrated into the flight spacecraft. Then,
as part of the overall spacecraft, the science payload is tested in the system and environ-
mental tests performed during type approval and flight acceptance testing and launch prepa-
ration.
7.1 MODEL TESTS
Engineering models are built and tested to verify the electrical, thermal and structural
designs. Initial Interface testing requires models of the parts of the science payload that are
interfaced or integrated in them for incorporation into the engineering model testing. Mock-
ups or simulators accurate for the characteristic to be proven in the model are sufficient.
The model tests are:
7.1.1 BUS THERMAL MODEL TESTS
This model is essentially the equipment module with thermal simulators for the equipment
in each bay. Thermal simulators for the DAE, the electronic control package and instru-
ments to go in or on the torus are required. Thermal vacuum tests are performed to measure
the heat transfer and thermal ambients to be experienced by equipment on the spacecraft.
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The initial thermal interface design between the science equipment and the spacecraft is
validated on this model.
7.1.2 ONE THIRD (1/3) SCALE THERMAL MODEL TESTS
The 1/3 scale model is a complete space vehicle including the capsule. It is used to deter-
mine temperature distribution in the overall space vehicle by testing in a simulated space
environment. A suitably scaled science payload is required. Tests with this model also
validate the thermal interface design for each instrument and piece of science equipment.
7.1.3 SCAN PLATFORM THERMAL MODEL TESTS
The thermal model of the scan platform is built full size. It is tested to determine the overall
thermal control of the scan package in a simulated space environment. Science instrument
simulators, accurate for thermal characteristics, are required for these tests. This set
of tests validates the thermal interface design for the instruments in the scan platform.
7.1.4 STRUCTURAL ANALOG MODEL ANALYSES
This is a mathematical model of the spacecraft structure. Structural analogs of all parts
of the science payload, accurate for mass and mounting, are required. Data runs are made
on this model to evaluate the structural design. From the data generated with the model
a structural test model is constructed.
7.1.5 STRUCTURAL TEST MODEL TESTS
The structural test model is used to measure the final structure. Dynamic equivalent
mockups of all equipment to be carried by the space vehicle are tested in this structural
model. A complete mockup of the science payload, equivalent for mass, c.g., mounting
and dynamic properties, is required. The vibration and shock environment for each instru-
ment is determined using this model. From these tests the structural interface is validated.
7.1.6 DEVELOPMENT SPACECRAFT TESTS
This engineering model is an electrically and mechanically complete vehicle. It is used
to validate the overall design before production of the PTM. Functional engineering models
of the DAE and the electronics packages and instruments suitable for environmental and
functional testing are required.
All of the interfaces between the science and the spacecraft are tested on this model.
Thermal and vibration tests verify the final designs developed in the earlier models.
Functional tests are run in which the signal and power interfaces are tested, electrical
interconnections and routing checked and data handling verified. For these tests the
functional science instruments are stimulated, and to the extent feasible operated in their
normal modes.
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7.2 PTM TESTS
For the PTM s and the flight spacecraft, the science to vehicle interface validation starts
at the electrical subsystem test when the DAE and the science electronic packages are
tested with other bay equipment in the assembled equipment module. As each instru-
ment is mounted on the equipment module it is tested for mechanical compatibility and
electrical connection. In parallel with assembly of the equipment module assembly, inspec-
tion and testing of the scan platform, on which the other science instruments are mounted,
is performed. Again as each instrument is mounted, its mechanical and electrical inter-
faces are validated.
The remaining science instruments (those mounted elsewhere on the spacecraft) are
assembled toward the end of the cycle. They are individually tested as they are mounted.
All of the electrical and functional interfaces are again validated in the final systems test.
Following the all-systems test, the overall science interface is verified in the vibration
test and the thermal environment protection and control is verified in the Thermal Vacuum
Test. Magnetic mapping and electromagnetic interference testing in the factory initially
verify these interface environments. In the terminal part of the assembly sequence, two
additional system tests verify the electrical and functional interface of the science instruments
by powering and stimulating the instruments and reading out the results from the tele-
communication signals.
7.3 FI/GHT SPACECRAFT TESTS
All of the science interface tests run on the PTM served to validate the overall design and
all its details. The same sequence of test_ from each instrument's initial mechanical and
electrical tests to the full science payload operating and feeding data through the telecom-
munication system is run on each flight spacecraft during its assembly and test cycle. The
purpose is to demonstrate that the active interface meets its design specifications under
all condition of operations.
7.4 LAUNCH OPERATIONS
Tests performed during launch operations are essentially retests of the interfaces of the
science payload with the spacecraft. By the time the spacecraft reaches KSC, all the inter-
face have been validated several times. Further testing is performed to demonstrate that
no degradation has occurred. Upon arrival at the SCF, the entire space vehicle is inspected
and system tested. The mechanical, electrical and functional interfaces of the science
payload and the space vehicle are revalidated. Magnetic mapping and EMI testing in the
preparation cycle verify these aspects of the interface at the SCF.
In the ESF and at the launch pad, the continued functional performance of the science payload
is monitored by both LCE and via the telecommunications subsystem. Final validation of
the proper functioning of the science to spacecraft interfaces is the monitoring of adequate
performance during countdown.
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8.0 ESF INTERFACE
During the launch preparation activities at KSC, the spacecraft is first tested at the SCF.
It is then transported to the ESF for fueling, and installation of pyrotechnics, mating of the
capsule and encapsulation in the nose fairing. The interface between the spacecraft and the
ESF is comprised of:
a. The mechanical and electrical interface is used during ESF checks to provide
electrical access and mechanical support to the spacecraft provided by the trans-
porter.
b. Fueling and cooling lines.
c. RF link from the spacecraft/fairing antenna.
d. Special test cable from spacecraft to ESF Control Console.
8.1 FACTORY TESTING
Verification of elements in this interface are conducted in two factory tests. The first is
assembly inspection, where fueling pipes are connected to the spacecraft and their fit and
tightness inspected. The second is in the Interface test when the LCE is connected through
the ESF cable simulation and the spacecraft is exercised through the ESF checkout sequence.
Thermal compatibility and control, effectiveness of encapsulation, and EMI are measured in
this test to verify the adequacy of ESF operations. This test is conducted as part of the
Interface test for each PTM and flight spacecraft.
8.2 PTMATKSC
Before the flight spacecraft are produced, the PTM is put through the cycle of tests required
at KSC for launch preparation. As a part of the cycle, the PTM goes to the ESF to be fueled,
have pyros installed, and to have the capsule mated.
While in the ESF, the special cables are tested and the PTM is connected to the LCE by these
special cables. The fueling and cooling lines are inspected and fitted and the PTM fueling
test completed. The nose fairing is fitted over the spacecraft. The parasitic fairing antenna
is connected to the ESF relay antenna system for telecommunication checkout with the STC
at the SCF. The spacecraft to ESF interface tests are completed by running a successful
systems test using the LCE and the launch readiness sequence.
8.3 LAUNCH OPERATIONS
In the first cycle of the launch preparation for each spacecraft, the vehicle is brought to the
ESF after systems test at the SCF. The fueling fittings and cooling lines are inspected and
a fueling test conducted. The special cable connectors are inspected, tested and connected.
The fairing parasitic antenna is inspected and tested and the fairing installed. The overall
radio link from spacecraft to SCF is operated and attenuation and noise measured. The
ESF system test completes the testing of this interface for each spacecraft.
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8.4 LAUNCH COMPLEX INTERFACE
Theinterface betweenthe spacecraft and launch complex is comprised of three areas:
a. Handling during launch preparation
b. Power and Control
c. Telecommunication
When the launch vehicle is ready for spacecraft mating, the overall spacecraft, encapsu-
lated in the nose fairing, is transported to the launch complex. The service tower provides
lifting and load control for mating. After mating, the launch complex provides cooling,
and environment control. Electrical power for the spacecraft is provided by a launch
complex generator system and supplied through a launch vehicle umbilical and the interface
electrical connector between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft. Control of this power
is provided by the LCE. Spacecraft control and monitoring signals pass through the launch
vehicle interface with the spacecraft, the launch vehicle umbilical, and the launch complex
transfer cables to the LCE located in the blockhouse. Spacecraft telecommunications
subsystem signals are transmitted to the STC in the SCF and to the Cape DSIF Station
(Cape 71). These signals pass from the spacecraft through the nose fairing parasitic antenna
and are relayed by another antenna mounted on the umbilical tower. Signals from either
the STC or Cape 71 picked up by the second relay antenna on the umbilical tower are fed through
the launch vehicle and its umbilical to the spacecraft.
8.5 FACTORY TESTING
The structural model will be used to perform initial lifting and simulated mating checks
using the AHSE, a dummy capsule and a nose fairing. This test will be conducted as part
of the acceptance tests of the AHSE. During the Interface test on each spacecraft, both
PTM and flight, the LCE will be interconnected with simulated launch umbilical and transfer
cables to the spacecraft and a launch countdown conducted. The STC will back the LCE
and comrnnnienta wlfh fho .%r_oav_f t in #ha _mo o_.f;m,_+;_, oo it _ _" _ ..... a ._.._-_-
launch. The capacity of the LCE to monitor overall spacecraft readiness in the simulated
environment of the launch complex and of the STC to analyse subsystem performance as a
backup to the LCE will be measured.
8.6 LAUNCH AREA TESTS
In the cycle of tests using the PTM at the launch area, the compatibility of the spacecraft
to the complex is tested. The tests follow the sequence established for the launch. The
test criteria are those validated by systems test at the factory. A complete mating and
demating is accomplished; space vehicle alignment is tested; cooling and contamination of
ambient air are evaluated. The telecommunications subsystem is operated and measure-
ments of attenuation and EMI are made. Using the countdown, the PTM is monitored for
flight readiness. Commands are loaded and all subsystems performance tested. After
demating and return to the SCF, the perm field of the spacecraft is remapped to determine
any change induced by the launch complex during the launch preparation sequence.
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8.7 LAUNCH COMPLEX TESTS WITH FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Each flight spacecraft goes through a similar sequence. The overall flight spacecraft is
brought to the launch complex and mated to the launch vehicle. Again, its interface with
the launch complex is tested. In the lifting, mating, and alignment checking on the first
cycle, the procedures, mechanical interface of the launch complex and spacecraft, and the
AHSE are reverffied. After mating, a full countdown is run and the launch readiness
procedure is reverified. The capability of the spacecraft, its LCE and'the interconnections
"between them are validated. Demating inspection and the final systems test, including
magnetic perm field measurement, to evaluate the effects of the first cycle completes
the testing of the launch vehicle to launch complex interface.
9.0 DSIF INTERFACE
In the flight portion of the Voyager Program, the spacecraft has a functional interface with
each of the tracking stations in the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility. Each of these
interfaces consists of the bi-directional transmission and reception of radio signals between
the spacecraft and the stations of the net which have it in view: Cape 71, ETR Downrange,
Johannesburg, Woomera, Canberra, Madrid.
Prior to initiation of the flight portion of the program, this interface must be functionally
verified by tests which closely simulate actual conditions. The degree of simulation can
vary from local checkout of each station using an RF simulator model to a controlled-
condition test using the PTM at each tracking station. As the closeness of simulation
increases, so also does the degree of confidence and the cost of running the test. At the
minimum, with no trial of a flight spacecraft or the PTM against a station, confidence of
mission success depends upon confidence in 1) the fidelity of meeting common specifications
thru design, fabrication and installation tests, and 2) tests with a model of the spacecraft
radio system that does not completely duplicate the flight spacecraft. While the costs
are lowest with this minimum testing, they are not commensurate with the loss of confidence.
At the other end of the comparison, consideration could be given to operating a spacecraft
with each station. While the degree of confidence of success rises, the cost rises so much
faster as to become excessive.
A combination of parts of each of these extremes yields nearly maximum confidence at
moderate cost. By means of complete evaluation performed at Goldstone (held in standard
configuration), comparison of other net stations to Goldstone using the RF simulator, and
checkout of each spacecraft with Cape 71 during launch, the entire interface between space-
craft and the DSIF is assured with high confidence.
9.1 RF MODEL TESTS AT GOLDSTONE
An RF model of the spacecraft valid for the telecommunications and data function is sent
to Goldstone for a comprehensive telecommunications test. This test determines and
demonstrates the capacity to communicate under simulated conditions of propagation and
frequency shifts for the function of range and range rate measurement, time to lock, data
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transmission, command reception, and mode switching. The RF model is then operated
at each of the DSIF stations to validate the spacecraft to DSIF interface for each station.
The model is used to revalidate the interface as needed during operations.
9.2 PTM TESTS AT GOLDSTONE
The PTM, after systems tests at Pasadena, is sent to Goldstone and the above telecommuni-
cations test rerun. Additional tests involving spacecraft generated telemetry data and
commands to be loaded, are run to verify the complete space vehicle to DSIF interface at
the Goldstone and the DSN land lines to Pasadena. This test verifies the operational inter-
face between the spacecraft and the SFOF.
9.3 FACTORY TESTS
As part of the factory all-systems tests for all spacecraft, the telecommunications system
is verified in all its data modes. Simulated DSIF signals are fed to the telecommunication
system to achieve lock and to measure sensitivity and the output is fed into a dummy load
with couplers for power checks and signal demodulation. This test is performed on every
flight vehicle, not only to verify it, but to increase the confidence of successful inter-
facing with DSIF.
9.4 LAUNCH OPERATION
For the PTM and each flight vehicle, the spacecraft telecommunications system is operated
and tested at each of the launch preparation locations (SCF, ESF, LC) to provide both data
about the vehicle and confidence about its interface with the DSIF. At the SCF, the all-
systems test is repeated with DSIF simulation and dummy loading of the transmitters.
At the ESF, the telecommunications system is operated through the nose fairing parasitic
antenna and the ESF relay antenna (for transmit} and the launch vehicle/umbilical RF lines
and ESF relay antenna (for receive}. Signals are exchanged with DSIF Station, Cape 71.
At the launch pad the spacecraft communicates with both the STC at SCF and DSIF Station
Cape 71 by means of relay antennas mounted on the umbilical tower and connected thru the
umbilicals to the spacecraft. Signal levels, frequency, time to lock-up, command and
data transmission tests are rerun to demonstrate the readiness of the spacecraft and the
continuing validity of its interface with the DSIF.
10.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT INTERFACE TESTING
In addition to testing the interfaces that the spacecraft has with other Voyager program
elements, tests are run on the OSE interfaces.
These interfaces are:
a. Systems Test Complex to SCF.
b. Launch Complex Equipment to Launch Complex.
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c. Launch Complex Equipment to ESF.
d. Mission Dependent Equipment to DSIF.
e. Mission Dependent Equipment to SFOF.
10.1 SYSTEMS TEST COMPLEX TO SPACECRAFT CHECKOUT FACILITY
The STC is built to be quickly emplaced in the SCF; each STC used during launch preparation
is the same equipment used for factory testing of its associated spacecraft. Therefore, the
interface between STC and the SCF is primarily environmental. There are two other sub-
interface elements, electrical power and the radio frequency antenna system, directed
toward the launch complex. In addition, the AHSE interfaces with the SCF for transport
and handling during testing.
I0. i.1 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
Initial tests for interface compatibility are run at the breadboard level by establishing that
circuit tests are effective in the configuration at the SCF. Then, using the engineering
models of both the spacecraft and the STC, tests are run to simulate the cycle of SCF
activities. The general test configuration duplicates that planned for the SCF.
10.1.2 FACTORY TESTS
As a part of the acceptance test of each production, STC tests are run to demonstrate
that the equipment not only conforms to its design; but, also that its interfaces, mechanical,
environmental, power input and RF links, are in accordance with their specifications.
Similarly for AHSE, handling operations using the AHSE with first the engineering models
and, later, the flight spacecraft are run to demonstrate compatibility and crew skill for
later tests at the SCF.
10.1.3 INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
Tests run on the STC after it is installed and inspected, but prior to its use with the
spacecraft, measure input power, temperature control, EMI effects, and data exchange,
thereby, specifically verifying the interface. Then, with the PTM and, later, with each
flight spacecraft, the interface is reverified as preparation for the all-systems test.
10.2 LAUNCH COMPLEX EQUIPMENT TO LAUNCH COMPLEX
The LCE interface with the launch complex includes electrical power and control functions,
cooling control for the spacecraft, mating and handling equipment and procedures, cables
carrying command and monitoring signals both to the spacecraft and to the STC at the
SCF, and the RF relay antenna system.
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10.2.1 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
Initial interface compatibility tests are run at the breadboard level by testing with bread-
board spacecraft subsystems. Further development compatibility testing is accomplished
with the Development Spacecraft by running tests using the launch countdown. The effects
of launch complex cables are simulated and launch power is used for the spacecraft. Using
the Structural Model and later the Development Spacecraft, and development AHSE (trans-
porter and mating sling}, trial matings are made to the launch vehicle simulator. These
validate the interface of the AHSE before production of end item equipment is started.
10.2.2 FACTORY TESTS
The acceptance test of the LCE and ancillary support equipment, using the transfer cable
simulator and umbilical cable simulator, demonstrates the capability of the LCE to perform
its functions in the LC environment when it is connected to the spacecraft by means of the
in-place launch complex cables. Acceptance testing of the AHSE includes demonstrating
the capability to lift, carry and mate a spacecraft to a simulated launch vehicle. These
acceptance tests again serve to assure the validity of the LCE to LC interface.
Further validation comes from the factory interface test in which the spacecraft is monitored
and controlled by the LCE. This test follows the All-systems test in which the STC monitors
and controls the spacecraft. Changing only the OSE provides data for direct comparison,
thereby, establishing the capacity of the LCE to validly monitor readiness in the simulated
launch environment.
i0.2.3 INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
After the LCE installation at the launch complex, a checkout test using the launch vehicle
and a spacecraft simulator provides further assurance that the interface is valid. Sub-
sequently, the PTM is put thru the launch preparation sequence, including mating, count-
down, compatibility testing and demating. Interfaces of the LCE and its ancillaries are
completely reverified. Further assurance is provided by the same series of tests performed
on the first round of each flight spacecraft's launch preparation.
10.3 LAUNCH COMPLEX EQUIPMENT TO ESF
The LCE to ESF interface consists of the electrical power and control functions, data lines
to the STC, the fueling and cooling systems, and the RF relay to both the STC and DSIF
Station Cape 71; and AHSE to transport the spacecraft, mate the capsule and lower the
nose fairing into place for encapsulation.
10.3.1 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
Initial interface compatibility is established at the breadboard level by testing breadboard
spacecraft subsystems in the planned ESF test configuration. Further development compat-
ibility testing is accomplished with the Development Spacecraft in fueling, capsule mating,
encapsulation and operations monitoring tests using the development LCE, AHSE, capsule
and fairing.
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10.3.2 FACTORY TESTS
The LCE accepf_ncetests are run to demonstrate both the function of LCE and the adequacy
of its interface with both the ESF and the launch complex. Then, in the factory interface
tests, the spacecraft performance under the control of the LCE is demonstrated. To make
the test valid for conditions to be met in the ESF, these conditions are simulated for the
ESF part of the factory interface test.
10.3.3 INSTALLATION AND CHECKOUT
At the completion of installation, the direct interface between the LCE (and its ancillary
equipment) with the ESF is tested by operating and testing the spacecraft simulator.
Then, when the PTM makes its complete circuit of the launch activities the interface is
reverified. In being processed thru the ESF, satisfactory fueling, encapsulation and
readiness testing of the PTM validate the LCE to ESF interface. Proper handling of the
PTM demonstrates the adequacy and utility of the AHSE in the ESF environment. Further
reverification is achieved in the first cycle of preparation of each flight spacecraft for
launch.
10.4 MISSION DEPENDENT EQUIPMENT TO DSIF
At the DSIF tracking stations, the radio signals received from the spacecraft must be
demodulated to extract the information carried by them. The output of the tracking/
telemetry receivers is connected to the MDE, which further demodulates the signal to
obtain overall spacecraft engineering and science data in the format necessary for local
processing and for transmission to SFOF. Before the flight operation begins, it is
necessary to demonstrate that the interface of this equipment, associated procedures,
and programs is functionally adequate and is compatible with the DSIF.
10.4.1 INSTALLATION TESTS
The first installation is at Goldstone. The MDE is tested for mechanical, electrical, and
functional compatibility in the station and then, using the RF model, the MDE is given
a complete operational use test. Both the interface with the local station and the interface
with the net are validated. When the PTM is sent to Goldstone, another set of interface
tests is runin.eonjunction with the PTM system evaluation. These tests verify the Gold-
stone MDE interface. At the other stations after MDE installation, the RF simulator is
used to validate the MDE interfaces. The RF simulator is used to continually revalidate
the interface at each station as required throughout the flight operation phase of the
mission.
10.5 MISSION DEPENDENT EQUIPMENT TO SFOF
Modification that reflect the specific characteristics of the Voyager mission and its space-
craft are required in SFOF hardware and software. The interface between the MDE and
the SFOF, therefore, is the participation of Voyager-peculiar equipment, procedures,
methods and people in the functions of the SFOF.
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10.5.1 MODIFICATION CHECKOUT AND TEAM EVALUATION
After installation, the IVIDE is electrically, functionally and environmentally tested for
interface compatibility with SFOF. Then additions and modifications to existing software
and hardware are tested initially by self-checks and by solving test problems reflecting
the change in capability to the basic equipment added by the MDE. The participation and
the interrelationships of personnel on the teams with JPL people are evaluated by simulating
flight conditions and observing the results of problems handled.
10.5.2 I:'TM TESTS
When the PTM is at Pasadena and, again, when it is at Goldstone, operations are initiated,
performance monitored and evaluated, using both automated and manual methods, commands
generated and sent, and changes in spacecraft performance analyzed. The reverification
during launch preparation of the effective functioning of both the material modifications and
the functional relationships of participating personnel completes the testing of this interface
and establishes its readiness for flight operations.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Achievement of Long Life Reliability is the most critical requirement on the Voyager
Program. GE-MSDwill solve this problem by emphasizing the following significant
reliability actions:
a. Adherence to sound reliability practices from design to flight and from parts
to system level hardware.
b. Establishment of reliability controls to maintain management cognizance of
progress vs schedule/cost milestones, and to enable rapid management
action in areas of identified risk.
c. Conduct of a comprehensive, but practical, test program to establish long
life capability and high confidence in operational verification.
d. Conduct of a strong subcontractor and vendor reliability program to assure
high reliability in procured hardware.
e. Close coordination with the JPL Voyager team and MSD's own Long-Life Space
Systems Program (See Appendix A, MSD Policy).
This document is the Reliability Implementation Plan for the Voyager Project. It
overlays the entire program of engineering, fabrication, test and mission activities
associated with the Voyager Flight Spacecraft and its related Operational Support
Equipment for the 1971 Mars mission opportunity.
The plan is specifically designed to meet the requirements of NPC 250-1. A cross
reference matrix between this Plan and 250-1 is presented in Figure 1-1.
In addition to a thorough plan and approach per NPC-250-1 key elements of this
reliability program include:
a. The full acceptance of and implementation of design standards, criteria, and
constraints to assure that the best state of the art is built into the Voyager
system (refer to paragraph 3.5).
bo The application of the Dynamic Mission Equivalent/Static Mission Equivalent
approach to all qualification and acceptance testing to verify that long-life
capability has been built into each end item (refer to paragraph 3.11.4}.
Co The application of failure-free terminal periods of testing under mission
environments at subassembly as well as at system levels to provide statis-
tically significant assurance of a high probability of mission success (refer
to paragraph 3.11.4 and 3.13.
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These key elements of the approach are emphasized because it is believed that they
provide the most effective means among the alternatives studied for applying prior
technical knowledge and experience to the practical solution of the Voyager Reliability
Requirement. Also, they provide for obtaining statistically significant test data and
product verification at reasonable cost, thus making possible a high degree of con-
fidence in mission success.
1.1 RELIABILITY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FORMAT
The format employed in this Plan consists of five major Sections.
I.i.1 RELIABILITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT (SECTION 2.0)
This Section describes the implementation of Voyager Project Management in controllin
the key parameters and daily working relationships that affect reliability and long life.
1.1.2 RELIABILITY DESIGN ASSURANCE (SECTION 3.0)
This Section describes the implementation of activities that take place from the
inception of basic engineering concepts through to the point of release of engineering
definition for the first prime prototype hardware.
1.1.3 RELIABILITY PRODUCT ASSURANCE (SECTION 4.0)
This Section describes the implementation of activities that take place from release
of engineering definition for first prime prototype hardware to the flight. The com-
bination of this activity with that of Design Assurance essentially constitutes the often
expressed "Womb to Tomb" cycle.
1.1.4 PROCUREMENT RELIABILITY PROGRAM (SECTION 5.0)
As a topic deserving particular attention, this Section describes the implementation
of activities that take place for the control and evaluation of procured items of equip-
ment. The procurement cycle spans both the Design Assurance and Product Assurance
aspects of the Project.
2.0 RELIABILITY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
2.1 RELIABILITY CONTROL
Reliability Control will be maintained throughout the course of the Voyager Project by
the continued use of basic GE-MSD reliability Management practices expanded to give
added emphasis to the Voyager requirement for long life reliability in a deep
space mission.
4 of 98
VBll0VP010
Reliability ManagementControl will be achievedthrough the implementation of three
key elements of activity:
• Specification of reliability requirements and constraints.
• Audit and evaluation of conformance to the requirements and constraints.
• Management visibility of the reliability program.
2.1.1 RELIABILITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Reliability requirements and constraints on the Voyager Project will emanate from
two primary sources of definition, the JPL Voyager Mission Specification and the
Voyager Reliability Implementation Plan (i. e., this Plan subject to the review and
final approval of JPL). These top level definitions will, in turn, be translated into
specific requirements that will include the following major areas of consideration:
a. Mission Assurance Requirements - JPL mission reliability objectives will
be analyzed and interpreted in terms of quantitative definitions of reliability
requirements for the spacecraft and OSE. These will be apportioned to the
subsystem and subassembly levels of assembly, and issued to all Project
Operations and applicable Subcontractors during Phase IB as Program Reli-
ability Requirements for Voyager Mission Assurance.
Do Parts, Materials and Processes - A thorough review of data, history, and
experience will be compiled and an approved parts, materials and process
list will be issued by Reliability Assurance to which all designs must comply.
ee Engineering Standards - Proven design methods, techniques, applications and
criteria for high reliability spacecraft will be utilized in all Voyager designs.
These standards are currently available in numerous d_si_n ma_mal_ arid
specifications and will be maintained by Reliability Assurance and updated as
required.
do Design Change - All changes subsequent to the Stage 3 design will be con-
trolled by a formal change process. Reliability sign off on all such changes
will be required via Reliability Assurance representation on the Change Con-
trol Board.
e, Acceptance Tests - Requirements for reliability and life verification tests in
prime hardware will be specified in all Acceptance Test Specifications by
Reliability Assurance. Minimum test requirements for subassemblies and
systems (Green Line Limits) will be a part of such a Specification. Part
screening requirements will be specified. Maximum operational test or
Shelf life limits (Red Line Limits) will be specified where necessary.
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f. Qualification Test - Requirements for reliability and life demonstration in
T/A and PTM test will be specified by Reliability Assurance, and their ap-
proval will be required before qualification status may be granted.
go
Failure Analysis - All hardware test failures subsequent to breadboard
testing will be controlled by a formal recording and analysis process. Reli-
ability sign-off on all such occurrences will be required via Reliability Assur-
ance representation on the Failure Analysis Review Board.
ho Manufacturing - Cleanliness requirements will be reviewed and/or specified
by Reliability Assurance, significant hardware rework will be reviewed and
approved by Reliability Assurance, and special handling and storage require-
ments will be specified where reliability degradation may be otherwise intro-
duced.
i* Data Accumulation - Requirements for various types of design and test data
for the Reliability Measurement Program will be specified and integrated
with the CII system and the Central Data Bank.
j. Subcontractor Vendor Reliability - Requirements for Subcontractor Vendor
reliability will be specified by Reliability Assurance via the General Specifica-
tion For Subcontractor Reliability Program Requirements (Spec. No.
VR 180 PR 001).
2.1.2 RELIABILITY AUDIT AND EVALUATION CONTROLS
Reliability requirements and constraints will be so stipulated as to achieve the mission
reliability requirement specified by JPL. Conformance to these requirements and con-
straints will be monitored by Reliability Assurance, and deviations therefrom shall
be reported on a CRAB (Correction for Reliability Action and Buy-off) and receive
corrective action through appropriate technical and management channels.
2.1.2.1 CRAB (CORRECTION FOR RELIABILITY ACTION AND BUY-OFF)
Identification of potential Project risks or non-conformance to reliability require-
meats or constraints will be accomplished via a CRAB report (see Figure 2-1). This
report will constitute the primary means by which reliability discrepancies are noted
and corrected. A CRAB may be issued by any management level individual in the
Reliability Assurance Operation, or individuals so delegated by the Manager, Reli-
ability Assurance.
A master file of all CRAB's will be maintained by both Reliability Assurance and the
CII, with copies to the operation (s) responsible for the corrective action, Project
Engineering and Quality Assurance.
Final disposition of corrective action must receive Reliability Assurance approval.
The close out signature on all CRAB reports will be made by both the initiator and
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Figure 2-1. Correction for Reliability Action and Buy-off
the Chairman, Design Review Board. The latter individual will be responsible for
maintaining the technical cognizance over all CRAB's including timely close out
actions. CRAB's which relate to a specific, serially identified, hardware discrep-
ancy will become part of the Quality Assurance, In Process/non-conformance,
report, on which all items must be corrected before hardware shipment can occur.
All outstanding CRAB's will be reviewed with the Project Manager via the Status
Matrix.
2.1.2.2 CONTINUOUS RELIABILITY PROGRAM AUDIT
A continuous audit and evaluation of program conformance to reliability requirements
will be conducted. Several modes of operation will be employed, including the fol-
lowing:
ao Reliability Design Analyses - In depth, design evaluation of inherent reli-
ability will be performed on all component elements of the system. This
will include the use of approved parts and materials, failure mode and opera-
tional back-up mode investigations, use of equipment dormancy to reduce
failure hazard, design life analyses, and the calculation of Reliability
Figures of Merit (RFMA). Each subsystem of the Spacecraft will have a
responsible Reliability Subsystem Engineer assigned who will serve as the
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focal point of reliability integration and evaluation for that area. The Reli-
ability SubsystemEngineer will act in suchcapacity during all preflight
phases of the Project.
bo Specifications - All subsystem and sub-assembly design and test specifications
will be reviewed and approved by the signature of the Reliability Subsystem
Engineer. The System Design Specification will be reviewed and approved
by the manager, Reliability Assurance.
Co Design Reviews - Formal engineering Design Reviews will be conducted by
Reliability Assurance on all subsystems and critical components during each
engineering design stage. These Design Reviews will issue action items and
review any outstanding CRAB's for resolution.
d. Design Change Control - Reliability Assurance will provide a permanent
member to the Change Control Board (CCB) (which is chaired by Project
Control) for the purpose of reviewing and approving all configuration and
design changes that are proposed on previously approved specifications
and/or drawings. The activity will be integrated with the Reliability Sub-
system Engineer by the reliability CCB representative.
eo Test Evaluation - Integrated Test Board responsibilities will include the
review and approval of all test specifications and status for T/A, PTM and
FA tests. The Reliability Chairman of the ITB will specifically provide the
final approval on T/A and PTM qualification ratings.
f. Failure Review - Reliability Assurance will provide a permanent member to
the Failure Analysis Review Board (which is chaired by Quality Assurance)
for the purpose of reviewing and approving all decisions affecting the dis-
position of failure analysis and the institution of corrective actions.
go Subcontractor/Vendor Reliability - Specific subcontractor and vendor reli-
ability requirements will be an integral part of each procurement Work
Statement. Regular Technical Director Meetings will be conducted to monitor
conformance to the Subcontractor Reliability Specification (see Appendix B).
2.1.2.3 SPECIAL RELIABILITY AUDIT CONTROL POINTS
A major reliability audit will be conducted at key control points in the Program. The
key control points will serve as milestone reliability reviews, and will constitute a
comprehensive evaluation of all outstanding CRAB's and the overall co_fformance of
the Project to the reliability requirements stipulated in the program plan and the
various Project Specifications. These milestone audit points are as follows:
a. Engineering Design Certification prior to engineering model and prime hard-
ware definition and release.
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b. Subassembliescertification prior to bondedstock.
c. System certification prior to ship.
d. Pre-flight readiness evaluation.
This latter milestone will constitute a review and input to the vehicle test director at
ETR, and will include a Pre-Flight ReadinessReport to JPL in which the latest infor-
mation on reliability mensurement, system reliability mission analysis, trouble
analysis and the like are included.
2.1.3 MANAGEMENT VISIBILITY
The sum of the information provided by the various Reliability Audits will constitute
a matrix of data that will accurately portray the status of the reliability program as
it relates to pre-established scheduleandperformance milestone criteria. More
specifically, this complete log of information will be tracked andcontinuously updated
on the Status Matrix Forms shownin Figures 2-2 and 2-3. The designand Develop-
ment Reliability Status Matrix (Figure 2-2) will present the pertinent data relating to
overall program progress in terms of selected items of key information. The Prime
Vehicle Reliability Status Matrix (Figure 2-3) will, on the other hand, specifically
relate to the overall status of a serially identified spacecraft system.
These charts will be reviewed with the Voyager Program Managerand his staff on at
least a bi-weekly basis. They will be periodically reviewed with the Department
General Manager and his staff. Critical items appearingon the chart will be reviewed
in detail and additional action taken where necessary.
2.1.4 RELIABILITY AND COST/SCHEDULECONTROL
£ _:_£l_:tU£1£Ly1_.,.,U_b _t[IU _{.._,I|(_,UUlt_ .[.J_Z_ILUIU_cI.t,J.UII_ L;_tli ll_lYt:_ _tJ. UIl_ lllllJ£1_Jc:tbiUll_ ULI Lllt:_ _ _q,-;U_Jt:_
of effort required to achieve mission success. Their impact on the probability of
mission success will be evaluated and properly documented and reviewed by the
Manager, Reliability Assurance with the Manager, Project Control.
2.2 RELIABILITY ORGANIZATION
The Manager, Reliability Assurance, reports directly to the Manager of the Voyager
Program and is responsible for the overall implementation and direction of the Voyager
Reliability Program.
The implementation of the Reliability Program described in this document will be
accomplished by the establishment of key areas of functional responsibility reporting
to the Manager, Reliability Assurance. Their tasks will be the detailed specification
of the reliability requirements set forth in this plan and the JPL Mission Specification,
and the in depth monitoring of conformance to these requirements with timely
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corrective action applied as may be necessary. This vertical structure of functional
responsibility is shownin Figure 2-4.
Primary amongthese functions is the exercise of Reliability Control, and its relation-
ship to Project Control for an optimum balance of technical, scheduleand budgetcon-
siderations throughout the course of the Program. Reliability Control also repre-
sents the interface with JPL on reliability matters as well as providing internal and
customer reliability managementreporting.
The technical aspectsof the Reliability Program, will, to a large extent, be inte-
grated by the assignmentof Reliability SubsystemEngineers to each major subsystem
within the Voyager Project. In-line design, development, fabrication andtest aspects
of the Project will be coordinated by these individuals who are assigned responsibility
for the technical contentof reliability matters, within a given area.
The Reliability SubsystemEngineers will be directly supported in their technical work
by several specialized functions. Engineering Standardsand associated Design Stand-
ards Teams, will provide the Approved Parts, Materials and Processes List as well
as back-up application and failure rate data, and specialized design and process in-
formation for useon the Voyager equipment design and fabrication. The Reliability
Data and Analysis activity will provide mathematical analyses, reliability measure-
ment andassessmentinformation and support for various analytical investigations.
Formal audit andevaluation of the Reliability Program will be conductedprimarily via
various Board activities. Two suchboards will be chaired by Reliability Assurance -
namely, the Design Review Board (DRB) and the Integrated Test Board (ITB). As
their name implies, these two boards will concentrate on the review of design and test
activities, respectively, and will be a vital part of the overall system which considers
the proper integration of technical andmanagementdecisions that effect long life reli-
ability. Reliability Assurance representation on the ChangeControl Board (CCB}and
the Failure Analysis Review Board (FARB) will likewise assure a positive measure of
reliability control in the important areas of configuration and design changeapproval,
andhardware failure analysis and corrective action approval.
Sincea significant amountof Voyager equipmentwill be procured external to GE, it
becomesan absolutenecessity that special attention be given to the problem of long
life reliability achievementin these procured items of equipment. A separate function
devotedto procurement reliability will be established to provide subcontractor con-
formance to all elements of the Plan. The special nature of this problem andthe
program to be followed in Procurement Reliability are covered as a special portion
of this Plan in Section5.0 and Appendix B.
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2.3 RELIABILITY PROGRAM COORDINATION WITH JPL
2.3.1 DIRECT JPL PARTICIPATION
It is suggested that JPL participate directly in many of the activities that are con-
ducted throughout the Reliability Program. This would include the various Board
meetings and reviews, subcontractor or vendor Technical Direction meetings and the
many technical analysis activities that continuously occur. Experience on other
NASA and military programs has shown that such participation, conducted in an air
of common purpose and intent, greatly enhances the ability to achieve an optimum
probability of mission success. The detailed milestone schedule for the Reliability
Program will define the time-phasing of the reliability activities, and, if requested by
JPL, GE will provide the schedule of specific reliability events and meetings in which
specific JPL participation is desired.
2.3.2 RELIABILITY WORKING GROUP MEETINGS
It is planned that a JPL-GE Reliability Working Group will be established. This
group would meet at regular intervals and discuss topics of mutual interest that would
lead to a better understanding of the technical or administrative aspects of the Relia-
bility Program. These topics could range in discussion from the details of a modeling
analysis to the review of a department instruction on some aspect of the Reliability
Program. It will provide an opportunity for the general exchange of information and
an informal opportunity to review new courses of action that may be beneficial to the
Voyager Project. A pre-planned agenda for these meetings could be arranged through
the JPL Voyager Reliability Office in conjtmction with the Manager, Reliability
Assurance.
2.3.3 PROGRAM PLAN APPROVAL AND CHANGE
The Reliability Implementation Plan will be submitted to JPL for final review and
approval sixty days after the award of the Phase I-B contract. The Plan will include
a list of tasks for each area of the Reliability Program, a detailed milestone for each
task, and an identification of the responsible performing function within the Reliability
Assurance organization. Subsequent changes to the Plan will be reviewed and approved
by both JPL and GE before incorporation into the plan.
2.3.4 JPL RELIABILITY DOCUMENTATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL
The Reliability Implementation Plan, the Approved Parts, Materials and Process
List, the Parts and Materials Qualification Status List and the Specification of Pro-
gram Reliability Requirements for Voyager Mission Assurance will be submitted to
JPL for review and approval. Periodic performance reporting to JPL will be ac-
complished via the submittal of a Quarterly Reliability Status and Data Report.
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2.3.5 INDEPENDENT RELIABILITY SURVEILLANCE
Paragraph 1.4.2 of NPC 250-1 provides for NASAemployment of independentrelia-
bility assessment contractors who will function as technical advisors to NASAin the
capacity of designatedNASArepresentatives. In the event that such a contractor is
employed on the Voyager Project, GE will extend full coordination and cooperation
with the contractor.
2.4 RELIABILITY PROGRAMREPORTING
Reliability Progress Reports will be provided to Project Control for incorporation
into the monthly reports to JPL.
The formal means of Reliability Program Reporting will be via the Quarterly Relia-
bility Status and Data Report unless otherwise requested. This report will be sub-
mitted to JPL by the 15thof January, April, July andSeptember and will contain a
summary of pertinent reliability status and data information for the preceding calen-
dar quarter. The Report will contain, but not be limited to, the following areas:
a. A review of the reliability milestone schedulechart including items com-
pleted and revisions to the schedulesince the prior reporting period.
b. A review and summary of technical reliability tasks and analysis completed
during the reporting period.
C. A review and summary of the outstanding reliability problems during the
reporting period including the status of action for problem resolution or the
nature of the resolution if such action is complete.
do A review and summary of the Procurement Reliability Program including a
listing, by Subcontractor and Vendor, of technical status, accomplishments
and problems for the reporting period.
e. A summary log of failure data from the various equipment test programs.
This will be reported in cumulative form, and will be initiated with the
testing of the pre-T/A hardware.
Working level documentation, such as that described in Appendix F of NPC 250-1,
will be maintained on file at GE for JPL review. Copies of this documentation will
be submitted to JPL as requested.
2.5 RELIABILITY AWARENESS PROGRAM
Personnel motivation and understanding are key contributing factors to conscientious
attention to detail. The Voyager Project will continue to use the existing Spacecraft
Department education and training program to bring to focus the various pieces of
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information that will lead to a clear knowledgeand appreciation of the Voyager long
life reliability problem. Included in this Program are:
a. Zero Defects - a formal Program aimed at the improvement of workmanship
at all levels of job function and responsibility.
Do Training Films - a series of training and orientation films on the Voyager
Reliability Program are being made for the purpose of promoting a project-
wide understanding of the reliability implementation plans and to identify
the role of each individual in helping to achieve long life reliability. These
films will be shown to all GE, subcontractor and vendor Personnel during
Phase IB. These films shall be particularly important in indoctrinating
subcontractor and vendor personnel on the importance of their role in
achieving long life reliability.
Co Professional Education - all new personnel with GE or the Voyager Project
will have available in-plant college level courses in Basic Probability and
Statistics, Reliability Theory and Application and Reliability Design and
Product Assurance. These courses will be made available to subcontractor
and vendor personnel as may be requested or deemed necessary.
d. Technician Certification - specific training courses in various operator and
technician skills will be conducted per the program detailed in the Quality
Assurance Plan.
2.6 RELIABILITY MILESTONE SCHEDULE
Key elements of the Reliability Implementation Plan are shown on the Milestone
Reliability Schedule in Figure 2.5. This schedule will be updated and shown in
greater detail prior to submission of the Plan for final JPL review and approval in
Phase IB.
3.0 RELIABILITY DESIGN ASSURANCE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Inherent reliability for the spacecraft and its related OSE is established by the basic
design and the selection of proper parts and materials for use in the equipment.
Reliability design assurance will be accomplished by:
a. Apportioning realistic reliability objectives to the component level of equip-
ment - objectives that exceed mission reliability requirements in order to
realize the highest probability of success on the first flight.
b. The applicationof design standards, criteria and constraints.
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C, Defining areas of redundancy, back up mode capability, dormancy modes,
part and material selection, derating factors and other design techniques
that enhance reliability.
d. Analyzing inherent design reliability to assure the attainment of reliability
objectives.
e. Providing timely identification of high risk areas so that appropriate design
measures may be taken.
f. Establishing test requirements that will demonstrate life capability and
verify flight hardware reliability.
g. Evaluating OSE availability and spacecraft launch readiness as it relates to
the launch window requirements.
3.1.1 DESIGN ASSURANCE FLOW CYCLE
The Design Assurancy Cycle, which covers project activities from inception of basic
engineering concepts through to the release of engineering definition for prime hard-
ware fabrication, is shown schematically on Figure 3-1. The schematic depicts the
major elements of this cycle and the relationship of the reliability tasks to it. Figure
3-2 is a further definition of Figure 3-1, and indicates the elements of reliability
that occur in each Design Assurance Phase. It is important to note that the system
reliability requirements, design reliability analyses and the reliability trade-off and
improvement loop are integral parts of the Design Assurance Cycle.
3.2 MISSION RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Mission Reliability Requirements for the Voyager Program are defined by the proba-
probability of success values for the various spacecraft mission phases, as stated in
this Specification, are inclusive of the launch vehicles, the LOS, and MOS and the
DSN as well as the Spacecraft and its associated OSE. In establishing spacecraft
reliability requirements, the capsule is considered only in relation to the interface
that must be maintained between it and the Spacecraft.
As a first approximation, Spacecraft reliability requirements for the 1971 Mission
have been established by assuming reliabilities for the other equipments and opera-
tions as follows:
Saturn Launch Vehicle = 0.95
Centaur Launch Vehicle = 0.95
LOS, MOS, DSN = 0.99
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A cumulative probability of mission success equal to 0.45 (i. e., Primary Mission
Objective Number 4 in the JPL Specification) yields a cumulative probability of suc-
cess for the spacecraft and related OSEequal to 0.5. Based on this requirement,
a reliability objective of 0.70 has been usedduring PhaseIA Study.
As a part of the Phase IB effort, a complete review of the Mission Reliability
Requirements will be conductedwith JPL to establish the validity of the assumptions
made for the launch vehicles, the MOS,LOS, andthe DSN.
i
3.3 RELIABILITY APPORTIONMENT
Reliability Apportionment is a vital aspect of the design and development of the
Spacecraft and OSE. It serves to allocate to each major item of equipment a fair
share of the reliability which it must carry in order to maintain an overall level of
risk that is compatible with the mission reliability requirement.
3.3.1 APPORTIONMENT BY MISSION PHASE
The initial step in the Phase IA reliability apportionment procedure, has been the
identification of four distinct phases of operation which describe the spacecraft por-
tion of the mission:
Phase 1 Launch into the interplanetary trajectory including acquisition of
the cruise mode and solar paddle deployment.
Phase 2 Interplanetary cruise and achievement of capsule separation from
the spacecraft.
Phase 3 Injection of the spacecraft into the Martial orbit, actuation of
Spacecraft scientific experiements for the orbital flight and estab-
lishment of orbit cruise mode.
Phase 4 Maintenance of Martian orbital flight for a period of one month.
These four phases correspond to those given in the JPL Mission Specification, and
provide an excellent breakdown for the analysis of the various functions and equip-
ments which bear on the successful achievement of the overall mission profile.
Reliabilityapportionment during the Phase IA Study has been carried to the Subsystem
level of equipment. This apportionment is shown in Table 3-1. Detailed design
definitionduring Phase IB will permit apportionment to the Subassembly level of
equipment. Apportionment to the Subsystem level has already established various
trade-off relationships in connection with basic configuration selection, basic modes
of operation, back up mode capability,test program definitionand equipment design
constraints and selection (reference: Technical Volume discussions). Apportion-
ment to the Subassembly level will further guide the details of circuit logic design,
parts de-rating, selected environmental control, worst case design, design tolerance
definitions,dormancy, and selected redundancy.
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Table 3-1. Phase IA ReliabilityApportionment
ASSUMED MISSION PROFILE
PHASE MISSION EVENT MISSION TIME
_2
Launch
Cruise Mode Acquisition
Early Mid-Course *
T+0
T + 2 hours
T + 2-5 days
Second Mid-Course *
Pre-Encounter Checkout
Lander Separation
Third Mid-Course *
Orbit Injection *
Mars Orbit
T + 165 days
T + 176 days
T + 178 days
T + 179 days
T + 180 days
T + 180 to + 210 days, minimum
* Assumed 3 hour duration for maneuvering, confirmation, engine firing and
reacquisition.
RELIABILITY DESIGN GOALS
Mission
Subsyste_ase
Radio
Command
C&S
Telemetry
Power
Thermal
Vehicle
Prop (M/C)
Prop (Retro)
G & C (Veh)
1 hr
99978
99959
99970
99978
99989
99922
9938
99972
(Autopilot)
(Antenna)
(Mars Pkg)
Pyro Control
Launch OSE
9967
9968
_2
178 d
9816
9653
9745
9814
9909
9852
9900
9858
9754
9909
9872
9836
_3
2d
99978
99959
99970
99978
99989
99922
9966
9917
9926
99972
9858
9998
m
9955
Rel. By _ 9856 8105 9610
Cumul. P/S 9856 7988 7676
_4
30 d
9969
9942
9958
9969
9985
9975
9957
9895
9960
9960
9902
9723
9723
9932
Mission
9781
9590
9699
9779
9892
9824
9764
9673 '
9926
9710
9673
9849
9723
9694
9968
9178
7050 7050
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3.3.2 METHODOF APPORTIONMENT
The Phase IA spacecraft apportionment utilizes two basic weighting factors: the
relative effect of losing a Subsystem, and the relative number of functions required
for a Subsystem to complete its operational profile. The former factor, which is a
combination of equipment interdependency and its criticality to the mission, was used
to establish relative weighting factors that permit a direct allocation of one-half of
the permissable risk to a Subsystem. The latter factor, which simply expresses the
functional complexity of an action (the greater the number of functions, the larger the
risk involved), was used to establish relative weighting factors that permit an in-
verse relationship for the allocation of the other one-half of the permissable risk to
a Subsystem. The two factors in combination then sum to give a total allocation of
permissable risk on the relative contributions of each Subsystem. This basic
method of apportionment will also be used for Subassembly allocation during Phase
IB. As the detailed equipment reliability assessments become available, this appor-
tionment will be modified to reflect any required shifts in the balance of risk among
the Subsystems and/or Subassemblies.
3.4 RE LIABILITY ANALYSIS
Design Reliability analysis techniques and methods to be employed may be grouped
into three categories: (1) mathematical analyses based upon prior part and device
failure rate data and associated application and environmental modifying factors,
(2) design analysis based upon actual test programs conducted on Voyager subassem-
blies or subsystems or on identical items used on other spacecraft, and (3) the use
of weighted judgement and ranking techniques to supplement (1) and (2) in design and
configuration analysis. Additional analysis and trade-off evaluations will be per-
formed in the areas of circuit logic, back-up modes, critical items and events,
equipment interface risks, dormancy and start-up after dormancy, failure modes
and effects, applicability of design standards, criteria and constraints, opportunities
for the application of redundancy and identification of alternative methods for mission
accomplishment by ground based commands, reduced performance criteria, as well
as producibility, accessibility and maintainability prior to launch.
3.4.1 RELIABILITY MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS METHODS AND DATA ELEMENTS
The methods used by General Electric and General Electric Subcontractors to pre-
pare reliability analyses and estimates of the probability of mission success are
those which have attained wide acceptance and credibility on prior NASA and govern-
ment programs. The premises upon which these are based necessarily involve
engineering, scientific, and practical experience judgements with respect to the
physics of failure, failure mode identification and the probabilities of occurrence of
each mode under the various environments and stress level sequences and durations
experienced by each element of the system during the entire Voyager Mission Pro-
file. These methods and premises are well illustrated by the G.E. Handbook of I
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Reliability Analysis Data for Systems andComponentDesign Engineers*, TRA-873-
74, andby the analyses conductedduring the PhaseIA contract andthe preceding
three General Electric Voyager study contracts. They will be reviewed with JPL as
well as with General Electric Subcontractors. Concurrence will be reachedwith
regard to the details of the mathematical modeling andwith regard to the basic failure
rates applicable to each element of the system (i. e., each approvedpart type or
processed material sub-assembly) as well as to the modifying factors usedto estab-
lish the probability of occurrence andsignificance of each identified mode of the
element during eachdormant and operational category of the mission profile. These
design reliability analyses will be performed at the sub-assembly equipment level.
They represent an estimate of inherent reliability, and are referred to as Reliability
Figure of Merit Analyses (RFMA' s).
3.4.1.1 PART, MATERIAL, AND PROCESS RELIABILITY DATA
The Reliability data will be applied to establish an estimate of the inherent reliability
of each subassembly in the system, (i. e., Subassembly RFMA' s). Elements of this
data will be determined from prior NASA programs and study test contracts (e. g.,
Voyager Studies, Ranger, Mariner, ATS, OAO, Nimbus, data from the NASA RADC
tests, Apollo Support Contract and from other data sources such as IDEP and
FARADA) as jointly established by review with JPL and principal General Electric
Subcontractors with respect to each approved part type, source and level of
application.
This data will be supplemented by data obtained during part type qualification and
screening burn-in testing conducted under the Voyager contract. An initial review
of representative part data has been made by the Electronics Design Standards Team
during Phase IA. The results are summarized in Table 3-2.
3.4.2 DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION ANALYSIS
Configuration analysis effortconsists of assisting the design engineers in making
optimum decisions before a design is frozen. A configuration analysis compares
alternate configurations, logicaldesigns, functional arrangements, and any other
schemes affectingthe reliabilityof the equipment, in such a manner as to assistthe
designer in selecting the optimum design. A systematic effortis employed to con-
sider all possible schemes and arrangements as noted in paragraph 3.4 before a
decision is made. For each configuration,the significantparameters involved in
the particular circumstances are identified:performance, life,maintainability,
reliability,fail-safefeatures, weight, etc. Configurations under consideration may
consist of different arrangements of components or functions which allyield the same
result in the main operating mode, but which may involve differentdegrees of re-
dundancy and differentdegraded modes of operation. The significanteffectof each
* Copies have been provided to JPL with prior Voyager Study reports. Additional
copies can be supplied upon request.
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Table 3-2. Representative Phase IA Failure Rates
Part
Capacitors
Diodes
Resistors
Transformers
Transistors
(NPN or PNP)
Silicon
Integrated
Circuits
Type
Tantalum - Solid
Tantalum - Film
Glass
Ceramic, rectangular
Paper
Mica
General purpose
Computer (switching}
Zener (Regulator)
Rectifier
Wirewound - Power
Wirewound - Accurate
Metal Film
CarbonFilm
Pulse
Switching (Sat. Cond.)
Small Signal (Non Sat. Cond)
Power
Digital
Linear
Representative
Vendors
Sprague, Kemet
GE, Sprague
Coming
Vitramon, Aerovox
Sprague
Elmenco
GE, CDC, TI, Unitrode
GE, Fairchild, CDC
Motorola, Dickson,
CDC, Unitrode
GE, Westinghouse,
Unitrode, RCA
Dale, SAGE
MEPCO, RPC
IRC, Electra
MEPCO
Sprague
GE, TI, Motorola,
Fairchild
GE, TI, Motorola,
Fairchild
Honeywell, TI,
Silicon Trans. Corp.
TI, Fairchild, Signetics
TI, Fairchild
Failure Rate
%/1000 Hrs
•005
.005
•0005
.001
•005
.005
• 002
• 001
• 010
• 006
.010
.015
.0005
.0005
• O4
•001
• 004
• 008
.OO5
.0075
G
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parameter is evaluated quantitatively by suitable figures of merit. Normally, these
figures of merit are composit numbers which provide a means of assessing the
weighted importance of those parameters within the scope of a particular investigation
for the purpose of establishing the optimum tradeoffs and, thus, arriving at the best
configuration.
3.4.2.1 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS
A Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is performed on all components to determine
systematically all identifiable failure modes, evaluate the possible causes and effects
of each mode, evaluate the probability of occurrence for each mode, and delineate
the necessary corrective action to prevent the occurrence of the failure mode. From
this analysis a ranking is made of these potential problems. The most severe (in
terms of criticality and probability) is ranked at the top, with problems of decreasing
importance following. Based upon the functional block and sequence diagr_tm for
each subsystem, the failure mode and effects analysis provides a basis for reliability
analysis and review of system design tradeoffs as well as providing inputs for sub-
sequent design decisions that may be required to minimize an area of identified risk.
The description of the possible modes of failure, the identification of the subassem-
blies involved and the consideration of measurements or observations by which these
could be detected if present provide inputs and review items for improving the ef-
fectiveness of test design and analysis activities. Breadboard development tests are
utilized to confirm the analyses, and additionally to seek out failure modes that have
not been identified via analyses.
3.4.2.2 CRITICAL ITEMS AND EVENTS ANALYSIS
adjustments, test design analyses, and design and configuration analysis activities,
the identification of technically critical items and schedule events becomes well
defined. Non-technical critical items and events including delivery schedules, test
facility schedules, cost controls also become significant elements in program deci-
sions. Every practicable effort will be made for the early identification of technical
life-risk items, and of non-technical constraints which may adversely affect the
attainment or demonstration of mission capability on schedule. As identified, these
items will receive continuing management and technical attention until each is sat-
isfactorily resolved.
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3.5 RELIABILITY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
Reliability analysis activities provide specific methods for establishing optimal sys-
tem and design trade-offs, and redundancy in terms of maximum reliability per
pound of weight for equivalent performance capabilities. With these design approaches
determined, it remains of vital importance that the detailed design be of consistent
excellence throughout each subsystem. For this purpose, prior design experience is
codified in the form of spacecraft design criteria and constraints. The requirements
and constraints of section G of the JPL Mission Specification will be fully applied
by all Voyager Contractors. A schematic flow diagram of the activities involved in
integrating these design criteria and constraints is shown in Figure 3-3.
PIIASE 1A
SYSTEMS 9
TRADE-OFFS
FUNCTIONAL _"
SPECIFICATIONS
PiiaSE1B 1
BREADBOARD'"
DEVELOPMENT &
PRELIMINARY
MODE L TESTING
DESIGN AND
COMPLETE TESTS
OF ENGINEERING
MODELS OF THE
SYSTEM
SECTION II
J
/
JPL DESIGN CRITERIA & CONSTRAINTS
R E LIABI LITY E NGINEERI NG
ENGINEERING STANDARDS
ANALYSIS SE LEC TION BY
G.E. TEAMS INCL.
G. E. SUBCONTRACTORS
SECTION I
f
VERIFICATION OF
PARTS, MTLS,
PROCESSES &
APPLICATIONS
APPROVED LISTS
DESIGN STANDARDS
G. E. SUBCONTRACTOR G.E.
ENGINEERING ENG'G
DESIGN DESIGN
MFG. &G.E. Q.C. MFG. &Q.C.
AC C E PTANC E ACC E PTANC E
TOLL-GATE CONTROLLED
SYSTEM ASSEMBLY AND
TEST .... WITH JPL
APPROVALS & MGR. REL.
ASSURANCE APPROVAL
FOR SHIPMENT
SECTION III
PRODUCTION
CONTROL OF
APPROVED PARTS,
MATERIALS AND
PROCESSES
PURCtf ASING
TEST LABORATORIES
CLASSIFICATION
Figure 3-3. Voyager Reliability Assurance by Design Criteria and Constraints
3.5.1 GE VOYAGER DESIGN STANDARDS
The JPL design criteria will be supplemented by more detailed specifications issued
during Phase IB as follows:
$31101
$31102
$31103
Structural Design Requirements.
Circuit Design Requirements.
Product Design Requirements.
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$31104 Guidanceand Control DesignRequirements.
$31105 Propulsion Design Requirements.
$31106 SpacePower Design Requirements.
$31107 Part, Material and Process Selection, Approved Lists and Application
Requirements.
S31108 Integrated Test Planning andTest Design Reliability and Long-Life
Capability Requirements.
$31109 Reliability and Engineering Data Standards andRequirements.
3.5. i. 1 APPROVEDPARTS LIST
List 490Ll14 has beenprepared andreviewed by GE Engineering and GE subcon-
tractors during Phase IA. Sample information from this list is provided in Table 3-3.
This list will be revised progressibely during later phasesof the program until it
provides a master reference for all parts approved for use on Voyager. Its identifi-
cation, form, and contentwill be modified as necessary to fulfill the requirements of
ZPP 2000GEN and such other approvedparts list requirements are received from JPL.
3.5.2 JPL APPROVAL OF DESIGN STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND CONSTRAINTS
During Phase IB of the Voyager Program, the Design Standards specifications will be
formally issued including the details applicable to known parts, materials, and pro-
cesses. These will be reviewed with JPL and approval obtained. The associated parts,
materials, and processes testing and life capability demonstration program will also
be prepared for JPL review. The resultant Voyager Approved Parts, Materials and
Processes lists and design standards will be applied to the design and production of
ENGINEERING MODELS.
3.5.3 VOYAGER PROJECT DATA BOOK
A Project Data Book will be issued during Phase IB and maintained during Phase II.
It will contain the principal elements of the Voyager Design Standards as well as a
full set of the Approved Parts, Materials, and Processes lists and related, item by
item, Application Data.
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3.5.4 RELIABILITY APPROVAL OF DESIGN STANDARDS APPLICATIONS
This effort consists of the activities and requirements involved in providing assur-
ance that:
ao Each part, material, and process and the design standards for each element
of application data for the Voyager Spacecraft System has the demonstrated
capability to accomplish its stated life and mission objectives.
b A history of Reliability is on record which
probability of successful Voyager mission
built in accordance with these standards.
this reliability assurance is established is
portance to all decisions from piece parts
adequately established the
accomplishment by flight hardware
The availability of data by which
to be considered of paramount im-
through systems.
All design standards, criteria, and constraints and their application to equipment
design, including related development and analysis methods and computer analysis
programs of approved parts, materials, and process selections, will be subject to
review and approval by reliability engineers. This review function will be particu-
larly active during the engineering development period in which all the elements of
electrical circuits, mechanisms, power, and propulsion components are established
and tested in breadboard or engineering development models.
3.5.4.1 ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT: PARTS AND MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS
Parts and materials on the approved lists will be used in breadboard and circuit
development wherever the type is applicable. This requirement is equally applicable
to pneumatic, hydraulic, electro-mechanical, sensor, and other devices. High reli-
ability specifications will not be recommended or required for breadboard items; how-
ever, the same part types, kinds and sources as are covered by specifications refer-
enced on the approved lists will be used.
3.5.4.2 ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT: DESIGN STANDARDS REQUIREMENTS
The design criteria and constraints covered by the Voyager Mission Specification and
those established by the Voyager Design Standards Team Chairman shall be applied to
Engineering -- Stage II Breadboard development hardware in every instance where
such is practicable. This inclusion of these requirements during the completion of
development models is made to assure that full consideration is given to the resolution
of these elements of Voyager risk at the earliest practicable stage of development. It
is not intended that this constraint in any way restrict the application of the best fea-
tures and items in the design. It is intended to assure that these lists are responsive
to actual Voyager needs and are updated as early as possible to meet these needs. It
is also to help assure that all features and items included in Voyager are conservatively
designed and developed and that all the best methods available to each technology in-
volved are consistently applied to verify the adequacy, reliability, and safety of Voy-
ager components.
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3.5.4.3 ENGINEERINGDESIGNCERTIFICATION -- STAGE2
At the completion of Stage2 (electrical and/or mechanical breadboard, product sample,
and initial structural model testing), a critical review will be held, at which time, the
needfor any additional parts, materials, processes and the completeness and adequacy
of test requirements and the results of engineering development tests with respect to
Voyager requirements will be determined. This reliability audit of subassembly and
schematic drawings for Stage3* -- Engineering Model fabrication andtesting by the
Design Standards Team (s) ITB, andthe subsystemReliability engineer is the initial
reliability milestone audit point (Reference Section 2.1.2.3).
3.5.4.4 ENGINEERING MODELS (STAGE 3) - IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN
STANDARD APPLICATIONS
Application of design criteria and constraints (Parts, Materials, Processes, Stan-
dards) approved by JPL will be initiated on all Engineering Model hardware. The
implementation procedures by which these reliability standards are made effective at
subcontractors and vendors (see Section 5.0), as well as at GE, will be initiated on
these subcontracted models. This will include activities in design, product assurance,
testing, and data accumulation portions of the Voyager program plan as applied during
the manufacturing and testing period of the Engineering Models. Any revisions needed
will be made to assure their complete effectiveness during later hardware stages.
3.5.4, 5 ENGINEERING DESIGN CERTIFICATION - S TAGE 3
At the completion of Stage 3 design activity, a critical review will be conducted to
assess the reliability adequacy of the design and engineering test data results for the
results for the release of prime hardware definition. Computer programs** will be
performed for verifying the Stage 4 reliability controls of system and component
design, for example:
a. Worst case** transient and D. C. analyses.
Do Parts List(s) and Manufacturing Standing Instruction(s), test instructions,
data handling routines, and Quality Control requirements vs the approved
parts, materials, processes and reliability data requirements.
Co High reliability handling procedures applicable to parts, materials, and pro-
cesses controls including bonded stock requirements on sub-assembly, module,
etc.
*As defined in the Project Control Plan (Schedule/Cost Control).
**Details are provided in the "Circuit Design Practice Constraints" discussion in Vol.
VB220SRI02. A Computer Report Appendix is also provided in that volume.
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at Serial traceability from system to part level with the related drawing number,
part number, purchase order number, test lot number, (degradation analysis)
stability ranking number, and circuit location designation number.
These computer outputs will be reviewed by reliability engineers as a part of the design
reviews and standards critical reviews conducted during this period.
Audit and document sign-off procedures per Voyager Configuration Management instruc-
tions will be used to confirm the implementation of reliability, engineering, and drafting
standards requirements in the related engineering, manufacturing and quality control
documents.
Operator, equipment and facility certification, Manufacturing, checkout and transpor-
tation procedures will also be audited and verified.
Any identified discrepancies, inadequacies or lack of program schedule, cost, quality,
or reliability responsiveness during this early implementation of these Stage 4 (T/A,
PTM and Flight) procedures will be rectified during this period.
Thus, not only the hardware reliability but the GE and GE Subcontractor internal soft-
ware reliability will be verified prior to the production of T/A, PTM or Flight hard-
ware.
This reliability audit is the second reliability milestone audit point (Reference Section
2.1.2.3).
3.5.5 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADDITIONS OR REVISED DESIGN STANDARDS, PARTS,
MATERIALS & PROCESSES
It will be the responsibility of each individual on the Voyager Project to recommend im-
provements to the applicable design standards. The Standards Teams include Motorola
TI, and other subcontractor representatives so that each subcontractor's needs can be
identified at his own plant, the number of types and kinds minimized, and the resultant
approved list items made responsive to the real needs of the program and schedule.
General Electric contact with its subcontracors will be established with the key engineers
so designated. Regular, frequent meetings will be held by each Standards Team during
phase 1B and II to review, add, or delete items on the basic approved lists. Rapid
direct communication by telephone, TWX, etc. will facilitate resolution of continuing
need items and problem areas by the team chairman. The final decision as to part or
material type selection for inclusion on the lists will be made by GE subject to JPL
approval.
3.5.5.1 PARTS VERIFICATION
Test specifications and the technical direction of all Part Type Approval testing
necessary to supplement the available "History of Reliability" for the particular part
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type and source will be coordinated by Reliability Assurance. The user first proposing
the items addition to the Voyager approvedlist is responsible for providing all available
"history of reliability" and application criteria andconstraints information. Derating,
worst case limits, safety margins, andrelated application data will be included in
such information. The test data and all other "history of reliability" information will
be reviewed by Reliability Assurance andthe applicable failure rates and modifying
factors will be established and published. Whenevera subcontractor wishes to propose
test points or methods, or to conducttests himself, he will submit his proposal to
GE.
3.5.5.2 MATERIALS AND PROCESSESVERIFICATION
Test specifications andthe technical direction of all material Type Approval testing
necessary to supplementthe available History of Reliability for the particular material
type and source will be coordinated by Reliability Assurance. The procedures of
3.5.5.1 are applicable. Processing cycles, criteria and constraints, safety require-
ments, andrelated application data including in-process testing and inspection will be
included in such information°
3.5.6 PART PROGRAM
Long-life componentsare basically aproduct of logical engineering analysis, conserv-
ative design practices, andclear understanding of constituent materials. To demon-
strate or establish confidence in the design requires certain steps that require men,
time, and dollars. The Voyager parts program is designedwith a proper balance of
these factors in mind.
3.5.6.1 IMPLEMENTATION
G.E. plans to utilize parts which havethe highest probability of failure-free operation
during the mission life of the vehicle. This plan will be implemented as follows:
a. Select the most reliable part types (per historical data and past experience)
and by consultation with J.P.L. and principal subcontractors. This includes
the determination of those which best fit the following criteria:
1. Optimum physics of construction for space application.
2. Favorable history on the basic part, e.g., Polaris, Minuteman, 206, Advent,
IDEP, PAGER, PRINCE, Ranger, Mariner, etc.
3. Be in common usage to permit optimum learnings, cost, and availability.
4. Demonstration of vendor capability and conformance to NASA 200-3.
5. Parts will be screened on a 100 percent basis either at the vendor's plant
or in-house.
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b.
Co
d.
.
o
Properly controlled and documented for our application, i.e. _ Source
Control/Selected Part Drawing.
Where unique applications and/or experience with a device exists, the
parts have been previously subjected to extended power aging and de-
gradation analysis (e. g., parameter trend plotting) and results of such
testing are available.
Select the best suppliers as determined by past performance and vendor survey
per NASA 200-3.
Perform sound electrical and environmental screening tests.
Power age the parts.
. Select for flight use the parts which exhibit the most stability during power
aging. Data cards will be submitted by parts vendors and/or test lab-
oratories by part serial number, machine compiled; and this data evalu-
uated by parts specialists.
e.
f.
3.5.6.2
These spell out the following test particulars:
a.
b.
C.
d.
De-rate parts and materials in each application.
Conduct dynamic mission equivalent tests (_, 700 hours) on subassemblies.
PARTS PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS, "M" LEVEL
Pre-conditioning environmental tests.
Group A electrical (functional) tests.
(e.g., *R2024)
(100 percent basis)
(100 percent basis)
Group B environmental tests. (AQL basis)
Burn-in or screening tests ( -< 250 hours). (100 percent basis)
e. Qual. requirements (sampling or one-shot basis)
These parts which we term missile or nominal Mission quality or "M" devices are
readily available from highly qualified parts vendors. The present Voyager Approved
Parts List 490LI14 is chiefly comprised of Advent, OAO, MACS, and 206 type parts
qualified on previous programs. To this will be added the J. P. L. part types and
specifications for which Voyager controls are established. A sample sheet is provided
on Table 3-3.
*Copies of this part specification will be provided upon request.
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3.5.6.3 PARTS PROCESSING DOCUMENTS: "S" LEVEL
To increase the confidence in the parts used for Type Approval, P.T.M. and Flight
equipment, the parts will be further processed by power-aging and selected by de-
gradation analysis methods. These selected parts are called Space quality or "S"
devices. "S" Quality Parts Processing Documents (e.g., 171P8301") spell out the
specific requirements including any necessary microscopic visual inspection, x-ray,
noise measurements, thermal resistance, as well as power-aging tests (e. g., 1250
hours), the parameters to be measured for stability, the trend analysis and selection
process used and the marking requirements.
NOTE:
About halfof the "M" Quality parts subjected to above
"S" Quality selection process will be selected and iden-
tifiedas "S" devices. This testing does not say the non-
selected halfwill not perform within vendor designed
limits, but rather, the selected half, by their stability,
exhibits homogeneous characteristics desirable in as-
suring a predictable and long-lifedesign.
3.5.6.4 PARTS DERATING
In subassembly design, parts generally will be de-rated to less than 25 percent of
their maximum power rating and part case temperatures operated at least 40°C below
maximum rating. It is important that the junction temperatures of semiconductors
and comparable key element temperatures of other compgnent parts or materials be ,
accurately determined in any instance in which these ge_al rules:_'e_,_a_}:ap_ted:: :%!:_.:!i
Recent long-life parts test programs have shown very close correl_/[lo_gf life expec-
tancy with these key element temperatures.
3.5.6.5 GE PART CONTROL
During phase 1A, the procedural details have been set up for part identification by
serial number at the part manufacturer, for burn-in and screening tests with computer
reduction of the data and print out of high reliability R-PAK (a special hi-rel packaging
technique developed by GE) identifying the part specification number, purchase order
number, test lot number, part serial number, ranking number (from most stable to
least stable as indicated by the screening tests), the separation of these into "S", space
flight quality parts (the more stable) and "M", engineering model and OSE quality parts,
and "X", rejected (the least stable) categories. Procedures for the serial number
traceability of the "S" {most stable) parts into the assembly of flight hardware and the
introduction into the Voyager data bank (C II) of the serial number composition of each
part and subassembly from part to system level have also been established.
*Copies of this part specification will be provided upon request.
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3.5.7 SUBCONTRACTOR SOURCES OF SUPPLY
Each GE subcontractor will use Voyager standard specifications and will procure and
be responsible for his own materials, parts, and process quality. However, GE will
provide, as a portion of the subcontract, for mutual exchange by purchase of bonded
stock "S" parts or materials which have received full screening, documentation, and
protective packaging to satisfy critical shortages. As required, GE will use its com-
puter program for the stability analysis and ranking classification of subcontractor parts
by serial number. Each approved part, material, or process will include the Voyager
approved sources of supply as a part of the engineering standards data (e.g., either on
the specifications or as suitable lists referenced by the approved parts, materials, and
processes lists. ) •
3.5.8 VERIFICATION OF ACTUAL USE VS. APPROVED STANDARDS
3.5.8.1 PARTS AND MATERIALS
The release of assembly drawing parts lists will be compared by computer with cor-
responding Approved Parts and Materials lists for GE stage IV (T/A, PTM and Flight
Items and OSE) hardware. Any "mis-matched" items will be returned to Engineering for
correction (either of the parts list entry or of the approved lists data if these contain
inadequacies). This check by computer will verify the conformance to JPL's require-
ment that "flight" equipment be built from approved parts and materials. OC Surveillance
at each subcontractor will assure that comparable and effective controls of part s and
materials and conformance with approved lists is obtained by each subcontractor in all
flight hardware.
3.5.8.2 PROCESSES AND PROCESS MATERIALS
The manufacturing planning sheets at GE provide step by step identification of the fab-
rication and assembly operations required to produce a given part or assembly. These
sheets identify the engineering drawing and the engineering revisions of that drawing to
which the engineering parts list, the planning sheets identify (by reference to specifi-
cations and MSI's) the processes and related materials, tools, etc. by which the quality
and uniformity of manufacturing is assured. These manufacturing planning sheets will
be processed by document control and the applicable process references will be incor-
porated into the configuration management data (CI1). These will be compared by
computer with the corresponding Approved Processes List and any mis-matched items
will be returned to Engineering Standards and Manufacturing Engineering for resolution.
This check by computer will verify the conformance to JPL's requirement that flight
equipment be built by the application of approved processes. QC Surveillance at each
subcontractor will assure that comparable and effective control of processes and
conformance with approved lists is obtained by each subcontractor in all flight hardware.
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3.5.9 MAGNETIC MATERIALS CONSIDERATIONS
Magnetic requirements place unique limitations on materials approvals and application.
This requirement does not stop with those incorporated in the engineering design. It
extends to the magnetic cleanliness of manufacturing environments and handling pro-
cedures. Magnetic standards will be established with respect to all materials usage
on Voyager which can involve magnetics. This includes tools, fixtures, etc. as well
as Spacecraft and OSE components. Sample magnetics parts and materials data are
provided in Table 3-4 and 3-5.
Reliability audits of manufacturing and test methods, locations, procedures, tools,
fixtures, etc. as well as QC inspections both at GE and at suppliers and subcontractor
locations will include inquiry into any practices or designs in which a reduction in the
amount of magnetic material in the spacecraft is possible. Design reviews and sign-
off of documents will include specific inquiry into this same subject area.
Magnetic materials will be separated from all other materials on the approved mat-
erials list. They will be removed from the list wherever a non-magnetic (or less
ma?:netic) material can be identified with which an equally reliable design can be pro-
duced.
Magnetic materials (e.g., dumet) which are used as part leads will be cut to minimum
length* prior to assembly. Previously used interconnection materials (e.g., nickel
ribbon) will be eliminated and alternative materials used. Weld schedules will be re-
vised and optimized for these new materials where welded joints are employed.
The extensive prior test data available will be used to minimize such evaluation effort
in qualifying parts and materials for inclusion on the approved lists.
*Consistent with reliable electrical joints, and other related product design and pack-
aging criteria and constraints.
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Table 3-4. Nonmagnetic Parts List
ZZZZZZZZZ_ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ_ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ
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Table 3-5. Non Magnetic Alloys
Metal
Alloy 843
Chromel A
Firth Brown NMCW
Firth Brown FNMC
OFHC Copper
Alloy 53 (Coast Metals)
Hadfield 14% MN A-128-33
Kennametal K-601
Chromel AA
17-14 CuMo
Hella 8302 MN Steel
22-4-9 SS
Monel K-500
Resista Ph Hi MN Steel
Incone X-750
K Monel
KR Monel
Molybdenum
M agnes iu m
Berrylium Copper
Aluminum Bronze
Johnson Bronze
Phosphur Bronze
Stainless Steel A286
Hastelloy D
CF-30 (111717-A)
CDC 730
Stainless Steel 316, 316-L
CK-20 (572-BB)
Stainless Steel 333
CDC 720
C robalt Tool Steel
RA-600
Incoloy 800
Hardsteel Hd-32M
Chromel D
Copel
_1030e
0
0
0
1
0
0
.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Field (7)After
102Oe
0
0
0
.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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3.6 SYSTEMRELIABILITY MODEL
Reliability analysesdescribed in Sections3.4 and 3.5 yield detailed information at the
subassembly equipment level. These datawill serve as one input to the assessment of
reliability at the subsystem and system levels of the Spacecraft. System level
reliability estimation for the Voyager mission, in turn, must account simultaneously
for the changingenvironments in the profile, the variety of functions and modes of
equipment operation that take place, andthe various interdependent relationships
that exist betweensubassembliesand/or subsystems.
Several years of GE-MSDdevelopmentand application experience in the area of sys-
tem modeling has led to the use of Monte Carlo techniques for assessing spacecraft
reliabilities. This techniquewill be usedon the Voyager Program, and takes maxi-
mum advantageof the detailed data available at all levels of design.
The model functions in the following manner:
a. Subassemblyfailure rate data, failure mode information andduty cycles
(mission profile) are stored in the computer memory.
b. Through a string model of the system (i.e., serially arranged), assuming the
system failure model to be Poisson distributed, the computer will determine
whether each simulated flight has experienced any kind of a failure. This is
done by the Monte Carlo random sampling technique, where the chance for
one or more failures is appropriately weighted by the Poisson relationship.
Co If one or more failures have occurred, the specific subassembly(s) failed
are again selected at random where the chance for a subassembly being
selected is weighted by its relative risk contribution to the system.
d_ The failed subassembly(s) are then subjected to a random sampling to
ascertain the mode of failure. Again, the chance for a given failure mode
being selected is weighted by the estimated relative frequency of mode
occurrence.
e. Finally, the time during the mission at which the failure(s) occurred (i.e.,
the mode of system operation at failure) is determined. The failure time is
chosen at random with the periods of high stress levels being more likely to
appear than periods of lower stress levels.
This process is repeated a large number of times, usually 2,000 or more simulated
flights are run, and the results are tabulated from the computer as shown on Figure
3-4. At this point, each simulated flight is evaluated as a success, degraded success
or catastrophic failure according to the nature of the failure experienced, as deter-
mined from the Monte Carlo process. A simple tabulation of success to total flight
history thus provides a measure of the system reliability based on very detailed con-
figuration and profile data and a large sample size of simulated flights.
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FLIGHT NUMBEROF FAILED FAILURE MODE OF
NUMBER FAILURES COMPONENT MODE SYS OPER COMMENTS
33 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 0
37 2 3 1 2 Power supply short at
orbit insertion-catastrophic
37 2 15 1 2
38 1 1 5 1
39 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0
G&C Valve stuck open -
above failure mode _overns
Loss of TM channel
(diagnostic) in powered
fit - no effect
41 0 0 0 0
42 0 0 0 0
43 1 2 5 1 Actuator failure - back
up mode takes over -
no effect
Figure 3-4. Reliability Simulation Model Print-Out Sheet
This modeling process, referred to as the Reliability Simulation Model (RSM), is an
established routine currently in use on the IBM 7094 computer. The Reliability
Simulation Model can be used for system reliability assessment throughout the course
of the Program; during the Design Cycle, the subassembly failure rates (which can be
expressed as functions of time) come from the design reliability calculations
(RFMA's). Later, as test data becomes available, these failure rates will be updated.
3.7 RELIABILITY ESTIMATION
3.7.1 RELIABILITY PREDICTION
The prediction of subassembly reliability is as discussed in Section 3.4, utilizing the
RFMA as the prime method of prediction analysis. Subsystem and system reliabilities
will be calculated by the RSM as described in Section 3.6. These predicted reliability
values will form the basis for the determination of satisfactory inherent reliability
achievement, and will be compared with the apportioned values of reliability to ascer-
tain a proper balance of risk within the system. It is this comparison, and the
identification of high risk areas that possibly result, that initiates the reliability
improvement loop depicted on Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
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3.7.2 RELIABILITY GROWTH
The achievement of the inherent design reliability comes with experience that is
associated with the learning curve for the design, fabrication, test and handling of the
specific Voyager equipments. The definition of the proper growth relationship for the
Voyager Spacecraft will be a continuing task which examines in detail the data and
experience from other space systems as well as the inspection and test results on
Voyager hardware, and establishes trends and analytical or empirical relationships
that describe the reliability growth picture for the particular Voyager equipments.
This analysis will prove instrumental in pinpointing specific areas of activity that
will optimize the learning curve process.
3.8 DESIGN REVIEWS
3.8.1 DESIGN REVIEW BOARD (DRB)
A formalized design review action will be conducted during the design/development
phase of the Voyager Program, and will be extended into the fabrication and test
phases of the Program as may be required. These reviews will be conducted by a
Design Review Board which is chaired by the Reliability Assurance Operation and is
composed of representatives from Quality Assurance, Human Factors, Manufacturing,
System Test and Field Engineering as well as key members of Design Engineering.
The primary purpose of the design review is to provide assistance to the design
engineers in optimizing the Spacecraft and OSE design. The review will include a
comprehensive analysis of design compatibility with Program objectives, basic con-
cepts and technical approach employed, conformance to approved parts and materials
list, appropriate use of design standards and known design techniques, compliance to
applicable specifications, evaluation of engineering development test results, integra-
tion of producibility, maintainability, handling, test requirements and qualification
_nd enmn_fihilitv fnr nr_'_tlnn_l ._e_ _fl.eh nf fh_ _hml _ri_u _,_-_r_f.rorit_ri_, ......... _ ......... J
is eonduoted prior to the formal review meeting, and it is this phase of the review
which provides a major percentage of the benefit derived from the DRB activity. A
formal DRB meeting is held at the conclusion of the informal integration and monitor-
ing activity to summarize the design status and content, to provide an independent
audit and integration of outstanding interface and technical problems including open
CRAB items, and to assign formal action items to responsible individuals for the
resolution of outstanding problems. These action items are continuously monitored
by the DRB until such resolution has been achieved, and the action items can be con-
sidered closed. Failure to obtain a satisfactory resolution to an action item will
result in a CRAB.
The Chairman of the DRB is responsible for coordinating the schedule for DRB meet-
ings, for issuing all notices of meetings to participants as well as providing partici-
pants with the specifications, schematics, drawings and other documentation
required for the review, and for documenting the minutes of the meeting and the
follow up on all action items and their status.
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Design reviews will be conducted on all critical subassemblies and all subsystems.
These reviews shall be conducted primarily during the Stage II and Stage III design
periods, and will be conducted thereafter as required. Critical design changes, or
critical design related problems that are experienced beyond the Stage IV release are
representative of situations in which later DRB action will be taken.
3.8.2 EXTERNAL DESIGN AUDITS
Complex equipment designs or critical design problems will, as necessary, be
reviewed by technical specialists, consultants or subcontractors external to the
Voyager Program. This method of technical design audit and review has proven to
be a highly beneficial source of pertinent design and technology information to aug-
ment the technical activity within the program.
3.9 HUMAN ENGINEERING
The Human Factors Program will have as a prime objective the identification of poten-
tial sources of human error in the design, test, handling and operation of the various
equipments of the Spacecraft and OSE, and the institution of a formal program to
eliminate or minimize such deficiencies. This objective is approached through a
three step program which implements a human factors effort during the design phase,
a training program to optimize the handling and use of the hardware during the test/
operational phase, and an evaluation program to provide a continual measurement of the
achievement of human error elimination in all phases of the program. (See Figure
3-5.) Human Factors will have a particularly significant role in the Voyager Program
in relationship to the human element of equipment degradation that potentially exists
with the manufacturing-test cycle, and the optimization of procedures and training to
minimize such degradations.
3.9.1 HUMAN FACTORS IN THE DESIGN
Human Factors personnel will participate in the design of the hardware (Spacecraft
and OSE) to insure the inclusion of the features of MIL STD 803 in the design to the
maximum extent possible.
The major contribution of the human factors personnel to the design effort is the
achievement of design considerations that will permit an efficient handling of the
vehicle during all phases of fabrication and test. Human factors personnel will
identify special procedures and training necessary to minimize the potential occur-
rence of human error and will utilize this information as an input to the training
program format. As an aid to the human engineering effort, design mock-ups will be
utilized to the maximum extent possible. Rough three dimensional representations
of the design solutions are quite beneficial in providing design personnel with a visual
representation of the problems that will be encountered in the various handling,
assembly, test and operational procedures to be employed. The human engineering
effort will also become a formal part of the Design Review procedure for the program,
and as such will become a party to the formal review and critique of all design
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evaluations performed on the program. Participation of human factors personnel in
Design Reviews is therefore a key item in the achievement of a realistic human engi-
neering program. The final output of the human engineering program will be the de-
lineation of recommended procedures for equipment handling during manufacture,
test, launch and space flight operations.
3.9.2 TRAINING PROGRAM
To insure that the specified procedures are properly implemented, it is necessary to
make handling personnel aware of the properties of the system and the peculiarities
involved in its proper manufacture, test, and use. The human factors effort will
determine what kinds of training are required and will recommend a program to
implement this effort. The design of the training program will involve the following
steps:
a. Determination of skills and knowledges required to successfully handle the
system.
b. Determination of the skills and knowledges presently available to personnel
responsible for handling the system.
c. The differences between the above items will identify what training is
required.
d. A training plan will be written detailing a recommended program for
accomplishing the required training.
e. After approval of the training plan, implementation of the program will take
place.
3.9.3 HUMAN FACTORS EVALUATION PROGRAM
The human factors Evaluation Program will be conducted most intensively during the
processing of the first PTM vehicle. Thereafter, a continual monitoring effort will
be employed to maintain the desired level of handling/processing efficiency. The
Evaluation Program will be carried on through two primary avenues. First, direct
observation of activities and the interview of personnel will be conducted to provide
feedback to the engineering designers on the identification of potential human error
situations inadvertently overlooked during the design phase. As a direct result of this
step, a document will be issued detailing the findings of these observations and inter-
views with recommendations for hardware or procedure changes as applicable.
Second, the human factors personnel will take an active participation role in the Fail-
ure Analysis Review Board in order to isolate and define the potential or real human
contribution to each failure. After identification of a human causation relationship,
an analysis will be conducted to ascertain the reasons behind the human errors and to
identify corrective measures necessary to eliminate the problem. As with Design
Reviews, the human factors participation in the Failure Analysis Review Board will
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represent a formal method by which their analyses and recommendations will
be integrated into the information cycle of reliability assessment.
3.10 MAINTAINABILITY, READINESS, AVAILABILITY
3.10.1 DEFINITIONS
As applied to the Voyager Program, the following definitions are provided.
3.10.1.1 MAINTAINABILITY
A quality of the design and installation of equipment which facilitates the accomplish-
ment of inspection, test, repair and replacement with a minimum of time, skill and
resources.
3.10.1.2 READINESS
The probability that an equipment is in a pre-determined operating condition over a
time interval when it will be called upon to initiate mission performance. Readiness,
then, relates primarily to the Spacecraft and its condition for launch actuation during
the prescribed window.
3.10.1.3 AVAILABILITY
The probability that an equipment is in a pre-determined operating condition over a
time interval when its satisfactory operation is required for completion of a mission
or task. Availability, then, relates primarily to the OSE and its operational condition
(up-time) when in use.
3.10.2 MAINTAINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN VOYAGER
Maintainability, when combined with Reliability, is viewed as a Voyager characteristic
which interrelates with support resources (spares, maintenance policy, manpov_er, test
equipment} in a manner to maximize the probability of mission success and the
probability of launch at an optimum interval within the launch window. The need for
maintainability design considerations can be viewed as in Figure 3-6 in terms of the
Spacecraft and OSE, and their relation to the pre-launch and in-flight phases of the
mission. Reliability and Maintainability interrelate in all blocks of the matrix where
physical access to equipment is possible. This interrelation affects Spacecraft
Readiness for launch at the optimum window, and OSE Availability for all ground
functions of the mission-- both pre- and post-launch. In the latter case, the OSE
availability requirements will differ greatly in the pre- and post-launch periods; al-
most continuous operation is necessary in pre-launch, while in post-launch certain
critical times of required operation will occur on a more staggered schedule.
The interaction of reliabilityand maintainabilityare schematically shown in Figure
3-7. Within the context of optimizing readiness/availability,the design/management
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program will allocate reliability and maintainability requirements throughout the
Voyager system in a manner that places an upper boundon both the permissible
number of failures or maintenanceincidents within a time span as well as the repair
(which includes replacement) time per failure instance. The end objective of the main-
tainability program, therefore, is to designand support the Voyager system in a manner
that maximizes system repair rates for given support resources.
3.10.3 DESIGNINGFORMAINTAINABILITY
Minimizing equipmentdowntime during the pre-launch and in-flight operations
requires appropriate design decisions that affect three basic time related parameters:
a. Detection and Diagnosis Time - This parameter considers the trade-offs in
continuous monitoring vs periodic checks as it relates to the criticality of
identifying system fault, and the isolation of the specific fault to a specific
location or level of assembly where maintenance can be performed. Detec-
tion and Diagnosis thus influence the design of test points in the equipment,
the structuring of test procedures, and the design of test equipment and OSE
monitoring and read-out capability.
b. Correction Time - This parameter identifies and influences the basic design
in terms of equipment accessibility, and system configuration and associated
packaging schemes. It also provides guidelines for repair/replace decisions,
and the structuring of an optimum logistics program for spares provisioning
and related inventory control/re-order policy.
Co Verification Time - This parameter again influences the same design con-
siderations inherent to Detection and Diagnosis time - i.e., test points, test
procedures, and test equipment.
The Maintainability Program for Voyager will utilize these three basic time parameters
as key design constraints in all phases of the Spacecraft and OSE equipment design.
The areas of accessibility, harnessing, test point allocation, system packaging, and
spares provisioning will be emphasized.
3.10.4 SYSTEM MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSIS
Analytical analyses of readiness and availability will be performed through a simula-
tion technique employing the Monte Carlo Checkout Simulation Model _ICCS-II)
developed by the Apollo Support Department of the Missile and Space Division
(Reference: Availability Estimation Report of Saturn V, GE-ASD, March 9, 1964).
The MCCS-II works, in principle, very much like the RSM described in Section 3.6.
Estimations of the maintainability time parameters together with reliability and
operating profile inputs provide simulated outputs of fault occurrences and restora-
tion times to full operation. With a large number of simulated runs, system readi-
ness and availability data are provided. Test information is utilized to update the
maintainability time parameters on a continuing basis. Results of the simulation
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analysis are used to isolate maintenance problems and to establish criteria
for required design, test or operator training action.
3.11 RELIABILITY ASSURANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS
3.11.1 ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT TEST REQUIREMENTS
The engineering development tests will include specific considerations for reliability
and life analyses. These test considerations will be guided both by the results of
reliability design investigations and by a detailed review of the test requirements to
be imposed on the T/A, PTM and FA portions of the Integrated Test Plan. Special
reliability life tests, either real time or accelerated, will be conducted on equipment
components exhibiting potentially critical life capability characteristics. Special
emphasis will also be placed on margin testing, back-up mode capability and
flexibility, operational contingency analysis and verification of failure mode-effect
relationships.
The ITB will coordinate the overall technical review of the engineering development
teat program and will provide for the integration of development test that will serve
to validate qualification and acceptance test criteria and assure a high probability of
equipment capability to meet all T/A, PTM and FA reliability test requirements.
3.11.2 ACCEPTANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS
A population of spacecraft systems, constructed totally from the "as received" parts
and materials and operated continuously to failure, can be visualized as constructing
the schematic histogram data record shown on Figure 3-11. A certain percentage of
the failures occurring in an acceptance test may be identified as infant mortality part
failures, another percentage will accrue due to anomalies that are traced to the manu-
facturing and handling processes during fabrication and assembly, and still a third
percentage will be found to have their incipient failure mechanism caused by equip-
ment interface discrepancies. A residual, but small, level of failure occurrence will
then take place followed by an upsurge in failure frequency due to some form of wear-
out. This latter mechanism (wearout) finally precipitates failure in all the remaining
systems.
Experience has validated the general pattern of this theoretical histogram, and has led
to the requirement on GE spacecraft programs for acceptance test measures to
eliminate the vast majority of such early failure incidents, leaving an acceptable level
of risk for spacecraft mission performance. Tests in addition to all in-process
inspection and testing are as follows:
a. Part Screening or Burn-In - to eliminate infant part mortality.
b. Subassembly Burn-In (Green Line Limits) - to eliminate in-process work-
manship deficiencies. Q
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c. System Burn-In (Green Line Limits) - to eliminate system assembly and
equipment interface discrepancies.
do Maximum Permissible Pre-Flight Operation (Red Line Limits) - but short
enough to eliminate the possibility of equipment operation during the mission
in the region of incipient wearout failure. See Section 4.4.5 for discussion
of Red Line Limits.
Test criteria will be defined as reliability requirements for acceptance testing, based
on the results of the design investigations and engineering development tests conducted
through the Stage III engineering release, and the Mission Equivalent testing require-
ments given in Section 3.11.3. These requirements will be coordinated by the ITB
and updated as required based on information obtained beyond Stage III. All Sub-
assembly Design Specifications will contain a definition of their respective SME and
DME profiles and the review and approval of these profiles will constitute a part of
the reliability sign-off on Component Design Specifications. Acceptance test require-
ments for reliability will be reviewed with JPL for comment and approval.
3.11.3 QUALIFICATION TEST REQUIREMENTS (T/A and PTM)
A prime reliability consideration for the T/A and PTM qualification tests is the estab-
lishment of a demonstrated engineering confidence in equipment mission and life per-
formance at (or below) the required level of risk. This level of risk which must be
demonstrated is, in turn, defined by the reliability requirements and equipment
reliability allocations discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. In terms of Figure 3-8 this
risk corresponds to the shaded area of the curve where probability of failure occur-
rence is at a minimum during the period of mission flight.
Reliability will specify those requirements for T/A and PTM testing that will provide
a proper degree of risk measurement and life capability evaluation. These require-
ments will be coordinated by the ITB and reviewed with JPL for comment and
approval.
Pertinent definitions and requirements for life qualification demonstration, in terms
of Mission Equivalent testing, are provided in Section 3.11.4.
3.11.4 MISSION EQUIVALENT TESTING
The interpretations of tests in terms of mission equivalents has been used effectively
on many prior programs. Reliability and life demonstration tests based on the concept
of STATIC MISSION EQUIVALENT (SME) and DYNAMIC MISSION EQUIVALENT (DME)
OPERATIONAL PROFILES will be applied on the Voyager Project.
Definition of DME/SME Terms:
The DME is a foreshortened mission obtained by eliminating from a normal, com-
plete mission profile all steady-state periods (either operating or non-operating)
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Figure 3-8. Schematic Failure Histogram
during which the level of stress (es) remains within predefined limits and retaining
only those during which transients occur.
The SME is that portion of an equipment operational profile where both function
and environment are constant within stated limits. Thus, a normal, complete mission
profile is composed )f one DME and one SME
The DME so defined is relative to the subassembly to which it is applied. Since
the different subassemblies of a system may operate at different times and under
different conditions the DME will also be different.
In considering any transient stress period, allowance must be provided for a return
to steady-state conditions. In instances of thermal heating and cooling, the dynamic
period is to be so defined as to assure (e.g., 95 percent) the completion of all thermal
pumping affecting the migration of materials from one location to another.
By the establishment of the limits defining the steady-state conditions the duration of
one DME can be adjusted to provide a maximum opportunity for meaningful results
per hour of test time expended. All portions of the normal, complete mission profile
which are not included in the definition of DME are automatically incorporated into
the SME for that component and mission. Graphical illustration is provided in
Figure 3-9.
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During prior GE Voyager studies, the method of separating a mission profile into its
Dynamic and Steady State portions was presented at JPL (July 1964).
This DME/SME approach is particularly valuable for Voyager because the
Voyager mission is so long as to preclude the use of test programs involving complete
mission equivalents. The DME portion of the profile is short enough to permit
repetitive testing of a limited number of speeimans and thus permit economically
establishing a high confidence in the demonstrated reliability for that portion of the
mission.
An analysis of ground and flight test data on GE spacecraft programs has shown that
the vast majority of equipment anomalies occur during the dynamic or DME portion
of operation. Hence, the greatest concentration of reliability test requirements will
be in the DME region of the profile. However, the Engineering Development Tests
will be analyzed to confirm this proportion for the specific Voyager equipment, and
special attention will be given to the identification of failure occurrence during a DME
as it may be influenced by the peculiarities (duration, environment level) of a pre-
ceding SME profile.
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3.11.4.1 DME/SME DATA COLLECTION
As noted in 4.8.4 and under paragraph 2.3.4.1 of the Voyager Configuration Manage-
ment Plan, data collection and processing activities will provide a subassembly pro-
file report including profile test time run, break of inspection, failure reports,
reliability request for corrective action, etc.
This Voyager Data Bank will thus make available for reliability analysis a complete
set of test-related data.
A guide manual for a reliability measurement program has been prepared by General
Electric for the special Projects Office, Department of the Navy. It was published
15 May 1965 as NAVWEPS OD 29304*. Such procedures have been used at General
Electric for many years and are adaptable to the Voyager Reliability Program.
3.11.4.2 DME AND SME ACCEPTANCE TEST CRITERIA
A review of activities and tests conducted prior to the recent Mariner Launch indi-
cated that as much as 800 hours of testing was applied by the subcontractor upon his
completed equipment subassemblies prior to acceptance for shipment to JPL. Also,
that as much as 1000 hours of additional testing of these equipment subassemblies
was applied prior to their acceptance for assembly and test as a complete spacecraft
system. After these subassembly tests, each of the flight systems was tested for as
much as five foreshortened mission profile - performance tests prior to shipment to
the launch facility where comprehensive checkout tests were conducted prior to launch.
Thus with three systems (two launch plus one back-up) a total of at least 15 DME
plus the above hours of testing preceded the Mariner Launch to Mars.
The preliminary criteria for acceptance testing indicated in the following paragraphs
is considered consistent with JPL and GE experience. Such requirements will, of
course, be submitted to JPL for review prior to their final incorporation into the
Integrated Test Plan.
Subassembly level acceptance tests will include the use of DME and SME tests for
Green Line Limit criteria within the scope of Phase II scheduling and funding consid-
erations. Subject to these constraints, a preliminary criteria has been established
requiring the accumulation of four (4) consecutive failure free DME's on each sub-
assembly level FA test, and a minimum of 300 test hours of additional SME mission
profile elements. Both DME and SME test durations will be well below any Red Line
Limit that may exist.
In addition to the subassembly acceptance criteria, system acceptance test require-
ments will consist of four (4) consecutive failure free DME's run against the system
*Copies are available upon request.
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type DME profile and a minimum of 300test hours of additional SME mission profile
elements for Green Line Limit criteria. These tests are also subject to the constraints
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Thus, a given subassemblywill see a minimum of 8 DME's and 600 hours of SME test
time at the completion of acceptancetests. This is graphically illustrated in Figure
3-10. Final definition of SME and DME acceptancetest criteria will be made during
PhaseIB and will be subject to JPL approval.
3.11.4.3 DME AND SME QUALIFICATION (T/A AND PTM) TEST CRITERIA
Subassemblylevel T/A tests will include the use of DME and SME tests for the pur-
pose of reliability and life demonstration, within the scope of PhaseII technical
schedulingandfundingconsiderations. Subject to these constraints, a preliminary
criteria has beenestablished requiring the accumulation of twenty-five (25) consecu-
tive failure free DME oneach of two sets of subassemblies for each subassembly
level T/A test. (As an illustration, using a binomial type of interpretation, such
results would indicate a demonstrated reliability for the subassembly in excess of
0.95 at a confidence level of 90 percent.) In the event that the equipmentfailure
history during this period indicates that the design life is inadequatefor the 25 DME
requirement, this number may be reducedprovided that the number of T/A subassem-
bly is correspondingly increased to allow for the accumulation of 50 failure free DME
on five or less subassemblies, with a minimum requirement of 10consecutive failure
free DME's per subassembly. Any DME life demonstration test short of this require-
ment must receive the review and approval of the Manager, Reliability Assurance.
An additional test accumulation, equivalent in duration to at least one (1) failure
free SME profile will be required to complete the subassembly qualification life test.
Subsystemand system qualification life tests (T/A and PTM) will require four (4)
consecutive failure free DME's run against the system DME profile, and a minimum
of 700 test hours of consecutivefailure free SME profile elements. (On a binomial
interpretation, the DME results would indicate a demonstrated mission reiiabiiity for
the system in excess of 0.55at a confidence level of 90percent. The PhaseIA inter-
pretation of the JPL mission specification, Section3.2, indicates a mission reliability
requirement of 0.50.) These tests are also subject to the constraints mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
These test requirements are graphically shownon Figure 3-10. Final definition of
SME and DME qualification test criteria will be madeduring PhaseIB and will be sub-
ject to JPL approval.
3.11.5 SPECIAL TEST REQUIREMENTS
Reliability Assurance will specify special test requirements for test procedures, as
deemednecessary. This would include such items as the number of permissible
times that harness connectors maybe mated and demated, and similar such consid-
erations for pin connections andvarious other mechanical mating procedures.
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Procedures for repair and replacement will be specified and monitored, as required,
in order to optimize the implementation of the maintainability analyses conducted
during the Design Assurance Cycle.
3.11.5.1 PARTS AND MATERIALS QUALIFICATION
As a point of special consideration, T/A testing for part (or for materials or proc-
esses) qualification will be conducted whenever the available reliability history for
a required part type is insufficient to establish satisfactorily the level of risk involved
in its particular Voyager application. The requirements for T/A part tests and the
specification of the associated test criteria will be provided for review by JPL before
its incorporation into the Integrated Test Plan.
3.11.5.1.1 TESTS FOR PRE LIMINARY APPROVAL FOR NEW ITEMS (JPL
YELLOW CODE*)
Progressive (STEP-STRESS) stress testing (one form of which is illustrated in
Figure 3-11 -- LONG LIFE TEST PLAN) will be used to provide an initial approval
data base. This method is the most effective and economical to provide an initial
demonstration of the capabilities of the item and provide a comparative basis (with
respect to other comparable high reliability devices) for initial approval. This com-
parison, together with dissection and microscopic examination to supplement the
available materials and process information and provide an initial physics of failure
analysis, will be the basis for approval and inclusion as a yellow code (i.e., caution,
for use only in individually approved applications) items.
3.11.5.1.2 TEST FOR LIMITED LIFE APPROVAL FOR NEW ITEMS (JPL WHITE
CODE)
The initial testing above will be supplemented by Dynamic Mission Equivalent
(DME**) testing° The method of test include consideration of known and proposed
Voyager applications of the device and a determination of the transient and dynamic
periods of operation, stress or environment.
In every case where the combined environments involved can be simulated in practical
test facilities (i.e., without excessive test facility, instrument, and test labor costs),
DME testing will use combined environments -for example, vacuum, thermal, elec-
trical and mechanical actuation will be combined in a single test setup. Where such is
not practicable (i.e., vibration) these elements of the profile will precede the particu-
lar operational environment in separate tests. The composite data from these
*JPL per Z PP 2000 GEN color codes are used to indicate the degree to which the
demonstration has been completed.
**Based upon the most severe single application of the part, material or processed
item being considered.
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sequential portions of the test profile will thus provide a test equivalent of the
applicable dynamic portions of the mission.
It is proposed that all part types for which any inadequacyof History of Reliability
exists be required to demonstrate a minimum red line capability of 25DME failure
free. Also, that complete failure analysesbe made in every instance of defective or
sub-normal performance to establish the causes and effects data and its Voyager
significance.
3.11.5.1.3 REQUIREMENTSFOR FINAL APPROVAL FORNEW ITEMS (JPL
BLUE CODE)
Those interactions of materials under steady-state (within defined limits) conditions
which require the presence of related materials in the component (e.g., the degrada-
tion of the separator in a class 2 battery) must be verified by longlife tests of suitable
subassemblies or modules. Since the major portion of the long Voyager mission is
under SME conditions, meaningful test times may become longer thancan be permitted
within the Voyager development scheduleand maximum advantagemust be taken of in-
formation available prior to Voyager test data. Accelerated tests (i.e., tests at higher
stress levels than those used in the Voyager component)will receive JPL and GE con-
sideration and approval prior to their useon Voyager. In its most complete form,
this would include not only STEADY STATE TEST RESULTS--SeeFigure 3-12, but
also DATA CORRELATION--SeeFigure 3-13, and DESIGNLIFE APPLICATION DATA--
Figure 3-14. Test histories and accelerated test data will be required to demonstrate
a minimum red line capability on all parts and materials as applied of at least 2
SME.
3.11.6 FAILURE CRITERIA FORREDUNDANTELEMENTS
In any of the foregoing test requirements (e.g., 3.11.4.2) in which a redundancYor fully
acceptable back-up mode of operation is available, the criteria of success is to be the
same as it would be in an actual mission. =_"_ "-*..... +_+'"'__¢,_,_,_qry _inop, bv
definition, reliability is a product characteristic that is defined as the probability
that a system will perform a required function under specified conditions, without
failure, for a specified period of time.
Thus, the failure of a redundant elementwhich does not cause a failure to meet the
functional requirements will not be considered as a test failure. However, any such
failures of redundantelements will be fully investigated and corrective action com-
pleted prior to proceedingwith the nexthigher level of assembly andtest. Also, at
least one (1) DME, failure free, will be required to verify the corrective action.
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Figure 3-14. Design Life Application
3.12 SPECIAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
3.12.1 SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS AND EFFECTS - RADIATION
Since this environmental risk is cumulative in nature, the probability of mission
success through the specified first month of operation insofar as radiation effects are
concerned is reasonably high. The risk beyond initial periods of mission success is
principally dependent upon two areas of uncertainty --
a. The uncertainty relative to the environment to be encountered, and
b. The variability of individual response by approved parts items to given
amounts of radiation exposure.
Semiconductors are the most sensitive to electromagnetic effects by a number of
orders of magnitude. The surface effects damage risks on Voyager are much more
severe than "bulk" damage risks. Device variability in surface effects damage under
given cumulative exposure is illustrated by the test data summarized in Figure 3-15.
A radiation bulk effects summary is provided in Table 3-6.
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Figure 3-15. TRANSISTOR DEGRADATION OF GAIN
3.12.1.1 SUBASSEMBLY AND SYSTEM TESTING
Based upon all currently available information, it does not appear advantageous to
incorporate any radiation testing in subassembly or system tests.
3.12.1.2 PARTS AND MATERIALS TYPE APPROVAL (QUALIFICATION TESTING)
Radiation testing of semiconductor types of devices from each approved source will be
planned as a part of the Voyager Parts Program. Other types of items are not present-
ly identified as more sensitive than these. In instances in which such more sensitive
parts or materials are proposed for Voyager use, they will be reviewed with JPL
for inclusion in this testing.
3.12.1.3 PARTS AND MATERIALS ACCEPTANCE
Additional knowledge as to the actual environment together with results from the
radiation testing of the part types will be used to establish the need for and to deter-
mine the methods applied to perform radiation screening of parts intended for flight
hardware. No such 100 percent screening for radiation surface effects is included
in this present plan. This will be reviewed with JPL during phase IB.
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Table 3-6. Radiation - Bulk Effects Data Summary
Material or Component
Germanium Transistors
Silicon Transistors
Diodes
IR Detector Cells
Thermistors
Resistors
Wire -wound
Carbon and Composition
Potentiometers
Electron Tubes
Vacuum Tubes
Gas Filled Tubes
Photomultiplier Tubes
Traveling Wave Tubes
Camera Tubes
Capacitors
Paper Capacitors
Ceramic Capacitors
Mica Capacitors
Tantalum Capacitors (Solid)
Oil-impregnated
Assemblies and Miscellaneous Components
Printed Circuit Boards
Quartz Crystals
Differential Transformer
Coaxial Cable
Magnetic-core Materials
Elastomeric Materials
Plastics
Laminates
Lubricants, etc.
Neutrons (n cm -2)
Approximate Damage Threshold
Gammas (r)
3 x 1012 f
6 x 1011 f
1 x 1012 f
2 x 1013 f
3 x 1017 f
2 x 1015 f
2 x 1014 f
1 x 1013 f
6 x 1014 f
6 x 1012 f
9 x 1013 f
6 x 1011 f
1 x 1015 f
2 x 1015 f
1 x 1015 f
1 x 1017 f
1 x 1015 f
2 x 1015 f
2 x 1015 f
8 x 1016 f
2 x 1018 f
3 x 1018 f
1 x 1015 f
2 x 1015f
4 x 1013 f
5x 10 4
7 x 10 6
1 x 10 6
6x 10 6
1 x 10 6
5 x 10 8
5 x 10 8
2 x 10 8
ix 106
2 x 10 7
1 x 104
4 x 106
1 x 106
3 x 10 8
3 x 10 8
3 x 10 8
7x 10 8
5 x 10 8
3 x 108
4 x 108
4 x 108
3 x 108
1 x 105
2 x 10 4
3 x 108
6 x 106
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Table 3-6. Radiation - Bulk Effects Data Summary (Cont)
I
Material or Component
Ceramic, Glass, and Optical
Materials
Refrigerants
Explosives and Propellants
Metals and Alloys
Neutrons (n cm -2)
Approximate Damage Threshold
Gammas (r)
3 x 1018 f
4 x 1018 f
2 x 104
1 x 107
1 x 108
3.12.2 DORMANCY
Dormancy exists when a particular item of equipment is nonoperative, and stored
under conditions of zero electrical, mechanical, and chemical stress. Under such
an ideal situation, the probability of failure (or the hazard rate) approaches zero.
The application of the dormancy principle, then, suggests an attractive design appli-
cation feature for the Voyager spacecraft where significant reliability gains can
potentially be made during certain relatively inactive cruise modes. The selective
use of dormancy will be explored in detail during Phase IB. Preliminary
analyses of dormant effects have been made in Phase IA and are included
in the Volume A technical discussions.
3.13 VOYAGER RELIABILITY DEMONSTRATION
3.13.1 ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE FROM TEST DATA
Data from the .... - .............. ; .^ .l.^ _,._-;...._1,_ pre¢._.,+,_a _n fh,_ T,if_ TestIntegrates lest rrogra,,,, _vaL_u _u _ _,_, ....................
Plan VBIIOVP008 and the paragraphs of Section ii.4 will be utilizedin the generation of
reliabilitymeasurements for the Voyager equipments. Estimation and inference procedures
that will be employed to obtain a meaningful measurement are discussed below. '69 Flight
Data will be included when available.
3.13.2 BINOMIAL INTERPRETATION OF DME RESULTS
DME testing, involving repetitive experimentation at the T/A, PTM, and FA levels of test,
will provide data giving the number of DME's experienced on identified items of equipment
and the sequence and number of any DME failures which occurred. (In judging failure count
in this process, due caution must be exercised to separate "true" reliability failures from
the burn-in or screening type of failure for which much of the testing is purposely designed.
Any failure that occurs will, of course, receive detailed analysis to increase our under-
standing of the failure mechanism involved and thereby provide proper corrective action.
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For purposes of DME reliability estimation, the total DME history (or that of a terminal
period) can be used in a simple binomial framework of interpretation. By logical synthesis
of test information obtained at the subassembly and system levels, the number of DME's
available for estimation at various levels of equipment assembly is greatly enhanced. This
assumes the ability to feed meaningful data up and down from subassemblies to systems.
This synthesis is not automatic in nature and proper simulation must be verified for the
Voyager equipments. However, this synthesis has been applied on current GE programs,
and its application on Voyager does appear reasonable. It should be noted that, in general,
test environment levels are more severe than corresponding flight levels, hence the ground
test influence in forming a basis of reliability estimation will err on the conservative side.
Utilizing the binomial technique will enable the estimation of a dynamic reliability RD,
and appropriate confidence bounds thereon for any level of hardware of interest. The
reliability demonstrated by this application of the binomial technique is shown in Figure
3-16. Reliability test requirements discussed in Section 3.11 have been so specified as
to be able to demonstrate meaningful reliabilities at confidence levels in excess of 75%
for such an interpretation.
3.13.3 SME ANALYSIS
Since the SME portion of an equipment profile can be quite long, the opportunity for SME
data accumulation is severely handicapped. Various methods of data inference must be
employed to provide an adequate basis for engineering confidence in SME reliability.
For example:
a. For cyclic functioning or go-no-go devices, environmental soak will be con-
ducted prior to the actual dynamic action to ascertain the SME effects on DME
performance.
b. Where design analysis or prior experience indicate critical life potential, real
time SME testing will be performed. Where statistically significant samples cannot
be employed, the key will be to achieve a basic understanding of life deterioration
phenomena so that appropriate corrective measures can be taken.
C. Results of accelerated testing which yield life characteristics at extreme stresses
will be used to predict reliability under mission conditions wherever the extrapola-
tion of the data from the high stress-short time region to the low stress-long time
region can be justified.
d. Analytical "stress-strength" techniques can be investigated in limited test samples
and used as a means to estimate reliability or incipient life deterioration.
Various methods of reliability analysis in each of these categories are available (e. g.,
"A Study of Spacecraft Testing Philosophies and Techniques," GE Document 64SD4370).
By its very nature, SME testing will be performed primarily at the part, material, and
subassembly level. It is at this level that SME affects of interest will occur. Hardware
phenomena above this level are primarily DME in nature because of equipment interrelation-
ships that are present. As outlined in the Life Test Plan, VBll0VP008, long term life
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tests will be made to verify system level SME characteristics. Via these techniques, an
estimate of the static reliability R S, will be obtained.
3.13.4 MISSION RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT
An estimation of mission reliability from the DME and SME measurements will be obtained
by R = R D x R S. Since statistically rigorous confidence limits on the value of R S may not
be possible (i.e., only small numbers of specimens will be available), the estimates of R S
will be treated as "best" estimates. It will be inferred that such values are related to a
confidence of 50%. As such, the value of R D will be calculated at a 50% confidence for
purposes of obtaining the overall mission reliability, R. This, of course, does not limit
the ability to obtain separately values of R D at higher confidence limits.
3.13.5 BAYESIAN ANALYSIS
The problem of small data samples mentioned above involves a significant problem of
mathematical interpretation. These problems will occur during the early phases of testing
when only a small data sample will be available, and statistically rigorous interpretations
are impracticable. During this same period in the program, test-measured reliability
values can be of most significance. The early identification of risk and problem areas is
necessary if timely corrective actions are to be taken before more serious schedule and
funding problems result.
The methods of Bayesian Statistics will be applied in order to analyze the data under such
restrictions. A complete report of this work is discussed in the paper "Application of
Bayesian Statistics in Reliability Measurement*" to be presented at the Fourth Annual
Reliability and Maintainability Conference.
3.13.6 GRAPHICAL RECORD OF RELIABILITY GROWTH
As shown in Figure 3-17, a record will be maintained in graphic form in which all failures
are documented. Those classified as "infant mortality" are to be graphed separately from
those classified as "reliability" failures. Monitoring of Q.C. and Manufacturing progress
will be performed to assure the elimination of "infant mortality" items. Monitoring of
engineering corrections (with or without Reliability requests for correction action) and
progress will be performed to assure elimination of the "reliability" items.
This record graph will be made and updated from the Voyager Data Bank whenever the data
bank printout of these data makes graphical clarification beneficial. The points plotted
will be subscript identified and cross-referenced to the data bank record to assure traceability.
As failure analysis and corrective action modify the reliability significance of the plotted
data, the line joining the data points will be revised. Its median slope and projection
represent individual system (or subassembly) reliability growth.
The mathematical significance of the test data will be analyzed separately.
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4.0 RELIABILITY PRODUCT ASSURANCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Operational achievement of the inherent reliability obtained during the Design Assur-
ance Cycle is a direct function of the detailed attention given to hardware fabrication,
test and handling. Reliability product assurance will be accomplished by:
ao A comprehensive program of manufacturing reliability to establish in proc-
ess controls, high levels of workmanship and controlled handling and storage
of all hardware.
0 A continuing program of deficiency reporting during all phases of hardware
fabrication using a closed loop information system and rapid feedback and
correction measures.
c. A comprehensive test program for hardware burn-in, process deficiency
screening, and life evaluation.
d. A continuous audit of the "as designed" to the "as built" configuration.
e. A continuous numerical assessment of measured reliability versus design
reliability goals to identify areas of risk and institute corrective action.
fo A continued exercise of control on the reliability performance of subcon-
tractors and vendors.
4.1.1 PRODUCT ASSURANCE FLOW CYCLE
The Product Assurance Cycle, which covers Project activities from release of engi-
neering definition for first prime prototype hardware to mission flight and operations,
is shown schematically on Figure 4-1.
This schematic depicts the major elements of this cycle and the relationship of the
reliability tasks to it. Figure 4-2 is a further definition of Figure 4-1, and indicates
the elements of reliability that occur in each product assurance phase.
4.1.2 RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
The relationship between Reliability and Quality Assurance during the Product Assur-
ance Cycle is, indeed, exceptionally close. This is reflected by the many activities
in which both groups share complementary roles and responsibilities. Such is the case,
for example, in the Data Accumulation Activity and the Trouble Analysis System, both
of which are discussed in later paragraphs.
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The Quality Assurance function is primarily one of the "point" determination of equip-
ment status and performance, while the Reliability Assurance function deals primarily
with the '%ime" dependent aspects of equipment performance. Thus, reliability brings
to bear the many facets of technology which permit an interpretation and extrapolation
of discrete points of information to the analysis of equipment behavior at some future
point in time - especially during the mission.
As an important corollary to this concept, it can be stated that while quality can be
achieved without the simultaneous achievement of reliability, reliability can be
achieved only when a satisfactory achievement of hardware quality has been effected.
4.2 MANUFACTURING RELIABILITY
The task of Reliability Assurance throughout the manufacturing phase of the Program
is one of Product Assurance. This activity assures that the inherent reliability de-
signed into the equipment during the Design Assurance Cycle is preserved during the
manufacturing cycle. In essence, the inherent designed-in reliability must also be
built into the equipment.
This portion of the Reliability Implementation Plan defines the reliability program to
be implemented during the manufacturing phase of the Voyager Program.
To assist in the understanding of this discussion, the following definitions apply:
a. Approved Manufacturing Processes are common usage, standard, processes
which require approval by JPL/GE and are listed on the Approved Processes
List. These Processes will be identified by GE Voyager Numbers and docu-
mented on a "Specification" format. The process for Potting Integrated
Circuit Modules is a typical example of an "Approved Manufacturing Proc-
ess r'.
b. Manufacturing Planning, as used herein, refers to special purpose docu-
ments used to specify the step-by-step flow of an item through the fabrica-
tion cycle. Manufacturing planning sheets will reference "Approved Manu-
facturing Process" where applicable, and generally will specify in-process
inspection Points. Manufacturing planning, of this type, will not be refer-
enced on the Voyager Approved Process List. The plan to be followed in
machining the various elements of a complex assembly or assembling a
Pneumatic Tube Assembly are typical examples of "Manufacturing Planning. "
4.2.1 APPROVED MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
During the initial phase of the program, a list of Approved Manufacturing Processes
which have been tried and proven for high reliability type hardware will be developed.
The list shall be updated throughout the period prior to release of the design to manu-
facture T/A, PTM and Flight hardware. The approved manufacturing process
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D documents shall be controlled by Reliability Assurance and issued as part of the Ap-
proved Parts, Materials and Processes Lists. In order to avoid dictating the use of
specified types of process equipment, and consequently excessive cost, prior ap-
proved "equal to" or "better than" processes may be used in specified applications.
4.2.2 ENGINEERING MODEL MANUFACTURE
Engineering model hardware will be fabricated in the manufacturing facility by manu-
facturing personnel in accordance with documented manufacturing processes and
planning. By so doing, Manufacturing will have the early opportunity to: develop
tooling, initiate the planning, and gain experience with this hardware in advance of
producing T/A, PTM or Flight Hardware. This opportunity will contribute greatly
to the overall growth and maturity of the fabrication cycle, and will permit an early
evaluation of the adequacy of the Approved Process List prior to prime hardware
fabrication.
4.2.3 MANUFACTURING PLANNING REVIEW
Manufacturing planning developed for fabrication of the Engineering Model, T/A,
PTM and Flight Hardware, will be monitored by Reliability to insure completeness
and adequacy of the planning from a Reliability Product Assurance Viewpoint. Mon-
itoring will be conducted on a continuing basis throughout the fabrication phase of the
Program.
4.2.4 MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND PLANNING CONTROL
To build inherent reliability into the equipment it is essential to take the maximum
precaution to prevent latent defect causes (i. e. undetected flaws '%uilt-in" during
fabrication) and potential malfunctions resulting therefrom. In addition to Green Line
Limits specifically designed to screen out latent defects via formal test programs,
the manufacturing process must be controlled to prevent degradation of completed
operations by those which follow (e. g. the fabrication of asscmb!ies must be con-
trolled to prevent degradation of the parts).
Quality Control, Test and Reliability personnel will monitor development of manu-
facturing processes and planning used to produce Voyager equipment to ferret out
latent defect causes at the point of origin. Non-destructive testing of in-process
items will be carried out to measure whether or not given characteristics or para-
meters are within specified tolerance limits prior to the next operation. A manu-
facturing degradation Analysis Report (Figure 4-3, or equivalent) will be prepared
and distributed to Reliability Assurance, Engineering and Manufacturing indicating
that changes are required for prevention of latent defects. Corrective actions must
be properly completed prior to "closing-out" the problem area. A CRAB will be
issued against the out-of-control condition by Reliability Assurance if this correc-
tive action is not taken in a timely manner.
81 of 98
VBll0VP010
F,
0.
L_
W
[3
m
U3
U3
>-
J
,<
Z
,<
Z
I-
0
ri-
M
0
(3
Z
n,
t-
O
Lu
Z
0
w
Z
0
- <
Z W -- ft. T"
- o • - 5 _. b
,( 0 0
• • o o • _
0
82 of 98
VB110VP010
4.2.5 MANUFACTURINGREWORKREVIEW
Incorporation of design changes into previously fabricated hardware or extensive re-
work of "workmanship type defects" will not proceed on T/A, PTM and/or Flight
hardware without prior technical review and approval by Reliability Assurance for
feasibility of incorporating the engineering change or rework without endangering the
"designed and built-in" reliability. Awareness of design changes will be maintained
through the Reliability representative on the Configuration Control Board. Awareness
of hardware rework will result from Material Review Board rework disposition, daily
monitoring of manufacturing operations, and periodic audits of process control charts
and Quality Control records. Rework will be done in accordance with approved pro-
cedures by trained personnel.
4.2.6 MANUFACTURING TRAINING AND AWARENESS
With specific interest in the manufacturing cycle, Reliability Assurance will ascertain
those areas in which operator training and certification (i. e., certified for ability and
performance) is especially required for reliability product assurance, and will monitor
the effectiveness of the existing training and operator certification program in these
areas. Recommended additions or improvements to the present program, as presently
enforced by Quality Assurance, will be made by Reliability when deemed necessary to
meet unique Voyager Program requirements. For details concerning the planned pro-
gram for training and certification of personnel for the Voyager Program, see the
Quality Assurance Plan.
4.2.7 CLEANLINESS
General "housekeeping" and basic contamination control procedures for fabrication,
assembly and test areas are formulated from the contamination control requirements
contained in the Design Specifications. These requirements for the Voyager Project
will be ..... _ _--- _^_ _ .... _n_ _nrl l_li_hility Assurance with the concurrenceSp{2L_lllt_u U J/ J.s_L_ _L_,_,_ .... _ .....................
of JPL. As is currently done, these requirements will form the basis for "Standing
Instructions on Cleanliness", which will be implemented in the specified areas by the
responsible Operation, and continuously monitored for conformance to Standard by
Quality Assurance.
4.2.8 MATERIAL HANDLING AND STORAGE
The full traceability, serialization to the part level, long life dormancy, high reliability
requirements of the Voyager Program requires that Reliability controls be placed upon
the material handling and storage of raw materials, parts, in-process and finished
assemblies, and "end-item" equipments. Reliability will review the proposed material
handling and storage procedures for possible weaknesses in the system which may lead
to traceability or reliability problems. Typical areas in which Reliability will exer-
cise such control include the specification of storage environment where shelf life
criticality exists, requirements for special packaging such as the use of the REPAMMI
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(Completedata available upon request. ) pack for electronic parts, and the specifica-
tion of special handlingprocedures for items suchas solar panels.
Throughout the life of the program, Reliability will monitor the material handling and
storage activities, and deviations from the established procedures shall result in the
issuance of a CRAB.
An essential part of the System Certification Prior to Shippingpertains to a review and
concurrence on the Packing and ShippingInstructions for the equipment. Reliability
will monitor the Packing and Shippingof items critical to the long life reliability of the
System.
4.2.9 PRODUCTASSURANCEMEASUREMENT
Reliability Assurance will utilize a systematic procedure of trouble spotting to measure
the effectiveness of the Product Assurance Activities. Continuousmonitoring of the
hardware manufacturing activities will permit pinpointing deviations from established
procedures and controls during the manufacturing cycle. Out of control conditions will
be reported by a CRAB which shall be distributed for corrective action. Removal of
the CRAB will be required prior to final acceptanceof the equipment. Reliability will
plot performance trends and chart historical data as an integral part of the Reliability
Measurement Activity.
4.3 INSPECTION
Inspection at all points of hardware fabrication and assembly will be performed as an
integral part of the Product Assurance Cycle for the Achievement of long life reliability.
Inspection activities for the Voyager Project are covered in detail in the Quality Assur-
ance Implementation Plan.
Inspection data plays an important role in the reliability program in terms of observable
hardware maturity trends, inspection efficiency for defect removal and the relationship
between inspection andtest activities for hardware acceptanceand certification. Re-
liability Assurance will, as part of its over-all product assurance measurement and
risk identification activity, monitor and evaluate inspection data and reports in order
to obtain information for hardware growth analyses and to correlate the effectiveness
of the combinedinspection-test activities with the elimination of risk areas. This in-
formation, like all reliability evaluation activities, will form the basis for feedback
of corrective actions as may be required.
4.4 PRODUCTASSURANCETEST IMPLEMENTATION
Flight acceptanceand qualification (T/A and PTM) tests for reliability and life demon-
stration will be implemented during the Product Assurance Cycle per the requirements
defined in Section3.11.
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4.4.1 PART BURN-IN TESTS
100%part screening through selective test burn-in procedures will beutilized on the
Voyager Project. Part screening at the manufacturer, up to as much as 250hours,
will be conductedto assure initially the high standard required for space vehicle mis-
sions. These parts, whenverified as to quality, are acceptedby GE or GESubcon-
tractors at the "M" quality level. Further testing at GE, the part manufacturer, the
GE Subcontractor or an authorized outside test laboratory is then conductedon "M"
parts to be considered for use in flight or qualification hardware. This testing is
accomplished on a 100%basis to establish long life stability and uniformity for long
spacecraft missions. Tests up to 1,250 hours in duration will be run, and degrada-
tion trend data obtained throughout the test period will be used in a further classifica-
tion of the parts as "S" Flight quality parts, "M", engineering model andOSEparts,
and the unstable disposable parts. Parts demonstrating highest stability have the
classification of "S" quality level. Experience has shownthat stability variations
during this intensive screening may showa variation of 10 to 1 within a given lot with
respect to stability of a given performance parameter - but there is seldom more than
10%of the lot which shows suchmarked instability that it is in the disposable classifi-
cation.
"M" quality parts not selected for the additional screening are made available for bread-
board, engineering model andOSEhardware. However, selection of parts for OSE
equipment is first made from the additionally screened "M" quality level stock, and
regular "M" quality level is employedon OSEonly whenprogram needs so dictate.
Non-standard or low useageparts are selectively screened on the basis of specified
criteria unique to the item. These criteria are established on the basis of past history,
results from engineering developmenttests and data analyses of the part qualification
test results.
All screening criteria will be reviewed and approvedby JPL, and Reliability Assurance
will continuously monitor the parts screening program for adherenceto the specified
burn-in requirements.
4.4.2 SUBASSEMBLYBURN-IN TESTS
Hardware fabricated and assembledto the subassemblylevel of the system configura-
tion will be subjected to a specified set of tests prior to delivery to BondedStock. These
tests will incorporate both a minimum number of operating hours or cycles that must be
accumulated as well as the environments (and if applicable the order of the environ-
ments) under which such operating time must be accomplished. These test specifica-
tions will be established by the Reliability Assurance Operation under the classification
of Subassembly/Green Line Limit Requirements. Green Line Limits will apply to all
hardware designatedfor T/A test, PTM test or prime spacecraft use (including spares).
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SubassemblyGreenLine Limit Testing is conductedprimarily to provide an in process
deficiency screening mechanism for the removal of workmanship and human error flaws
prior to equipmentuse in the next higher level of assembly.
Operating time accumulated on serially numbered componentswill be monitored by
Reliability Assurance for conformance to the Green Line Limit and will constitute a
specific item of review and approval at "Subassembly Certification Prior to Assembly"
Green Line Limits will be defined in terms of Static or Dynamic Mission Equivalents
(reference Section 3.11.4).
4.4.3 SYSTEMBURN-IN
The principles developedfor SubassemblyBurn-In and Green Line Limits will likewise
be applied at the system level configuration of the spacecraft prior to shipment from
GE. Minimum system operation shall be specified by Reliability Assurance under the
classification of System Green Line Limit Requirements. System operation will be
monitored on the basis of time accumulation on selected subassemblies subsequentto
their installation into the system configuration of the spacecraft. Conformance to the
System Green Line Limit will constitute a specific item of review and approval at
"System Certification Prior to Shipment," Green Line Limits will be defined in terms
of Static or Dynamic Mission Equivalents (reference Section 3.11.4).
4.4.4 QUALIFICATION (T/A AND PTM) TESTS
Demonstration of life capability will be made during T/A and PTM testing. Life capa-
bility tests will be performed per the requirements of Section 3. ii. 4.2. Test require-
ments and specifications for T/A and PTM tests will be reviewed and approved by the
Integrated Test Program Board (ITB). Results of the tests will also be reviewed, in
detail, by the ITB, and GE recommendations to JPL for hardware qualification statue
shall be madeby this Board.
4.4.5 MAXIMUM PRE-FLIGHT OPERATION
Any relevant test information, either from prior history or specific Voyager test data
analysis, which indicates equipment sensitivity to operating wearout risk will be identi-
fied anddesignatedas life sensitive equipment. Where such equipments are identified,
Red Line Limit Requirements will be established by Reliability Assurance to define the
maximum amountof operational test time permitted on a componentor sub-assembly.
In the case of suchequipments, time accumulation to a Red Line Limit will require a
special review by the ITB to ascertain appropriate disposition (replace, fly as is, etc. ).
Test time projections will be made on Red Line items to assure that timely action is
taken before theRed Line Limit is reached. Operating time accumulated on serially
numbered componentswill be monitored by Reliability Assurance for adherenceto Red
Line Limits, andwill constitute a specific item of review and approval at "System
Certification Prior to Shipment." Continuous monitoring of Red Line Limits throughout
the LaunchOperations will also be conducted.
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Red Line Limits will also account for shelf life sensitivity, and will so specify shelf
life constraints where such are applicable.
4.5 INTEGRATED TEST BOARD (ITB)
An Integrated Test Board will be established as a key part of the test planning, monitor-
ing and control activities. The Board will coordinate all test planning for the project
and approve the Integrated Test Plan. It will provide for overall test monitoring, T/A
and PTM qualification status and Flight Spacecraft data certification.
One important function of the ITB is to bestow or withhold qualification status of prime
equipment in accordance with the results of T/A and PTM portions of the Integrated
Test Plan, and to review and approve F/A tests on flight equipment. The Board pro-
vides overall support for the planning, integration and implementation of the Voyager
test activities including design qualification testing, equipment acceptancetesting,
field and flight testing. Eachof these test activities provide pertinent data relative
to the equipmentoperation under specified environmental conditions. More specifically,
the Board is responsible for qualification of equipment by:
ao Inputs to and review of acceptance and qualification specifications, and
approval of such documents as valid bases for test verification and equip-
ment qualification.
b. Review of requests for waivers of, or deviations from, specification test
requirements that may arise from considerations of cost and schedule.
C. Review of data generated in qualification requalification tests and lot
sampling, and conference of qualification based on such reviews (also
removal of qualified status when necessary).
d. Review of failure reports, failure analyses and design changes for *_-'-_,,_,_
effects on qualification status of equipment.
Early in the program much of the ITB effort is devoted to the review and approval of
the test criteria sections in the hardware design specifications. This commences with
the issuance of the test specification containing subsystem level approval. This docu-
ment is examined for conformance with requirements regarding format and structure
as prescribed in basic specifications such as Mil-S-6644 and in-house "Qualification and
Acceptance Test Requirements". Format study also is extended to include, for example,
the suitability and adequacy of listed cross references to Mil standards, JPL Procedures,
and GE Drawings as well as procedures to be employed by the sub-contractor relative
to drawing preparation, part interchangeability and identification, and preparation for
delivery and storage. Overall, the document is studied with the idea of eliminating
ambiguous statements which could affect a subcontractor's obligation or GE's ability
to monitor and evaluate the results of a test. Effort is then focusedon the content of
the specification with particular attention to Sections 3 and 4 (Design Requirements
and Quality Assurance Provisions, respectively.) For this analysis, the mission
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profile and JPL Mission Specification are consulted for definitionrelative to operating
and service conditions, reliabilitygoals, DME and SME requirements and interface
parameters. Based upon this information as well as experience garnered from previous
programs via analyses of production, qualificationand flighttest data, prescribed test
procedures are studied to ascertain suitabilityof technique, adequacy of environmental
stress levels and control of test factors and cost. Included herein are comments re-
garding standards for recording test data, reporting and analyzing failures, calibrating
instruments and specifying performance tolerance. In general, all test procedures are
reviewed to insure that successful completion of the test program will develop confi-
dence in the abilityof the equipment to perform as required to meet all program ob-
jectives.
Upon completion of the above task by the ITB members, a preliminary meeting is
convened with the cognizant design engineer for the purpose of discussing required
revisions to the test specification. At this time, the design engineer considers the
merit of the suggestions presented, reviews his position in certain areas or solicits
the opinion of various individuals present who have specialized knowledge in such fields
as manufacturing or mechanical and thermal dynamics. Subsequent to this meeting
the design engineer initiates an AN (Alteration Notice) to the specification, if required,
reflecting the changes discussed and agreed upon. This AN is reviewed by the ITB
members and final disposition is made on any and all deviations not reconciled at the
preliminary meeting. The Board members then accept, reject, or, in the event of
additional major changes, conditionally accept the test specification.
Final sign off is completed when the specification is examined for completeness and
approval signatures affixed. Monitoring these approved documents is continued through-
out the program via surveillance of subsequent AN's with prerogative to withhold ap-
proval whenever the requested changes seem detrimental to the best interest of the
program.
The ITB then undertakes the task of examining the test data evolving from the test
program. Frequently during the conduct of this, testing situations arise which cast
doubt on the wisdom of continuing the test. Thus the Board may be required to make
decisions as to whether certain hardware failures, adjustments or repairs during the
test have invalidated previous results or the "primeness" of the component, or whether
unusually poor acceptance test performance makes it necessary to suspend qualifica-
tion testing. As testing is completed and a final Qualification Test Report issued for
each item of hardware, the ITB evaluates the performance data, recapitulates on the
failure and corrective action activity and finally grants or withholds qualification
status for the subassembly. In the latter case the ITB defines the deficiencies and
furnishes precise requirements directed toward achieving qualified status. Thus the
Board may ask for additional tests or information, specification or drawing changes,
and additional controls on quality. A similar review of flightacceptance tests is also
conducted.
Subsequent changes in product performance, processes, procurement or design are
hence forth scrutinized for their effect on component qualification standing.
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The ITB when convened and chaired by Reliability Assurance includes a representative
from Engineering, Quality Control, Manufacturing, Project Control, and as deemed
necessary, specialists in stress analysis, heat transfer, materials and processes.
A block diagram illustrating the ITB work function is shown in Figure 4-4.
4.6 TROUBLE ANALYSIS
The heart of product assurance revolves about an ability to identify a discrepancy that
potentially contributes to product risk, and to respond rapidly with corrective action
that eliminates that risk. This includes the ability to respond to unexpected trouble,
and to isolate and correct it quickly before its effect on cost and schedule becomes
prohibitive. An integrated system, developed from over ten years of GE experience
on missile and spacecraft programs, will be employed on the Voyager Project to re-
cord formally all discrepancies and failures in hardware starting with the engineering
models and to process formally their disposition with respect to investigation of cause
and correction action.
A diagram of major elements and flow are shown on Figure 4-5.
A brief description of Figure 4-5 follows: Hardware undergoes two basic forms of
fabrication and operation verification i. e., inspection and test. These two activities
serve as the primary source of trouble identification via the IR (Inspection Report),
the UFR (Unified Failure Report) and the Reliability CRAB or Quality Assurance "In
process/non-conforming" report.
Trouble identification leads to one or more of three basic courses of action; re-work,
Materials Review Board (MRB) and/or failure analysis. Any item of significant risk
consequence (as determined by the test engineer, reliability engineer, Q.A. engineer,
desigm engineer or FARB all of which are actively reviewing the trouble identification
forms on a continuing basis) will be formally processed for failure analysis, and will
receive a failure analysis number and be recorded in a log with certain pertinent data
for inclusion in the Quarterly Reliability Status Report to JPL. The failure analysis
triggers any number of possible activities (e. g., teardown), and establishes cause/
effect relationship for the institution of corrective action (e. g., a design change which
must flow through the Configuration Change Board for approval). The failure analysis
report, complete with corrective action, goes to the Failure Analysis Review Board
(FARB) whose responsibility is to buy-off on both the technical adequacy of the analysis
as well as to assure that the proper corrective action has, indeed, taken place. A
more detailed treatment of various aspects of this is given in the Quality Assurance
Implementation Plan, including a further discussion of the FARB activity.
Reliability Assurance plays a direct role in Trouble Analysis in several very important
areas. First, the reliability engineer may be instrumental in directing that some dis-
crepancy be subjected to a failure analysis. Second, Reliability Assurance participates
directly in many of the failure analyses and indirectly participates in all of them through
the reliability measurement activity which utilizes all trouble and discrepancy records
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as an integral part of itsevaluation program (risk identification,trend and history
studies, and reliabilityestimates). Third, and perhaps most important of all, Re-
liabilityAssurance contributes to and, where necessary, directs the course of correc-
tive action that must be taken to effectthe elimination or minimization of risk com-
mensurate with overall program scope and schedule.
4.7 PHYSICS OF FAILURE
Failure analysis activity, described in Section 4.6, often requires equipment teardown
and microscopic examination for the detailed understanding of a cause/effect relation-
ship present in an observed failure.
GE experience has shown that teardown analyses and physics of failure investigations
are a most important function, and in a complex spacecraft program require close
control and coordination. Hence, in the Subcontractor/Vendor area, GE will require
its approval before any outside microscopic teardown analysis can be performed.
Where audits indicate a Subcontractor or Vendor capability for such action, the analysis
will be performed there in most cases. If such capability does not exist, equipment
will be sent to GE for physics of failure investigations.
4.8 DATA ACCUMULATION FOR RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT
The ReliabilityMeasurement and Life Evaluation Program is dependent upon design
and test data inputs that are both timely and accurate. This necessitates an ability
to record, transmit, store and retrieve information in an efficientmanner. Basic
Project information will be handled via the CII System, and itsassociated Data Bank
that will serve as a primary but not exclusive source of data for ReliabilityAssurance.
Methods of data recording and accumulation are detailed in the Quality Assurance and
Test Plans, and under the discussion of the CII and Data Bank in the Configuration
Management Implementation Plan (theTrouble Analysis System, Section 4.6, being
typical of the ,urma_y" _,-._.._A_u._ _ _ethna_.-....... ....fn_"_nnfurinv__...... c, data of interest to Reliability)..
Typical sources of data required by ReliabilityAssurance include subcontractor/vendor
information, inspection information, test time and failure data, laboratory log books,
basic design configurations and changes thereto, design analyses, and operational
mission profiles. Data sources include System and Design Engineering, Quality As-
surance, Test, Field Engineering and JPL.
4.8.1 ENGINEERING DATA
Engineering design data of primary interestto ReliabilityAssurance includes circuit
and hardware configurations upon which reliabilitydesign analyses are based (RFMA,
failure mode/effect studies, tolerance analyses, etc.), the parts, materials, processes
and standards used in these designs, and all information relating to design changes
that may be incorporated subsequent to Stage III. Engineering development data, start-
ing with the engineering test models, will also be formally used in the reliability
measurement program (breadboard data willbe analyzed as a part of the normal re-
liabilitydesign activities). All of thisabove information will be either initiatedby
Reliability Assurance or will be available within the CII structure.
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4.8.2 QUALITY AND TEST DATA
A major source of reliability information for hardware evaluation is operating time
accumulations anddiscrepancy/failure data.
Operating time andcycle data for spacecraft and OSE equipment will be recorded via
timers on the OSE and STE. Time accumulations will be tracked on a subassembly
level basis. Where necessary, spacecraft equipment times will be calculated from
this timer data manually via a knowledge of the "power on" time (or its equivalent),
the specific test procedure being run and a detailed knowledge of the equipment pro-
file encountered with the test procedure. This approach has been used extensively
on a classified satellite vehicle program where subassembly test operating times
from a system level test have been calculated by such a method and verified as being
within ± 5% of the actual subassembly time as monitored and recorded by real time
log entries.
Requirements for time monitoring will be provided to Quality Assurance and Test by
Reliability Assurance. Equipment times recorded directly by the timers will go to
the Data Bank time records requiring further reduction and interpretation will be
provided by Reliability Assurance and then forwarded to the Data Bank. Discrepancy
and failure data will be accumulated via the Trouble Analysis System, and recorded
in the Data Bank.
4.8.3 SUBCONTRACTOR/VENDOR DATA
Requirements for the above types of data will be imposed on all Subcontractors and
Vendors. While Subcontractors and Vendors may utilize their own internal record
system for keeping such data, GE will specify a common data summary format, to
be filled in and provided on a periodic basis, that will make all such information
readily adaptable to inclusion in the Data Bank.
4.8.4 CENTRAL DATA BANK
The Central Data Bank of the CII system will contain cross referenced documents, test
data, operating times, discrepancy/failure data, subcontractor information and other
pertinent information required for reliability evaluation. It will serve as a primary
source of information, and will be the recipient of reliability information. Certain
portions of the sorting and analysis may also take place in automated portions of the
Data Bank (e. g., failure sorting by various categories). Reliability Assurance will
specify detailed Data Bank requirements for shortage, coding and retrieval during
Phase IB.
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5.0 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM
5.1 SCOPE AND APPROACH
The reliability activities described in this section define the approach to the Procure-
ment Reliability Program to be implemented by GE on the Voyager Program. The
procurement activity is classified into three broad categories of interest:
a. Subcontractor - provides the overall design, development and fabrication of
a functional "end item" product. This product could include an entire sub-
system (e. g., propulsion, telecommunications) or subassembly (black box
or its equivalent e. g., a power control unit).
Do Vendor - provides an "as designed" functional end item product. This gen-
erally occurs at the subassembly level, or at a lower functional level where
a major assembly of the subassembly is procured (e. g., a gyro package).
c. Supplier - provides basic raw materials or parts.
The overall Procurement Reliability Program, as specified herein, is primarily aimed
at Subcontractor and Vendor procurement actions.
Historically, the reliability control of procured equipments is a difficult problem.
Proper control of basic parts and material usage, adherence to approved standards
and applications, adequate product workmanship, trouble analysis and corrective ac-
tion control, and equipment interface problems constitute but a few of the elements
that must be closely coordinated. These and other factors must become part of the
Procurement Reliability Program. At the same time, however, the cost of a Program
that will achieve these and results must be properly balanced with the total Project
resources. GE experience in this area has identified specific key elements of a
Procurement Program that are essential for such control. These elements are.
. Selecting the most suitable source for equipment procurement - i. e., active
reliability participation in make/buy decisions and in procurement surveys
and selection.
2. Provisions for the positive control of parts, material, processes and design
standards used in procured equipment.
3. Provisions for the detailed design analysis of the "inherent reliability" of
procured equipment.
. Provisions for the positive control of hardware failure and anomaly occurrence
at the procurement facility, including the reporting of such incidences and the
corrective action that results.
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5. Provisions for identifying,controlling and correcting "weak-link" or problem
areas.
6. Provisions for the positive exercise of all reliability controls (see Section 2.1)
on all procured equipment.
A Program constituting these basic elements will be implemented under the direction
and cognizance of the Manager, Reliability Assurance.
5.2 SOURCE SELECTION AND CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
Reliability is a primary factor in the selection of Voyager Subcontractors and Vendors.
Reliability will be involved in all phases of this task i. eo, the make/buy decision phase,
the RFQ phase, the bidders evaluation phase, and the Subcontract negotiation phase.
5.2.1 RELIABILITY IN THE MAKE/BUY PHASE
The decision to make or buy an item of equipment is made after a thorough evaluation
of in-house experience and capabilities in the specific field versus that of outside
sources. The reliability role in this task generally involves:
a. A review of existing designs and design concepts,
b. A review of experience as related to problems of the nature to be experienced
on this program,
c. A review of existing performance or test data on similar equipments,
d. A review of existing reliabilityorganization and "modus operandi", and
e. A review of reliability controls during the manufacturing cycle.
As a result of this evaluation program, Reliabilitywill make recommendations to De-
sign Engineering and Procurement regarding the sources being considered. Several
reliabilityevaluations in this regard have been conducted during Phase IA e.g., an
extensive review of potential subcontractors for the propulsion subsystem and certain
elements of equipment for the autopilotsubsystem. Such reviews have included
facilitysurveys by Reliabilitypersonnel.
5° 2.2 RELIABILITY IN THE RFQ PHASE
GE will specify reliability tasks to be implemented by the Subcontractor or Vendor.
This will be accomplished through reference to:
a. The equipment specification which will specify the hardware reliability
design and tests requirements.
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b. The Procurement Reliability Requirements Specification which will stipulate
the Subcontractor/Vendor reliability program and support requirements.
C° The Procurement Reliability Handbook which will serve as a guide to ensuring
uniformity and continuity in the format and contents of Subcontractor/Vendor
practices and performance (e. g., Reliability Predictions, Serialization of
Parts, Failure Reporting System}. Conformance to applicable criteria and
methodology as specified in the handbook will result in acceptable performance.
Deviations from the handbook will require "equal to" or better than perform-
ante and shall require GE approval prior to implementation.
The RFQ will reference these documents which, when combined with appropriate costing
instructions, will supply the bidders with a clear definition of the Reliability require-
ments.
During bidders briefings, Reliability Assurance will fully explain all details concerning
specific tasks (e. g., the Failure Reporting System) and answer any questions which
may evolve following a review of the requirements by the bidders.
5.2.3 RELIABILITY IN BIDDERS EVALUATION PHASE
In accordance with pre-established procedures for rating an evaluation of bidders pro-
posals and their facilities (see Procurement Management Plan), Reliability will be
part of the team which will be responsible for selecting the Subcontractors and Vendors.
All proposals will be closely analyzed to determine the extent to which compliance with
or exceptions to the requirements of the RFQ have been documented. Exceptions to
the basic requirements will be critically examined to determine the impact of the change
on the overall program. Reliability Assurance will also participate in facility surveys
to:
a. Evaluate management of the Reliability function,
b. Determine the capability of the reliabilityorganization to carry out the re-
quired functions,
c. Review existing documentation describing operating procedures to verify
"modus operandi" and adaptation to new requirements,
d. Examine the type of reliability controls exercised during the manufacturing
cycle,
e. Examine existing data from similar programs and equipment as back-up for
preliminary reliability predictions and acceptance of "figure-of-merit"
requirements,
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f. Appraise the interdepartment relationship of Reliability and other functional
groups, and
g. Consider the overall reliability motivation of the Subcontractor's personnel.
The results of the proposal evaluations and facility surveys will be fully documented
and reported to responsible GE organizations as defined by the Procurement Manage-
ment Plan.
5.2.4 RELIABILITY IN SUBCONTRACTNEGOTIATIONPHASE
Reliability personnel will evaluate all reliability cost estimates submitted by the Sub-
contractor Vendor andparticipate in contract negotiations to appraise the understanding
of the tasks to beperformed within a specified schedule, for the negotiated cost.
5.3 RELIABILITY CONTROLOF SUBCONTRACTORS
The Procurement reliability program effort is oriented around the concept of "re-
liability by design", the early detection and elimination of knownor potential "weak
links" or problem areas, the incorporation of specified control points, and the con-
tinuing effort of preserving the inherent reliability of the system in later phases.
"The General Specification for the Voyager Program Procurement Reliability Require-
ments," VR180PR001,is provided as Appendix B. A copy is also appendedto the
Voyager Procurement and Fabrication Plan. The requirements of VR180PR001in-
voke the essential Reliability Program requirements of NASAReliability Publication
NCP 250-1 uponVoyager Subcontractors and Vendors, and are subject to JPL review
andapproval.
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APPENDIX I
DIVISION POLICY ON RELIABILY
FOR
LONG LIFE SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS
i/ii of 3
SUBJECT
LONG- LIFE RELIABILITY
GENERAL @ ELECTRIC
CLASSIFICATION
GENERAL
ISSUED
JULY 1965
NUI%IBER
1.14
I°
II.
PURPOSE
The Missile and Space Division recognizes that the main problem facing
the National Space Program is the development of spacecraft to survive
and accomplish the long duration mission -- the Long-Life Space System.
In keeping with the importance of this problem and the Division's charter
to make important contributions to the national space program, this
policy directs the establishment of a Long-Life Space Systems Program,
creates a Division level Program Office to manage the program, provides
for allocating appropriate funds for supporting the program, and directs
each Department of MSD to support the program.
DEFINITIONS
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A. Long-Life -- denotes a requirement for continuous operation
(or long term storage) without benefit of preventative maintenance
and without failin G in specification performance for time periods
in excess of one year.
B. Long-Life Capability -- is that basic capability of the design, and
the capability to reduce that design to hardware that exhibits the
long-life operability defined above.
C° Long-Life Reliability -- is that special facet of Reliability Technology
related to providing long-lived systems as defined above.
POLICY
This policy establishes solutions of the Long-Life Space Systems problems
as a major goal of the Division and provides the following means for
achieving this goal.
A. Manager, Long-Life Space Systems Program
The position of Long-Life Space Systems Program Manager is
established, reporting to the Division General Manager. The Manager
of Long-Life Space Systems Program develops the Division's Long-
Life Space Systems Program Plan with the assistance of the Departments,
integrates the plan content and funding throughout the Division, and
manages execution of the plan in keeping with program management
principles. He communicates with the customer in order to determine
program requirements and to report progress in accomplishing the plan.
INTERPRETED BY
MANAGER, LONG-LIFE
SPACE SYSTEMS PROGRAM
REVIEW BEFORE
JANUARY
1967
SUPERSEDES
NEW
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B. Executive Council, Long-Life Space Systems
Co
Do
The Executive Council for Long-Life Space Systems is established
by the Division General Manager and is made up of those Department
General Managers and Section Managers most directly involved
in Long-Life Space Systems. The Council will review and accept
the Long-Life Space Systems Program Plan, will review progress
against the Plan at monthly Executive Council program meetings,
and will provide overall policy guidance to this effort.
Planning Council, Long-Life Space Systems
The Planning Council for Long-Life Space Systems is established,
consisting of key technical and management contributors in the
Division so identified by the respective Department General Managers.
The Planning Council shall act as the staff of the Manager of Long-
Life Space Systems Program assisting him in planning and managing
the program.
_Long-Life Space Systems Program Plan
The Long-Life Space Systems Program Plan provides for Division
direction and services in the following areas:
lo Division Policies: Formulate, implement and monitor
adherence to Division Long-Life Space Systems policies.
o Research and Development: Engage in and promote the
establishment of funded R&D efforts in key areas, having
identified the need for such R&Dprograms.
. Proposals: Review critical Long-Life section proposals
and provide for specialized assistance where required.
. Methods: Establish improved methods for the management
and audit of the Long-Life Space Systems programs.
o Data Center: Provide for the establishment, maintenance
and use of a central library of information and a data bank
of accumulated Long-Life Space Systems experience, program,
cost, schedule and performance data, knowledge and require-
ments from Department programs.
° Consultation: Provide specialized consultation to all
Departments and levels for Long-Life Space Systems.
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E.
, Special Assignments: Carry out special assignments from
the Division General Manager (e. g. inter-relationship with
configuration management, system effectiveness, etc. )
1 Reputation: Create and maintain a favorable reputation for
the Division in the eyes of the customer and the aerospace
industry.
The Department General Managers are responsible for the support
of the Long-Life Space Systems office and for implementing approved
Division Policies. They will provide for organized participation in
Division efforts such as Long-Life Space Systems research and
development, centralized data banks, information reporting
techniques, etc.
VICE PRESIDENT & GENERAL MANAGER
PAGE
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APPENDIX II
GENERAL SPECIFICATION
FOR
SUBCONTRACTOR RELIABILITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
VR180PR001
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1.0 SCOPE
This specification covers the Reliability Program Requirements for GE Subcontractors
of Voyager Program "items" of equipment.
1.1 The basic requirements as specified herein shall apply to the Subcontractors
except as modified by the Statement of Work. The requirements of this specification
shall not be superceded, deleted or modified by equipment specifications or other
references documents.
1.2 Design requirements or constraints, tests programs and procedures, or other
operating procedures considered necessary or desirable to achieve "long life" re-
liability of any subcontracted item and increase the probability of Voyager Mission
success shall be as specified in appropriate specifications or documents as specified
in the Statement of Work.
1.3 Detected or suspected inconsistencies between the requirements of this specifica-
tion and other specified Voyager Program requirements shall be brought to the atten-
tion of GE for interpretation and revision, if required.
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following specifications, standards, and publications, form a part of this specifica-
tion to the extent specified herein.
Note
Only documents referenced in this specification shall be
listed. VRI80PR002 Engineering Design Review Instruc-
tion (available upon request), Complete listto be provided
during Phase IB.
3.0 REQUIREMENTS
3.1 RELIABILITY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
The Subcontractor shall establish a single source of responsibility for the implementa-
tion of a reliability program consistent with the requirements of this specification.
This single source of responsibility shall act as the principle reliability contract
representative of the Subcontractor, and shall have the delegated authority to enforce
reliability policies and ensure necessary actions.
3.1.1 CONTRACT CHANGE NOTICES
As specified in the Statement of Work, the Subcontractor shall not recognize or imple-
ment any direction to extend the scope of this specification except as authorized by
the GE-Voyager Subcontractors Representative.
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3.2 PROGRAMREVIEW
GE-SD shall monitor the Subcontractor's Reliability Program status through the
media of Technical Direction (T/D) Meetings, Reliability Audits and Reviews, and
Reliability Engineer Residents.
3.2.1 TECHNICAL DIRECTION (T/D) MEETINGS
The Subcontractor shall participate in joint GE/Subcontractor Technical Direction
Meetingsto beconductedto review reliability documentationand design progress, to
coordinate technical subject matter, to evaluate test data, andto discuss "weak-link"
or problem areas and solutions. T/D Meetings may result in action items which will
remain as "open" actions until the basis for "closing" is adequatelydefined by the
responsible party. T/D Meetings will normally be held bi-monthly on an alternating
basis at the GE-Subcontractor's facility.
Prior to each T/D Meeting, a mutually agreed to agendashall be prepared to distrib-
uted by GE. GE shall also be responsible for the T/D Meeting Reports.
3.2.2 AUDIT REVIEWS
The Subcontractor's Reliability Program shall be subject to periodic GE Reliability
Audit reviews. The audit team reserves the right to visit Subcontractors on a 48
hour notice to review in detail all aspectsof the Subcontractor's activities and
facilities as related to reliability of his Voyager equipment. The audit teams evalu-
ation of the Subcontractor shall be reported to GEVoyager Project Managementfor
consideration and action as necessary.
3.2.3 RELIABILITY RESIDENTS
GE reserves the right to establish residency at the Subcontractor's facility for re-
liability surveillance purposes. The resident Reliability Engineer shall: 1) function
in all matters relative to the overa,..............V_U_L,Ly requirement, _j_'_1_,.,,,,_,.,_._^_*.. . ,_,,,.,'__....v,_,_"_4^
Subcontractor's reliability activities, and 3) resolve questions or problems. The
resident Reliability Engineer may operate on a full or part time basis depending upon
the specific needs of the program. The Subcontractor shall provide office space and
authorize necessary access to the Subcontractor's facility to permit carrying out the
resident surveillance functions.
3.3 PROGRAM REPORTS
3.3.1 QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORTS
The Subcontractor shall submit to GE formal Reliability Progress Reports by the
15th day of March, June, September, and December. The quarterly Reliability
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Progress Reports shall be of an engineering level including at least the following
information:
a. A narrative statement of progress and description of all reliability program
activities, including status of scheduled tasks and milestones.
b. Reliability Design Analysis Inputs to update the Reliability Design Analysis
Report.
c. A summary report of all open "weak-links", detected or suspected, in the
design of the equipment.
d. A summary report of approval status of parts, materials and processes,
including information on recommended modifications to Approved Lists.
e. A Corrective Action Follow-up Summary documenting the status of corrective
actions or action items steming from the design reviews, technical direction
meetings, reliability audits, and failure reporting.
f. Engineering change Analysis Summary Report documenting the accumulative
effects of all engineering changes to the equipment on the final predicted
inherent reliability of the equipment.
g. A summary report of all engineering test activity being performed on the
equipment.
h. A summary report of all Failure Reporting Activity to a format specified
by GE.
3.3.2 ENGINEERE_G REPORTS
The Subcontractor shall submit to GE Reliability Engineering Reports on the following
subjects:
a. Reliability Design Analysis per the requirement of Section 3.7.1 of this
Specification.
b. Parts, Materials and Processes Approval and Qualification Data on all recom-
mended modifications or additions to Approved Lists provided by GE.
c. Failure Reports (see Section 3.8.2) Operating Time Logs and Failure Analysis
Reports.
These shall be submitted per the overall schedule requirements established on the
Voyager Project by GE.
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3.4 DESIGNREQUIREMENTS
3.4.1 "FIGURE-OF-MERIT" OBJECTIVE
A numerical reliability figure-of-merit design objective shall be specified for the
Subcontractor's equipmentby GE in the applicable equipment specification. The
Subcontractor shall consider this requirement as a major design parameter and shall
implement all necessary steps, as specified herein, to attain this objective.
3.4.1.1 RELIABILITY APPORTIONMENT
Based on the overall figure-of-merit objective for the equipment, the Subcontractor
shall apportion numerical figure-of-merit design objectives to the componentlevel
elements within the equipment.
3.4.2 PARTS, MATERIALS AND PROCESSES
3.4.2.1 APPROVEDPARTS, MATERIALS AND PROCESSES
The Subcontractor shall select for use in his design parts, materials andprocesses
as specified in the GEapproved lists. During the design and developmentphaseof
the program, the Subcontractor may submit for approval request to use additional
parts, materials andprocesses of equal to or better than quality than those on the
approved lists (see Section 3.4.2.3). All parts, materials andprocesses spec-
flied for use in the equipment shall havebeen "approved for use" and included on
the approved lists prior to release of the design to manufacture the T/A, PTM and
Flight equipment. Unless specified otherwise, Subcontractor's parts, materials
and processes, as specified on the approved lists, shall be considered applicable
to other equipmentswithin the Voyager System. Parts, materials and processes
used in existing designedportions of the Subcontractor's equipment shall be subject
to the approved parts, materials andprocesses requirements as specified herein.
_pproveu Parts, Droc,_ss,_¢h_11h_ irt_ntifi_d on the Subcontractor's
drawings, parts lists, and related documents by the approved lists identification
number.
3.4.2.2 PARTS, MATERIALS AND PROCESSES SELECTION PROGRAM
The Subcontractor shall establish and maintain a Parts, Materials and Processes
Selection Program to ensure the proper use of high reliability parts, materials and
processes __s specified in the approved lists or as required when prior approval does
not exist. This program shall apply to all engineering and support groups who are
involved in the selection, procurement, testing application and control of parts,
materials and processes used in the Subcontractor's equipment. The program shall be
directed toward maximizing the use of proven standardized parts, materials and
processes and minimizing the risk of using items with inadequately verified life
capabilities.
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3.4.2.3 REQUEST OF APPROVAL OF PARTS, MATERIALS AND PROCESSES
The Subcontractor shall submit "requests for approval of parts, materials and pro-
cesses" to GE for each variation in Application of the part, material or process.
The request for approval shall include the approval request form, justification for
using the new part, material or process, and qualification test data to support the
approval request. When substantiating qualification test data is not available, the
subcontractor shall include a proposal for qualification testing. Approval of the pro-
posal by GE is required prior to conducting the test program. Request for approval
shall require written approval by GE prior to use of the parts, materials and pro-
cesses in T/A, PTM and Flight equipment.
3.5 DESIGN STANDARDS
The Subcontractor shall use the Voyager Design Standards in the design of his equip-
ment. Inadequacies of the design standards shall be brought to the attention of the
applicable Design Standards Team via the Subcontractor 's Design Standards Repre-
sentative. The design standards shall be used as support information during Design
Reviews of the Subcontractor 's equipment.
_q
3.5.1 DESIGN STANDARDS TEAM REPRESENTATIVE
The Subcontractor shall provide engineering representation and the necessary sup-
port activity to Voyager Design Standards Teams for the development and imple-
mentation of: Mechanical/Electro-mechanical, Electronic Circuit, Product Design
and Magnetic Design Standards. The design standards shall be developed into mu-
tually agreed upon documents and distributed by GE. The Design Standards Teams
shall meet on a periodic basis during the design and development phase of the Program.
3.6 DESIGN REVIEW
Review of the Subcontractor's design shall be conducted by GE in general accordance
with the requirements of GE Engineering Design Review Instruction No. VR180PR002.
Unless specified otherwise, design reviews shall be held at the level of equipment to
be supplied by the Subcontractor prior to the release of the Engineering Model and
T/A, PTM and Flight equipment designs to fabrication. Design reviews shall be
conducted at the GE or Subcontractor's facility in general accordance with a pre-
planned agenda for the specific review meeting. GE shall formally document and
distribute the results of each review as to findings, recommended action items, and
responsibility for action items. In the event of action item disputes, the matter shall
be processed through the GE Voyager Project Office for resolution.
In support of Design Reviews conducted at GE, the Subcontractor shall provide engi-
neering liaison personnel (average 3 per meeting) and engineering documents necessary
to adequately document the pertinent design criteria. The Subcontractor shall be noti-
fied at least 14 calendar days prior to each design review meeting.
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3.7 RELIABILITY DESIGNANALYSIS
3.7.1 RELIABILITY "FIGURE-OF-MERIT" ANALYSIS
The Subcontractor shall systematically predict the inherent reliability "figure-of-
merit" of his equipment. These analysesshall be conductedat the Componentlevel.
The elements of the Reliability Figure of Merit Analysis are:
a. The Reliability Block Diagram
b. The Mathematical Model including all back-up modes, redundancy, and
alternative operating procedures.
c. Parts Usageand Application Data
d. Failure Rate Data
e. Failure Modeand Effects Analysis
f. Computingthe Reliability Figure of Merit
g. Reliability Improvement Requirements and Recommendations
This analysis shall be used by the Subcontractor to; provide a basis for selection
when comparing two or more designswith respect to reliability; disclose critical
areas of reliability where improvement efforts may best be applied; provide inputs
directed toward maturing a design; provide a basis for reliability trade-off studies;
and establish a quantitative measureof the inherent reliability of a design against
which later reliability optimization efforts measured.
The initial reliability prediction shall be performed in conjunction with an engineering
review of. feasibility_ of existing designs, proposed design concept, adequacyof ap-
proved parts, materials and processes lists, minimization of failure modes, operational
flexibility, maintainability, dormancy, etc. The Subcontractor shall periodically up-
date the reliability predictions as pertinent data becomesavailable. Updating informa-
tion shall be included in the quarterly Reliability Progress Reports. A final relia-
bility prediction shall be submitted to GE prior to release of the design to fabricate
T/A, PTM and Flight equipment. Thefinal reliability prediction shall clearly indicate
that the inherent reliability of the equipmentmeets or exceedsthe specified reliability
"figure of merit" objective for the equipment.
3.7.2 ENGINEERINGCHANGERELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The Subcontractor shall analyze all proposed or required engineering changesto
released designs to determine the effect of the engineering changesinherent relia-
bility characteristics of the equipment. The methods used in making computations
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and all pertinent support data (e.g., design philosophy, circuit diagrams, parts appli-
cation data, parts count, packaging concepts, environmental stress data, etc.) shall
be provided to GE to permit a detailed evaluation of the engineering change reliability
analysis. The Subcontractor shall not proceed with the engineering change prior to
written approval by GE.
3.7.2.1 ENGINEERING CHANGE ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT
The Subcontractor shall prepare and submit to GE, as part of the Quarterly Reliability
Progress Report, Engineering change Analysis Summary Report. The report shall
include an identification of the equipment, a brief description of all engineering changes
and the effects of each change(s) on the inherent reliability of the equipment expresses
quantitatively.
3.7.3 LONG LIFE DESIGNS
The Subcontractor shall establish for each deliverable equipment the useful design
life and life limiting criteria, as applicable to his equipment, to support a high degree
of confidence that the "wear-out" risk of his equipment is low and shall not effect the
Voyager Mission Flight Profile. The Subcontractor shall make available to GE for
review, all performance histories, test and design data and other pertinent informa-
tion used to establish the long life design.
3.8 FAILURE REPORTING
The Subcontractor shall implement a closed-loop "in-plant" Failure Reporting Acti-
vity which shall make provisions for the collection, reporting, and feedback, and
analysis of all failure data.
3.8.1 REQUIREMENT
Failure reporting is required for all failures or anomalies that may be considered
detrimental to the proper and reliable long life operation of the equipment. Failure
reporting shall commence with the engineering model equipment after completion of
assembly, or start of test or adjustment, whichever is earlier. Included in this
category are failures which occur during testing or operating periods as well as
manisfestations which are noticed during non-operating periods, such as may be
caused by handling or accident. Part malfunctions, damaged or broken parts or
assemblies, erratic or improper operation of equipment, undue readjustments, and
out of tolerance or rating are examples of conditions that shall be reported. Reportable
conditions which occur prior to this period shall be documented and controlled as spec-
ified by Quality Assurance.
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3.8.2 FAILURE REPORTS
The Failure Report (FR) shall be initiated by the Subcontractor at the time the failure
or anomaly condition is detected. The initiator of the FR shall complete; all equip-
ment and activity identifying information; operation time and control information;
brief but adequate narrative description of the failure event, the apparent cause,
symptoms, surrounding circumstances; and initial corrective action or disposition.
Appropriate maintainability data (e.g., t i - time required to isolate failure measured
from the time the failure was detected, t a - time required to disassemble and reas-
semble the failed component, tf - time required to make the corrective fix (repair or
replace), t c - time required for checkout or test to show restoration of function, and
tr - active recovery time (sum t i + t a + tf + tc) shall also be included in the report.
The initiator shall date and sign the FR. It shall be reviewed for accuracy and com-
pleteness by the GE or Subcontractor authorized representative and countersigned
by him. The FR shall be forwarded to GE within 24 hours following detection of the
failure.
3.8.3 FAILURE REPORT FORMS
All failures or anomaly conditions, as generally defined by paragraph 3.8.1, shall be
reported on the Failure Report Form as supplied by GE or the Subcontractor's equiv-
alent. Subcontractor equivalent forms shall be forwarded to GE for approval prior
to use on the Voyager Program. All forms shall have provisions for recording the
minimum information necessary for input into a bi-weekly Failure Summary Report
to be prepared by GE. As necessary, Subcontractor forms shall be revised or
amended to include the basic requirements.
3.8.4 FAILURE INVESTIGATION OR ANALYSIS
The extent of failure investigation or analysis to be conducted by Subcontractor per-
sonnel is determined by the nature of the failure, its frequency of occurrence and
resultant trend, the model or "stage" of the equipment, and the relevancy of the con-
dition on reliability and performance. Subcontractor failure investigation and analysis
activity shall be directed as follows:
3.8.4.1 Failures which are relevant to performance of intended function and which
require corrective action as a result of failure investigation and analysis to the speci-
fied repair or replace (i.e., component module, piece part, etc.) level shall be in-
vestigated and analyzed to the repair or replace level, but not within the unit, to:
a. isolate the failure to the required level;
b. determine conditions leading up the failure, and auxiliary circumstance
bearing on the discrepancy;
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c. establish the true failure mode, cause, and consequences to the equipment;
do determine functional responsibility for the failure, and classify the failure
as attributable to design, non-conformance to design, or externally induced;
or to
e. determine and prescribe necessary corrective or preventive action.
All corrective actions shall be implemented into the equipment in accordance with
the Manufacturing Rework Review requirements of Paragraph 3.9.3.
3.8.4.2 Failure investigation and analysis below the specified repair or replace
level (i.e., that requiring tear-down laboratory micro-analysis of the failed unit)
shall not be conducted by the Subcontractor without prior approval by GE. As di-
rected, the Subcontractor shall conduct tear-down laboratory micro-analysis of the
failed unit.
3.8.5 FAILURE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS REPORTS
The Subcontractor shall prepare and submit to GE Failure Investigation and Analysis
Reports upon the completion of analysis as required by paragraphs 3.8.4.1 and-3.8.4.2.
Results of the analysis and recommended corrective actions, if any, shall be approved
by GE prior to "closing out" the action item to perform the analysis. Unless speci-
fied otherwise, Failure Investigation and Analysis Reports shall be submitted to GE
within ten (10) working days.
3.8.6 DISPOSITION OF FAILED ITEMS
Failed items removed from the quipment shall be returned to a bonded quarantive
area pending analysis, repair or scrap action. The item shall be identified with the
applicable FR. The bonded quarantive area shall not accept any failed items unless
properly documented, nor shall the failed items be released to another activity with-
out properly authorized disposition.
3.8.7 CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURES
All failures reported on the Subcontractor's equipment shall be classified "relevant"
or non-relevant" to reliability performance depending upon their cause and effects.
GE shall classify all failures in accordance with an agreed GE Subcontractor Failure
Classification Code to be established for each equipment.
3.8.8 OPERATING TIME LOGS
An equipment Operating Time Log (OTL) shall be maintained for each equipment
supplied by the Subcontractor. OTL's shall be on a format having complete informa-
tion necessary for input into the Reliability Assessment Report to be developed by GE. 9
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A record of operating time during each day, work-shift, or shorter period of operation,
as applicable, shall be maintained. One line on the form shall be used for each such
period of operation. When an equipment is operated in more than one mode, or more
than one test activity during any day, separate lines shall be used to record the oper-
ating time in each mode or test activity. The OTL's shall originate simultaneously
with the Failure Reporting Program, Paragraph 3.8.1, and shall remain with the equip-
ment throughout the period prior to launch. Two (2) reproduced copies of the current
period OTL record shall be forwarded to GE on a bi-weekly basis.
3.8.8.1 ELAPSED TIME INDICATORS
Elapsed time indicators which indicate equipment cumulative operating time shall be
integrated with the OSE/STE units (component level) in tests. Unless specified other-
wise, the indicators shall be of a synchronous motor driven, digital readout type
providing readings in increments of no greater than one (1) hour. The serial number
of the ETI as well as the operating time for the report period shall be recorded on
the OTL. Operational Failures of an ETI will not be classified as relevant in deter-
mining equipment reliability or performance.
3.9 MANUFACTURING RELIABILITY
The Subcontractor shall assure that the inherent reliability designed into the equip-
ment during the design and development phase is not degraded during the manufac-
turing phase of the program. The following basic manufacturing reliability controls
shall be implemented by the Subcontractor.
3.9.1 MANUFACTURING PLANNING REVIEW
The Subcontractor shall maintain reliability surveillance over all manufacturing
planning sheets (i.e., special purpose documents used to specify the step-by-step op-
_-,_,,_^-_*_^-_ or _1v,,_1.... of an item thro-gh i__._fabrication cycle) to assure completeness_ and
adequacy from a Reliability product assurance viewpoint. Subcontractors will utilize
manufacturing planning sheets to document manufacturing and assembly operations
commencing with the Engineering Model Equipment.
3.9.2 MANUFACTURING PROCESS CONTROL
The Subcontractor shall monitor the in-process use of manufacturing processes used
to produce Voyager equipment to ferret out latent defect causes (i, e. ,undetected flaws
"built-in" during fabrication). Non-destructive testing of in-process items shall be
carried out to measure whether or not given characteristics or parameters are within
specified tolerance limits prior to the next operation. Detected or suspect latent de-
fect modes (weak links) shall be properly documented and remain as "open items"
until satisfactory corrective action has been implemented.
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3.9.3 MANUFACTURINGREWORKREVIEW
The Subcontractor shall control the incorporation of design changes,failed item re-
pair or replacement, and rework of function affecting "workmanship type defects"
into fabricated T/A, PTM and Flight hardware. The rework shall not be accomplished
without prior reliability technical review to determine the feasibility of the process
usedto incorporate the engineering changeor rework without endangeringthe de-
signed or previously built-in reliability.
3.9.4 CLEANLINESS
The Subcontractor shall establish and maintain the level of contamination control
specified in the equipment specification for the manufacture, assembly andtest of
Voyager equipment. The Subcontractor shall monitor the various facilities to assure
conformance to the established standard.
3.9.5 MATERIAL HANDLING AND STORAGE
The Subcontractor shall monitor the material handling and storage activities for con-
trol of possible weak-links in the system which may lead to traceability, serialization
to the piece part level, or equipment reliability problems. Special consideration
shall be given to packing and shipping of items critical to the long life reliability of
the System.
3.9.6 MANUFACTURINGASSURANCEMEASUREMENT
The Subcontractor shall utilize a systematic procedure to measure the effectiveness
of the manufacturing reliability controls as specified herein. These controls shall
be reviewed andapproved by GE prior to incorporation. Out of control conditions will
be recorded andreported for proper "weak-link" corrective action and follow-up.
3.10 WEAK-LINKS AND CORRECTIVEACTIONS
The Subcontractor shall maintain a list of detected or suspectedweak-links or problem
areas, of significant effect on the reliability characteristics of the equipment, and the
recommendedcorrective action to be implemented for specific items. The list shall
include the following information:
a. Definition of "weak-links" for problem areas,
b. Description of corrective action to be taken,
c. Responsibility for the corrective action (engineering design, components
engineering, quality control, etc.)
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d. Expected completion dates, and
e. Estimated quantitative effects of each corrective action on the inherent
reliability of the involved equipment.
Weak-links shall be entered on the list as a result of reliability prediction analysis,
design reviews, failure data analysis, test results, etc. Items included on the list
shall remain as "open" problems until the basis for "closing" each problem is ade-
quately defined to GE.
The "weak-links" list shall be reported in the quarterly Reliability Progress Report.
3.11 RE LIABILITY TRAINING AND AWARENESS
The Subcontractor shall maintain a Reliability Training and Awareness Program for
all levels of personnel involved with the administration, design and development,
fabrication, test and handling of Voyager equipment. GE shall monitor the Subcon-
tractor's reliability training and awareness activities. As required, the Subcontractor
may propose that training and awareness courses for key personnel use GE training
material and be taught by GE personnel. Course of instruction provided to fabrication
and test personnel shall be directed toward achieving a single standard of workman-
ship on all Subcontractor procured Voyager equipment.
3.12 CONTROL OF SECOND AND LOWER TIER PROCUREMENT SOURCES
The Subcontractor shall invoke applicable portions of this specification upon second
and lower tier procurement sources. GE shall closely monitor all Subcontractor
procurement activities and, as required, will assist the Subcontractor in enforcing
these requirements.
4.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE PROVISIONS
The Subcontractor is responsible for an acceptable level of performance in the estab-
lishment and implementation of a reliability program complying with the Voyager
Program Reliability Requirements as specified herein.
5.0 PREPARATION OF DELIVERY
The Subcontractor shall supply to GE all deliverable documents, reports, data, etc.,
as required herein in accordance '*' _'-- _..... * _ ..... _+,, req,,_-,_m_nf._ n._ ._neei-WILII b[lt:_ IUI ll_tb tllU _taLJ VLV$ ................ • .
fled in the Subcontractors Statement of Work or Delivery Items Lists.
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6.0 NOTES
6.1 INTENDEDUSE
The Reliability Program Requirements specified herein are intended as those basic
program elements necessary to assure meeting the Voyager SystemReliability
Requirements.
6.2 SOURCEOF DOCUMENTS
The Subcontractor may procure copies of the documentsreferenced herein from:
General Electric
SpacecraftDepartment
P. O. Box 8661
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
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Ci_-V_luuVP
Paze 5 of 14, 2.4.3 Spacecraft Systems Engineerin$. Delete second paragraph
and insert the following:
A key responsibility of Systems Engineering is to establish allocation of
risks across the total Spacecraft system. Systems Engineering will review
and approve the system reliability objectives and subsequent apportionments
to subsystem and subassembly levels as determined by Reliability Assurance
in conjunction with Design Engineering. (See paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of
VBI!0VP010.)
CII-V3110VP00i
iI PaRe 19/20 of 42, Figure 5-1. Caption now reads "Pert System." Change to
read "Project 3u_r_na_y Network."
2. Pa_e 41/z_2 of 7:2_ 7'f:_,::'_-e6 17, Cantion. Change 1961 to read 1969.
! _-= 26 of ¢o , 4 ...........
..... c....C i, :_econ__ P_,_a,z_,._h_ Line 4. Delete word "torsional."
. Pa_:e 39 _f _ and Pa_e 40 of 88. Delete material starting with e.2 on
page 39 or _o through par=_ap_ ,-. on page 40 of 88 and substitute the
followin_:
_. Electrical Tests
Electrical compatibility will be established by:
(a) Providing a spacecraft simulator for tests of the ESF
wiring prior to tests with a spacecraft.
(b) Tests with the '69 Back-up Spacecraft or the PTM. .
(c) Tests with each flight spacecraft during the preliminary
"dry run" through the ESF.
f. Spacecraft to SCF Tests
I. Mechanical Tests
The mechanical compatibility between the spacecraft and the SCF
relates to clearances, handling procedures, etc. This compatibility
will be established by:
Tests with the '69 Back-up Spacecraft or the PTM prior
to the arrival of the flight spacecraft.
Tests with the flight spacecraft.
9
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2. Electrical Tests
The electrical compatibility of the SCF with the spacecraft
is through the System Test Complex except as related to EMI.
This compatibility will be established during the tests of the '69
Back-up S/C and PTM at KSC which will require the use of an STC
in the Spacecraft Clneck-out Fac_llty (SCF)_ A _pacec_f_
simulator will be used during these tests.
3. Magnetic Tests
Prior to the arrival of the spacecraft, it must be verified that
the gradients and stability of the SCF are suitable for magnetic
mapping of the spacecraft.
Cii-VBIIOVP003
lo Pa_e 21 of 62. Delete the word "model" and substitute the word "modal" in
the following places:
.
a.
b_
C.
Firs a paragraph, Line 7 and Line 13.
Secc_6-_: _-_graph, Line i.
...._ paragraph, Line i and Line 7.
Page 22 of 62, Paragraph d._ Line 5. Delete word "model" and substitute word
'_moda!" in two places.
C!I-VAIIOVP004
i. _ ^_ .... pages 13 and 14... _er_._ll_
C !!-VB !10VP¢07
Page 19 of 78_ Table 3-2.
a. Opposite Pen and Oscil. Channels under Joburg and subsequent stations,
add "44 than".
b. Opposite Antenna Gains under Venus, reverse "30 ft" and "85 ft."
e Page 32 of 78_ Figure 3-6. Add Capsule omni antenna and link to S_band
receiving antenna.
1
4.
5.
Page 34 of 78_ Table 3-4. Delete lines 6 and 7.
Page 44 of 78_ Paragraph d._ Line 7. Delete "VHF" and substitute "RF".
Page 55/56 of 78_ Figure 3-11. Under Orbit Parameters change Perigee Height
from 300 Km to 3000 Km and change Penod to Period.
1
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.
.
Pa¢_e 60 of 7___88_Paragraph (2), Last Line. Delete words "refer to paragraph
(b)" and substitute the first two complete sentences from top of page.
Paze 64 of 78, Fisure 3-14. Add an output from the Probe to the Transmitter.
Ci!-VBIIOVP008
I. _e 9 of 16 Remove present Table 3-1 and insert attached Table 3-1.
CII-VB!IOVP010
.
2.
page 7 of 98, Figure 2-I_ Item 2. Change "Arab" to "Crab".
Page 15 of 98, Figure 2-4. In lower left hand block change "DFB" to Y',DRB".
. Pages 21/22 and 19/20 of 98, Figure 2-5. Sheet I of 2 should be 2 of 2, and
vice versa.
0 Pa_e 24 of 98, Pa____zrasra_h3.3.1. Phase 3. Change: "Martial" to "Martian"
and "Ex_eriaments '_ to"Experiments".
,
.
7.
.
Page 29 of 98, Table 3-I_ Lower Half. Insert decimal point to left of first
digit of each number. _
Page 35 of 98_ Parasraph 3.5.1.i_ Last Line. Delete word "are" and insert "as".
Page 37 of.98, Paragraph 3,5;_.3, Line 6. Delete " - - " and place parenthes_s
around "E_inee_if_odel fabrication and testing".
Pa_e 43 of 98_ .paragraph 3.5.8.1, Line 6. Change OC to QC.
. Pase4__3 of 98, Paragraph 3.5.8.2_ Second Sentence. Delete material up to first
parenthesis and insert the following:
These sheets reference the engineering drawings, parts lists and revisions to
which they apply and identify.
_ ....... _ _ 112d Line I. Delete the words "but short enough".i0. _age 57 of 98_ .... _r .......
Ii. Page 57 of 98_ Parasraph 3.11.2_ Last Paragraph _ Line 4. Change "3.11.3" to
"3.11.4".
12. Page 61 of 98 t Parasraph 3.11.5_ Line I. Change "for" to "and".
13. Page 71 of 98_ Paragraph 3.12.2_ Next to Last Line
b.
De!ete:"and are included in the Volume A technical discussions".
Add:"Do_-mancy aspects of life capability will be ........= by t_oe= =e
part, material and processed module level in each instance in which the
S.M.E. po;'tion of other planned tests or prior information is _nadequate
to provide a history of reliability".
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BOOK 4A
14. Pa_e 71 9f+98,+ Paragraph 3.13.2 , Line 5. Add closing parenthesis at end
of line five. Change "our" to the "the" in Line six.
15. .Page 73 of 98_ Figure 3-16. Delete this illustration and reference
Figure 5-2 of CII-VBIIOVP008.
Page 75 of 98_ Figure 3-17. Change "TIN-E" to "TI_E" at bottom of the chart.
Paf_e 81 of 9S_ Paragraph 4.2.4, Second paragraph_ Line I. Change"Quality
Contro___ _ to "Quality Assurance"
18. Pa_e S6 of _
_o, Paragraph 4.4.2_ Last Paragraph_ Line 3. Change "Assembly"
go _o_._ Sto¢k".
Ci!-VBIIOVPC@5
---- -°I. ........P_' = ]_ of 64_ F_g. 4-2.
_EProEected'_.
Top of first column. ChAnge "Protective" to
+ Page 23/24 of 64_ Figure 5-1.
a. 6 ange caption to read "1971 S/C Assembly and Test Flow."
b. Over circle labelled "VIBRATION" add "3. Launch Sequence."
o Page 25/26 of__!_j___Figure 5-2. Change caption to read "I_69/71 S/C Assemblx
and Test Comparison".
.
5.
Page 98 c f _] _--_ .... a. 5.7.2.3d. Change "Bankwidth" to "Bandwidth".
Page 37 of 6L: Para. 5.7.8 Line 5. Delete word "deter,nined":_nd Inse=t
word ;+<easured" in its place.
+
_! 57 of 64+ Para. i0.2. Line 4.
_+Jords "a JPL representativ_______e."
Insert after the words "will be", the
C117- 3100\rP
_]. insert attached Figure 2-2 _^+u_._ pages 9/10 of 14 and Ii of 14.
-_. Pege 8 of 14, Paragraph 2.6, Line 1. Change "Figure 2-1" to "Figure 2-2."
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VOLUME A (Continued)
BOOK 4A
Ci i-VB 110VP003
_ 3/4 of 6__P_aragraph 1.4 Insert the following:
m_i. pA_.R_METER CON ,-ROL
Mass properties and energy management represent major activities during the
design, development and production of the spacecraft system. The objective
is to deliver a spacecraft that meets all system target parameters of weight,
center of gravity, moments and products of inertia; power profile; and
th_rmal balance. Parameter Control steps were initiated during the Phase IA
study; these will be expanded during Phase IB to provide the require d constraint
on the system definition effort. A major objective will be to obtain JPL
approval of all parameter target values.
M_ASS PROPERTIES CONTROL
Control of mass properties consists of two basic activities - allocation and
prediction, and measurement and control - and depends largely on an effective
weight apportioe_nent and control program.
i. Allocation anl Prediction
ao Initial system and subsystem element weigkts have been determined from
an analysis of system constraints, functional requirements, preliminary
___._, _.._ experience from previous programs_ and are listed in Table
4-! of Volume A (Book I-VB220FDI03).
b. DuringPhase IB, weight growth factors will be assigned to all system
elements. Growth factors will be based on historical data and such
considerations as state of the art, stage of development,lcomplex£ty,
fixed weight elements, etc. In addition, growth rates willlbe estab-
lished for the various program phases: design, manufacture, and test.
Co Based on the initial weights and growth factors, the anticipated mass
properties history of the spacecraft and all elements will be deter-
mined (predicted launch weight).
d, The allocation of target weights will then be established from the
iterativ_ process of comparing the predicted launch weight _ummation
of initial weights plus growth factors for all elements) against the
required launch weight, and adjusting individual weight values until
the spacecraft system target plus desired growth margin meets the
Mission Specification value. General Electric will apply a 10-15%
growth margin, subject to JPL approval, based on its own and other
space program experience.
et The target weight (required launch weight minus growth margin) will be
t_ne requirement placed on the designer, and the value against which
current progress will be measured. Continuous p_u_.---_=^_ o__ ...._p_cecraft
_eight at launch will be made by applying the growth factors to current
weight values. Existing prediction techniques will be augmented, where
applicable, by those developed on theApollo Program by the Apollo
Support Department of GE-MSD.
15
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2. Measurement and Control
Control will be achieved through four key actions:
a, The Project Manager will establish Parameter Control as a primary Project
requirement and maintain throughout the organization an emphasis on
individual attention to meeting targets.
b. The mass properties control and analysis engineers will participate
directly in the detailed design and development activity to factor
evolving design concepts and details into the properties measurements.
By keeping the weight assessment current with the design definition,
trouble areas will be detected and highlighted early for corrective
action. The project engineer will initiate appropriate action through
the concerned design engineers.
C. The current measurement and prediction against target for all system
elements will be displayed in the Project Control Center and reviewed
by the Project Manager and his staff in the weekly Project Review
me_ting. Action items considered necessa=_, beyond those already ini-
tiated, will be assigned to the project engineer responsible for the sub-
system. Action items are followed up as part of the project control
activity, as well as in the Project Review meetings, until a satisfac-
tc=-y conclusion is established.
Wide distribution to concerned Project personnel and to JPL of parameter
status reports. These reports showing status against target, trend,
and predicted launch value, will be issued bi-weekly.
P_,;er profile and Thermal balance control will be similar in approach to mass
properties control; determination and detailed apportionment of requirements
and target= _ith adequate......igrowth allowance; predicted growth trend for each
system eiamant or user; early and continuous assessment of detailed significant
cha,acteristic values such as :mission point occurrence, durati6nll a_eve_ _of_i
peak power, the=.-mai dissipation, etc. ; and weekly managem_tlreviewi!_!!<_:_s£_ii_:_x_ipo
of s_atus, are thekey elements. Measurement of actual power requirements will:!_
be compared against the Energy Balance Table <_=_t__o_le___5-1_ VB236FDI01) to _:ii
determine status against the target in terms of current power capability.
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